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I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself
alone from the result of my own research and any work that




In Artifacts, Revolutionaries and Bureaucrats, I have
combined oral accounts with primary and secondary
documentation, to reconstruct a sociotechnical history of
the National Aeronautic and Space Administration's (NASA's)
space shuttle, from 1968 to 1985. Encompassed within the
thesis is an exploration of the design, development,
fabrication and operation of technology. Drawing from
literature in the social studies of science and technology,
the thesis aims to map the relations between the social and
the technological and survey the underlying dynamics of
technological change. A principal objective of this thesis
is to show that the creation of technology is as much a
social activity as a technical one: that social matters
were as a significant influence on the content of the
shuttle as technological or scientific matters. The thesis
does not, however, neglect the role of the material world
and also provides an analysis of the technical shaping of
technology. Nevertheless, the aim of a historical sociology
of technology is to reveal the error in assuming that
technology is entirely under the control of rational
decision making; that the process of technological change
takes place along a well defined, sequential path; and that
technological progress is inherently predictable. The
practitioners of technology may strive to create order,
system and control, but the history of technology is
usually complex and contradictory.
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. . . history ought first of all to tell what
happened and how. That, however, is little
enough. From the very telling it ought to become
clear why it happened thus and not otherwise.1
During antiquity, the retelling of an event held great
prominence in historiography. The meaning, or "lesson"2 of
each event was illuminated through the occurrence, or the
deed itself. Causality and context were not independent of
an event, but revealed through it. Meaning in modern
historiography, by contrast, is derived through causality;
through an exposure of the underlying processes of history.
Events are mere fragments of a story rather than the story
itself.3 Nevertheless, some events manage to retain their
authority, impacting with such ferocity that they dominate
the subject of study and bestow a meaning on its history.
The explosion of the National Aeronautic and Space
Administrations's (NASA's) space shuttle Challenger, on
January 28, 1986, can be regarded as such an event. Since
1986, research into NASA's shuttle has primarily focused on
Leon Trotsky, 'The History of the Russian Revolution,' E.W. Dupree (ed) The Russian
Revolution (New York, Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1959), p viiii.
Throughout this text double quotation marks are used to indicate a contentious word or
phrase, whereas single quotation marks denote a direct quote.
Hannah Arendt, 'The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern,' Between Past and Future: Eight
Exercises in Political Thought (Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, 1993); Philip Abrams,
Historical Sociology (Somerset, England, Open Books Publishing Ltd, 1982) .
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the failure of Challenger, examining both its causes and
consequences.4 In turn, many of these studies have created
a starting point, a structure and a boundary within which
the shuttle programme has been interpreted.
Notwithstanding the importance of Challenger, the
event, nor the causes or consequences, are topics of this
inquiry. Nor is it assumed that the shuttle's history was
a straight line towards Challenger. Instead, the basic
purpose of this thesis is to explore the creation of a
large socio-technical assemblage: to chart the dynamics of
that assemblage as it unfolds forward in time and to reveal
the forces and dynamics that gave both the technology, and
the social ensemble that formed around it, composition,
function and utility. The central aim is to uncover the
dynamics of and the relationships between, social and
technological change. How do the social and the
technological interact and what influence does each have on
the other over time?
For the definitive work on the Challenger accident see, Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch
Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, The University of Chicago
Press, 1996). Other academic examples include: John Logsdon, 'The Decision to Develop the
Space Shuttle' Space Policy 2, (May, 1986), pp 103-119; John Logsdon, 'The Space Shuttle
Program: A Policy Failure? Science (May 30, 1986), pp 1099-1105; Barbara Romzek, Melvin
Dubnick, 'Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy,' Public
Administration Review (May/June, 1987), pp 227-238; Jon Miller, 'The Challenger Accident and
Public Opinion,' Space Policy (May, 1987), pp 122-140; Hans Mark, Larry Carver, 'Challenger
and Chernobyl: Lessons and Reflections,' Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 12, (1987), pp
241-252; William Starbuck, Frances Milliken, 'Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds Until
Something Breaks,' Journal of Management Studies 25, (July 1988), pp 319-340; Thomas
Johnston, 'The Natural History of the Space Shuttle,' Technology in Society 10, (1988), pp
417-424; Randy Hirokawa, Dennis Gouran, Amy Martz, 'Understanding the Sources of Faulty
Groups Decision Making: A Lesson from the Challenger Disaster,' Small Groups Behaviour 19,
(November, 1988), pp 411-433; Alan Jarman, 'Context and Contingency in Public Sector Disaster
Management: A Paths Model of the US Space Transportation System Failure, 1968-1988, ' Journal
of Contingencies and Crisis Management 2, (December, 1994), pp 191-204; Diane Vaughan,
'Autonomy, Interdependence, and Social Control: NASA and the Space Shuttle Challenger,'
Administrative Science Quarterly 2, (June, 1990), pp 225-257; Claus Jensen, Contest For the
Heavens: The Road to the Challenger Disaster Trans, Barbara Haveland, (London, Harvill Press,
1996) . And two journalistic books on the subject are: Joseph Trento, Prescription for
Disaster: From the Glory of Apollo to the Betrayal of the Shuttle (New York, Crown Publishers
Inc, 1987); Malcolm McConnell, Challenger: A Major Malfunction (New York, Doubleday & Co,
Inc., 1987) .
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The purpose of this chapter is to lay down some of the
foundations upon which this thesis rests before the reader
journeys through the labyrinth of events. An introduction
to space, the shuttle and NASA is thus presented to inform
the reader of the programmes current position and provide
some background details. The main theoretical issues are
then outlined so that the framework through which the data
has been interpreted is made clear. A section on methods
and sources follows; and, finally, the structure of the
thesis is describe.
Space, the Shuttle and NASA.
Space has been a prominent issue on the United States (US)
political agenda ever since the Soviet Union launched
Sputnik I on October 4, 1957. From exploration to
exploitation, the past forty years has seen an extensive
build up of technological capabilities in space, especially
in near earth orbit.5 A whole host of artificial satellites
are now in orbit; each carrying out their various functions
while falling in ever decreasing circles towards the Earth.
Their impact on methods of communication, information
transferral, navigation, weather prediction, and both
military and civilian surveillance, has been monumental.
Space technology has also provided new forms of data and
This build up has not just been the result of US activity. Many of the worlds most powerful
nations have contributed to the construction of a sizable space infrastructure. Since 1957
there have been 3 687 launches in the world, of which 1033 came from the US. NASA, NASA Pocket
Statistics (Washington DC, NASA History Office, 1995), p B2.
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improved methods for its collection for many scientific
disciplines ranging from cosmology and astronomy to
geography and biology. But without the means to access
space, the utilization of this environment would be
impossible. Thus, one of the most important elements in the
space infrastructure, is the launch vehicle.
Conventionally, the method of escaping the Earths
gravitational pull has been, and still is, the rocket: a
ballistic or guided missile, that is entirely expendable;
only the payload (cargo or spacecraft) being transported
survives the journey. On January 5, 1972, President Richard
Nixon announced that the US would invest in a multi-billion
dollar enterprise to develop 'an entirely new type of space
transportation system'.6 Proclaimed as the "next logical
step" from the Apollo Moon landing programme, the space
shuttle was touted as a utilitarian space vehicle that
would 'transform the space frontier and revolutionize'
transportation to near Earth orbit.7 The concept was to
combine both aircraft and rocket technology to fabricate a
reusable space transportation system, which would foster a
new age of routine, safe, and economical space travel.8
President Richard Nixon, Statement by the President, Press Release from the Office of the





The rhetoric surrounding the shuttle and its links to the opening up of a new space age can
be found in a whole variety of publications and official documents. For some examples see:
Wernher Von Braun, 'The Reusable Space Transport' American Scientist (November\December
1972), pp 730-738; Michael Collins, 'Orbiter is First Spacecraft Designed for Shuttle Runs,'
Smithsonian (May, 1977), pp 39-47; John Yardley, 'To the First Launch,' Astronautics &
Aeronautics (February, 1979), pp 28-34, 72; Jerry Grey, 'Implications of the Shuttle: Our
Business in Space,' Technology Review (October, 1981), pp 34-46.
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Yet, the shuttle's revolutionary impact has not been
as widespread, nor as sweeping as the space industry's
leading prophets foretold. It has not led to hotels in
space, factories in orbit, bases on the Moon, nor any grand
ships touring humans across the solar system.9 Indeed, most
of the satellites that are in orbit today were put there by
conventional means, namely, the expendable rocket;10 and
NASA's control over the commercial space market has
plummeted from a 100 per cent share in 1972, to 30 per cent
in 1992.11
Beset with problems from its very conception, NASA's
shuttle programme has endured many setbacks; the most
prominent of which was the destruction of Challenger.
Demands that the shuttle programme should be phased out, or
replaced by the end of the century have come from some of
the highest echelons of the US political system;12 and the
promise of a routine and economical means to access the
Earth's orbit, remains a distant aspiration. Nevertheless,
Such distant aspirations have long been part of the populist rhetoric on space and still
serve to reinforce the direction of new space technology today. For examples see, Werhner Von
Braun, 'Science Looks at Life in 2057 A.D. , ' New York Times Magazine (December 8, 1957);
Leonard David, 'To Boldly Go for Profit, ' Scotland on Sunday (March 30, 1997) .
Michael Skapinker, 'Upward Thrust is Restored,' Financial Times (November 13, 1997); Michael
Skapinker, Ralph Atkins, 'Countdown to Success,' Financial Times (March 20, 1995); US
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Lower Tiers of the Space Transportation
Industrial Base (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, OTA-BP-ISS-161, August 1995);
The.National Research Council, From Earth to Orbit (Washington DC, National Academy Press,
1992) .
In 1992 the European Space Agency, with its Ariane rockets, controlled 60 per cent of the
commercial space market. See, G. Sojka, J. Mansfield, T. Dawson, Space Launch Oversight Trip:
23 August - 3 September, 1993 (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Archive,
Washington DC).
Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the US Space Program (Washington DC, US
Government Printing Office, 1990).
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over 25 years and $79 billion (1992 dollars) later,13 the
shuttle prevails as an operational vehicle and still finds
justification through its links with the international
space station.14
The past 25 years has also witnessed the decline of
NASA. The dominant perception of the US space programme is
that it is faltering. NASA, it has been argued, has ended
up as an organization without direction; a fossilized,
overcautious, and bureaucratic agency, that has lost its
capacity for innovation and is no longer equipped to manage
large complex technologies, nor able to argue credibly for
a space policy on Capitol Hill.15
A Historical Sociology Of Technology.
Technology has often been treated as an autonomous thing.
Derived only from its own "internal logic", or from the
application of scientific knowledge. Within such a
framework, technology only has "impacts", not contexts. It
impinges on society from the "outside", shaping and
Figure taken from R. Pielke, 'Space Shuttle Value Open to Interpretation,' Aviation Week and
Space Technology (July 26, 1993), pp 57-58.
NASA, NASA Strategic Plan (Washington DC, NASA, February 1995); AIAA Public Policy Committee,
America's Space Launch Capabilities, February 1994 (American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics Archive, Washington DC) ; Kathy Sawyer, 'NASA Looks for Contractor to Move
Shuttle Toward Privatization, ' The Washington Post (June 7, 1995) .
Albert Wheelon, 'A "Born Again" Space Program,' International Security 11, (Spring 1987), pp
142-150; Richard DalBello, 'Space Transportation and the Future of the US Space Program,'
Radford Byerly, (ed) Space Policy Reconsidered (San Francisco, Westview Press, 1989);
Riccardo Giacconi, 'Science and Technology Policy: Space Science Strategies for the 1990's,'
Radford Byerly, (ed) Space Policy Reconsidered (San Francisco, Westview Press, 1989) ; Arthur
Levine, 'The Future of the US Space Program: A Public Critique,' Public Administration Review
52, (March/April, 1992), pp 183-186; Howard McCurdy, 'NASA's Organizational Culture,' Public
Administration Review 52, (March/April, 1992), pp 189-192; Henry Lambright, 'The Augustine
Report, NASA, and the Leadership Problem,' Public Administration Review 52, (March/April,
1992), pp 192-195; David Callahan, 'Forks in Space, ' Technology Review 96, (August/September,
1993), pp 60-67; Howard McCurdy, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in
the US Space Program (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1993).
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reshaping social order and social relations in its wake.16
Society can do nothing, but learn how to adapt to the ever-
changing, increasingly complex environment produced by
technology.17 Or, at worse, society is unable to keep pace
with technological change and thus is consumed by it
pervasive, rationally orientated nature.18 In this
framework technology is endowed with teleological
tendencies; a rigid sequence of stages through which
technological change must move in order to achieve some
final state. This process is often equated with
evolutionary progress, in the sense that the path of
development will inevitably lead toward some "higher order
of life". Such a perspective has led some to suggest, that
once a technological design becomes established,
incremental innovation will tend to follow a "natural
trajectory".19 And it has led others to conclude that once
large technological systems get established their
associated momentum becomes virtually unstoppable.20
Wilbert Moore, (ed) Technology and Social Change (Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1972); Robert
Heilbroner, 'Do Machines Make History?' Technology and Culture (July, 1967), pp 335-345.
William F. Ogburn, On Culture and Social Change: Selected Papers 0. Duncan, (ed) (Chicago,
The University of Chicago Press, 1964).
Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society J Wilkinson, (trans) (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1964) ;
Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society
(London, Routledge Sc Kegan Paul Ltd, 1964).
Richard Nelson, Sydney Winter, 'In Search of a Useful Theory of Innovation,' Research Policy
6, (1977), pp 36-76; Giovanni Dosi, 'Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories:
A Suggested Interpretation of the Determinants of Technical Change,' Research Policy 11,
(1982), pp 147-162; Giovanni Dosi, Christopher Freeman, Richard Nelson, Gerald Silverberg,
Luc Soete, (ed) Technical Change and Economic Theory (London, Pinter Publishers, 1988).
David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (London, Francis Pinter Publishers Ltd,
1980); David Collingridge, The Management of Scale: Big Organizations, Big Decisions, Big
Mistakes (London, Routledge, 1992).
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However, the aim of a historical sociology of
technology is to understand technology as a historical
product and a social creation.21 To reveal the error in
assuming that technology is entirely under the control of
rational decision making; that the process of technological
change takes place along a well defined, sequential path;
and that technological progress is inherently predictable.
The practitioners of technology may strive to create order,
system and control, but the history of technology is
usually complex and contradictory.22 Accordingly, this
thesis follows other authors in the sociology of technology
who have widened the boundaries of inquiry and treated
scientific knowledge, technological artifacts and
technological systems, as sociohistorical products.23
Drawing from this wide field, the analysis aims to
illustrate technology's diverse and unpredictable nature.
Hence, this reconstruction of the shuttle's history
follows a broad "social constructivist" approach, and also
draws heavily on systems and actor-network theories. The
Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1993).
Thomas Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm 1870-
1970 (New York, Viking Penguin, 1989).
Writings in the social shaping of science and technology are numerous and varied. For
background texts see, Barry Barnes, David Edge, (ed) Science in Context: Readings in the
Sociology of Science (Milton Keynes, The Open University Press, 1982); Donald MacKenzie, Judy
Wajcman, (ed) The Social Shaping of Technology: How the Refrigerator Got its Hum (Milton
Keynes, Open University Press, 1985); Michel Callon, John Law, Arie. Rip, (ed) Mapping the
Dynamics of Science and Technology: Sociology of Science in the Real World (London,
MacMillian Press, 1986) ; Brian Elliott, (ed) Technology and Social Process (Edinburgh,
Edinburgh University Press, 1988); Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, (ed) The Social Construction
of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1990); John Law, (ed) A Sociology of Monsters: Essays
on Power, Technology and Domination (London, Routledge, 1991); Wiebe Bijker, John Law, (ed)
Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Soclotechnical Change (Cambridge
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1992); Robert Fox, (ed) Technological Change: Methods and Themes
in the History of Technology (Netherlands, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996).
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common thread that ties these approaches together is a
recognition that technologies are not created, nor
employed, in isolation of political, economic, cultural and
ideological interests; all play an active role in shaping
the design and utility of technology. At their core,
science and technology are social activities, created out
of the interactions and negotiations between a large number
of diverse actors and things. Thus, questions about design,
development, fabrication and operation have to be framed to
include both technical and societal matters. A historical
sociology of technology has to open the "black box" of
technology and expose its "inner workings".
The first methodological step in opening the black box
is to locate and follow the "relevant actors".24
Conventional wisdom has portrayed the inventor as the
dominant actor in the story of technology. Locating the
inventor or any "moment of invention", for a technology on
the size and scale of the shuttle is, nonetheless, hindered
by the very character of the machine. Forged from a myriad
of different artifacts, all of which have their own micro-
histories, the lineage of the shuttle can be traced back to
several different people and various moments in time. NASA,
of course, is the principal protagonist. It is the
organization that set about to transform a two dimensional
24
Trevor Pinch, 'The Social Construction of Technology; A Review,' Robert Fox, (ed)
Technological Change pp 17-35; Wiebe Bijker, 'The Social Construction of Florescent Lighting,
or How an Artifact was Invented in its Diffusion Stage,' Wiebe Bijker, John Law, (ed) Shaping
Technology/Building Society chapter 3; Jane Summerton, 'Heroes, Giants and Critics: On
Building Bridges Between Systems Approaches, ANT and STS,' (Paper for Actor Network and After
Workshop, Keele University, 10-11 July, 1997).
9
concept into a three dimensional object. But, NASA itself
is made up of nearly 30 000 people,25 housed in ten
separate field Centers, each with their own offices and
directorates, and a headquarters. Working in alliance (and
sometimes in opposition) to this complex organization are
also actors within government, the state, the military,
industry and academic organizations and institutions.
An appreciation of all these actors leads to the
second methodological step, an acknowledgment that most
modern technological artifacts are not self-contained
things, but parts of much larger systems.26 With
technologies like the shuttle, there are a multitude of
different actors that are linked together. So the formation
and stabilization of these linkages form an important locus
of the analysis. The shaping process cannot be understood
without reference to the linkages and the technology's
place within them. The definition and creation of an object
is also the definition and creation of its sociotechnical
context. Within such a context, the social and the
technological are both at once created and transformed,
NASA direct employment has fluctuated over the years, from a peak of 35 860 in FY 1967 to
23 097 in FY 1994. NASA, Pocket Statistics (Washington DC, NASA History Office, 1995).
Thomas Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society (Baltimore, John Hopkins
University Press, 1983).
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each affecting the other in an on-going chain of events,
unions and struggles.27
From here it is clear that the analysis must
accommodate another important principle of the actor-
network approach; namely, that the links between science,
technology and society are so opaque that any attempt at
separating them will be problematic. Society and technology
are not seen as two ontological distinct entities, but as
phases of the same essential action.28 Distinctions between
the social and the technical are argued to be problematic,
because they can lead to the disproportionate selection of
particular events for analysis. This may only exemplify
mistakes or breakthroughs. Thus, sociologists should not
concentrate their efforts on examining only the
controversial or the successful, but should also focus on
the "normal" and "everyday" activities of the
"technologists" .29
From this perspective it also becomes clear that a
sociotechnical analysis has to treat the technology itself
as an actor. In this study, this is principally the
Michel Callon, 'Techno-economic Networks and Irreversibility,' John Law, (ed) A Sociology of
Monsters; Michel Callon, 'The Sociology of an Actor-Network: The Case of the Electric
Vehicle, ' Michel Callon, John Law, A Rip, (ed) Mapping the Dynamics of Science and
Technology; Michel Callon, 'The State and Technical Innovation: A Case Study of the Electric
Vehicle in France,' Research Policy 9, (1980), pp 358-374; Bruno Latour, 'Technology is
Society Made Durable, ' John Law, (ed) A Sociology of Monsters; Bruno Latour, Science in
Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Milton Keynes, The Open
University Press, 1987).
Bruno Latour, 'Technology is society made durable', John Law, (ed) A Sociology of Monsters
p 129.
Bruno Latour, Steve Woolgar, Laboratozry Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts
(London, Sage Publications Ltd, 1979).
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shuttle, but the shuttle is itself a system, constructed
from tens of thousands of separate technologies. The focus
of the analysis then, must not just be on the whole, but
also on the parts of the shuttle. The inquiry thus follows
the creation of particular sub-systems and aims to expose
their influence on each other, on the gargantuan
technological system and the wider sociotechnical network;
all of which, in turn, dictated the shape of the sub¬
systems themselves. Uncovering the influence of testing on
the configuration of sub-systems also forms an important
part of the analysis of technological innovation. The role
of the experiment in science has been widely investigated
in the social studies of science, but there has been
inadequate attention paid to technology's equivalent, the
test. This analysis, therefore, goes beyond an exploration
of how technology is shaped through the convergence and
negotiations of different groups, to also show, through an
inquiry into testing, how the actual technical workings are
themselves embedded in social choices and negotiations.30
The formulation of predictions about the operational
environment, their influence on the construction of the
tests, and the judgements made from the tests, are,
Donald MacKenzie, 'From Kwajalein to Armageddon? Testing and the Social Construction of
Missile Accuracy,' David Gooding, Trevor Pinch, Simon Shaffer, (ed) The Use of Experiments:
Studies in the Natural Sciences (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989); Trevor Pinch,
'Testing - One, Two, Three, . . . Testing: Towards a Sociology of Testing, ' Science, Technology
and Human Values 18 (Winter, 1993), pp 25-41; Walter Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How
They Know It: Analytical Studies from Aeronautical History (Baltimore, The John Hopkins
Press, Paperback edition, 1993), especially chapter 5.
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therefore, also explored and analyzed in relation to the
shaping of sociotechnical assemblage.
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar have argued that the
distinction between description and explanation is false:
that if an analysis describes all that occurs then
explanation will be self evident.31 Although I would not
venture this far, description is important to this
historiography and the presentation of detail comprise a
large part of the inquiry. Events are dissected to reveal
their internal activities and agents. Milieus are surveyed
to expose the mobilization strategies of their occupants,
and various journeys are mapped to understand their impact
on events. Detailed description is also applied to the
technology and in parts this can be very dense. I make no
apology for this. I believe that the history of a
technology is empty without a study of the technological
detail itself. Any research into technology has to make a
commitment to understanding the technical issues. The role
of the material world is a significant part of
technological development and understanding how it shapes
the composition, function and utility of technology, is
fundamental. Relations between technologies, the physical
environments within which they have to function, and the
knowledge upon which they are based are important matters
that need to be unpacked. A glossary has been provided and
Bruno Latour, Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life; Bruno Latour, 'Technology is Society Made
Durable,' John Law, (ed) A Sociology of Monsters.
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can be found in Appendix 1, if the reader feels in need of
it.
However, opening the "black box" of technology is not
an easy task. With a technology as complex as the shuttle,
some black boxes must remain shut. Thus, in the narrative
that follows, some decisions remain unexplained and there
are many left unexplored.
It is not part of the analysis to make judgements
about knowledge claims or competing technologies. The
"good" or "bad", or the "right" or "wrong" way of doing
things, is left to the statements made by the social actors
involved in the programme. The narrative, therefore,
employs what David Bloor has termed symmetry, what Donald
Mackenzie had called sociological relativism, or what the
sociology of technology now terms interpretative
flexibility.32 That is, a historical sociology of
technology should treat "correct", "false" or alternative,
claims, judgements and technologies, equally.33 In any
case, I do not have a background in rocket science,
David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976); Donald
MacKenzie, 'Notes on the Science and Social Relations Debate,' Capital & Class 14 (Summer,
1981), pp 47-60; Wiebe Bijker, 'Do Not Despair: There is Life After Constructivism,' Science,
Technology and Human Values (Winter 1993) pp 113-118; John Law, Michel Callon, 'The Life and
Death of an Aircraft: A Network Analysis of Technical Change,' Wiede Bijker, John Law, (ed)
Shaping Technology/Building Society pp 21-52; Wiebe Bijker, 'The Social Construction of
Fluorescent Lighting, or How an Artifact was Invented in its Diffusion Stage,' Wiede Bijker,
John Law, (ed) Shaping Technology/Building Society pp 74-102; Ronald Kline, Trevor Pinch,
'Users as Agents of Technological Change: The Social Construction of the Automobile in the
United States,' Technology and Culture (October 1996), pp 763-795; Kann Garrety, 'Social
Worlds, Actor-Networks and Controversy: The Case of Cholesterol, Dietary Fat and Heart
Disease,' Social Studies of Science (October 1997), pp 727-73.
For a criticisms of this approach see, H. M. Collins, Steven Yearley, 'Epistemological
Chicken,' Andrew Pickering (ed) Science as Practice and Culture (London, University of
Chicago Press, 1992); Langdon Winner, 'Social Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and
Finding it Empty,' Science as Culture 3 (1993), pp 427-451.
14
aeronautical engineering, nor any of the other numerous
technical disciplines that converged to create the shuttle.
The emphasis of the systems and actor-network
approaches on construction and agency has led to the
criticism that it ignores or underplays the constraints
placed on agents in their efforts to act.34 The approach
claims that there is no "inside" or "outside". That none of
the heterogenous elements can be placed in a hierarchy, or
can be distinguished according to their nature; each, so
the argument goes, are as important as each other. In the
absence of one ingredient the whole would breakdown. The
existence of technology is bound up with the construction
of the actor-world. Actors and structures are both
"products", which are seen as created and sustained
together.35 Nevertheless, although technological systems
are created out of multiple and diverse interconnecting
parts, I do not agree with the idea that all of these parts
are equal. The autonomy of people to act is always limited
by the situations they are in.36 Within each functioning
sociotechnical system some parts are more crucial than
For examples see, Langdon Winner, Ibid; Robin Williams, Stewart Russell, Opening the Black
Box and Closing it Behind You (Edinburgh, PICT Working Paper No. 3, 1988); Stewart Russell,
'Response to Pinch and Bijker,' Social Studies of Science (May 1986), pp 331-46; Daniel Lee
Kleinman, 'Untangling Context: Understanding a University Laboratory in the Commercial
World,' Science, Technology, and Human Values (Summer, 1998), pp 285-314.
Michel Callon, 'Techno-economic networks and irreversibility', John Law J, (ed) A Sociology
of Monsters p 137; Michel Callon, 'The Sociology of an Actor-Network: The Case of the
Electric Vehicle,' Michel Callon, John Law, Arie. Rip, (ed) Mapping the Dynamics of Science
and Technology; Wiede Bijker, John Law, (ed) Shaping Technology/Building Society
introduction; John Law, (ed) A Sociology of Monsters introduction.
V.I Allen, Social Analysis: A Marxist Critique and Alternative (Shipley, The Moor Press,
1975) .
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others. Some sections will be interdependent, while others
will just be dependent. Hierarchical structures are a
"normal" part of large human-machine networks. The
centralization of control, although not always successful,
is a pervasive aspect of the sociotechnical management of
technological construction and operation.37
In addition, wider structural and historical
conditions also determine the fate of technological
systems. These conditions cannot just be seen as backdrops,
or contexts. They play a vital role in shaping the
possibilities and can even effect the content of the
technology itself. Thus, the milieus of technological
protagonists are located and analyzed in the structural and
historical conditions within which they reside. Established
relations and fixed boundaries existed simultaneously with
emerging ones and their influence on the range of
potentialities must also be explored. Detailed interaction
is, therefore, blended with wider circumstances through an
analysis of structural conditions, social action, and
technological matters.
37
Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political
Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1985), pp 181-185.
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Sources and Methods.
A combination of oral accounts, primary and secondary
documentation, was used to reconstruct a sociotechnical
history of NASA's space shuttle. The majority of the data
was collected from March to September 1995 on a field trip
to the United States.
The documentary data:
Overall, 7 archives were accessed for the collection of
documentary data: the NASA History Office, Washington DC;
the Kennedy Space Center, Florida; the Marshall Space
Flight Center, Alabama; the National Air and Space Museum,
Washington DC; the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Washington DC; the General Accounting Office,
Washington DC; the National Academy of Science and
Engineering, Washington DC. And 3 libraries at: the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, Maryland; the Space Policy Institute, George
Washington University, Washington DC; and the University of
Edinburgh, Edinburgh.
The History Office houses a sizable and diverse
collection of sources that span a considerable number of
years and cover a wide range of NASA's activities. The most
significant collections to this study included: the Space
Shuttle Historical collection; the LeRoy Day, Space Shuttle
Historical collection; collections on NASA Administrators,
Deputy Administrators, Associate Administrators of the
Office of Manned Space Flight and the Office of Space
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Flight; Directors of the Johnson Space Center, the Marshall
Space Flight Center, and the Kennedy Space Center; and
Congressional Hearings. But given the sheer breadth and
depth of the sources available, other collections were also
examined.
At the Kennedy Space Center archive the two principal
collections explored were: the Kennedy Director, Kurt Debus
collection and the G. Merritt Preston collection; although,
many other files were also examined.
At the Marshall Space Flight Center archive time was
mainly spent studying the shuttle historical collection,
which is contained on microfilm. I scanned all available
microfilms, noting documents of interest and Marshall then
photocopied my selections and sent them on via mail at no
cost.
At the National Air and Space Museum I was given hard
copy catalogues of collections on NASA and the shuttle from
which I selected certain files. Most of the collections
specific to the shuttle and shuttle management were
examined.
At the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA) I was allowed access to a computer
database on AIAA publications and reports, from which I
selected certain documents, which were then forwarded via
mail at no cost.
At the General Accounting Office (GAO) Distribution
Center, I used a computer database to locate reports on
18
both NASA and the shuttle. The GAO photocopied every report
requested, absolutely free of charge, and I would collect
them a few days later. I also contacted the GAO
Distribution Center on a number of occasion after my return
to the UK and requested specific documents. Again these
were photocopied and sent via mail at no cost.
The National Academy of Sciences and Engineering sent
me reports, letters and other types of documentation
requested via mail and at no cost.
The library at the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers only contained a small
collection on NASA, but there were a variety of other
sources from which I could draw. Of significance was a
complete collection of the union's paper, The Machinist,
which proved a useful source in exploring the perspective
of aerospace workers. A complete review of The Machinist
(from 1969 to 1990) was, therefore, conducted.
The Library at the Space Policy Institute had small
primary and secondary collection on NASA and the space
shuttle, which was made full use of.
Finally, of course, I drew on the resources of the
University of Edinburgh's own libraries. Significantly, the
main library houses a complete collection of Aviation Week
and Space Technology, which was donated by Faranti.
Throughout the four years it took to complete this project,
I made a complete review of Aviation Week and Space
Technology (1968 to 1985).
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The documentary data can be broken into the following
types:
Unpublished letters, memorandums, position papers,
policy documents, technical reports, management
instructions, management reviews and technical
reviews, generated within and passed between, the NASA
offices, Centers and the "outside world".
Unpublished letters, memorandums, policy documents and
technical reports, directed at NASA, but generated by
other institutions, organizations and individuals.
Letters sent to the author from those involved in the
shuttle programme.
Published letters, memorandums, technical documents,
policy documents, management reviews and technical
reviews, generated by NASA and other organizations,
institutions and individuals.
Congressional Hearings held in the Senate and the
House on space policy, NASA budget authorizations and
shuttle status.
Conference papers written by engineers and bureaucrats
from NASA and its contractors.
Science and engineering professional, academic and
news publications.
Other professional, academic and "popular"
publications.
Press Releases from NASA, members of the White House
and Congress.
Clippings from newspapers, radio, television and the
internet.
As well as primary sources, the thesis draws on a
variety of secondary sources. However, in a historical
project the distinction between secondary and primary is
often blurred. Secondary sources are themselves locked into
time. As such, an historical project can treat some of them
as quasi-primary sources, because their content is shaped
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by their historical location and their sociohistorical
context.
The coding of primary documents was an iterative
process. At first I organized the data in chronological
order. This was done for two reasons. First, whilst in the
US it helped me locate gaps or particular issues that
appeared throughout the period I was interested in. Second,
when I arrived back in Edinburgh, the chronological order
gave me an overall picture of the sequence of events and
decisions made. The next step was to order the data into
particular issues, subjects and topics.
Key issues, subjects and topics:
* External Politics: political issues/debates
surrounding the shuttle from individuals,
organizations and institutions outside of NASA. These
files were also broken into the period blocks, which
represented major phases in the shuttles's history:
1968-1972; 1973-1977; 1978-1981; and 1981-1985.
* Internal Politics: political issues/debates
surrounding the shuttle from individuals,
organizations and institutions inside NASA. These
files were also broken into the period blocks, which
represented major phases in the shuttles's history:
1968-1972; 1973-1977; 1978-1981; and 1981-1985.
* Budgetary Issues: issues/debates on costs of
development both within and outside of NASA.
* Space Traffic Models and Cost-per-flight:
issues/debates on the estimates of cost-per-flight,
demand for the shuttle and space traffic models
* The Contractors: issues/debates about the role of the
contractors, the selection process and the
relationships between the contractors and NASA.
* Management and Organization: issues/debates on the
management and organizational structures of the
shuttle's development.
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Operations: issues/debates on the management and
organizational structures of the shuttle's operations;
and on the changing culture, practices and
philosophies of shuttle operations as opposed to
operations of external launch vehicles.
Impact on the Kennedy Space Center: as above, only
with focus on the Kennedy Space Center.
The External Tank: design, development, fabrication
and testing.
The Thermal Protection System: design development,
fabrication and testing.
Aerodynamics and Aerothermodynamics: creation of
models about environments and the design, development
and fabrication of systems that they affected.
The Space Shuttle's Main Engines: design, development,
fabrication and testing.
Booster Technology: design, development, fabrication
and testing.
The Orbital Manoeuvring System and the Reaction
Control System: design.
Atmospheric Flight: issues/debates on the role of air-
breathing engines and on the selection of the carrier
aircraft
Once the documentary data was separated, it was then
reordered chronologically within its particular
classification. Of course many of the documents dealt with
several issues, so cross referencing was an essential part
of the process. This was accomplished mainly through note
taking and adding lists of documents that were housed in
other files to the file in question.
The semi-structured, in-depth interviews.
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A total of 44 people were interviewed as part of this
research. All of the informants were connected to the
shuttle programme and the selection ranged from NASA and
contractor engineers to NASA Administrators and contractor
managers. Not all those interviewed still work for NASA or
the respective contractors. Some have retired and some are
now employed in other industries or organizations.
Locating who to interview was the first priority.
Before going to the US, contact was made with the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers to request assistance in the location of
informants. The two organizations provided contact names
and addresses of people who were, or still are, involved
with the shuttle programme. This enabled a foundation to be
built, upon which further contacts could be made. While in
the US, the NASA History Office, NASA Headquarters, the
Kennedy Space Center and the Marshall Space Flight Center,
all assisted in suggesting possible people to interview and
helped in tracking contact addresses and/or phone numbers.
The list of people to interview also "snowballed" from
suggestion made by the informants themselves.
The interviews themselves:
The longest interview lasted for 3 hours and the shortest
lasted for one half hour. Thus, the interview technique was
fluid, adaptable and tailored to the conditions of each
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particular interview. The primary aim was to allow the
informant to talk as much as possible, without
interruption. The interview was not, therefore, entered
into with a rigid set of questions. The idea was to
establish a discussion about the shuttle's history in
general and on the informants roles within and
recollections of that history in particular. Hence, the
only question that was common to all those interviewed was
an inquiry into the informants own background; otherwise,
in many ways, each interview was unique.
All the interviews were conducted in a friendly
atmosphere. No attempt was made to antagonise the
informants and all the question were put in a cordial
manner. As the interview progressed, notes were taking on
what was being said, which shaped the questions then asked.
I was always careful, however, not to interrupt the flow
and usually waited for the informant to stop talking before
I asked a question. This method was chosen because,
although I had some background knowledge based on the
archive work and secondary source reading, the informants
would often raise issues within the conversations that were
not obtained from these two sources. However, I did always
enter an interview with a rough plan of questions in case
the informant was not forthcoming with information.
Shortly after the interview, I would listen to the
interview tape and take notes. This aided in two ways:
first, it catalogued issues, subjects and topics within the
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interview; and second, it provided me with knowledge that
could be used in another interview. The second
transcription, conducted on my return to Edinburgh, was
again done in a note taking form. From the notes taking in
the US, I constructed an "order of importance" and then
worked through this order listening to each tape again.
This time a fuller set of notes were taken and specific
quotes were drawn out. Tape counter numbers were also added
to these notes so that I could locate points of interest
easily. The third transcription was conducted as
documentary and interview data was reconstructed to tell
the history. The tapes were listen to again, using the
counter numbers as a guide, and more detailed notes and
quotes were drawn from the interviews. Although a full
transcription was never completed, the tapes were often
listen to repeatedly to maintain an appreciation of their
overall content.
Thesis Structure.
History is rarely orderly. Human affairs usually act out a
torrent of events and, more often than not, the analyst
must impose a sense of order on the chaos. Reconstructing
a sociotechnical history of the shuttle was no exception;
and the task cannot be described any better than has been
so eloquently put by Alex Roland:
Across the seamless web of history, historians
stitch seams. Not to distort the record, or to
mislead the reader, but to make sense out of
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chaos. History is a never-ending Bayeux tapestry,
interweaving lives and deaths that overlap one
another and shape one another. Any story lifted
from it must begin and end somewhere.38
This historiography begins in 1968, the year NASA
announced its intention to build the shuttle. Chapter 2
charts the events that led from this beginning up to 197 0;
a period that witnessed a sea of change, both for NASA and
the wider historical conditions within which it resided.
Chapter 3 then follows on up to 1972, when political
approval to build the shuttle was finally granted. Thus,
the focus of chapters 2 and 3 is definition. Together they
explore and unveil the sociotechnical web of alliances,
conflicts and compromises that shaped both the technology
and NASA's goals. Throughout this period the shape of the
technology was fluid: continually undergoing definition and
redefinition as NASA endeavoured to position the shuttle on
the political agenda. The intentions of the two chapters
then, are to reveal the underlying forces and dynamics that
led to: NASA selecting the shuttle as a major part of its
space programme for the 197 0s; and caused the programme
and, therefore, NASA's position to become unstable; and
induced radical effects on the design of the shuttle, its
objectives and the objectives of NASA. Although the
chapters concentrate on the years between 1968 and 1972,
introductions to events, actors and positions are also
Alex Roland, 'Barnstorming in Space: The Rise and Fall of the Romantic Era of Spaceflight,
1957-1986, ' Radford Byerly, (ed) Space Policy Reconsidered (San Francisco, Westview Press,
1989) , p 33 .
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taken into account. This is done to provide some historical
background to an emergent network that encircled the
shuttle and to capture the changing mood of a nation
towards the civilian space programme.
Definition is again the main theme of chapter 4, but
this time the focus is on the level of the sub-system. The
narrative delves deeper into the technological detail to
explore, not just the social forces, but the technical and
material shapers of particular shuttle systems. Unpacked
are the convergence of sociotechnical relations and
interactions that conditioned the forms and functions of
major components of the shuttle. Again, histories behind
the various sub-systems are traced, and then synthesized
with the activities of the period in question, to discover
why certain technologies were chosen and others abandoned.
The chapter is dense in detail, but that is a necessary
part of understanding the dynamics behind the shaping
processes.
Chapter 5 turns its attention to organizational
factors. The fabrication of a technological system of this
size and complexity, required, by its very nature, the
rigorous organization, management and control of human
activity. Social order was an inherent part of the making.
The emphasis of this chapter, therefore, is on the
construction of the social assemblage that formed around
the making of the shuttle. It explores the rise of
shuttle's management structure, the development of linkages
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between the various NASA Centers and their contractors, and
their relationships to and impacts on the composition and
function of the technologies.
Social scale is climbed twice more in chapters 6 and
8. Wider political, historical and structural conditions
(between, 1972 and 1976 for the former, and 1976 and 1981
for the latter) are surveyed to expose their continuing
influence on both the technology and NASA. What is explore
within these two chapters is how the momentum of large
sociotechnical assemblages can change direction, be slowed
down, or be halted altogether. Despite the large
investments of time, people and resources, retrenchment and
cancellation were always possible paths of action. The
reasons why the shuttle survived, and how the
sociotechnical assemblage adjusted itself against the
volatility of its circumstances, are the main issues to be
uncovered.
In chapter 7, attention is again turned to the
technical detail. The focus this time is on the fabrication
and testing of some of the major components explored in
chapter 4. The principal aim of this chapter is to show
that closure did not occur at the end of design. Continuous
modification, both to the technology and to the social
order, is the process that forms the foundation of this
chapter. The development of knowledge about the
technologies in question; its application to the process of
fabrication and predictions about function; and the
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dialectical relationship between the "working" machines and
the engineers attempts to capture material agency, are the
key subjects of inquiry.
Whereas the central focus of the previous chapters is
on design, development and fabrication, chapter 9 is
principally concerned with issues of operations. The
shuttle's operational environment was very different from
that of NASA's old expendable launch vehicles. It entailed
a new way of doing things: a change in the organizational
culture and in its practice. Thus, reorganization,
transformations of practice and philosophy, and the
antagonisms between practices of the old and the "demands"
of the new, are the matters of study within this chapter.
The structure of the thesis is essentially
chronological, but, of course, many of the themes that
emerge are interwoven with each other in the tangled fabric
of the shuttle's history. The purpose of chapter 10,
therefore, is to disentangle and tie the threads together:
to glean some meaning from the parts in order to make sense
of the whole.
Before the narrative begins it is worth highlighting that
the term shuttle refers to the entire system, which is made
up of three major sub-systems: the orbiter, the external
tank and the solid rocket boosters (see figure 1:1). Thus,
when the term shuttle is used it referring to the entire
29
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And it ought to be remembered that there is
nothing more difficult to take in hand, more
perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its
success, than to take the lead in the
introduction of a new order of things. Because
the innovator has for enemies all those who have
done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm
defenders in those who may do well under the
new.1
NASA, Post-Apollo and the Rise of the Shuttle.
A discreet announcement to an audience of the British
Interplanetary Society in early 1968 marked the first
public acknowledgement by the NASA Office of Manned Space
Flight that it intended to develop a space shuttle.2 The
announcement came as Apollo, NASA's grand mission to land
an American on the Moon approached its conclusion. The
issue of what to do next had not been fully resolved, but
the disclosure did marked a consolidation of thinking
within NASA's upper echelons on future programmes,
objectives and direction.3
NASA had been instructed by the White House to form a
post-Apollo plan back in 1964, but NASA's upper echelons
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. W. K. Marriott (London: J.M. dent & Sons Ltd, 1958),
p 29.
Robert Freitag, interview with author, June 5, 1995; David Baker, 'Evolution of The Space
Shuttle: Part 1' Spaceflight (June 1973), p 202.
Le Roy Day, interview with author, 29 June 1995.
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were not eager to finalize a follow on programme at that
time. They were of the opinion that to do so would make
NASA vulnerable and open to criticism, which could divert
attention away from the Lunar objective. Vagueness thus
became common and disagreement between the NASA Centers
flourished. By 1966 the White House no longer wanted to
hear about post-Apollo possibilities, nor did it want
Congress to hear them. For the first time since the Soviet
Union's launch of Sputnik moved space to the centre stage
in US politics, a president did not mention space in the
State of the Union Message to Congress. The escalation of
the Vietnam War in 1965 and the consequential ten per cent
tax increase in 1967 to pay for it and President Lyndon B.
Johnson's bold social programmes, knocked space off the top
of the political agenda. Apollo was secured, but the stance
of the White House and Congress took its toll on NASA's
future. The Apollo Applications Programme, which would
utilize the Saturn/Apollo hardware in near-Earth orbit was
approved in early 1967, but the year mark a transition from
expansion to retrenchment.4
1968 thus witnessed the mobilization of various groups
within NASA's space divisions aiming to strengthen their
positions, by re-defining the shape of space activity.
Francis Hoban, interview with author, May 15, 1995; Walter McDougall, The Heavens and The
Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985), pp 420-22; Henry
Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University
Press, 1995); pp 139-141; Henry Lambright, Presidential Management of Science and Technology:
The Johnson Presidency (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), pp 142-150; Robert
McNamara, with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York,
Times Books, Random House, 1995), chapters 7-9.
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Those that advocated the development of a space shuttle
represented only one of a variety of movements that sought
to control the burgeoning realm of space. The NASA Centers
devoted to space science saw their hopes ready to expand
now that Apollo was nearing completion.5 But in its 1969
report, America's Next Decade in Space, NASA's upper
management gave a prominent and permanent position to the
human element of the national space programme. Outlined was
a quixotic inventory of projects to take the "space age"
into the next century, including: three Earth orbiting
space stations and one space station in Lunar orbit; a
fleet of reusable shuttles that would link the Earth with
the three Earth orbiting space stations; a nuclear powered
shuttle that would form a link between the Earth space
stations and the Moon; a Lunar base equipped with a Lunar
Module that would link the ground base with the Lunar
orbiting station; and a human expedition to Mars, which
would also conduct a fly by of Venus on its journey back to
Earth.6 In the politics of post-Apollo, NASA's higher
echelons sought to fortify the organization's position
through an expansion of the space enterprise and the
creation of a vast new space infrastructure.
Central to the NASA Office of Manned Space Flight was
the permanent Earth orbiting space station and a fleet of
Bruce Murray, Journey Into Space: The First Thirty Years of Space Exploration (New York,
London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1990).
Francis Hoban, interview with author, May 15, 1995.
33
reusable shuttles. The concept of a permanent human-
inhabited space station had been 'a gleam in the eye of
numerous NASA engineers'7 since the agency was founded.
Indeed, the original planning for Apollo incorporated an
Earth orbiting rendezvous method, which, NASA planners
hoped, would eventually lead to an Earth-orbiting space
station by 1967. Nevertheless, pressure to complete Apollo
within the time frame set by President John Kennedy in
1961, to land an American on the Moon by the end of the
decade, forced NASA to adopt a Lunar orbit rendezvous
method. What this effectively meant to some NASA officials
was that the agency would have no productive technology
with which to establish extensive near Earth orbit
operations.8 For many in NASA, therefore, Apollo was
perceived as imparting no logical legacy upon which to
build a space infrastructure.9
The large Saturn boosters and the Apollo spacecraft
were seen as single mission technologies; built to carry
people and machines to the Lunar surface (see figure 2:1).
Expansion of the space enterprise, in NASA eyes, had to
Sylvia Fries, '2001 to 1994: Political Environment and the Design of NASA's Space Station
System,' Marcel Lafollette, Jeffrey Stine, (ed) Technology and Choice: A Technology and
Culture Reader (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p 234.
A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development Program, Report to the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics by a special committee on space technology, The Working
Group on Vehicular Program, July 18, 1958 (NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC); The
Long Range Plan of The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Program
Planning and Evaluation, December 16, 1959 (NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC) ;
James Hansen, Enchanted Rendezvous: John C. Houbolt and the Genesis of the Lunar-Orbit
Rendezvous Concept (Washington DC, NASA History Office, Monographs in Aerospace History
Series #4, December 1995).
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rest on operations in near Earth orbit. One shot missions,
built and launched from Earth limited future potential. If
space was to be conquered then according to NASA, the US
needed a steppingstone in near Earth orbit. Rapid growth
could only be encouraged by means of a revolution in launch
vehicle and spacecraft technology; a revolution in the
means would provide a revolution in the ends. A growing
contingent, therefore, converged around the idea of
developing an entirely new launch vehicle for Earth orbit
logistics.10 Ultimately, this orientation towards leap-frog
innovation rather than incremental innovation became
dominant because of NASA's penchant for the development of
advanced technology. Ideas to move in an incremental
fashion and modify both the Saturn or Titan boosters and
the Apollo or Gemini spacecraft were quickly silenced.
By the end of 1968 project planning was well under way
and by early 1969 the Office of Manned Space Flight had
established two task groups, during a reorganization of its
management structure; one to take responsibility for the
proposed space station and the other to take responsibility
for the shuttle. The Space Shuttle Task Group, headed by
LeRoy Day, Apollo Test Director, comprised forty people
from different Centers and was delegated to evaluate the
diverse technical issues and produce a report on the
progress and direction of Phase-A shuttle planning. Phase-A
William Normyle, 'Large Station May Emerge As Unwritten US Goal,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (March 10, 1969), pp 103-109.
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was the first part of an anticipated four phase shuttle
development process. Labelled advanced studies, Phase-A was
to be followed by Phase-B, known as project definition and
then Phase-C, actual vehicle design and Phase-D, production
and operations.11
Major sections of the US aerospace industry were
involved with NASA's Phase-A shuttle planning studies by
early 1969 and by mid-1969 the Space Shuttle Task Group
defined six different types of missions that a shuttle
should perform:
* Logistical support of a near-earth orbiting
space station.
* Placement and retrieval of satellites into
near-earth orbit.
* Delivery of other payloads to near-earth
orbits.
* Propellant delivery to spacecraft in near-
earth orbits.
* Near-earth orbiter satellite servicing and
maintenance.
* Short duration manned orbital research
missions.12
The group also expressed a preference for a fully or near-
fully reusable vehicle, but accepted that the challenge of
designing an orbital vehicle flexible enough to perform all
these diverse missions, whilst also being both economical
to develop and operate, demanded a number of trade-offs. As
NASA changed this process as the programme progressed re-terming Phase-A as preliminary
analysis, and combining Phases C and D into one. Hans Mark, Arnold Levine, The Management of
Research Institutions: A Look at Government Laboratories (Washington DC, NASA, Scientific and
Technical Information Branch, 1984), p 93.
Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of Developing the National Space Transportation
System (Wisconsin: Motorbooks International, 1993), p 49.
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such the task group listed a number of trade-off studies
that they thought should be performed, including:
* Partially or fully reusable systems.
* Piloted flyback booster vs expendable
booster.
* Winged vs lifting-body configurations.
* Off-the-shelf engines or new design
propulsion systems.
* Vertical vs horizontal launch.
* Low vs high crossrange capability.
* Small vs large payload capability.
* Sequential staging vs parallel-burn.13
As 1969 drew to a close, so did the Phase-A studies.
A variety of proposals and designs were put forward (see
figures 2:2, 2:3 and 2:4), but the Office of Manned Space
Flight eventually selected a reusable, two-stage shuttle
design as the most promising concept to be examined in
Phase-B. The whole shuttle system was designed as two
separate vehicles; a booster, about the size of a Boeing
747 that would provide the thrust to lift the system off
the Earths surface; and riding piggy-back, an orbiter,
about the size of a Boeing 707 that would disengage at
between 10 to 20 miles altitude and go on into orbit on its
own. Each stage was designed to be piloted, both would be
fully reusable and both would fly and land like a
conventional aeroplane (see figures 2:5 and 2:6). System
life was projected at ten years and each vehicle was to be
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refurbishment.14 It was envisaged that the shuttle would be
operational by the second half of 1977 and capable of
conducting 75 flights per year by the end of the decade.15
The configuration of NASA's proposed space station had
also taken shape by mid-1969. Earlier plans to launch a
small fully constructed space station had been rejected on
the grounds that it would be too conservative in size,
scope, and potential accomplishments. Instead, NASA opted
for a modular design with the intention of constructing the
station in orbit rather than on Earth. This would allow
development of a platform that could accommodate up to 100
people by 1980.15
The concepts were grandiose in design, potential and
cost. In 1969 the estimated cost of development for the
space station was put at over $10 billion and $5.2 billion
to develop the shuttle. By January 1970 the figure for the
space shuttle climbed to just under $10 billion17 and
reached $12 billion before the year concluded.18 Including
the space station, NASA was asking for an investment of
well over $20 billion from the American taxpayer.
14
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Such an outlook was overly optimistic and out of line
with the political and economic conditions of the time.
1968 had been a watershed year on many fronts. Incipient
contradictions in the consensus politics promoted by both
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations had surfaced by
1967. Riots swept through American cities exposing the
fragility of the solutions offered by liberal democracy to
the problems of civil rights and social exclusion and
destabilizing Johnson's Great Society programme. Opposition
to the Vietnam war had also intensified as it escalated.19
Economic crisis threatened in the spring of 1968 as
inflation reached an unprecedented 4.7 per cent and the
federal deficit crept towards $25 billion, far more than in
any other post war year. Although unemployment remained
relatively stable, sections of organized labour, not least
in the public services, were showing signs of discontent.20
Each of these factors impinged upon NASA's future
planning. The most decisive was the collapse of the
Democratic hegemony. President Johnson had announced that
he would not be seeking renomination for another term; and
in an election fought in 1968 over the Vietnam war, support
Ronald Segal, America's Receding Future: The Collision of Creed and Reality (England:
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd, 1968), pp 159-60, 242-244, 252-258, 260-261, 275-278;
Although public demonstrations against the war on moral grounds were substantial, there was
a larger tide of opinion that opposed the conflict because the cost was to great. Noam
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1969) .
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Administrations (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p 205, 219; Michael
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Century: US Politics from Vietnam to Clinton (Manchester and New York: Manchester University
Press, 1995), pp 56-57.
39
for Republican, Richard Nixon grew in strength.21 Prior to
and during his precedency, Johnson's politicking had been
crucial to NASA.22 When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik
I in October 1957 he interpreted it as the second Pearl
Harbour, an invasion of the skies.23 The then Republican
President, Dwight Eisenhower attempted to play down the
significance of the Soviet Union's entry into space,24 but
under political and public pressure during the post-Sputnik
paranoia agreed to remodel the National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics to take charge of a new civilian space
programme. As Vice President, Johnson convinced the newly
elected President Kennedy to recruit NASA in their campaign
against a perceived Soviet threat by engaging in the
lengthiest battle, en route to the Moon.25 When Johnson
himself became president in 1964, NASA received almost
The first Gallop poll after the Democratic convention showed that Nixon had a substantial
lead with 43 per cent of the vote. Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London:
Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1978), p 318.
For a detailed analysis of the establishment of NASA see, Enid Schoettle, 'The Establishment
of NASA,' Lakoff, (ed) Knowledge and Power (New York: Free Press, Collier-Macmillian Ltd,
1966) . For detailed histories of the Apollo space programme see, Mary Holman, The Political
Economy of the Space Program (Pacific Books, 1974); John Logsdon, The Decision To Go The
Moon: Project Apollo and The National Interest (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1970); Walter
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the American Rocket State (London, New York: Verso, 1988); Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo.
Dale Carter, The Final Frontier p 127; John Logsdon, The Decision To Go To The Moon pp 21-22;
Enid Schoettle, 'The Establishment of NASA,' pp 185-186, 220-229; Walter McDougall, The
Heavens and The Earth pp 141, 148-149; H. Young, B. Silcock, P. Dunn, Journey to
Tranquillity: The Long Competitive Struggle To Reach The Moon (New York: Doubleday & Co Inc,
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complacent since the Technologies Capabilities Panel Report in 1955, accelerating research
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public for security reasons. Such concerns with space strategy over propaganda left
Eisenhower open to attack, but as McDougall emphasis, loss of public face was less important
than loss of potential secret satellite intelligence. In practice Sputnik proved
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unqualified support from his administration despite
political opposition and programmatic friction between
Apollo, the Vietnam War, and the Great Society programme.
A victorious outcome for the US in the space race was
regarded as so important that NASA was in a position to
continue with its project no matter what the cost. Even the
deaths of three astronauts in the Apollo fire of 1967 did
not deter NASA or the government from persisting with its
main objective; to beat the Soviets to the Moon.25
Johnson's departure from office thus had an important
bearing on the political support NASA would receive for its
post-Apollo planning. Its immediate consequence however,
was to influence the departure of another significant
individual, James Webb.
Appointed as NASA Administrator in 1961, Webb has been
described as the power behind Apollo.27 His management
skills and political sophistication were well recognized
within NASA.28 Webb's leadership unquestionably led to the
location of the Manned Spacecraft Center in Texas and the
building of the southern crescent;29 a political manoeuvre
which assured NASA powerful congressional support. By
For a detailed analysis of the Apollo Fire and its aftermath see Henry Lambright, Powering
Apollo pp 142-188.
Ibid.
Francis Hoban, interview with author, May 15, 1995.
Walter McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth pp 373-374; Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo pp
106-107. The Manned Spacecraft Center was renamed the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center on
February 17, 1973. Further references will cite the Manned Spacecraft Center as the Johnson
Space Center notwithstanding the time period.
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locating NASA facilities right across the south at a time
when these areas were trying to get out from an
agricultural based economy, Webb managed to make powerful
members of the Congress 'stakeholders in Apollo'.30 After
Johnson's announcement of departure, Webb became concerned
that the agency's leadership would become a political
issue. If he was still NASA Administrator after the
election political conflict would be inevitable. Vice
President Hubert Humphery, the Democratic favourite, and
Webb had had tensions and if Nixon succeeded then it was
likely that Webb would be removed. Webb felt that his
removal would also cut deeper into NASA's leadership, with
Nixon excising those that he regarded to be loyal to Webb
or Johnson. After a meeting with Johnson on September 17,
1968, Webb announced his retirement and Thomas Paine,
NASA's Deputy Administrator, took up the reins.31 In
November 1968, Nixon won the presidential election and the
new administration took office in January 1969.
Over 1.5 billion people around the globe witnessed the
planting of Old Glory at Tranquillity Base,32 assuring Neil
Armstrong's place in history as the first man to walk on
Francis Hoban, interview with author, May 15, 1995.
Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo pp 200-205.
Mary Holman, The Political Economy of The Space Program p 5.
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the Moon on July 2 0 1969.33 In the public's eyes, NASA had
reached the zenith of the "space age".
At jet-set parties in Paris, grand tribal fires
of Southern Zambia, in the courtyards of Buddhist
temples in Bangkok, on street corners in Colombo,
Ceylon, and in snug Dublin pubs millions huddled
close to TV sets or radios as the Apollo voyage
was described in dozens of languages. For days
newspapers, radios, and television stations
throughout the world have featured the historic
space journey, often giving little attention to
domestic issues. It seemed as if there were no
part of earth unaware that two men had set foot
where no man had gone before.34
Over ten years of planning, research, development, and
production accomplished what has been called the 'greatest
engineering feat of all time.'35 The Apollo euphoria was,
nonetheless, short lived. Rather than a mechanisms for
uniting a nation, Apollo reflected its divisions. Not
missing the potential of good publicity, the newly elected
President Richard Nixon, had declared July 20, 1969 a
'National Day of Participation'. But the events of the day
were not universally shared. Although exemplified as the
embodiment of the "frontier spirit" of America, Apollo
remained at odds with everyday life.
In St. Louis hundreds of AT&T employees went on
strike when management declined to follow the
Presidents lead; and in California most aerospace
Astronauts Armstrong and Aldrin, landed the Lunar Module to the Moons surface, leaving
Collins in the Command Module. Armstrong became the first human to set foot on the Moon at
9:56 pm (EDT). They remained on the surface for a period of 21 hours, returning to a splash
down in the Pacific Ocean on July 24. Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book Volume
III: Programs and Projects 1969-1978 (Washington DC: The NASA History Series, Scientific and
Technical Information Division, 1988), p 74.
The New York Times (July 21, 1969) .
Francis Hoban, Where Do You Go After You've Been To The Moon: A Case Study of NASA's
Pioneering Effort at Cost Control with Prescriptions for Today (Virginia: Draft Manuscript,
George Mason University, 1995), p 1.
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companies likewise refused to pay their workers
to sit at home watching the fruits of their
labour. ... Even as Apollo XI made its way to the
moon, Wall Street analysts were forecasting an
unpromising future for aerospace stocks in the
context of declining NASA expenditure, conditions
which only underlined the need for the workers to
stick at their tasks. And even as 8,000 Western
Electric Employees voted with their seats and
stayed home anyway, the Houston garbage workers
. . . elected to work through the day: quite
simply, they needed the cash.36
Discontent quickly spilled over into the space
programme. Student groups from Boston and New York
disrupted meetings of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, and formed picket lines at a NASA
exhibition of Lunar rock brought back from Apollo XI.37
Hans Mark, then director of NASA's Ames Center, recalled a
formal dinner, hosted by the President, to celebrate the
return of the Apollo XI astronauts. He described the
atmosphere inside the Century Plaza Hotel, Los Angeles, as
both 'festive and patriotic'.38 Outside a large
demonstration had amassed. Its message, a brusque reply to
the advocation by Vice President Spiro Agnew that Americas
next venture in space should be a 'manned flight to Mars by
the end of this century.'39
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A major feature of the demonstration was a huge
sign with the legend "Fuck Mars" printed on it in
large letters that the demonstrators had somehow
been able to hang along the upper floors of one
of the office buildings across the street from
the Century Plaza. The same message was clearly
repeated on signs that some of the demonstrators
carried.40
Political activists were not however, alone. The very
success of the Moon landing led to a general public
disinterest in space.
The public had been exposed to at least a decade
of intensive media attention to "getting to the
moon". It had been a topic of curious speculation
for centuries. Once the first landing occurred
that interest was forever terminated. ... In this
sense public support for the Apollo program had
been designed to self-destruct on the initial
achievement of the program's major objective.41
Leaders within the agency feared that NASA's decline would
be sharp without continued public support. Television had
become an important medium for NASA, beaming their
achievements back to a captivated audience on Earth. Soon
after Armstrong's historic footsteps NASA's TV ratings
dropped rapidly. George Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, put
together a group of very senior NASA officials to address
this problem. Nicknamed the Think Group, discussions
centred on efforts to create a TV extravaganza during
Apollo's next visits to the Moon.42 All of their endeavours
Hans Mark, The Space Station p 37
Francis Hoban, Where Do You Go After You've Been To The Moon p 3.
The "Think Group" consisted of George Low; Wernher von Braun, Chief of NASA Planning Robert
Jastrow, Director of the Goddard Institute for Space Studies; Homer Newell, Associate
Administrator; Edward Cortright, Langley Research Center Director; Richard McCurdy, Associate
Administrator for Organization and Management; and others as invited. The group spent a great
deal of time debating the value and appeal of watching an astronaut pushing a boulder into
Hadley Rille. The slow motion fall of a huge rock into a deep canyon at one-sixth gravity
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failed and public curiosity continued to drop, and was only
briefly rekindled during the abortive flight of Apollo
XIII.
Political support for Apollo was also decidedly weak.
The Lunar landing signalled a turning point. With the space
race won, many in the political arena believed that the
programme could now be terminated.43 Apollo was to include
nine further visits to the Moon after the initial landing,
but pressure on NASA's fiscal year (FY) 1971 budget forced
the agency to phase out production of the Saturn rocket and
cancel the final two Lunar landings.44 NASA astronauts
visited the Moon on December 11, 1972 for the last time,
and have not returned since.
The question of what to do after Apollo thus entered
the political arena again in early 1969. NASA's Apollo
Applications programme had been severely downsized in the
politics of 1967 and 1968 and the agency had no mission
objectives beyond the mid-1970s. The newly formed Nixon
Administration did not place civilian space activity very
high on its agenda and instead of making any immediate
announcement it decided to establish a Space Task Group to
examine the issue. Chaired by Vice President Spiro Agnew,
would prove incredible, but the scenario was dropped when the danger was pointed out of the
astronaut falling in behind the boulder. Several attempts at viewer stimulation were made,
including the feather and hammer drop, racing the Lunar Rover and playing Golf. These stunts
tended to reinforce public scepticism rather than capture their attention. Ibid, pp 2-6;
Francis Hoban, interview with the author, May 15, 1995.
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the Space Task Group consisted of a variety of actors,
including the new NASA Administrator, Thomas Paine45 and
was charged with providing a 'definitive recommendation on
the direction the US space program should take in the post-
Apollo period' .46 In addition to the Space Task Group,
several other planning activities were also under-way. The
President's Science Advisory Committee had established the
Branscomb committee, headed by Lewis Branscomb, then
director of the National Bureau of Standards; and within
NASA, George Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, had expanded the Office of Manned Space
Flight's management committee.
The Space Task Group reported at the end of 1969 and
provided a selection of spending options that ranged
between a maximum pace, where the limits were set by
technology, not available funding; and a low level pace,
which did not include any human missions for the 1970s,
(see table 2:1) . Paine and Agnew, both endorsed a human
expedition to Mars as the next logical step in space
exploration. The Office of Manned Space Flight, however,
were still pushing hard for the development of the space
shuttle and the space station. Whereas the President's
STG included representatives from NASA, Defence Secretary Malvin Laird, Secretary of State
William Rogers, Science Advisor Lee DuBridge and representatives from the State Department,
the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Bureau of the Budget. Input was also received from
members of Congress, the National Academy of Sciences, the American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics, private citizens and industry. Normyle W. 'Broad New Space Program Urged,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (August 11, 1969) pp 22-23.
The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions For The Future, Space Task Group report to the




Milestones Maximum Pace Programme I Programmes Low Level
II,III
Manned Space Systems.
Space Station (Earth Orbit) 1975 1976 1977 _
50 Man Space Station 1980 1980 1984 -
100 Man Space Station 1985 1985 1989 -
Lunar Orbiting Station 1976 1978 1981 -
Lunar Surface Base 1978 1980 1983 -




Earth to Orbit 1975 1976 1977 -
Nuclear Orbit Stage 1978 1978 1981 -
Space Tug 1976 1978 1981 ~
Scientific.
Orbiting Observatory 1979 1979 1980 -
Mars Mapping 1977 1977 1981 1977
Venus Probes 1976 1976 Mid-1980s 1976
Outer Planet "Tours" 1977-79 1977-79 1977-79 1977-79
Astroid Belt Survey 1975 1975 1981 1975
Applications.
Earth Resource Systems 1975 1975 1976 1975
Direct Broadcasts 1978 1978 mid-1980s 1978
Navigation/Traffic Control 1974 1974 1976 1974
Source: Adapted from Table 1, The Space Program in the
Post-Apollo Period p 20.
Science Advisory Committee's followed its earlier position,
and recommended that NASA should concentrate its efforts on
only developing a reusable transportation system for the
1970s.47 Moreover, the President's Science Advisory
Committee suggested that planetary exploration should be
conducted by automated equipment and NASA should adopt a
slow pace development of a space station; examining its
viability during the 1970s and progressing to full
development in the 1980s.
It was clear that a schism was beginning to develop
between the ideas that were being generated by the Office
of Manned Space Flight and the ideas that were being
considered by the other actors. The Office of Manned Space
Flight placed the highest priority on the creation of new
technologies to operate in space. What would actually be
done with these technologies was secondary in importance.
In contrast, the Space Task Group, the President's Science
Advisory Committee and other areas of NASA concentrated on
mission objectives. Technology was seen as something that
would have to be created in order to execute the missions
that were being proposed.48 Notwithstanding this rift, the
Office of Manned Space Flight was successful in translating
its interests into the interests of the other groups. By
47
The PSAC had released a report in early 1967 entitled The Space Program in the Post-Apollo
Period, which recommended that studies should concentrate on more economic systems for the
delivery of payloads to orbit. The impact of the report was minimal as it had come at a time
when the Johnson Administration was preoccupied with the escalating Vietnam war. The United
States poured more money into the war in 1967 alone than it spent on the entire Apollo
programme.
48
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advancing the idea that the shuttle and the space station
represented steppingstones in space, the Office of Manned
Space Flight managed to persuade each of the groups to
include at least one or the other in their proposals. This
strategy was particularly effective with the Space Task
Group who incorporated the shuttle in three out of four of
its options .49
In the immediate politics of post-Apollo, NASA's
higher echelons sought allegiance with the White House
through the chair of the Space Task Group, Vice President
Spiro Agnew, in the expectation that his approval would
result in a new mandate. It was a strategy that initially
appeared to work. Agnew endorsed NASA's grand plans and the
agency had partial success in influencing the direction of
the other groups involved in the post-Apollo planning. NASA
soon found however, that it had few friends in the White
House and was entering a new world of post-Apollo with no
real identity.50
Forces of Resistance.
Richard Nixon carefully monitored political reaction to the
post-Apollo planning reports before delivering his space
policy message in March 1970. The message was considerably
less ambitious than even the third option offered by the
Jerry Grey, Enterprise (New York: William Morrow and Co Inc, 1979), p 55.
Francis Hoban, interview with the author, May 15, 1995.
49
Space Task Group. It did not include any commitment to a
space station, a shuttle, or an expedition to Mars. Instead
Nixon expressed the need for a balanced space programme
which would combine all the elements of exploration,
accumulation of scientific knowledge, and practical
applications. Studies into the development of a space
station and a shuttle were indicated, but no new projects
were detailed. Nixon's submission of NASA's Fiscal Year
(FY) 1971 budget to the Congress remained well below the $4
billion minimum needed if NASA were to begin its programme
in that fiscal year.51
NASA's budget had been slowly reduced from its peak of
0.9 per cent of GNP in FY 1966, to 0.47 per cent of GNP in
FY 1969. The primary objective pursued by NASA
Administrator, Thomas Paine, was to reverse this trend and
push for an investment commitment of 1 per cent of GNP.52
Agnew gave his patronage to a venture on the scale of
Apollo, but the shapers of space policy were vastly out of
step with the shapers of macro-economic policy. Fiscal and
monetary constraint were the primary tools advocated by the
Council of Economic Advisors, to stave off the threat of
economic crisis, perceived because of the growing federal
deficit, a slow down in economic growth, high inflation and
signs of rising unemployment. The dictation of economic
Jerry Grey, Enterprise p 55.
52
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policy was thus a maintenance of a federal budget in which
expenditures would be matched by revenues.53 Policy
implementation was under the control of the newly formed
Office of Management and Budget54 and they were showing a
growing concern over NASA's lack of justifications for its
expensive programmes. The Office of Management and Budget's
impression of NASA was of an organization that pushed
technological innovation for innovation's sake. Officials
within the Office of Management and Budget were thus
determined not to get snowed under by NASA's requests for
advanced technological challenges.55
Sceptical of NASA's development cost estimates, the
Office of Management and Budget directed the agency to
conduct a cost-benefit analysis of its proposed shuttle
design. At the end of this study, NASA projected
development costs of between $6.4 to $9.6 billion for its
fully-reusable, two-stage shuttle system.56 Unconvinced,
the Office of Management and Budget made an extraordinary
manoeuvre and demanded that NASA contract an outside
evaluation of shuttle development costs. NASA's upper
James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change pp 205-211; Michael Bradley 'The Inexorable
Rise of the National Dept, ' Philip Davis, (ed) An American Quarter Century: US Politics from
Vietnam to Clinton (Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1995), pp 56-57;
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1970 .
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management were reluctant to conduct such a study, fearing
that it would raise the whole issue of what constituted a
good space programme. Nevertheless, given the political
climate, NASA bowed to White House pressure and contracted
Aerospace Corporation and Lockheed Corporation to assess
the impact of the shuttle on reducing payload and launch
costs; and Mathematica Incorporated, to provide an overall
economic analysis.57
The Office of Management and Budget were not the only
White House agency seeking control over NASA's activities.
The Office of Science and Technology and the President's
Science Advisory Committee also demonstrated apprehension
over both the costs and the technological risks associated
with the agency's proposals. In the summer of 1971, the
Presidents Science Advisory Committee established a high
level scientific panel to examine NASA's post-Apollo plans.
Chaired by Alexandria Flax, President of the Institute for
Defense Analysis, the Flax panel worked closely with the
Office of Science and Technology and the Office of
Management and Budget to curtail NASA's ambitious plans.
Critical of NASA's programme cost estimates, the Flax panel
concluded that cost overruns could be in the region of 30
to 50 per cent. Armed with an open mandate, the Flax panel
also focused attention on technological matters. In an
John Logsdon, 'The Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle,' Space Policy (May, 1986), pp 103-
119; John Logsdon, 'The Space Shuttle Program: A policy Failure?' Science (May 30, 1986), pp
1099-1105.
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effort to reduce research and development costs, but still
retain a national space programme, the panel expended a lot
of energy on proposing alternatives to NASA's baseline
shuttle design. While making no single recommendation, the
panel did outline three alternative options: (i) defer the
decision on new technology until a later data; (ii) develop
a new expendable ballistic launch vehicle; or (iii) develop
a small partially reusable launch vehicle.58
The major difference between NASA and the White House
on the type of space transportation system required
revolved around a trade-off between operational costs and
development costs. The shuttle designs that had emerged
from the Phase-B studies reflected NASA's orientation
towards supporting heavy logistics. The underlying
assumption was that the shuttle's primary function would be
to construct a space station. Emphasis was thus on
technical viability rather than design economics.
Development costs were, therefore, secondary to a system
designed around reducing operational costs.59 The White
House however, wanted to disembark from a heavy funding
curve. Consequently, many of NASA's debates in Washington
were related to the annual funding of its proposed
programmes; as Space Shuttle Manager, Robert Thompson
recalled:
Claude Barfield, 'Intense Debate, Cost Cutting Precedes White House Decision to Back
Shuttle.'
David Baker, 'Evolution of the Space Shuttle,' Spaceflight p 230.
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A lot of our debates in Washington had to do with
what the annual funding in support of the program
would be. And I know lots of times up there the
meetings would kind of come to the bottom and
say, we don't care what you build, but we don't
want the annual funding to get over $1 billion a
year.60
In the fragile politics of post-Apollo, NASA
discovered that many members in both houses of Congress had
also developed a negative response to the costly and
seemingly intangible proposals coming from the agency.
Opponents in the Congress to funding large technological
programmes had steadily mushroomed as social, political and
economic conditions declined. Agnew's endorsement of a
mission to Mars was considered too ambitious and found
little support.
I do not at this time wish to commit ourselves to
a specific time period for setting sail to
Mars .61
I just for the life of me can't see voting for
monies to find out whether or not there is some
microbe on Mars, when in fact I know there are
rats in the Harlem apartments.62
Within the House of Representatives two main issues
dominated the space policy debate during 1970 and 1971;
whether to support NASA's proposals for human space flight;
and whether space programmes should receive such a large
slice of the national budget. Some members of the
Robert Thompson, interview with the author, September 7, 1995.
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subcommittee on Space Science and Applications and the
subcommittee on Advanced Research and Technology positioned
themselves against the quixotic visions of a post-Apollo
age. In an address to the American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics, Space Science and Applications
subcommittee chairman, Joseph Karth (Democrat, Minnesota),
condemned the Space Task Group's report as 'totally
unrealistic' and went on to say:
Based on my experience ... NASA's projected cost
estimates are asinine. ... NASA must consider the
Members of the Congress a bunch of stupid idiots .
Worse yet, they may believe their own estimates -
and then we really are in bad shape.63
In the House, Karth focused his attack on the space shuttle
declaring:
Here we are going into contracts on the Shuttle
which for all practical purposes is a new
program, not even a year old, and we haven't done
the basic research necessary ... to determine
just how this Shuttle vehicle ought to be built.
... I predict on the record right here that
program will cost at least three times what NASA
today is saying it is going to cost.64
It was the decision by NASA to delay several space science
and applications projects so that room could be made for
the space station and the shuttle as budget items that led
the Space Science and Applications subcommittee to campaign
against both programmes.65 The group however, were up
Ibid, p 274.
Ibid, p 273.
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against powerful support from both the Manned Space Flight
subcommittee and some influential members on the Committee
on Science and Technology. In 1970, Chairman of the
Committee on Science and Technology, George Miller
(Democrat, California), announced his intention to hold all
NASA authorization hearings within the full committee. This
effectively centralized power in the full committee at the
expense of the subcommittees; a sharp contrast with
traditional practice where the subcommittees had ample
opportunity to probe deeply into NASA's projected
programmes in detailed public hearings.66
When the debates unfolded on the House floor it was
evident where the battle line had been drawn. The Manned
Space Flight subcommittee jostled to increase NASA's budget
for human space flight and the Space Science and
Applications subcommittee, sought to fix the human space
flight budgets under the Office of Management and Budget's
recommendations. In 1970, Chairman of the Manned Space
Flight subcommittee, Olin Teague (Democrat, Texas), angered
by the proposed cuts, told the House:
I think that our subcommittee ... have got a good
feeling for this thing, and I don't think we have
to rubber stamp something the [Office of
Management and Budget] does. ... What should we
do, just sit back on our cans and let the [Office
of Management and Budget] dictate every damn
thing we do?67
Ken Hechler, Towards the Endless Frontier p 271.
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A continuing rise in unemployment during 1970 spurred many
in the House to increase public spending; and John Wydler
(Republican, New York), expressed a common sentiment in
1971 when he told the House during a shuttle authorization
debate:
I have been going along with these cuts year to
year. I really feel we have reached a point where
we should stand up and say "enough." ... I think
we had better start redirecting the public's
attention to the fact they . . . [are spending
public money] ... to hire American people, to do
American productive work.68
Nevertheless, there were others who contended that at a
time when budget constraints were most severe, it did not
make sense to spend vast sums on human space flight.
Charles Mosher (Republican, Ohio), told the House in 1970:
We must put relatively greater emphasis on those
aspects of the space program [where] the
practical returns are the greatest ... to the
human beings right here on earth.69
1970 had witnessed the most significant debate in the
House. Opposition to the shuttle and the space station was
at its height and as the debate progressed it became
apparent that the position of the Republicans represented
a crucial swing element. When the roll was called to
eliminate both the shuttle and the space station it was
clear that the vote was going to be close. As the final
count came in both George Miller, supporter of the






announced their total votes as 53 each, which meant that on
a tie vote the amendment to eliminate funding for the
shuttle and the space station just failed. Louis Frey
(Republican, Florida), recalled the event:
I'd lobbied pretty hard with the freshmen, and
after the first rush of people went through, one
of the freshmen from Maryland came rushing in
from a meeting and went through the line on our
side. He was followed by another Maryland
Congressman. The gavel came down, it was
announced to be a tie vote, and so the Shuttle
stayed in. The second Maryland Congressman said
... I went through the wrong way! As I look at
the Shuttle now, I often wonder what would have
happened if he'd walked through the right way.70
By 1971, the opposition in the House to funding human space
flight had dramatically declined. The subcommittee on Space
Science and Applications failed to bolster support and Olin
Teague's Manned Space Flight subcommittee successfully
increased the shuttle budget from the $100 million
advocated by the Office of Management and Budget, to $125
million.71
Yet, as support for the shuttle rose in the House of
Representatives, opposition mounted in the Senate. Led by
Walter Mondale (Democrat, Minnesota) and William Proxmire
(Democrat, Wisconsin), the Senate debate revolved around
the impact that NASA's space station and shuttle
development programme could have on the scientific






could eventually cost the taxpayer $100 billion, argued
Mondale and Proxmire, "space science" programmes would be
severely curtailed. Many space scientists, both in academia
and NASA, saw their hopes for space science programmes
ready to expand once Apollo was nearing completion. The
rise of another large, human centred programme sent a wave
of consternation through the space science community. Once
again their goals looked in danger of being submerged.
Riding on the support from disgruntled space scientists,
Mondale sponsored an amendment to eliminate both the space
station and the shuttle from NASA's FY 1971 budget.72
Even James Van Allen, prestigious discoverer of
the vast radiation belts that bear his name,
enriched Mondale's arsenal with a letter stating
unequivocally that scientific purposes could be
served by an unmanned program at least as well as
and considerably cheaper than - manned
flights .73
Support for the human space programme in the past had
come from Senator Clinton Anderson (Democrat, New Mexico)
chair of The Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee.
Plagued by,ill health, Anderson had taken little interest
in the debate or in the essential pre-vote politicking.
Responsibility for marshalling support for the space
station/shuttle, therefore, fell on the shoulders of the
committee staff. Staff member Glen Wilson, 'an old hand in
the behind the scenes manoeuvring of the Senate', and well
72




versed in the political process, was an 'ardent and
effective instrument in combating the suddenly powerful
anti-shuttle movement'.74 As in the House, the debate in
1970 was crucial and opposition was at its height, as Glen
Wilson recalled:
We came awfully close to losing the damn thing.
... We won that first shuttle go-around by four
votes , [32-28] .75
Mondale and Proxmire continued their attack during the
Appropriations Bill in December 1970, but eventually lost
by a large margin, 50-26, allowing NASA's space
station/shuttle programme to go through the Senate.
In the years between 1968 and 1970 neither strong
advocates nor influential opponents of the civilian space
programme successfully dictated the political agenda.
Public and political support for any new space programme on
a similar scale to Apollo was, at best, indifferent. Those
that exhorted the development of the space station and
shuttle were successful only in negotiating for further
research into the possibilities. Although funding for the
Apollo applications programme, which would utilize the
remaining Apollo hardware in near-earth orbit, had been
secured, the prospects for NASA's space station and shuttle
were bleak.
Ibid, p 69.
Glen Wilson, quoted in Ibid, p 69.
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Two Space Shuttle Program Requirements Documents were
issued in 1970, which summarized NASA's specifications for
the shuttle as the programme transferred to Phase-B.
Following the Phase-A effort, the shuttle's configuration
had congealed into a fully reusable two stage vehicle, with
the orbiter housing a 15 foot diameter, by 60 foot long
payload bay. The vehicles lifting capability was specified
at 25 000 pounds to the design reference orbit, 270
nautical miles circular with a 55 degree inclination: the
location of NASA's proposed space station. Operational
capability was expected to begin in the second half of
1977. Total turn around time, from landing to launch
readiness, was dictated at less than two weeks, and launch
rates predictions varied from a minimum of 25 to a maximum
of 75 per year.76 By 1974 revision numbers six and seven of
the Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document were
describing a very different technological system:
The Space Shuttle System flight hardware shall
consist of a reusable Orbiter Vehicle including
installed main engines, an expendable External
Tank and reusable Solid Rocket Boosters which
will burn in parallel with the main engines.77
NASA, Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document Level 1, Office of Manned Space Flight,
July 1, 1970 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC); NASA, Space Shuttle Program
Requirements Document Level 1: Change No. 2, Office of Manned Space Flight, December 3, 1970
(NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
NASA, Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document Level 1: Revision No 6, Office of Manned
Space Flight, March 12, 1974 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington, DC), p 1; NASA Space
Shuttle Program Requirements Document Level 1: Revision No.7, Office of Manned Space Flight,
October 7, 1974 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington, DC), p 1.
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The justification for the shuttle had also expanded, from
an initial objective, 'to provide a low-cost, economical
space transportation system'78 to include 'a capability
designed to support a wide range of scientific, defence,
and commercial users'.79 Launch rates had been quietly
dropped and the operational date had been deleted
altogether. Within three years both the design of the
shuttle and the programme's underlying rationale had
shifted. In the next chapter the events, processes and
interactions that led to these changes are revealed.
7 8
NASA, Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document Level 1 pi.
7 9
NASA, Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document Level 1: Revision No. 7 p 1.
Chapter 3
Redefinition
Technical people rely upon their ties with power
because it is the access to that power, with its
huge resources, that allows them to dream, the
assumptions of that power that encourages them to
dream in an expansive fashion, and the reality of
that power that brings their dreams to life.1
Internal Dissidents.
The plans of the Office of Manned Space Flight were not
only being frustrated by external factors. Internal
obstacles also appeared as factions within NASA mobilized
their forces in an attempt to capture control of the
shuttle programme's resources.2 At the end of 1969 no firm
consensus existed between, or within, the NASA Centers
about a shuttle design. Supporters for partially or
completely recoverable versions of the Saturn rocket and
some minor patronage for a single stage to orbit vehicle
could still be found.3 Advocates for further development of
lifting body technology could also be discovered at the
Flight Research Center and the Office of Advanced Research
and Technology.4 The greatest pressure though, came from
David Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York,
Alfred Knopf, 1984), p 44.
2
Adelbert Tischler, letter to the author, April 16, 1996.
Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle p 67.
4
Adelbert Tischler, letter to Author, April 16, 1996.
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the Johnson Space Center. NASA's FY 1970 budget had allowed
$30 million for the already awarded Phase-B studies,5
Johnson, however, wanted additional funding to explore
alternative concepts.
Max Faget, the Mercury capsule designer, was leading
a group of renegade engineers in an attempt to influence
the Office of Manned Space Flight to develop a small
interim shuttle to test the concept of a logistics system.
Embarking on an in-house study in January 1970, their
philosophy was to design a system that would lower both
developmental costs and risks.6 Known as the DC-3 because
of its relative simplicity,7 the design was much smaller
than those being considered by the Office of Manned Space
Flight. But despite his efforts Faget did not find much
support for his ideas.8 The Office of Manned Space Flight
favoured building a large scale shuttle that would qualify
immediately as an operational system.9 From the outset the
Office of Manned Space Flight thought it would be dangerous
to build a research vehicle and then go back to Congress to
William Normyle, 'NASA Asks Quick Shuttle Replies,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(February 23, 1970), pp 16-17.
LeRoy Day, interview with author, June 29, 1995; Robert Thompson, interview with author,
September 7, 1995; 'Mini Shuttle Proposed as Interim Project,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (February 23, 1970), p 16.
It was named after the Douglas DC-3 aeroplane, which had become renowned for reliability and
simplicity of design.
Max Faget, interview with author, September 9, 1995.
Letter to Adelbert Tischler from George Mueller, August 25, 1969 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
64
ask for more money to construct an operational vehicle, as
LeRoy Day recalled:
Making the shuttle smaller would not make the
development of the technology any easier.10
Nevertheless, a realization that NASA's budget was not
going to be restored to the heights of Apollo slowly
filtered through the organization. NASA Administrator,
Thomas Paine, thus agreed to establish a separate Phase-A
effort in the event that budget limitations forced NASA
into a redesign.11
Proponents of the large fully reusable two-stage
shuttle also began to seek alternatives that would allow
them to continue with their design and reduced peak
funding. Two versions of the same idea, one advanced by
Marshall's former director, Wernher von Braun and the other
proposed by the new Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, Dale Myers, involved spreading the
development costs over a longer period by phasing the
programme.
Von Braun started his campaign early in an attempt to
persuade top NASA officials that the agency should develop
the reusable booster first, thus allowing NASA to go
operational with an expendable orbiter while the reusable
LeRoy Day, interview with author, June 29, 1995.
Richard Kline, interview with author, May 31, 1995; William Normyle, 'NASA Asks Quick Shuttle
Replies,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (February 23, 1970), pp 16-17.
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version was under development.12 The concept did gain
credence within certain sections of NASA. Milton Thompson,
from the Flight Research Center, described the idea as:
not only . . . the most attractive alternative, but
also the most logical.13
Von Braun and his advocates considered that if NASA did
develop the reusable booster first, then not only would it
provide a proof of concept, but the next logical step would
be to build the reusable orbiter.14
It was during a meeting on November 27, 1970, at the
home of NASA's Deputy Administrator, George Low, that Myers
suggested 'a course of action in which the orbiter might be
developed for initial operational readiness using an
expendable Saturn-IC booster.'15 For Myers it was clear
that the development of the orbiter first was the logical
path to take because 'it focused all the attention on the
toughest technology problem.'16
George Low had received a similar suggestion from the
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board as they expressed





Letter from Dale Myers to Thomas Paine, June 29, 1970 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
Letter from Milton Thompson to Dr W. Von Braun, November 18, 1970 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
Ibid.
Charles Donlan, memorandum for the record, discussion of the space shuttle program with Dr.
Low,' December 2, 1970 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
Dale Myers, quoted in Zack Strickland, 'Expendable Booster Gains Favor As NASA Studies Phased
Shuttle,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June 21, 1971), p 19.
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original concept of the shuttle.'17 Seeing its role as an
engineering advisory body, the Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board went on to recommend:
If future payloads decrease in size and
frequency, the trade off between initial R&D and
operating costs may suggest a different approach
... Thus, an "interim" booster system might be
satisfactory for several years.18
George Low reassured the Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board that NASA was:
looking at a number of ways to minimize
technological risk and to decrease peak annual
funding.19
These included an interim booster as part of a phased
approach to the shuttle's development, but Low was still
unconvinced on its merits and told the Aeronautics and
Space Engineering Board that:
the most promising [expendable interim booster
is] the S-IC, the Saturn V first stage. But even
the S-IC presents formidable problems. There are
technical difficulties, especially in the area of
combined vehicle control, and also economic
problems arising from the high cost of modifying
the SI-C and the high repetitive cost of each
launch.20
The concept of a phased approach did, however become
increasingly attractive within NASA, although the agency
found it much harder to sell to the contractors working on
Letter from Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, Chairman The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board,
National Academy of Engineering, to George Low, December 18, 1970 (National Academy of
Sciences Archive, Washington DC).
19
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Phase-B. Discussions held at McDonnell Douglas resulted in
them recommending 'against any interim booster system'
preferring instead 'a slip of a year or so in the launch
date.'21 North American Rockwell 'also presented similar
arguments to those heard at the McDonnell Douglas
briefing'.22 North American Rockwell's Shuttle Project
Manager, Bastian Hello highlighted the reasoning behind
their negative reaction:
As the programme went on doubts were raised about
the R&D costs ... NASA started looking at
partially reusable and partially throw-away
vehicles ... we thought we were leading the pack
... in the all-reusable design and we were a
little reluctant to let go of what we thought was
our advantageous perch.23
As the programme moved into 1971 the orbiter-first strategy
gained more weight. Despite Milton Thompson's observations
that NASA had ' some tremendous gaps in the knowledge and
experience required to design a successful shuttlecraft,
regardless of all our spacecraft and aircraft experience'24
the booster-first approach was 'never taken seriously by





Charles Donlan, memorandum for the record, trip report on visit to Phase-B contractors with
Dale Myers on December 21, 1970, dated January 4, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive,
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Bastian Hello, interview with author, April 27, 1995.
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An Inconspicuous Coup.
Tensions between NASA Administrator Thomas Paine, the
Congress, and other executive branch officials had been
working against NASA. Constantly agitating for additional
funding, Paine publicly criticized the Nixon Administration
for cutting NASA's budget.
Battling everyone in the executive branch from
mid-level Office of Management and Budget
personnel to the president, he proved an
embarrassment to the White House and soon lost
credibility with the administration.26
After the Space Task Groups recommendations were ignored by
the White House, Paine decided to resign from the post of
NASA Administrator.27 The Nixon Administration's refusal to
support NASA's post-Apollo planning reinforced Paine's
belief that, as a Democrat, he was an outsider within the
new Republican Administration.
I sat down with Nixon always under rather formal
and stilted circumstances. But he gave every
appearance of listening and interacting and I
would say, looking back on my interactions with
the White House at that time, that I finally left
because I really didn't think I could deliver to
NASA the kind of relationship the head of NASA
really ought to deliver.28
Roger Launius, 'NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-72,' The Historian 57
(Autumn 1994) p 25.
Paine actually left office in September 1970 although his intentions were well known within
NASA months before. Hans Mark, The Space Station p 38; W. Henry Lambright, Powering1 Apollo
p 208. For background on the resignation of James Webb in 1968 and the appointment of Thomas
Paine see pp 201-202, 204, 206-207.
Thomas Paine, quoted in Trento Joseph. Prescription for Disaster: From the Glory of Apollo
to the Betrayal of the Shuttle (New York, Crown Publishers Inc, 1987), p 94.
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Deputy Administrator George Low was thus placed in the
position of Acting Administrator at a crucial juncture in
the organizations history.
Low then led what was a very interesting exercise
... he said we have got make a choice, whether to
do the space station first or the shuttle first.
... Technically the space station was easier but,
we recognized that the shuttle was the pacing
item in this thing and, therefore, we said look
... let's do the difficult thing first and the
space station will follow.29
It was clear that the Station would be very
expensive using expendable launch vehicles to
build ... so it was deferred until the Shuttle
was assured.30
Initially this idea was treated with some scepticism, as
future NASA Administrator, James Fletcher reflected:
When we first began thinking about the Space
Shuttle, we thought of it as a vehicle to serve
a large space station in Earth orbit. But we ran
into a dilemma: we found that we could not expect
to get funding to build both a large space
station and the Space Shuttle in this decade. A
space station would be of no use without the
Shuttle. And at first we thought that the reverse
was also true - that the Shuttle would be of
little use without a space station to serve. But
the more we looked at this, the clearer it became
that no dilemma existed but rather an
opportunity.31
As NASA's programmatic plans were remodelled,
justifications for the shuttle became more elaborate. The
predominant rationale for the shuttle had been based upon
Hans Mark, interview with author, September 8, 1995.
Robert Freitag, letter to the author, June 1, 1996.
James Fletcher, banquet address before the Antelope Valley Board of Trade, where Do We Go
From Here in Space?, Lancaster, California, October 18, 1974 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC), p 9.
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a perceived requirement for a new logistics vehicle for a
space station. Now that hardware development of the space
station had been postponed the role of the shuttle needed
to expand. As well as a service vehicle for a future space
station, the shuttle would also be configured to build
it.32 Early conceptual thinking had characterized the
shuttle's operational goals as 'broad' and able to serve 'a
large number of users'.33 Revitalized, these justifications
now served as the key to the shuttle's promotion. During a
meeting on November 27, 1970, top NASA officials, agreed
that:
[NASA] should probably change the baseline
mission for the shuttle ... [from] the 270
nautical mile orbit and 55 degrees which is
primarily for the space station to something more
representative of the needs of NASA and DOD. This
step would uncouple the prime justification of
the shuttle as support for the space station to
one of a transportation system for space
satellites.34
The shuttle, now unhinged from the space station, was
touted as a utilitarian space vehicle that would usher in
a new age of space transportation. Economical and routine
access to space were now central agents in the advancement
of the shuttle.
The shuttle was always a key to the space station and the shuttle's systems and
configurations were driven, in part, by the station's requirements. Robert Freitag, letter
to the author, June 1, 1996.
LeRoy Day, abstract to a collection of papers presented at The Space Shuttle Symposium,
October 16-17, 1969 (Smithsonian Museum of Natural History, Washington DC).
Donlan Charles, memorandum for the record, discussion of the space shuttle program with Dr.
Low, December 2, 1970 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
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If we had a vehicle that provided a less severe
launch environment, adequate space and weight
carrying capability, and particularly the ability
to return spacecraft to earth for maintenance,
repair and refurbishment for reuse, I believe we
could move far in the direction of bringing these
costs down substantially, and relaxing many of
the current constraints on space operations. We
have every reason to believe that the Space
Shuttle will do just that.35
To emphasise the impact the shuttle would have on future
space operations, Myers went as far as to suggest the
possible savings the shuttle would bring:
With the largest and most efficient present
launch vehicles, the present cost is somewhat
under $1,000 a pound. With the Space Shuttle, we
expect to get this down to less than $100 a
pound.36
This statement eventually proved controversial and was
based only on preliminary analysis coming from Mathematica,
the organization contracted to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of the shuttle. It stirred up a debate both within
and outside of the political forum that continued
throughout the programme and placed the economic rationale
in jeopardy.
An understanding that the economic argument might
prove tenuous was appreciated by George Low. Indeed true to
Mueller's vision, importance for Low was in the new
capabilities that the shuttle would provide.
NASA is not seeking to justify the space shuttle
program on purely economic grounds. The principal
Dale Myers, statement at the hearings before The Committee On Science and Astronautics 1972




justification for the space shuttle is the new
capability it can bring both to our civilian and
military space programs for versatile and
efficient operations in space.37
Routine access to earth orbit was seen as the catalyst for
future infrastructure building in space.
George Low, when we started this program, had a
vision of making NASA more relevant and that
relevancy would come when we had a whole new
group of customers, and these would be the
entrepreneurs and the cheap experimenters and the
Edisons of their time, and we would provide them,
easy, cheap access to space and they in turn
would come up with new industries.38
After Paine's resignation Low, 'attempted to heal the
breach between NASA and other agencies in the executive
branch'39 while simultaneously embarking upon a potent
campaign for the shuttle. The aftermath of the 1970
Congressional battle left NASA in the role of appeaser.
George Low aimed to win the Congress over by arguing that
NASA's requests were moderate. Earth orbital hardware
development was restricted to the Apollo Applications
Program, with space station hardware downgraded to Skylab.
The concept of a permanent 100 manned orbiting platform was
tabled as a 'future project'.40
We believe that in moving toward the decision on
the development of the space shuttle, NASA is
Letter to Clinton Anderson from George Low, May 28, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
Francis Hoban, interview with author, May 15, 1995.
Roger Launius, 'NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-72' p 2.6.
Letters to Walter Mondale and William Proxmire from George Low, September 28, 1970 (NASA






proceeding in a conservative manner ... In
connection with the decisions on FY 1972 budget
request, we have deferred the development of the
space station to avoid what would other wise have
been unrealistic funding peaks during the
1970s .41
In an effort to rebut the criticisms of Senators William
Proxmire and Walter Mondale, who were attempting to focus
an anti-large space programme sentiment in both Congress
and the White House, Low emphasised that Mars was not the
hidden agenda. He also stressed that:
the space shuttle program does not represent a
commitment to a huge manned space program. . . .
The space shuttle can be justified by its
potential contributions to programs relying
entirely on unmanned spacecraft. Decisions on
future manned space programs . . . can and have
been decoupled from the decision on the space
shuttle.42
Upgraded in status as NASA's principal programme for the
1970s, the shuttle 'became more and more important relative
to the other elements'43 of the space programme. Although
a shuttle configuration that could be accepted by all
interest groups was yet to be established, the decline of
the space station advanced the ascension of a new shuttle
principality.
Letter to Walter Mondale from George Low, April 28, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
Letter to Clinton Anderson from George Low, May 28, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC), emphasis in the original.
Hans Mark, The Space Station pp 39-40.
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Precarious Affiliations.
Left at the end of 1970 with no human missions beyond the
Apollo Applications programme and concerned by the Office
of Management and Budget's emphasis on cost-effectiveness,
NASA believed that in order to gain political approval, it
had to show that the shuttle could perform a much larger
role than they had originally intended. NASA thus embarked
on a campaign to persuade other communities of the benefits
of its new launch vehicle; especially the national security
community whose space hardware were projected to constitute
some 34 per cent of all future space traffic.44
Since the establishment of NASA, the United States has
had two space programmes; a civilian one, housed in NASA,
and a military one controlled by the Air Force. NASA's long
relationship with the US Air Force has invariably been both
confrontational and cooperative. In the race for space
among the services during the post-Sputnik months of
1957/58, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force all had their
long-range space programmes on the table. The Air Force saw
space power as 'merely the cumulative result of the
evolutionary growth of air power' and, space flight as the
'natural and logical extension of air flight.'45 General
Bernard Schriever, commander of Air Force Systems Command,
John Logsdon, 'The Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle, ' Space Policy 2 (May 1986), pp 103-
119; John Logsdon, 'The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?' Science (May 30, 1986), pp
1099-1105.
John Logsdon, The Decision To Go To The Moon pp 28, 30.
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was convinced long before the launch of Sputnik I that
'nations will fight the battles of the future in space'.46
Although left out of the competition to launch the
first American satellite, the failure of the Navy's
Vanguard rocket and the transfer of the Army Ballistic
Missile Agency to NASA in 1960 solidified the Air Force's
hold on military space flight.47 The Air Force, however,
considered that a programme split between themselves and
NASA was unworkable. They lobbied hard in both the Pentagon
and the Congress during the early 1960s to gain dominion
over human space flight. 'Soviet men in space posed an
"impending military threat" that could not be met by
current space organization, ' argued an Air Force Space
Study Committee in 1961. Its recommendation was that a new
Air Force Command should 'be given the task of developing
manned space flight.' Submerged in rhetoric of space as a
"sanctuary", exploited only for peaceful purposes and
scientific advancement, arguments for total military
control over space operations failed to dislodge NASA's
hold over the Lunar landing programme.48 The Air Force were
not however, pushed out of the game entirely. As the Moon
landing programme progressed, the transfer of Air Force
technology (the Atlas and Titan rockets) and personnel to
J. Manno, 'The Military History of the Space Shuttle,' Science for the People
(September/October, 1983), p 7.






NASA impacted significantly on the space agency's culture,
management systems, and relationship to the service.49 The
Air Force continued to fund research projects for human
space flight during the 1960s, but the termination of its
spaceplane, Dyna-Soar in 1963 and the cancelation of the
Manned Orbital Laboratory in 1969, had left the Air Force
hesitant over its role within a national space programme.
Despite this the Air Force had demonstrated an
interest in NASA's space station/shuttle development
programme. Although their research was being conducted
separately, there was some cooperative agreement between
the Air Force and NASA in generating shuttle concepts
during 19 6 9 . 50 The framework for DOD participation in
NASA's shuttle programme was established through two
groups: the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board
and the Space Transportation System Committee. The
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board had been in
existence since 1965 and served primarily as a mechanism
for the formulation of policy. During 1969 the issues on
the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board's
agenda were: the progress of NASA's shuttle design;
establishment of DOD design requirements and their impact
on NASA's plans; and the interrelationship between DOD's
Howard McCurdy, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in the US Space
Program (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1993), pp 14-17.
This was, in part, due to the fact that the aerospace companies working for the Air Force
were the same four under contract with NASA: General Dynamics, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas,
and North American Rockwell. 'Air Force Pushing Studies of Reusable Space Shuttle,' Aviation
Week and Space Technology (August 11, 1969), p 25.
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current fleet of expendable launch vehicles, their growth
versions, and a reusable launch vehicle. The Space
Transportation System Committee was signed into existence
on February 17, 197 0 and was co-chaired by Grant Hansen,
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for R&D, and Dale
Myers, NASA's new Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight. The committee had a broad mandate to review shuttle
operational plans, technology requirements, programme
objectives, and development plans to ensure that both NASA
and DOD specifications could be met.51
Cooperation in developing concepts for a reusable
space vehicle between the Air Force and NASA had begun in
1966. At the time it was concluded that the numerous cost
uncertainties and technical risks could not be resolved.
Their report did, however, consider that future demand for
access to space would encourage the development of reusable
launch vehicle technology and, that the current (1966)
launch vehicle system would only fulfil NASA and DOD
requirements for the next 7 to 10 years.52
The DOD did, however, view a NASA operated shuttle as
potentially useful. The promise of lower costs to access
space combined with the potential of new capabilities
proved an attractive prospect. The Air Force though, were
not prepared to fund any part of the programme from its own
51
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budget. Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans admitted
that he saw 'no pressing need for the shuttle' but did
characterized it as 'a capability the Air Force would like
to have' .53 Seamans was a former NASA top official, and
sympathetic to the agency's aspirations. Few other high
ranking Air Force officers favoured the shuttle and were
content with their expendable launchers like the Atlas and
Titan.54 Hansen best summed up the position.
Sure, NASA needs the shuttle for the space
station . . . but for the next ten years
expendables can handle the Air Force job. We
won't seek shuttle funds even if NASA doesn't. We
don't consider the shuttle important enough to
set money aside for it.55
The job of securing Air Force support had become paramount
for NASA if the economic arguments given to the White House
and the Congress were to stand ground. Before 1971 drew to
a close, NASA's efforts to gain the Air Force as an ally
would have a significant impact on a shuttle design.
Three key shuttle requirements were insisted on by the
Air Force at the end of Phase-A: lifting capability,
orbiter payload bay size and orbiter crossrange (the
lateral manoeuvrability of an aircraft). The dimensions of
the payload bay and the lifting capability of a shuttle
John Logsdon, 'The Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle' p 109.
Bill Sneed, interview with author, August 21, 1995.





were based on a new generation of DOD reconnaissance
satellites. Far heavier and larger than any previous
observation satellites, it was lifting these kinds of
payloads that the Air Force saw its most frequent use of
the shuttle.56 In a presentation to the NASA on June 29,
1970, the Air Force discussed DOD payload size and weight
requirements. DOD satellite designs for the 1970s dictated
a vehicle configuration which would could accommodate a
payload of 10 feet in diameter 60 feet in length, and be
able to launch up to 30 000 pounds into a near-Earth polar
orbit. Given the drivers of improved capabilities,
increases in power, and extensions of lifespan, Air Force
projections for the 1980s required a shuttle capable of
lifting payloads between 40 000 to 50 000 pounds to the
same orbit, within a 15 feet diameter by 60 feet long
payload bay.57
LeRoy Day's Space Shuttle Task Group had not specified
any volume requirements in its 1969 report. A design goal
of lifting 55 000 pounds to a space station was
unofficially stipulated by the Office of Manned Space
Flight during a briefing with the Phase-A shuttle
contractors and a maximum diameter of 22 feet for the
Joining the separate functions of area surveillance and close-look photography into one
satellite was responsible for the increased size and weight of this new system. Increasing
the length of the satellite made possible increases in focal length of the camera, which when
combined with increases in the camera aperture provided new a new level of ground resolution.
T. Greenwood, 'Reconnaissance and Arms Control' Progress in Arms Control? (San Francisco:
W.H. Freeman and Co, 1979), p 99.
The increase in diameter represented early thinking within the Air Force on the size of a
third stage, or space tug that would deliver satellites to higher synchronous orbits.
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payload bay had been examined by some of the contractors in
1969. As the Phase-A studies progressed, shuttle designs
incorporated payload weights of between 25 000 and 65 000
pounds, and payload diameters of either 15 or 22 feet, at
a variety of lengths.58 The Office of Manned Space Flight
eventually specified a 15 foot diameter by 60 foot long
payload bay in the summer of 1970.59 A statement of work,
issued in February 1970, indicated a desired lifting
capability of 15 000 pounds to the reference orbit for a
space station, but this was later revised to 25 000
pounds .60
Crossrange requirements arose from a tactical
judgement. The Air Force wanted an orbiter that could
rendezvous with a satellite and return to Earth after
completing only one orbit, thus removing the need for
flying over hostile territory in times of crisis. This
demanded a high-crossrange capability of between 1100 and
1500 nautical miles on either side of the orbiter's reentry
ground track. A requirement that arose from the physical
reality that the landing strip would have moved east some
1100 miles as the Earth rotated during the shuttle's first
orbit. This requirement for a return to runway after a
Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice pp 111-113.
Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document Level 1, Office of Manned Space Flight, July 1,
1970 (NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC), p 2.
Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document Level 1, Change No.2, Office of Manned Space
Flight, December 3, 1970 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC), p 5.
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single orbit dictated a relatively shallow angle of attack
and the high lift of a delta wing. In a series of reports
the Air Force also argued that a delta wing planform would
produce a more aerodynamically stable and thus far safer
orbiter.
Nonetheless, crossrange was of no great concern to
some of NASA's engineers. Their primary interest was
providing a routine daily opportunity to return to the
Kennedy Space Center, which only demanded a low 200
nautical mile crossrange capability. Many of the orbiter
configurations emanating from Johnson, the NASA Center that
traditionally controlled spacecraft design, thus adopted
straight wings, essentially for simplicity. Indeed as Max
Faget, a leading spacecraft designer at Johnson recalled
several Johnson engineers were:
dead set against the [high] crossrange, it cost
us a lot on performance. Having a [higher]
crossrange on the way down meant you had to carry
a heavier vehicle up there, and that extra weight
on the vehicle meant less payload.61
Advocates of the low crossrange design also claimed that
the Air Force did not appreciate NASA's expertise in low-
lift-to-drag ratio wing designs that used exceptionally
high angles of attack; a critical point in safely operating
a straight winged orbiter.62 Arguments for a straight
Max Faget, interview with author, September 9, 1995.
Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice pp 111-113; Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle
pp 67-69.
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winged orbiter were, nevertheless, wholly rejected by the
Air Force.
The controversy over crossrange continued on through
1970 because the Office of Manned Space Flight failed to
generate any decision on the subject. Indeed both the 200
nautical mile and 1500 nautical mile crossrange options
were still included in a second Office of Manned Space
Flight shuttle requirements document released in December
19 7 0 . 63 Awareness of the political and economic conditions,
however, obliged NASA to formally adopt all Air Force
requirements into its Phase-B studies, early in 1971. The
manoeuvre was essentially a political one. NASA needed Air
Force support to strengthen the shuttle's economic
rationale and so gain political sanction. The straight wing
approach was, therefore, dropped in favour of a delta-wing
design, which would produce the Air Forces stipulated 1500
nautical mile crossrange; and the large 15 X 60 foot
payload bay and a system lifting capability of 65 000
pounds into a due east orbit, the Air Force's two other
principal requirements, were also incorporated. The extent
of the Air Force's influence on NASA to adopt these
requirements at this time is, however, debatable.
As we got into Phase-B we had pretty well
established, although there was still a lot of
debate, ... the 15 foot diameter, 60 foot long
payload bay. We had pretty well established the
roughly 20 ton, 60 000 pounds due east orbit. ...
Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document Level 1, Change No.2, Office of Manned Space
Flight, December 3, 1970 (NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC), p 3.
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We played with cutting the payload bay size down,
we played with cutting the crossrange down, ...
but I don't think we ever deviated very much from
what we built as far as payload bay and
crossrange requirements were concerned.64
The 15 X 50 foot payload bay and the 65 000 pounds lifting
capability had become more important to NASA since the
postponement of the space station. Still on NASA's planning
boards, the eventual construction of the space station
would dictate a launch vehicle configuration that could
contain and lift each of the modules into orbit.55
In line with Nixon's original request to former NASA
Administrator Thomas Paine, to cut NASA's human space
flight budget in half, NASA had come to the conclusion in
early 1971 that by postponing the space station they could
continue with the reusable two-stage shuttle at a
development cost of $12 billion.66 The National Academy of
Engineering, however, were still troubled by the proposed
development cost of NASA's shuttle, as the following letter
extract shows:
Basically, I'm afraid our concern today, as it
has been in the past, is that the justification
of the space shuttle program is still weak. It
appears to us that the reason for this weakness
Robert F. Thompson interview with author, September 7, 1995.
The 15 X 60 foot payload bay would be large enough to house one module, and the 65 000 pound
lifting capability to a 100 n.m. orbit translated into 25 000 pounds to NASA's reference
orbit for a space station. Robert Freitag, letter to the author, June 1, 1995.
Hans Mark, interview with author, September 8, 1995.
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is not so much the ultimate utility of the system
but the fact that we still have not found the way
to spread out the development costs in order not
to have such a tremendous development peak that
the entire NASA budget is placed in jeopardy. In
the present environment of the anti-
technologists, it seems to us even more important
that we somehow solve the cost problem,
particularly the development cost impact.67
In replying to the National Academy of Engineering, George
Low alluded to the shifting position of NASA's higher
echelons towards an alternate shuttle system:
Spreading out the development costs of the
shuttle so as not to place the NASA budget in
jeopardy has been a subject of concern both to
NASA and to our Phase-B shuttle definition
contractors. We are devoting a great amount of
study to cost reduction and cost alternatives.
... As part of our Phase-A activity, we have
under study several alternate concepts for the
space shuttle.68
Shifts in the Baseline Design.
The preferred orbiter configuration to emerge from the
Phase-B and alternate Phase-A studies was a delta wing
vehicle, which incorporated external liquid hydrogen fuel
tanks that could be jettisoned before entering orbit (see
figure 3:1).69 The incorporation of external fuel tanks
allowed for a simplification of the orbiter's design, with
Letter from Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, National Academy of Engineering, to George Low, April
22,-1971 (National Acadeny of Sciences Archive, Washington DC).
Letter to Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, Chairman The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board,
National Academy of Engineering, from George Low, May 21, 1971 (National Academy of Sciences
Archive, Washington DC).
Letter from James Fletcher to Dr 0'Brian, June 16, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC); Letter from James Fletcher to Robert Seamans, June 16, 1971 (NASA History
Office Archive, Washington DC) ; Strickland Z. 'Expendable Booster Gains Favor As NASA studies

































the overall size of the orbiter now being driven by the
payload bay rather than the size of the internal tanks.
Removal of the orbiter's internal fuel tanks represented
the most significant deviation from NASA's original shuttle
design and paved a way for NASA to manoeuvre around both
the political and economic obstacles that stood in the way
of the shuttle's development. Space Shuttle Program
Manager, Robert F. Thompson considered the removal of the
fuel tanks from the orbiter as 'the single most important
configuration decision made in the shuttle program.'70
I think the biggest thing that broke [the] logjam
was our willingness to give up on everything
being reusable. To take the propellants out of
the orbiter. Propellants just made a mess out of
trying to build the orbiter. You get them out and
get them in a fairly simple tank, get some great
big manifolds there to pump the propellant
through and then throw that aluminum tank away,
looked like a good common sense way of going.71
Once NASA's higher echelons conceded to the idea of merging
expendable technology with reusable, a shuttle design which
proved politically acceptable shortly followed.
The idea was most forcefully put forward in proposals
from Grumman Aerospace. Grumman, who were working on the
alternate Phase-A studies, had been persuaded by some early
ideas emanating from Johnson, as Grumman's Shuttle
Engineering Manager, Richard Kline recollected:
Robert Thompson, The Space Shuttle: Some Key Program Decisions, American Institute for
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Von Karman Lecture, 22nd Aerospace Sciences Meeting, Reno,
Nevada, January 9-12, 1984 (supplied to the author by Robert Thompson), pp 3-4; Michael
Yaffee, 'Program Changes Boost Grumman Shuttle' Aviation Week and Space Technology July 12,
1971), pp 36-39 ;
Robert Thompson, interview, with author, September 7, 1995.
86
When we heard those we felt that really was the
answer. Not the technical answer but the
pragmatic answer in view of the financial
restrictions. So we went after the external tank
concept quite heavily and validated the
practicality of doing that.72
A series of design reviews conducted during January and
March 1971, indicated that significant advantages could be
made if the orbiters liquid hydrogen fuel tanks were an
external structure. The innovative move by Grumman was to
extract the orbiter's liquid hydrogen tanks, which were far
larger than the liquid oxygen tanks, and place them
externally either side of the payload bay. The concept
allowed the orbiter to shrink in size, thus altering the
energy balance between the orbiter and the booster. Further
studies by both NASA and the shuttle contractors
demonstrated that additional savings in development costs
could be made if both the liquid hydrogen and the liquid
oxygen tanks were housed in a single external tank
structure. In August 1971, the introduction of a single
external structure housing both the liquid oxygen/hydrogen
tanks for the orbiter had become a NASA baseline design.73
To circumvent criticism by the Congress and the White
House, NASA's higher echelons publicly announced in June
1971 what they had been considering at the end of 1970: to
proceed with phasing the shuttle's development. The orbiter
would be developed first followed by the booster. An
72
Richard Kline, interview, with author, May 31, 1995.
73
Scott Pace, 'Engineering Design and Political Choice,' p 31.
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interim, expendable booster would then serve the system
while the reusable, human operated booster was under
development. NASA argued that this would keep programme
peak funding to just under $2 billion.74 This change in the
programme's approach translated into very different set of
booster requirements.
Multi-stage rockets had played a vital role in NASA's
crusade to the Moon. Staging methodologies provided step¬
wise increases in velocities with systems of conservative
propellant-to-stage mass ratios.75 Staging the rocket was
a practice established very early in the history of space
flight. Ultimate stage velocity at burnout is exponentially
proportional to the ratio of initial fuel mass to total
system mass. Separating the rocket into stages kept the
mass ratio of each stage at conservative levels and allowed
the final stage velocity (the sum of the velocity increases
from each stage) to be tailored for a characteristic final
orbit or escape trajectory.76 The total mass of a space
transportation system comprises of propellant, vehicle and
payload. Maximising the payload requires minimising the
inert vehicle mass that must be carried along with it.
Robert Thompson, Von Karman Lecture pp 3-4; M. Yaffee 'Program Changes Boost Grumman Shuttle'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (July 12, 1971) pp 36-39;
Mass ratio is a design parameter which relates the total mass at ignition and the final
rocket mass at burn-out.
Max Faget. interview, with author, September 9, 1995; Myron Uman. (Electronic mail, October
7, 1996); Adelbert Tischler. interview, with author, May 3, 1995; Adelbert Tischler, letters
to the author, November 13 and December 4, 1996; Lyn Dutton. Etal Military Space pp 30-36;
Arthur C. Clark. The Exploration of Space pp 27-28; Joseph Thiboaux. 'Propulsion and Power
Systems Perspective' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference, Part 2.






















































































Nevertheless, there are limitations to reducing the
collective mass of a system's structure. The solution was
to partially offset this limitation by using several
propulsion stages. This amounts to removing the inert mass
of each stage when the stage has expended its propellant
(and thrust capability), thereby lightening the remaining
vehicle.
In 1970, structural design, materials and fabrication
techniques were not considered by many of NASA's engineers
and their contractors, to be sufficiently advanced to
produce a single stage to orbit vehicle.77 Staging
methodologies thus followed on into the shuttle, which is
why a vehicle incorporating two separate stages was first
considered as the most viable configuration.78
When NASA moved to the interim booster approach two
sets of staging criteria were evoked: series burn and
parallel burn systems (see figure 3:2). Series burn was a
known stacking arrangement, traditionally exploited on
NASA's previous launch vehicles. Orbital velocity would be
achieved via stages, with the booster powering the initial
ascent on its own and then, after separation, the orbiter's
engines would ignite for the final climb. Three different
booster concepts came under consideration within this
Single stage to orbit vehicles are only just recently becoming a distinct possibility with
developments in new high-strength, light-weight materials and fabrication techniques.
Adelbert Tischler, letter to the author, November 13, 1996.
Adelbert Tischler, letter to the author, June 16, 1997.
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category: the Saturn I-C as proposed by Dale Myers; a
winged version of the Saturn V, proposed by Boeing; and a
modified Titan III, proposed by the contractor Martin
Marietta. Although NASA favoured the use of the SI-C, David
Vine, Vice President of Martin Marietta, lobbied hard for
the Titan III. He claimed that the development costs would
be low because most of the components were already in
production, and that a modified Titan would also provide a
basis for active Air Force participation in the shuttle
programme.79 Boeing's idea, to convert the Saturn V into a
booster system that could be recoverable after a sea ditch
or a human-occupied fly-back vehicle, met with mixed
reaction within NASA. Some considered the approach to be
pragmatic because it utilized technology already in
existence, while others were concerned that such a system
would mean that the two-stage, fully reusable shuttle would
'never come to full fruition.'80
Parallel burn was a new procedure and presented the
'challenge of a previously untried stacking arrangement.'81
The concept involved the orbiter's main engines working
simultaneously with the boosters allowing both to provide
the necessary thrust for lift-off. The stacking arrangement
was conducive to the use of relatively low performance
79
Z. Strickland, 'Titan 3L Studied As Expendable Booster' Aviation Week and Space Technology




Robert Thompson, Von Karmen Lecture p 8.
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boosters as the orbiter's main engines would perform a
larger share of the boosting, thus the staging velocity
could be reduced to around 3 000-4 000 feet per second. In
addition, the parallel burn concept meant that verification
of main engine ignition could be made prior to booster
ignition.82 The technical proposals were due on the
December 15, 1971, but as late as November NASA was still
undecided on whether to opt for a series burn or parallel
burn configuration (see figure 3:3 for some comparisons).
Enervation, Resurgence and Ratification.
George Low's role as NASA's acting Administrator ended with
the appointment of James Fletcher in March 1971. Fletcher,
after a long career in industry as a physicist and as
president of the University of Utah, came to NASA with
strong Republican credentials. Initially he presented a
very cynical attitude towards human space flight and
questioned the judgement of NASA's top officials on the
need for a shuttle. Within a short time, however, he had
become convinced that approval of the shuttle programme was
essential.83 With over $4 billion invested in facilities to
support human space flight and NASA's three main Centers,
Kennedy, Johnson, and Marshall almost totally dedicated to
NASA. Technology Influence on the Space Shuttle Development p 5-20.
Jerry Grey, Enterprise p 71; Joseph Trento, Prescription for Disaster pp 105-106; John














































it, support was imperative if NASA's organizational
structure was to remain intact.
Within Congress, a continuing rise in unemployment was
spurring on a campaign for increased public spending. The
1970 recession and the refusal of Congress to hold down
public spending meant that the deficit for the fiscal year
ending in June 1971 was $23 billion, far more than in any
post-war year except 1968. Unemployment was up to 6.1 per
cent in May and the dollar had steadily grown more
vulnerable in the international exchanges. A flight from
the dollar in the money markets grew to rout proportions,
finally leading to the Bank of England requesting that the
US guarantee convertibility of Britain's dollar holdings
into gold. In an attempt to stabilize the economy, on
August 15 Nixon made a radical economic policy u-turn
reverting to tight controls, including: a ninety day freeze
on wages and prices; suspension of convertibility of the
dollar into gold; and a $4.7 billion cut in federal
spending.84
James Fletcher, [NASA's new Administrator] by a
total mistiming went to see Nixon on the day that
the dollar was floated and Nixon said, listen I
don't have $12 billion ... do something for
half.85
The Office of Management and Budget, equally concerned to
limit budget requests going to the Congress confirmed the
James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change pp 219-225.
Hans Mark, interview with author, September 8, 1995.
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reduced sum, as William Lilly, NASA's Chief Budget Officer,
recalled.
When we first sat down with them in the summer to
discuss fiscal 1973 they told us that our total
budget ... would not go above its present level
($3.3 billion) . When we calculated it out, it
meant that if the Administration approved the
shuttle project, we'd have to live with about a
$1 billion peak funding figure.86
The two-stage shuttle that top NASA officials had been
pushing for the past two years had an estimated peak
funding level of over $2 billion.
December 1971 had been earmarked by top NASA officials
as the deadline for a presidential decision on the shuttle.
Many in NASA were growing concerned about both the costs
and psychological effects of a stretch out. Holding the
industrial teams together would become problematic if the
programme were deferred for another year.
We were worried as hell that we'd lose the
momentum the program had gained, and beyond this
we seriously doubted that the . . . contractors
could, or would continue to pump in their own
dollars.87
Fletcher also felt that approval for some kind of shuttle
had to come in that year if NASA was to remain a leading
force in space technology. Once it was clear that the
economic climate would not sustain a $12 billion programme,
Fletcher instructed the Phase-B contractors to develop
alternative design configurations that would cost no more
William Lilly, NASA Chief Budget Officer, quoted in Claude Barfield, 'Intense Debate, Cost
Cutting Precede White House Decision to Back Shuttle,' p S16615.
Charles Donlan, quoted in Ibid, p S16615.
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than $5 billion to develop.88 This was no easy task, as
North American Rockwell's Shuttle Manager, Bastian Hello
reflected:
We were directed to move over to the other
vehicle, and proposal time was hurrying along and
we had some catch up work to do. So it became ...
intense ... we were given some three months to
propose and that became a nightmare.89
In addition to the new Phase-B contracts, Fletcher
also let out a new contract to Mathematica to study all the
alternative designs emanating from the extensions. The
first study had been forced upon NASA by the Office of
Management and Budget; NASA went into the second
voluntarily in the hope that it would justify an economical
and practical programme.90 The key factor in the economic
analysis was market demand; the number of flights. Accurate
mission models were elusive and scenarios for future flight
traffic rates over the 1979-90 time period varied
considerably.91 Indeed forecasting future demand was an
impossible task and so was driven by political
considerations as much as anything else. It was believed
that the agency's 'position would be significantly
The Grumman/Boeing team and Lockheed also received Phase-B extension contracts even though
they had not technically participated in Phase-B.
Bastian Hello, interview, with author, April 27, 1995.
Grey Jerry. Enterprise pp 78-79.
Memorandum from Dale Myers to Deputy Associate Administrator, Planning, June 17, 1971 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washing ton DC). Flight rates varied from 492 to 732.
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weakened'92 if Mathematica's economic analysis eliminated
the space station. Some models, therefore, included the
space station while others simply escalated the commercial
demand. The debate over the number of flights persisted for
some time before Mathematica eventually settled on a 514
mission model for its study.93 Controversy, nevertheless,
persisted: in particular, traffic models and estimates of
operational costs were continually modified and attacked as
the programme progressed.
By the end of the summer the Mathematica study had
revealed that even if operational costs rose to $10 million
per launch all but 5 per cent of the shuttle's planned
missions would be cost effective.94 The configuration
favoured by Klaus Heiss, who was leading the Mathematica
staff, was a parallel burn Thrust Assisted Orbiter System
based on a design first derived at McDonnell Douglas.95
... WE CONCLUDE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TAOS
[Thrust Assisted Orbiter System] SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEM IS ECONOMICALLY JUSTIFIED, within a level
of space activities between 300 and 360 Shuttle
flights in the 1979-1990 period, or about 25 to
30 Space Shuttle flights per year, well within
the U.S. Space Program including NASA and DOD.96
Ibid.
Heiss K.P. Morgenstern 0. Economic Analysis of the Space Shuttle System: Volume 1.
The two-stage fully-reusable configuration had a projected per-launch cost of $4.6 million.
LeRoy Day, letter to the author, May 5, 1996.








According to Heiss it was difficult to get a hearing late
in the summer because:
everybody in Washington was designing a shuttle.
There seemed to be a hundred pet ideas . . . and
for a while nobody listen to anybody else.97
Allied with Robert Lindley, NASA's Director of Engineering
and Operations, Heiss pressed McDonnell Douglas and Grumman
to include the thrust assisted orbiter system configuration
in their presentations to NASA, but 'some NASA officials
kept telling them to forget it, the configuration had no
chance.'98 Resistance to the thrust assisted orbiter
configuration primarily came from Marshall because it
eliminated the need for a future human piloted booster,
which Marshall hoped to build.99
Heiss's strongest recommendation came in the form of
a memo sent to Fletcher on October 28, 1971. In it he
stated that the Mathematica studies showed the thrust
assisted orbiter to be the economically preferred choice.
Among the reasons given for its economic superiority were:
lower development costs of less than $6 billion; lower
development risks; equal capability with the originally
proposed system; elimination of the need for an immediate
decision on a reusable booster; and the assurance of an
97
99
Klaus Heiss, quoted in Claude Barfield Claude 'Intense Debate, Cost Cutting Precede White
House Decision to Back Shuttle,' p S11667.
Ibid.
LeRoy Day, letter to the author, May 5, 1996.
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early programme definition and thus a purpose to the
agency.100
Although the final Mathematica report was not due for
release until the end of January 1972, the memo gave a
clear indication to Fletcher of its conclusions. Armed with
this information and under pressure from the Office of
Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology
and the Presidents Scientific Advisory Committee, the
Program Office began to push hard for the thrust assisted
orbiter configuration.101
The debate continued right through November and
December, but TAOS eventually emerged as the leading
candidate and was presented to President Nixon on January
5, 1972.
Jim Fletcher and George Low went out to
California ... and had a meeting with President
Nixon, who was [on vacation] . . . and the paper
they took and the briefing they gave on shuttle
said that we would develop the vehicle for $5.15
billion ... in the purchasing power of the 1971
dollar and that we would do it by September 1979,
but that we needed about an 18 month schedule pad
on the back of that and a billion dollars of
funding over and above that to account for
contingencies, but that we would be willing to
embark on the 5.15 and the '79 time period as a
planned program.102
During that 40 minute meeting, Nixon stated that both
military and civilian applications should be emphasised if
Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice p 40.
LeRoy Day, letter to the author, May 5, 1996.





the programme was to be accepted. He also appeared to like
the idea that 'ordinary people' would be able to fly in the
shuttle. Low and Fletcher stressed 'the fact that the
shuttle is not a $7 billion toy, that it is indeed useful,
and that it is a good investment'.103 Nixon replied:
... that even if it were not a good investment,
we would have to do it anyway, because space
flight is here to stay. Men are flying in space
now and will continue to fly in space, and we'd
best be part of it.104
The programme was thus accepted by Nixon on the terms set
out by Fletcher and Low and on the same day he publicly
announced:
I have decided today that the United States
should proceed at once with the development of an
entirely new type of space transportation system
designed to help transform the space frontier of
the 1970s into familiar territory, easily
accessible for human endeavour in the 1980s and
'90s. ... It will revolutionize transportation
into near space, by routinizing it. It will take
the astronomical costs out of astronautics. ...
The new year 1972 is a year of the conclusion for
America's current series of manned flights to the
moon. ... they bring us to an important decision
point - a point of assessing what our space
horizons are . . . and of determining where we go
from here. ... the space shuttle program is the
right next step for America to take, in moving
out from our present beach head in the sky to
achieve a real working presence in space.105
George Low, memorandum Cor the record, January 12, 1972 (NASA History Office, Washington DC) .
Statement by President Richard Nixon, press release from the Office of the White House Press
Secretary, January 5, 1972 (National Air and Space Museum Archive, Washington DC).
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Nixon also sent a letter to the chairman of his New
Hampshire campaign committee on that day announcing his
candidacy for reelection.106
Unbeknown to NASA, senior White House staff members
had started to support a shuttle development programme.
Although Nixon's economic policies were slowing down the
rate of inflation, unemployment continued to hover around
6 per cent. While much of the domestic bureaucracy was busy
implementing the new economic policy, a few technicians at
the Office of Management and Budget were assigned to
develop statistical models plotting the effect of economic
conditions on the outcomes of presidential elections. The
study's results, which were reported to George Shultz and
John Ehrlichman, not surprisingly showed that rapid
economic growth benefited an incumbent president seeking
reelection.107 Nixon did not need statistical models to
know that falling unemployment in 1972 would increase his
chances of reelection. He thus decided to plunge ahead with
increased federal spending to produce boom conditions in
the election year.108 The approval of the shuttle programme
may well have been part of that agenda. It is certainly
believed that Peter Flanigan, a White House policy level
staffer, persuaded Nixon to go ahead with the shuttle
Nixon Richard. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon p 541.
Edward Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1978)
p 136.





because the continuing depression in the aerospace industry
and that the relatively high rate of unemployment among the
national pool of scientists and engineers would soon become
election issues.109 Whatever Nixon's motivations were, the
shuttle's proponents had finally cleared the first hurdle;
presidential approval. The shuttle's development could now
be programmed into NASA's FY 1973 budget.
Nixon's January 5 decision, to commit $5.15 billion to
the development of a partially reusable shuttle initially
prompted an adverse response in Congress. As Representative
Don Fuqua (Democrat, Florida) recalled, many members of the
congressional space committees were perturbed by NASA's
conversion to a partially reusable system:
We had just finished defending one configuration
on the Floor and then suddenly they announced
they were going to change it. ... We all wanted
to know how long they had known they were going
to change and how much of this kind of thing was
going on behind the committee's back. They
explained the reasons behind the changes, and
everybody calmed down.110
Despite the initial consternation over NASA's "sudden"
shift, strong allies quickly mobilized in support of the
new configuration against a notably weak opposition. After
a morning of government and industry witnesses describing
how necessary the shuttle was for America's future,
Representative Bella Abzug (Democrat, New York) appeared
Francis Hoban, interview with author, May 15, 1995.




before the Manned Space Flight Subcommittee in opposition
to the Shuttle, on the afternoon of March 14, 1972.
Now that NASA has reached the Moon, it is seeking
a new, similarly glamorous toy for its next
project and it feels that the Space Shuttle would
be just the ticket. ... I would remind you that
the President recently vetoed as fiscally
irresponsible a bill that would provide only $2
billion for child care Centers, a mundane but
urgent issue for the millions of working parents
in this country.111
Defenders of the shuttle adroitly counteracted her argument
by portraying the programme as one solution to America's
rising unemployment problem. The American Federation of
Labour and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO) executive council supported Nixon's decision to
develop the shuttle and urged Congress to defend the
programme and its potential 50 000 jobs.112 Taking up this
issue, John Wydler (Republican, New York) neutralized
Abzug's case by commenting on the predicament of aerospace
workers in their own state:
Thousands of these people are out of work,
thousands of their children are suffering . . .
They need some relief, some help from Government.
It would seem to me we would be helping those
people if we were to pass this program. For that
reason alone, it would seem a very people-
orientated program.113
Bella Abzug, quoted in Ibid, p 290.
'AFL-CIO Backs Space Shuttle' The Machinist (March 2, 1972) p 1.
John Wydler quoted in Ken Hechler, Towards the Endless Frontier p 291.
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Wydler was not the only member to attack Abzug. Ken Hechler
(Democrat, West Virginia) recollects the how curt a
reception Abzug received at the hearings:
Other committee members gave Mrs Abzug a hazing
for daring to oppose and presuming to know more
than they did about the worth of the Shuttle. It
almost seemed at times that they were attempting
to accomplish a rite of exorcism for the
heretical beliefs she espoused.114
As the debate moved to the Floor the recommendation that
NASA should receive the $200 million requested to begin the
shuttle development had powerful backing. Representative
Les Aspin (Democrat, Wisconsin) was the only member to
introduce an amendment to eliminate the $200 million and to
have the National Academy of Sciences conduct further
studies into the programme. The amendment was soon crushed
with both the Majority Leader, Hale Boggs (Democrat,
Louisiana) and the Minority Leader, Gerald Ford
(Republican, Michigan) standing against it. NASA's
authorization bill was thus passed with a comfortable
majority: 277-60.115 Challengers in the Senate found
themselves in a similar position. A bipartisan coalition of
61 Senators successfully defeated Walter Mondale's
amendment to cut shuttle funding, which only received 21
Ibid, pp 291-292 .
Ibid, pp 292-293; 'Senate Vote Coming on Space Shuttle' The Machinist (May 4, 1972), p 3;
Jeffrey Banks, 'The Space Shuttle,' Linda Cohen, Roger Noll, (ed) The Technology Pork Barrel
(Washington DC, The Brookings Institute, 1991), p 203.
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votes.115 The shuttle plans had thus passed through both
houses giving NASA the sanction to proceed.





Technology succeeds by taking the world apart and
putting it back together in productive ways. ...
In the operation of technical systems the
components must, at the outset, be separated and
precisely defined.1
Conditions of Invention.
While the titanic struggles over the definition of the
entire shuttle system were enacted, below the surface
rippled the process of sub-system definition. Due to the
complex nature of the shuttle, there was a great deal of
interaction between the NASA Centers and the shuttle
contractors through the years 1968 to 1975. Changes in
design of the entire system imposed changes in design at
the sub-system level; and activity at the sub-system level
shaped the range of possibilities of the entire system. One
central motivation behind many of these changes was to
ensure that the programme adhered to the tight budget
limitations, as Bastian Hello, North American Rockwell's
Shuttle Program Manager, told Aviation Week and Space
Technology at the time:
The system design decisions we're making are
reflecting costs in two areas, overall program
Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political
Thought (Cambridge, Massachuetts, MIT Press, Eighth Printing, 1992), p 182.
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costs as well as costs per flight, and we're
hitting both of those very, very hard.2
However, minimizing overall system complexity and gross
lift-off weight also formed a large part of the agenda for
change.3 Fluidity of design, both at the level of the sub¬
system and at the level of the entire system, therefore,
dominated this period (see figure 4:1 for changes to
shuttle configuration).
Within this chapter I explore the process of
separation and precise definition of some of the shuttle's
main components. A detailed analysis of every sub-system is
not possible within the boundaries of this particular
thesis, so I have focused on some key examples required to
carry out the shuttle's major functions: namely, ascent to
orbit, on-orbit manoeuvrability, reentry, return flight and
atmospheric flight.
Subverting Gravity.
Ascent to orbit ranges of between 100 to 800 nautical miles
with launch azimuths from 28.5° to 90° inclinations were
defined as the primary functions of the shuttle's main
propulsion system.4 Entwined with these basic functions
D. Fink, 'Shuttle Subcontractor Briefings Begin,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(November 27, 1972), p 48.
Bastian Hello, interview with the author, April 27, 1995; 'Space Shuttle Design Changes Cut
Costs' Aviation Week and Space Technology (November 13, 1973), pp 18-19.
Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document: Level 1, July 1, 1970 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC); Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document: Level 1, Change No.2,






































































































were the additional requirements of reusability and low
operational costs. Each presented technological problems
and, as engine design moved through its conceptual phases,
each was tied to multifarious technological solutions.
Function, along with operational environment, are
important factors in engine design. Knowledge of the
Earth's gravitational pull and its effects on orbital
dynamics play a pivotal role in shaping the technological
systems required for propulsion. The velocities required to
overcome the effects of the Earths gravitational pull are
enormous. For the orbiter to reach NASA's reference parking
orbit, 100 nautical miles circular, the vehicle had to
achieve speeds of over 17 000 miles per hour.5 This
physical problem did however, have technological solutions.
Two principal innovations, the rocket engine and high
energy rocket fuel, had matured sufficiently by 1957, for
the Soviet Union to launch Sputnik I. The number of
successful launches after this event multiplied rapidly.
Between 1957 and 1972 over 1 200 launches into orbit
occurred world-wide, with the most dominant activities
The force of gravity acts on all bodies in an identical manner, giving any unsupported mass
at a given distance from the centre of the Earth, the same acceleration towards the Earth.
To escape the Earth's gravitational pull, acceleration to a velocity of 36 700 feet per
second (7 miles/sec, or 25 200 mph) is required. Lower velocities are required for orbital
insertion, which are dependent on the characteristic of the orbital plane required, ie.
circular or elliptical and the altitude of the orbit. Lyn Dutton, David de Garis, Richard
Harding, Military Space (London, Brassey's UK, 1990), pp 31-32; Bernard Lovell, The Origins
and International Economics of Space Exploration (Edinburgh, University Press Edinburgh,
1973), pp 1-4; Arthur C. Clarke, The Exploration of Space (London, Temple Press Ltd, 1951),
p 31; Jerry Grey, Enterprise p 94.
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centred in the Soviet Union and the United States.6 At the
outset of the shuttle programme, therefore, the US space
community had accumulated a significant amount of knowledge
and experience in the methods, practices and associated
technologies needed to manipulate the Earth's gravitational
pull to propel an artificial object into orbit. Many of the
basic technologies surrounding the shuttle's propulsion
system had thus already been established.
Cryogenic fuels, which had played vital roles in
NASA's crusade to the Moon, is one example. Higher
performance cryogenic rocket fuel technology followed on
into the shuttle.7 On the Saturn V Moon rocket, liquid
oxygen and kerosene fuelled the five F-l rocket engines at
the bottom of the stack. But the six J-2 engines, five on
the second stage and one on the third, were fuelled with
liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.8 The two upper stages
employed cryogenic fuels, liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen
(L0X/LH2), because these technologies provided higher
specific impulse figures than had been achieved
Total world wide launches, including the US military, up to 1972 amounted to 1218. Out of
this total NASA launched 267. Bernard Lovell, Ibid, pp 1-3, 28-33; Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA
Historical Data Book, Volume IT p 26: Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Volume
III p 21; Joseph Green, Harriet Brown, A Summary of Major NASA Launches: October 1, 1958 -
December 31, 1989 (Florida, KSC Historical Report No.1, June 1992).
ibid; John McCarty, Byron Wood, 'Space Shuttle Main Engines: Interactive Design Challenges,'
Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference, Part 2. (Houston Texas, NASA, JSC,
Conference Publication 2342, 1985), pp 600-617; Armis Worlund, John Jamieson, Timothy Cole,
Tibor Lak, 'Cryogenic Propellant Management: Integration of Design, Performance and
Operational Requirements,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference, Part 2.
(Houston Texas, NASA, JSC, Conference Publication 2342, 1985), pp 585-599.
J. Mitchell, (ed) Thirty-Five Years in Power for America: A History of the Rocketdyne
Division of Rockwell International (Rocketdyne Publications Services, n.d).
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previously.9 During the late 1960s innovation planning in
rocket engine technology at NASA was directed towards
improvements in utilizing cryogenic fuels, as the Director
of the Chemical Propulsion Division at NASA's Office of
Advanced Research and Technologies, Adelbert Tischler,
recalled:10
At the time there was no clear definition of the
next generation of space vehicle. I was
satisfied, however, that the F-l was a good
enough booster engine and that the bigger need
was for improved upper stage engines. ... Also
with considerable experience in using L0X/LH2 I
had no fear of going in that direction even
though many "experts" at the time were adverse to
using LH2 in particular.11
A continuation along this technological path for the
shuttle's main engines was, for many, the 'logical
choice. '12
The hydrogen/oxygen technology for rocket
propulsion was pretty mature at that time and
that was pretty well accepted as a method of
propulsion.13
. . . one of the most dramatic advances in the
whole business was the use of hydrogen. ... its
just the most efficient fuel that we have right
now, short of nuclear.14
Specific impulse is defined as the thrust produced per unit of mass of propellant per second.
Despite the low bulk density disadvantage of the liquid oxygen/hydrogen combination, the
performance advantage of hydrogen over kerosene (RP-1) is roughly 50 per cent greater on an
equivalent mass basis. That advantage is huge when large velocity increments must be produced
by a stage. Adelbert Tischler, letter to the author, 13 November 1996.
Adelbert Tischler, letter to the author, November 13, 1996.
12
Robert Thompson, Von Karman Lecture p 5.
13
Robert Thompson, interview with the author, September 7, 1995.
14
Robert Freitag, interview with the author, June 5, 1995.
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At the outset of 1970 the estimated gross lift off
weight of NASA's original two-stage shuttle was 3.5 million
pounds. This translated into a total engine cluster of
thirteen 400 000 pound thrust liquid oxygen\liquid hydrogen
engines; ten on the booster and three on the orbiter.15
Simplification of operational and turnaround logistics
encouraged the employment of the same engine configuration
on both the orbiter and booster, but not everybody within
NASA agreed with this arrangement. For example, a leading
spacecraft designer at Johnson, Max Faget, recalled:
[There was an] agenda to use the same engines on
both the first stage and the second stage; well,
that was wrong.16
Dissenters at Johnson, led by Max Faget, were pushing the
Office of Manned Space Flight to employ a liquid
oxygen/kerosene (RP-1) engine similar to the F-l for the
booster. Faget agreed that the orbiter 'had to have a
hydrogen engine because it needed a high specific impulse,'
but thrust per cubic foot, because of the cost/size
relationship, was thought far more important on the booster
than increases in specific impulse.17 This debate continued
for sometime, but events ultimately rendered it superfluous
once the human piloted booster was dropped. Instead, it
Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document: Level 1, July 1, 1970 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC); W. Normyle, 'NASA Asks Quick Shuttle Replies' Aviation Week and
Space Technology (February 23, 1970), pp 16-17.
Max Faget, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
Max Faget, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
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took on a different form in the discourse surrounding the
choice between liquid or solid propellant booster systems,
covered later in this chapter.
Three development paths for a liquid oxygen/hydrogen
engine were open to NASA at the start of the shuttle
programme: one, embark upon the development of a new
aerospike engine concept; two, continue with the
traditional J-2 type gas generator combustion cycle engine
design, improving its performance and reducing both its
size and mass/thrust ratio; or three, embark upon the
development of new staged combustion cycle engine concept.
Aerospike, originally proposed by a General Electric
engineer, was a Rocketdyne development that had arisen from
a joint NASA/Air Force project in the mid to late 1960s
(see Print 4:1) . A significant step forward in rocket
engine technology, it offered many advantages, such as:
less mass than a conventional engine; and, because of it
unique nozzle design, less aerodynamic drag at the base of
the rocket or spaceplane.18 Thus, aerospike's major
innovation was in nozzle design, which was designed to
solve the problem of varying expansion ratios from sea
level to altitude. Otherwise, as Rocketdyne engineer, Lee
Solid, recalled it was basically a J-2 engine:
We had taken J-2 running gear, J-2 pumps, J-2
valves, J-2 start system, just about everything
on a J-2 except the thrust chamber and built what
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995; NASA, Technological Influence on the




we called a linear engine, which was an aerospike
[engine] .19
Aerospike's nozzle engine differed from the traditional
bell nozzle engine in that high pressure supersonic exhaust
flow from the combustion chamber would be directed
obliquely inward to expand on the central body. Expansion
outward would be limited aerodynamically to the Prandtl-
Meyer expansion angle, which is defined by the ambient
(atmospheric) external pressure. The exhaust stream area
leaving the base of an aerospike engine could thus be
confined to produce maximum force at very low back
pressure; with lesser exhaust stream area and thrust force
when higher back pressure existed. The exhaust stream area
would thus have been self-adjusting and, therefore, at near
maximum thrust coefficients for all back pressures. Since
the centre body was small, much of the mass of a bell
nozzle could be eliminated.20 Rocketdyne had built and
tested the hardware during the late 1960s, but many at NASA
were sceptical of its utilization on the shuttle. Two main
problems troubled NASA engineers:
[Aerospike] looked like an interesting concept.
... The trouble was that ... this meant that you
tied the type of rocket to the configuration and
in the early stages when we were ready to begin
development on the engine we hadn't decided yet
exactly what the orbiter was going to look like
and this would have tied these two developments
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995.
Adlebert Tischler, letter to the author, June 16, 1997; Lee Soild, interview with the author,
July 26, 1995.
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together, which is always a dangerous thing to
do.21
And;
The NASA decided that the aerospike technology
just wasn't there yet ... The problem we had with
the aerospike ... was that we were really
struggling with how to cool it. We just didn't
have enough cooling surface to cool it.22
So finally the programme administrators decided not to go
that route, but to specify a standard bell type engine,
which was relatively universal and could be bolted onto a
variety of airframe configurations (see figure 4:2) .23 With
its proposal rejected, Rocketdyne had to put together a
bell nozzle engine configuration very quickly.24
This left the competition between a high pressure,
staged combustion cycle engine and a traditional gas
generator cycle engine; both bell nozzle configurations.
The staged combustion cycle engine was basically an
aircraft cycle engine concept transferred to rocket
technology. All of the propellants used to spin the
turbines were to be used again in the combustion chamber.
As a result very high pump pressures were required; around
3000 pounds per square inch in the combustion chamber and
approximately 6000 pounds per square inch discharge
pressures at the pump. In contrast, the gas generator cycle
LeRoy Day, interview with the author, June 29, 1995.
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995.
LeRoy Day, interview with the author, June 29, 1995.







- Comparison of Aerospike and bell engine installations.
Source: NASA. Technology Influences on the Space Shuttle
Development p 5-13.
i
engine exhausted whatever propellant that was used to
combust and drive the turbines. Consequently the design was
less efficient, but it operated with much lower pump
pressure requirements (see figure 4:3) .25
Knowledge about staged combustion cycle engine
technology had been accumulated on a joint NASA\Air Force
low level funding programme during the 1960s. Managed by
the Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory programme, Pratt
& Whitney, the principal contractor, had produced a liquid
oxygen/liquid hydrogen, high-pressure engine designed to
generate high specific impulse figures, but was roughly
half the size of a conventional low pressure liquid
oxygen/liquid hydrogen engine. The programme, which had no
specific mission, was originally scheduled to end in 1972,
but on August 18, 1970 the Air Force terminated its support
and let NASA take it over.26 Although the shuttle's main
engines were judged to need at least twice the amount of
thrust of Pratt and Whitney's, it was a technology that
some in NASA thought could be expanded.27 Gas generator
engines, such Rocketdyne's J-2, had, on the other hand,
already been fully developed and utilized in NASA launch
vehicles. Consequently some members at Johnson began to put
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995; Max Faget, interview with the author.
September 9, iy9b; Adeibert Tischler, interview with the author, May 3, 1995.
Michael Yaffee, 'Reusable Rocket Motor Unveiled' Aviation Week and Space Technology (August
31, 1970), p 38.




Source: John McCarty. Byron Wood. 'Space Shuttle Main Engine:
Interactive Design Challenges' p 606.
pressure on the Office of Manned Space Flight to continue
along this technological path.
The Marshall Space Center, however, favoured
proceeding with the development of a new staged combustion
cycle engine for the shuttle. Higher specific impulse and
increased efficiency were, for Marshall, determining
requirements for a low operational cost, reusable system.
Accord was not, however, uniform among all members of NASA.
The same dissenters at Johnson that had questioned the
Office of Manned Space Flight over a booster engine
configuration, also raised an objection to Marshall's
rationale to develop a new staged combustion cycle engine.
Gambling higher specific impulse, at higher pump pressures,
against "proven" technology was thought by Faget's rebels
imprudent. The staged combustion cycle was considered by
these engineers to be overly complex and they foresaw
problems with cooling within the pre-combustion chamber and
at the turbopumps.28 Their position was that the gas
generator cycle engine was known to perform well and would
have a significant weight advantage over the staged
combustion cycle. The gas generator cycle engine was also
claimed to be a better design because the pumps and
turbines, driven by a separate gas generator, could be
decoupled for testing purposes from the development of the
injector and thrust chamber. The only area of technology in
Max Faget, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
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which the gas generator cycle engine was regarded by
Faget's rebels to be at a disadvantage was cooling the
thrust chamber at pressures as high as 4000 psi.29 As such,
they proposed that a modified version of the gas generator
cycle engine could be constructed that would meet shuttle
specifications (see table 4:1 for engine specification
comparisons).
Engine design however, was under the management of
Marshall and it rejected the gas generator engine. As Max
Faget recalled wryly:
The people at Marshall had fallen in love with
this [staged combustion] cycle ... and although
we had lobbied hard against this decision we
didn't have a very good chance because they knew
more about engines.30
Marshall's engineers argued that a modified gas generator
cycle engine had some inherent characteristics, namely
chamber cooling, chamber operations at higher mixture ratio
and turbine efficiencies, that cast serious doubt on the
promise of substantially lower engine weight at only a
slightly reduced specific impulse. Even assuming an
optimistic break-even position on weight versus specific
impulse, both Marshall and the Office of Advanced Research
and Technology (OART) argued that a higher specific impulse
engine translated into a heavier payload lifting
29
NASA, Technology Influence on the Space Shuttle Development p 5-14.
Max Faget, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
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Table 4:1.





Chamber Pressure, psi. 4000 3000











Thrust (vacuum), lb. 474 200 475 800
Specific impulse (vacuum), seconds. 455 . 0 461.1
Chamber cooling.













Source: Adapted from table 5-1. NASA, Technology Influence
on the Space Shuttle Development p 5-17.
capability.31 Adelbert Tischler, director of the Chemical
Propulsion Division at OART and Director of Shuttle
Technologies for both the Office of Manned Space Flight and
OART, estimated that even a 1 per cent degradation in
specific impulse would reduced payload capacity by about
10 000 pounds.32
On October 12, 1970, Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight, Dale Myers, concurred with Marshall's
position. Due to limited funds for the shuttle programme
Myers instructed that NASA's efforts should concentrate on
the high pressure, staged combustion cycle engine, so he
terminated activities related to the gas generator cycle
design.33 Compared with the gas generator cycle engine, the
higher specific impulse and thrust-to-weight ratios of the
staged combustion engine proved an attractive proposition
to the Office of Manned Space Flight when considering the
overall size that the engine had to be.34
As the engine programme advanced towards fabrication,
both Marshall and the main engine contractor, Rocketdyne
had to reconcile the complexity of design with
NASA, Technology Influence on the Space Shuttle Development p 5-16.
William Normyle, 'Shuttle Poses Dominant Challenge' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June
22, 1970), p 115.
NASA, Technology Influence on the Space Shuttle Development p 5-16.






specifications that were atypical in the realms of rocket
engine technology. NASA's general specifications for the
shuttle's main engines were:
400 000 pounds thrust at sea level with
continuous throttling down to 50 000 pounds
thrust with nozzle extended.
Minimum specific impulse of 455 seconds.
Thrust vector control of +/- 7 degrees.
Multiple restart requirements and a maximum time
between restarts of 30 days in orbit.
Continuous run ranging from 10 to 600 seconds.
Durability of 100 re-uses, 500 starts and 10
hours between overhauls.35
The most distinctive of these requirements was
reusability. Few rocket engines had been designed for
reuse. Almost all previous engine hardware had been
fabricated for expendable vehicles and thus, only required
an operational life of a few hundred seconds. The shuttle,
envisaged as a reusable means to access orbit, was expected
to conduct up to 100 missions before major refurbishment.
Accordingly, engine design had to incorporate a much longer
lifespan than had previously been required, as Rocketdyne
engineer, Lee Solid commented:
In the past we designed engines to be used once
or twice, ... but we never designed a system that
we would reuse over and over again. Whether we
were designing it for tactical systems or defense
systems, or whether we were designing it for
space application, it was always a one time use
thing. Now we had to think some new disciplines.
We had to think maintainability and reliability
and life. I [was] going to have to design and
develop life into these things.35
William Normyle, 'Shuttle Poses Dominant Challenge' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June
22, 1970) p 115.
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995.
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Notwithstanding these differences, reuse was not entirely
new to NASA's rocket engineers. Testing requirements for
previous engines demanded an element of reusability to keep
development costs reasonable. The F-l, for example, was run
up to 35 times between take down and inspection.37
Nonetheless, the extent to which the shuttle's engines were
planned to be reused went far beyond what NASA and its
contractors had accomplished before. Many of the problems
to be faced would thus be unique.38 Rocketdyne and
Marshall, therefore, had to embrace a new approach to
engine fabrication. A crucial part of that new approach
involved the use of line replaceable units. Major engine
components were designed so that they could be
interchangeable without system re-calibration and
individually removed or installed either in the field or at
the factory.39
Along with specifications on performance and hardware
life, Marshall and Rocketdyne also had to contend with
constraints on engine dimension and mass. The reusable
nature of the shuttle contributed to a relatively high
growth trend in hardware mass. As most of the vehicle was
designed to return to Earth, it contained many systems that
37
39
Adelbert Tischler, letter to the author, June 16, 1997.
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995.
Robert Ryan, Larry Salter, George Young, Paul Munafo, 'SSME Lifetime Prediction and
Verification, Integrating Environments, Structures, Materials: The Challenge,' Norman
Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 1 pp 386-402; John McCarty, Byron
Wood, 'Space Shuttle Main Engines: Interactive Design Challenges,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space
Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 1 pp 600-617.
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would remain inactive during the ascent to orbit. These
technologies, such as the orbiter's undercarriage,
essentially represented surplus payload until they were
activated.40 In addition, the reentry, flight and landing
characteristics also place a priority on the relationships
between engine weight, engine thrust and engine size.
Situated at the tail end of the orbiter, the three engine
cluster had to produce sufficient thrust to lift the
vehicle to a characteristic orbit, yet be light so as not
to induce critical repercussions on the orbiter's centre of
gravity on the journey back down; and be small enough so
that it would fit within the relatively small, as compared
to Apollo, space at the back of the orbiter.41
Compliance with many of these specifications was, to
a large extent, an inherent part of the engine's design.
The engineering solution to higher specific impulse and
augmentation of thrust-to-weight was to increase combustion
pressure. An increase in combustion pressure, demanded an
increase in power to feed the propellants to the combustion
chamber. The central issue thus facing both NASA and
Rocketdyne, was the development of turbo-machinery that
would provide sufficient horsepower to meet performance
demands. Turbo-machinery efficiency, turbine flow rate,
turbine temperatures and mechanical dynamics all stood as
40
Max Faget, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
41
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995; Max Faget, interview with the author,
September 9, 1995; Robert Lindstrom, interview with the author, August 17, 1995.
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constraints on potential power levels. The predictions of
operating regimes, temperatures, pressures, rotary speeds
and combustion processes, were all unprecedented.42 As
Marshall engineer, Bill Sneed recalled:
I remember a fellow by the name of Thompson that
was one of the leading engineers on the SSME
[space shuttle main engine]. I remember in all of
his projections he showed speeds and temperatures
that were just almost off the chart in comparison
to things that we had developed up to that
time.43
The goal of greater combustion pressure had to be
accomplished through improvements in component technology.
A crucial factor in engine fabrication was, therefore, the
requirement for exotic materials that could be formed into
high strength yet light components.44
An early interruption to the stabilization of engine
design descended from the universal drive to control the
mass of the entire shuttle system. As engine component
development advanced, the mass of each component spiralled
upwards, generating a concern over the growth in total
engine mass. Engineers at Marshall and Rocketdyne were thus
mandated by upper management to initiate strategies in
42
43
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995; Robert Ryan, Larry Salter, George Young,
Paul Munafo, 'SSME Lifetime Prediction and Verification, Integrating Environments,
Structures, Materials: The Challenge,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical
Conference: Part 1 pp 386-402; John McCarty, Byron Wood, 'Space Shuttle Main Engines:
Interactive Design Challenges,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part
1 pp 600-617 .
Bill Sneed, interview with the author, August 21, 1995.
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995; Robert Ryan, Larry Salter, George Young,
Paul Munafo, 'SSME Lifetime Prediction and Verification, Integrating Environments,
Structures, Materials: The Challenge,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical
Conference: Part 1 pp 386-402; John McCarty, Byron Wood, 'Space Shuttle Main Engines:
Interactive Design Challenges,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part
1 pp 600-617.
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weight reduction. Attention quickly focused on structural
design. In many areas where engine components would have
been assembled using conventional bolts and flanges,
Marshall and Rocketdyne made a tactical shift to welded
constructions. This change in approach allowed the engine
builders to comply with short-term mass restrictions, but
resulted in long-term difficulties. Most of the engine's
components were formed in extremely complex shapes and
required a considerable amount of time and care in bonding
the materials together (see figure 4:4).
By the end of 1974 weld development was still a major
area of concern and project focus. Testing, which was
scheduled to begin in 1974, suffered major delays as
process development for critical welds, on both the turbo-
machinery and combustion devices, elevated to the status of
"pacing item": a technology that determines the overall
schedule of a systems development.45 David Winterhalter,
chief of NASA's shuttle propulsion branch, commented at the
time:
We are doing a lot of learning on the welding of
the first one or two components that come down
the line. We're also vulnerable to a component
problem in that we don't always have another
piece of hardware right behind, necessarily, if
we lose a test component.46
Ibid; Robert Lindstrom, interview with the author, August 17, 1995; Marshall Space Flight
Center, Rockwell International, 'Summary of Space Shuttle Main Engine Review,' Space Shuttle
1975 Statue, report for the Committee on Science and Technology, US House of Representative
(Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, February 1975), pp 39-41, 91-93; Craig
Covault, 'Shuttle Engine Passes Critical Milestone,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June
30, 1975), pp 37-42 .
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As highlighted above, the removal of the orbiter's internal
fuel tanks represented the most significant deviation from
NASA's original shuttle design. Simplification of design
was the main impetus behind the introduction of the
external tank. The complexity of building and operating an
orbiter with internal fuel tanks had aroused a lot of
concern within NASA as Johnson's Director, Christopher
Kraft recalled:
The structure was driven by our lack of
confidence in being able to build a tank that
could be an internal part of the aeroplane
structure, because you had to be able to test it
structurally after every flight ... and there was
no way you could guarantee you weren't going to
blow the aeroplane up by testing it. ... That's
what drove the tank out of the machine ... I
don't think structurally we could have done
otherwise.47
By incorporating both the liquid hydrogen and the liquid
oxygen fuel tanks to a single external structure, the
complexity of systems integration was reduced and the
development costs of the orbiter were significantly lowered
(see figures 4:5 and 4:6) . In addition, the approach
relieved pressure on the tight restrictions in the mass
growth of the orbiter and the uncertainties involved in
achieving optimum performance from the main engines.48
47
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
J.P. Loftus, S.M. Andrich, M.G. Goodhart, R.C. Kennedy, 'The Evolution of the Space Shuttle
Design,' unpublished presentation paper presented to the Production and Development Panel of
the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident, March 6, 1986 (NASA History Office










































Source: NASA History Office Archive.
The primary function of the external tank, namely to
house the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen that would fuel
the orbiter's three main engines, was the basic determinant
of its overall size. The amount of fuel the system would be
required to carry was dictated by both the thrust output
and operation time of the orbiter's three main engines. A
thrust specification of 400 000 pounds for each engine
translated into a combined consumption rate of over 64 900
gallons of liquid propellant per minute. Since NASA had
selected a parallel burn stacking arrangement, the main
engines, ignited before lift-off, would have to propel the
shuttle virtually all the way to orbit: a duration of about
eight minutes. The external fuel tank, thus had to be sized
to contain over 520 000 gallons of liquid propellant.49
Another critical design parameter shaping the external
tank was its mass ratio. As the external structure had to
go virtually all the way to orbit, it had to withstand all
the aerodynamic forces, vibrations and speeds (around
27 000 feet per second) of the flight. In addition, because
mass is of vital importance in travel to orbit, every pound
of tank was equivalent to every pound of payload. Hence,
NASA's tank designers had to keep the mass fraction of the
tank as high as they could get it: the tank had to be very
light, yet structurally very sound. The result was a unique
Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle pp 225-226; W.H. Morita, (ed) Space Shuttle System Summary p
28 .
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tank design that comprised a very thin aluminum wall.50
Just the welding of aluminium alone was, in 1971, a 'very
difficult thing to do,'51 but coupled with the size of the
tank walls, each weld would typically have to land:
Anywhere from about 1/4 to 3/8 of an inch [on the
liquid oxygen tank], whereas in the liquid
hydrogen tank a lot of the metal is only about a
1/10 of an inch thick.52
Although distinct in its requirements, the design of
external tank drew heavily on NASA's past experience with
the tanks in the Saturn rockets (see figure 4:7).
In concept [the external tank] ... was from the
Saturn V, but it was designed differently because
its shape was different. It was not as big in
diameter ... it used less pieces to make a
circle. ... The bulk heads were different shapes
... The technologies however, were the same.53
The Saturn tanks were several feet in diameter larger, so
NASA had learnt a lot about welding capabilities.
Nevertheless, in each tank there was going to be almost a
mile and a half of weld:
So every weld had to be perfect because if any
one of them starts leaking, it doesn't have to
rupture, just leak, then you can ... lose a
vehicle.54
Welding was thus going to be a very crucial part of
production process.
James Odem, interview with the author, August 21, 1995.
James Kingsbury, interview with the author, August 16, 1995.
James Odem, interview with the author, August 21, 1995.
James Kingsbury, interview with the author, August 16, 1995.
























Predictions of aerodynamic forces on ascent were one
of the first factors to modify areas of the external tank's
design. Late in 1972 the external tank's original cone-
shaped nose was changed to an ogive shape as early
aerodynamic studies indicated that this shape would give a
better performance. Throughout 1973, overall length of the
external tank was gradually decreased and its diameter
increased as the aerodynamic characteristics and
interference effects of the integrated vehicle were better
understood.55
To be able to fly a vehicle stable you want to
have the center of pressure in front of the
center of gravity. So what we had to do was
balance the diameter and the size to where
basically the center of gravity was countered
near to what we call the intertank, that bolts
the [liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks]
together, because that was about where the
combination of the whole vehicle center of
gravity would be. We wanted the center of
pressure to be a few feet ahead of that; that
way, as long as those two are separate, then your
control laws are a lot simpler.56
At the end of 1973 negotiations and further
refinements to an external tank design tapered off. A
configuration acceptable to NASA was established in early
1974 and with the design process at satisfactory a point of
closure hardware development began.
James Odem, interview with the author, August 21, 1995; 'Shuttle Weight Cut 20 Percent Over
Last Year,' Defense/Space Business Daily (March 1, 1974), p 5; Charlie Dill, J.C. Young, B.B.
Roberts, M.K. Craig, J.T. Hamilton, W.W. Boyle, 'The Space Shuttle Ascent Vehicle Aerodynamic
Challenges: Configuration, Design and Data Base Development,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space
Shuttle Technical Conference, Part 1 pp 151-152.
James Odem, interview with the author, August 21, 1995.
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Ballistic Solutions.
Although Nixon had given his approval of the thrust
assisted, parallel burn orbiter system, the specific
details on booster technology had not been established in
early 1972.
When we first got the go-ahead for the program
... we were still not clear whether we were going
to use liquid boosters ... or solid rockets and
that was a major controversy in the early part of
the program.57
The choices surrounding booster technology at the outset of
1972 were: development of a new liquid fuelled pressure-fed
system or modification of a solid propellant rocket.58
Grumman Aerospace and Boeing Corporation were also
promoting the traditional series-burn, pump-fed liquid
system.59
Recovery versus expendable, coupled with development
versus operational costs, hinged the debate between liquid
fuelled and solid fuelled booster technology. Initial
thinking within NASA had centred around reusable liquid
systems fashioned for recovery after a sea ditch. This
would keep operational costs low because the rockets would
57
58
LeRoy Day, interview with the author, June 29, 1995.
William Hieronymus, 'Three Shuttle Booster Concept Studied,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (January 10, 1972), pp 46-48; 'Shuttle Decision Hailed as NASA Victory,' Aviation
Week and Space Technology (January 10, 1972), pp 15-16; Zack Strickland, 'Pressure-Fed
Booster Explore,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (January 24, 1972), pp 40-41.
The Grumman\Boeing concept was based on a modified Boeing S-1C, which they claimed could be
developed for about half the cost of a liquid pressure-fed system and would entail less
technological risk. They also cited an advantage of less weight over the pressure-fed system,
300 000 pounds as compared to 1 million pounds, because it would not need thick walls to
withstand tank pressurization. Despite the obvious benefits associated with thrust to weight
specifications, reduction in weight was considered less of a risk because there was great
uncertainty at the time as to what would happen to a million pound pressure-fed booster on
water impact. Michael Yaffee, 'Alternate Booster Evaluation Set,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (January 24, 1972), pp 36-37.
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be reused, but development costs would be high, because
they were complex boosters to fabricate. Expendable solid
fuelled booster systems were also examined, because as
relatively simple vehicles they would keep development
costs low. However, throwing them away after each launch
vastly increased operational costs.60 Liquid fuelled rocket
technology had been the mainstay of NASA's experience in
human space flight. For many, both within NASA and the
aerospace industry, it appeared a given that NASA would use
liquid propellants for the shuttle's booster system.
The solid rocket people didn't understand why
they were still being asked to study this and
study that because we had never used solid
rockets on a manned program as a major propulsion
element. ... they came to me ... and said you are
kind of stringing us along, we could be doing
some other things here. We just can't understand
why you are having us carry on these studies
because we don't believe NASA can be serious
about using solid rockets. . . . They asked von
Braun's opinion, he told them he felt sure that
NASA, when they settled down, they would make the
decision to go with the liquid booster. ... So
the contractors were a little perplexed as to why
we were still pushing that way.61
The liquid booster technologies though, were presenting a
number of problems for NASA's engineers.
The initial approach was to use liquids ... stay
with what we know. However, a group came into the
picture which said I think we can recover these
[solid] boosters and reuse them. It [was proving]
pretty difficult with the liquids. Once you get
those engines soaked in sea water the probability
William Hieronymus, 'Three Shuttle Booster Concept Studied,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (January 10, 1972), pp 46-48; 'Shuttle Decision Hailed as NASA Victory' Aviation
Week and Space Technology (January 10, 1972), pp 15-16; Zack Strickland, 'Pressure-Fed
Booster Explore,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (January 24, 1972), pp 40-41.
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of using them over is pretty remote, but the
solid, which doesn't have a lot of complex
mechanisms or machinery, has a chance. And so
Thiokol and a couple of other solid people worked
on it ... and when they went out and began
demonstrating and throwing the thing into salt
water and pulling it out and trying to reuse it,
it became pretty convincing.62
External political pressures also influenced NASA's
booster technology decision. Although the Office of
Management and Budget had agreed not to become directly
involved in any technical judgment after Nixon's
announcement, their power over NASA's budget commitments
was an effectual leverage on the agency's technological
decision making. Office of Management and Budget Director,
George Shultz told NASA Administrator James Fletcher, early
in 1972:
With these very real funding constraints in mind,
I believe that NASA would be well advised to
select a shuttle system which minimizes the risk
of cost overruns and allows flexibility to absorb
possible cost increases within overall funding
constraints. Otherwise, a cost overrun on the
shuttle could lead to an undesirable stretch-out
of the operational date for the shuttle or
serious cutbacks in other productive NASA
programs which, in turn, could jeopardize the
shuttle program.53
In addition, NASA was being forced to act quickly on a
final configuration commitment. The House Committee on
Science and Astronautics had 'demanded a firm decision' on
NASA's choice of booster and shuttle configuration by the
Robert Freitag, interview with the author, June 5, 1995.
Letter from George Shultz, Director of the OMB to James Fletcher, February 16, 1972 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC).
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time they appear before the committee on March 16, 1972,64
which especially concerned William Lilly, NASA's
Comptroller:
In reviewing the approach to the shuttle cost
analysis ... we [have] become a bit apprehensive
that some considerations that appear vital to a
well rationalized decision on the shuttle
configuration may not be adequately treated in
the time frame which has been established for the
final study effort.'65
In connection with the booster technologies Lilly felt that
it was important to expose 'the degree of uncertainty
associated with pressure-fed development costs versus solid
development costs,' given the tight budget and lack of
flexibility for contingencies.66
Early in March, NASA Administrator James Fletcher came
to the conclusion that the 'use of solid boosters in the
parallel staged configuration represents the optimum choice
from combined technical and budgetary points of view:'67
The decision concerning liquid or solid boosters
was a difficult one. It involves a trade-off
between future benefits ... and earlier savings
. . . liquid boosters have lower potential
operating costs, while solid boosters have lower
development cost. The decision concerns
development risk which is lower for the solids
because the technical unknowns are less, and also
risks in operational costs which favor the solids





Letter from James Fletcher to Casper Weinberger, Deputy Director, OMB, March 6, 1972 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC).
Letter from William Lilly to Dale Myers, February 11, 1972 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
Letter from James Fletcher to Casper Weinberger, Deputy Director, OMB, March 6, 1972 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC).
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recover a booster is much less. Another approach
to reaching this decision involved adding all
costs together - development, investment and
operating. However the conclusions here are
heavily dependent on the mission model, with the
liquid booster favored if we assume a large
number of flights per year, and the solids if the
number of flights per year is less. Based on the
results of our contractor studies and our in-
house estimates, and with our great concern about
holding down development costs in these years of
tight fiscal constraint, our decision must be in
favor of the solid booster.68
A meeting between George Low and Donald Rice, of the Office
of Management and Budget on March 7, confirmed that NASA
was going to go ahead with the development of the solid
rocket boosters for the shuttle.69 In announcing the
decision Fletcher said the development costs would be
reduced by $350 million and that the decision was based on
lower development costs at less technical risk.70
On-orbit Manoeuvres.
If the shuttle was going to retrieve or repair satellites
in orbit, rendezvous and dock with orbiting hardware and
serve as a supply vehicle for a possible future space
station, then a technological system that would enable the
orbiter to manoeuvre in orbit, turn on its axis and provide
on-orbit stability, had to be an integral part of the
George Low, memorandum for the record, meeting with Don Rice, March 8, 1972 (NASA History
Office Archive, Washington DC).
Zack Strickland, 'Single Shuttle Contractor Planned' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(March 20, 1972), pp 14-15.
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system. Manoeuvring and attitude control systems were thus
important to both NASA and the Air Force.71
The absence of air in space means that the orbiter's
aerodynamic control surfaces (its wings, tail, flaps,
elevons, etc.) have no value. A complex of many small
rocket engines, collectively known as the reaction control
sub-system (RCS), would thus have to be positioned on the
orbiter to enable the vehicle to move around its own centre
of gravity; that is to change its pitch, yaw and roll (see
figure 4:8) .72 This system alone, however, would not be
able to provide sufficient thrust to perform orbit
circularization, orbit transfer, or de-orbit, so a
secondary rocket engine system, an orbital maneuvering sub¬
system (OMS), would also be necessary.
Knowledge about the physics and technological
requirements of on-orbit manoeuvres had been accrued on
both Gemini and Apollo. On the Apollo lunar and command
module's the OMS and RCS engines were configured to use a
hypergolic propellant combination (nitrogen
tetroxide/Aerozine-50). Hypergolic propellants are
extremely toxic and very corrosive. When brought together
they ignite spontaneously, which serves well inside the
combustion chamber of a rocket engine, but can be very
dangerous if accidentally spilt. Special safety precautions
William Normyle, 'Shuttle Poses dominant Challenge' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June
22, 1970), p 120.
72
Jerry Grey, Enterprise pp 95-96.
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Figure 4:8.
Source: NASA History Office Archive.
are thus imperative when working with this technology.
Consequently, a continuation with hypergolic propellants
for the shuttle was thought to be imprudent as it could
impede a perceived frequent turnaround process.
Simplification of logistics, operation and maintenance,
combined with rapid turnaround requirements, prompted NASA
engineers to move away from hypergolic's and design orbital
maneuvering and reaction control systems using a
hydrogen/oxygen propellent combination, as a chemical
engineer, Norman Chaffee, recalled:73
So our going in position was that we really
needed to be working with hydrogen oxygen
propulsion ... systems and that persisted in our
planning for two or three years.74
Apart from being relatively safer than hypergolics, a
hydrogen\oxygen system promised higher specific impulse
figures and, because the design would enable both the OMS
and RCS internal propellant tanks to be integrated into one
structure, a volumetrically more efficient system.75
In 1970/71 Johnson took on an extensive technology
program in conjunction with Marshall and the Lewis Space
Center to examine on-orbit propulsion systems. With demands
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995; C. Gibson. C Humphries.
'Orbital Maneuvering System Design Evolution' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical
Conference, Part 2. (Houston Texas, NASA, JSC, Conference Publication 2342, 1985), pp 639-
655; Ralph Taeuber. W. Karakulko. D. Blevins. C. Hohmann. J. Henderson. 'Design Evolution of
the- Orbiter Reaction Control Subsystem' Norman Chaffee. (ed) Space Shuttle Technical
Conference, Part 2. (Houston Texas, NASA, JSC, Conference Publication 2342, 1985), pp 656-
672; Frank Anderson. Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA 1915-1980 (Washington
DC, NASA Scientific and Technical Information Branch, SP-4403, 1981), pp 47-53.
Norman Chaffee interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995; C. Gibson. C. Humphries.
'Orbital Maneuvering System Design Evolution,' pp 639-640; Ralph Taeuber. etal. 'Design
Evolution of the Orbiter Reaction Control Subsystem,' p 656.
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ranging from brief pulsing to relatively sustained thrust
for orbit translation or de-orbit, a gaseous supply of
hydrogen\oxygen was thought preferable to liquid. This
choice, however, gave rise to issues of production and
storage of gaseous hydrogen!oxygen and ignition techniques,
because hydrogen and oxygen gases do not ignite on contact.
Multiple restarts, longer lifetimes, higher cycles, fast
responses and reusability also dominated the technical the
agenda.76 Embedded within the cooperative programme,
though, was a strong element of competition, as Norman
Chaffee remembered:
At that time, roles and missions were not well
defined. This was a NASA activity and each Center
was starting to carve out its niche of the
business ... the Lewis guys, they wanted hydrogen
oxygen propulsion, but the Marshall people wanted
to do the on-orbit propulsion and they realized
they would probably have to do the attitude
control propulsion because of the integrated
nature of the thing. We had done the Apollo
attitude control and ... although it was a
hypergolic system we felt like that was our
expertise.77
As the design work progressed it became apparent that
a hydrogen/oxygen system would be extremely complicated to
operate. This complexity generated concerns about
reliability and systems integration within the orbiter. In
addition, the internal volume constraints and questions of
system .mass had became more explicit as the size of the
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995; William Normyle, 'Shuttle Poses
Dominant Challenge,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June 22, 1971), p 120.
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
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orbiter was slowly reduced during 1971.78 As the year drew
to a close it was also clear that the on-orbit propulsion
systems could not escape the rigors of the economic
climate.
When the rubber really hit the road . . . the
bottom line came out and said we've only got
money to do something that we know how to do and
have done before. That technology was the
hypergolic technology, ... so we ended up the
attitude control system went that way [and] ...
the on-orbit propulsion system went that way. ...
I believe that we could have brought in a good
hydrogen oxygen system, which would of had a
better record on maintainability, would have been
less onerous in its maintenance, ... but its up¬
front development cost would have been very
high.79
As the issue of development costs superseded the
appetite for advanced technology, ideas on utilizing
established technologies burgeoned. Early studies had
focused on using the Apollo Lunar Module ascent or descent
engine for the OMS. Resurrected in 1971, both engines were
seriously examined afresh as viable hypergolic alternatives
to a hydrogen/oxygen system. NASA engineers had learnt a
lot from Apollo, especially from their mistakes.
Nevertheless, requirements for the shuttle's operational
environment were very different. To achieve the reliability
and operational economy commensurate with the shuttle's
requirements, an operating life of hundreds of thousands of
Sufficient internal volume for a low density hydrogen/oxygen system was a significant penalty
in a smaller orbiter. Higher density storable propellants, which could produce the specified
delta velocity increments and be stored within smaller tanks, thus appeared more attractive.
C. Gibson, C Humphries, 'Orbital Maneuvering System Design Evolution,' p 641; Ralph Taeuber,
W. Karakulko, D. Blevins, C. Hohmann, J. Henderson, 'Design Evolution of the Orbiter Reaction
Control Subsystem,' p 656.
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
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thrust cycles with nearly zero maintenance was necessary.80
Problems with reducing the mass of both the Lunar Module
ascent and decent engines, and the high cost of redesigning
them for reusability, were issues that eventually persuaded
NASA's engineers to abandon the idea and opt for the
development of a new, reusable hypergolic OMS engine.81
As an overall shuttle configuration advanced towards
an initial closure point, the requirements for both the OMS
and RCS became more defined. On the smaller, partially
reusable, thrust assisted orbiter, the OMS had evolved into
a third stage engine. After main engine burn-out and
external fuel tank jettison, the OMS engines would have to
generate the additional velocity of 90 feet per second to
insert the orbiter into the Office of Manned Space Flight's
reference mission orbit (delivery of 65 000 pounds to a
circular orbit of 100 nautical miles). Once in orbit, a six
day mission would require the OMS to fire 12 times to
produce 4.5 feet per second velocity increments, so that
the orbiter could maintain its orbit. Orbital manoeuvres,
rendezvous and satellite retrieval, translated into a delta
velocity range of between 32 feet per second and 1500 feet
per second for the OMS, and 120 feet per second to 150 feet
per second for the RCS. A crossrange capability of 1500
nautical miles, provided by the orbiters delta wings,
8 0
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995; Wernher von Braun, 'The
Reusable Space Transport,' American Scientist (November\December 1972), p 737.
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C. Gibson, C Humphries, 'Orbital Maneuvering System Design Evolution,' pp 641-643.
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eliminated the need for the OMS to perform positional
changes in orbit to line up with the landing target, but a
velocity burn of 250 feet per second against the direction
of orbit, would be required to slow the orbiter down enough
for it to leave space and return to Earth.82
Such a multiplicity of functions gave rise to
questions over the preferable choice of propellant or
propellant combinations for both the OMS and the RCS.
Originally nitrogen tetroxide/Aerozine-50, as used on
Apollo, was the hypergolic propellant combination choice
for the OMS with a mono-propellant, hydrazine, for the RCS.
Mono-propellants were, however, also being put forward for
the OMS as NASA engineer, Norman Chaffee recalled:
As we got down to the final choices there was a
very strong school that wanted to even drop back
away from the hypergolic bi-propellant propulsion
systems to go to a mono-propellant hydrazine
systems, which had their impetus way back there
in Second World War Germany.83
Considerations of development risk, cost, safety,
maintainability, hardware life, reliability, performance
and mass along with an engine design that was
regeneratively cooled, pushed NASA towards a bi-propellant
Ibid, pp 645-646; Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document Level 1: Revision No. 4. (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC) pp 3, 4-5.
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
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system using nitrogen tetroxide, monomethyl hydrazine for
the OMS.84
When push came to shove it was a hard trade to
make, but the performance of the bi-propellant
system ... was just so much better than the mono-
propellant system.85
A mono-propellant system for the RCS remained until late
1972, but as performance became a more important factor and
the potential for integrating the RCS with OMS looked
favourable, the trade-off eventually swung over to using
nitrogen tetroxide, monomethyl hydrazine on the RCS as
well.86
Heated Debates.
One shuttle observer noted in 1970 that:
If there is any clear cut lack of agreement among
those planning the space shuttle, it is in the
area of thermal protection.87
The problem of shielding the orbiter's primary structure
from the intense heat induced by atmospheric drag on
reentry attracted such visible controversy because its
solution was inextricably bound with the design of other
major elements of the shuttle. Airframe configuration,
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995; C. Gibson, C Humphries,
'Orbital Maneuvering System Design Evolution,' pp 645-646; Ralph Taeuber, etal, 'Design
Evolution of the Orbiter Reaction Control Subsystem,' p 656.
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
Ralph Taeuber, etal, 'Design Evolution of the Orbiter Reaction Control Subsystem,' pp 656-
657 .
William Normyle, 'Shuttle Poses Dominant Challenge,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June
22, 1970), p 99.
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structure and materials could not be divorced from the
selection of materials and structure of the thermal
protection system. Equally, weight and distribution of a
thermal protection system could threaten the preservation
of design thrust levels of the propulsion system and thus
adversely effect payload lifting capability.
Early in 1970 NASA and its contractors focused their
attention on four principal thermal protection design
concepts: (i) replaceable ablator panels; (ii) metallic
heat shields; (iii) nonmetallic materials; and (iv) carbon-
carbon hot structures.88
Ablator technologies had been developed and utilized
on the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programmes. Essentially
an ablator heat shield was a sacrificial outer layer that
would burn up on reentry. The concept employed materials
that had almost no ability to transfer heat, but would turn
white hot, char and then melt away without transmitting
energy into the primary structure.89 Although the
development of a low density ablator system for shuttle
application was judged as uncomplicated and workable, it
was not regarded as feasible unless some of the design
requirements imposed were relaxed.90
Robert Freitag, interview with the author, June 5, 1995; Robert Dotts, Donald Curry, Donald
Tillian, 'Orbiter Thermal Protection System,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical
Conference p 1062.
Mike Gray, Angle of Attack pp 212-215.
Hans Mark, interview with the author, September 8, 1995; Letter from Hans Mark to Roy
Jackson, February 15, 1972 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
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An expensive and complicated refit of the orbiter's
thermal protection system after every flight was not in
harmony with the discourse on economic and routine access
to space. The Office of Manned Space Flight's requirement
that the shuttle system perform routinely over 100 missions
with a cost-effective level of refurbishment and
maintenance, placed a heavy demand on the design of a
thermal protection system.91 Materials that could meet such
a specification existed only as fledgling development
programmes or research projects.
The inter-related nature of the thermal protection
system traverse a much greater distance than its influence
on other subsystems. Indeed, the problems and solutions
associated with thermal protection were integral to the
overall justification of the programme.92 If a solution
could not be found, then the shuttle programme was in grave
danger of no longer be able to rationalize itself.
Nevertheless, NASA continued its research into ablator
techniques in case a backup would be required.93
Repeatedly withstanding the thermal environments of
reentry was the key determinant of a thermal protection
system design. Coupled with this were other induced
Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document: Level 1. (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC), p 4.
Ibid; David Baker, 'Evolution of the Space Shuttle,' Spaceflight (September, 1976), p 311.
'Shuttle May Use Low-Cost Ablatives,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (October 5, 1970),
p 56.
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environments within which the system had to perform; such
as acoustic loads, structural deflections induced by
aerodynamic loads, the extreme heat and radiation of the
sun, the extreme cold of space, and the natural
environments on Earth, such as salt, fog, wind and rain;
and because the thermal protection system was to cover the
exterior of the vehicle, it also had to provide an
acceptable aerodynamic surface.94
Due to the inter-related nature of the thermal
protection system, most of the contractors exhibited a
tendency towards combinations of metallic materials in
their Phase-B proposals.95 Design emphasis was on a thermal
protection system that was an integral part of the load
bearing structure, providing commonality between materials
for airframe structure and thermal protection, with a
minimum reliance on exotic materials.95 Nonetheless, a
perception prevailed at NASA that the metallic heat shield
concepts possessed some significant drawbacks. Many of the
metallic materials required coatings, such as Sylvania R-
512E, to provide oxidation protection. The coatings would
Robert Dotts, Donald Curry, Donald Tillian, 'Orbiter Thermal Protection System,' Norman
Chaffee (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference, Part 2 (Houston, Texas, NASA, JSC,
Conference Publication 2342, 1985), pp 1062-1081.
McDonnell Douglas and Martin Marietta's Phase-B design proposed a titanium alloy hot-
structure for the wings and fuselage, with the lower surfaces covered with columbium
shingles. Cobalt superalloy was proposed for the control surfaces and the vertical tail was
to made of a nickel superalloy. North American Rockwell's Phase-B design also adopted a
radiant heat shield configuration, constructed of various metallic superalloys including
columbium-129Y, Haynes-188 and Inconel-718. Grumman/Boeing' s Alternate Phase-A design thermal
protection system consisted of metallic panels backed with Micro-Quartz insulation; except
for the rudder which was made of Inconel-718. Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle pp 76, 79, 93.
David Baker, 'Evolution of the Space Shuttle,' Spaceflight (July, 1973), pp 264-265.
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have to be applied so thoroughly, both inside and outside
(including fasteners), that it was feared that complicated
inspection techniques between each flight would negate the
advantages of commonality. Superalloys that did not require
any coatings, such as nickel chrome (TDNiCr) were also
considered, as they could withstand temperatures up to
2 400 degrees F, but the production rate of TDNiCr (around
10 000 pounds per year in 1970) was not sufficient to meet
shuttle demands. Superalloys also showed a tendency to
produce a rippling effect over the surface when repeatedly
exposed to high temperatures, which could have a
detrimental influence on aerodynamic stability. Metallic
concepts, on the whole, were complex. Design features to
minimize thermal distortion, intricate panel to panel
joints, as well as the additional insulation blanket that
would be required to protect the primary structure of the
orbiter, all conspired against a metallic thermal
protection system.97
In contrast to the complexity of the metallic systems,
the nonmetallic heat shield concepts appeared to posses the
advantage of design simplicity. Lockheed Missiles and Space
Company's alternate proposal had an orbiter constructed
from conventional aluminum with a thermal protection system
comprised of titanium on the upper surfaces and its
William Normyle, 'Shuttle Poses Dominant Challenge,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June
22, 1970), pp 96-121; Robert Dotts, Donald Curry, Donald Tillian, 'Orbiter Thermal Protection
System,' Norman Chaffee (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference, Part 2 (Houston, Texas,
NASA, JSC, Conference Publication 2342, 1985), pp 1062-1081.
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proprietary silica system, called LI-1500, on the lower
surface.98 It was the silica system that captured NASA's
interest. Composed of tiles fabricated from 99.6 percent
pure amorphous silica fibres derived from common sand, the
system had the potential of offering a low density, low
maintenance, reusable thermal protection system, which
could be installed on a conventional airframe (see figure
4:9) . While it was recognized that a major development
programme would have to be undertaken to bring the
nonmetallic materials out of the laboratory to a state of
high production and vehicle application, the significant
weight savings and inherent design simplicity influenced
NASA to favour it as the primary material for the orbiter's
thermal protection system.99
From 1970 to 1972 two nonmetallic reusable materials
were under investigation by NASA and its contractors: a
silica-base material (Si02) and a mullite (3A1203 Si02) .
Mullite was initially expected to exhibit a higher
temperature capability because of its higher density;
however, tests showed that the low density silica possessed
a superior thermal performance due to the small fibre
diameter material used in its formulation. The contractors
working with mullite, McDonnell Douglas and General
'Non-Metallics Studied for Shuttle,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (January 18, 1971),
pp 36-39; Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle p 89.
Samuel Beddingfield, interview with the author, July 31, 1995; 'Non-Metallics Studied for
Shuttle,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (January 18, 1971), pp 36-39; Robert Dotts,
Donald Curry, Donald Tillian, 'Orbiter Thermal Protection System,' Norman Chaffee (ed) Space
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Electric, failed to strengthen the material to levels
compatible with the predicted thermal stresses of reentry.
Silica was thus selected as the baseline material for the
orbiter's thermal protection system in January 1973.100
Carbon-carbon was the only known material that showed
potential for providing reuse capability for the high
temperature areas (greater than 2 300 degrees F), such as
the wing leading-edge and nose cap. NASA considered carbon-
carbon a clear choice for the leading-edge applications
because in test conditions it appeared far more durable
than superalloys. Nevertheless, significant developments in
coatings to prevent oxidation would have to be made to make
carbon-carbon a multi-mission material.101
Eliminating Powered Atmospheric Flight.
Discussions on powered versus unpowered landings as an
orbiter requirement had begun in late 1969. Powered
landings, using air breathing jet engines, offered several
potential advantages in operational flexibility, namely:
that the orbiter could manoeuvre during atmospheric flight;
be able to transport itself between launch sites and space
Centers; offer the proviso of a testing capability during
William Hieronymus, 'Two Reusable Materials Studied for Orbiter Thermal Protection,' Aviation
Week and Space Technology (August 23, 1973), pp 16-18; Robert Dotts, Donald Curry, Donald
Tillian, 'Orbiter Thermal Protection System,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical
Conference
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development flights; and provide an abort or go-around
capability if the runway approach was inaccurate.102
Adding an atmospheric propulsion system also impacted
on the shuttle's main propulsion systems by adding more
weight to the vehicle.
Well when you look at the jet engine you are
carrying all that extra weight up to orbit, and
there is about a 100 to 1 ratio thrust needed to
propel it into orbit, plus the fuel it had.103
As a potential technical fix, low density liquid hydrogen
fuel appeared to offer a partial solution to this problem.
Hydrogen's lower mass and higher performance were
significant advantages over conventional jet propellant
(see figure 4:10). It did not require so many engines and
had significantly less fuel mass, directly translated into
higher payload lifting capability.104
Fuel mass was not, however, the only consideration. A
hydrogen jet engine with a 500 hour life was not an
existing technology and would have to be developed;
elevating development costs and technical risks. The
limited cruise range of the vehicle also implied numerous
refuelling stops for long distance flights on ferry
missions. In addition, since some of the projected shuttle
missions would involve removal of the jet engines from the
Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice pp 166-167.
Charles Donlan, interview with the author, June 7, 1995.
Michael Yaffee, 'New Technology Shuttle Engine Key, ' Aviation Week and Space Technology




Source: NASA chart, taken from Michael Yaffee, 'New
Technology Shuttle Engine Key, ' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (August 10, 1970), p 53.
orbiter to launch heavier payloads, the design had to allow
for relatively easy mounting and removal with a minimum of
inter-connecting hardware left on the orbiter.105
Pratt & Whitney and General Electric were both issued
with hydrogen jet engine study contracts in June 1970. As
concerns grew about the development and operational
risks/costs of a hydrogen system, NASA extended both these
contracts to re-examine conventional jet propellant
systems. By 1971, Pratt & Whitney were proposing the use of
their F401 engine and General Electric were championing
their F101 engine. Minimum modifications to both engines
would be necessary for utilization on the shuttle, but the
contractors indicated that if conventional jet propellant
was selected then their engines were well within existing
technical capabilities.106
Germinating within NASA at the time was a movement to
remove the jet engines from the shuttle's design
completely. Carl Peterson of the Space Shuttle Project
Engineering Office at Johnson, first gave voice to this
movement in August 1970 when he issued a study change
request to eliminate the jet engines from the shuttle
system.107 Peterson did not have the authority to change
the requirement himself, but the request did stimulate
Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice pp 169-170.
Ibid.
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Carl Peterson, Manned Spacecraft Center Study Change Request, August 17, 1970 (NASA History
Office Archive, Washington DC).
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discussions about the role of jet engines in the baseline
design. The central argument was that operational analysis
had indicated that the addition of jet engines on the
orbiter would only marginally increase reliability of a
safe orbiter landing.
[There was a] ... kind of mistaken views as to
what constituted safety. You are carrying jet
engines around in case you miss the airport. You
have to think things through and say under what
conditions are you going to want to that. If your
guidance is so far away, you are not going to be
near enough to that airport to use those jet
engines anyway and if the guidance is right, as
it has to be, you don't need the jet engines.108
Many within NASA were confident that a jet engine system on
the orbiter would be superfluous because Gemini, Apollo,
the X-15 and lifting body research had shown that guidance
systems could pin-point vehicle entry very closely.109
Dissent within the aeroplane community and among some test
pilots and future shuttle astronauts was, however, evident;
as LeRoy Day recalled:
The aeroplane people were just in a state of
shock. ... I remember giving a briefing to
General Brown ... he said ... that was the most
foolish thing he had ever heard of and NASA
people didn't know what they were doing and they
should talk to some aeroplane people. Well as a
matter of fact NASA had a lot of aeroplane people
and we were basing a lot of our thoughts and
decisions about that on our research people ...
at Edwards Air Force Base. ... We had already
proven from a navigational standpoint that you
Charles Donlan, interview with the author, June 7, 1995.




could bring a vehicle back from space and come
close to where you wanted to put down.110
Nonetheless, Donald Slayton, Director of Flight Crew
Operations was unconvinced and advocated the retention of
jet engines until confidence was gained with unpowered
landings. In one memo Slayton commented:
... those in favor of unpowered operations cite
FRC [Flight Research Center, Edwards] and AFFTC
[Air Force Flight Test Center] experience ... as
adequate evidence that the unpowered, piloted
landing mode is practical and safe. Certainly,
their work in this area is impressive. However,
we believe that their experience only indicates
that, given the unique conditions of the Edwards
environment, unpowered landings can be
accomplished safely if the vehicle can be
maneuvered through reentry to certain initial
conditions relative to the desired landing point.
It is not intended, however, to operate the
orbiter under the same conditions as exist at
Edwards, and the effects of these differences
need to be assessed operationally before the
decision is made to remove the orbiter
engines .111
Support for Slayton did not, as expected, come from the
larger community of test pilots. They tended to give more
weight to the experiences at Edwards, as Major Jerauld
Gentry, an aerospace test pilot at the Air Force Test
Center, Edwards Air Force Base, commented at the time:
Many of us at Edwards feel that the requirement
for the orbiter to have landing engines may be
neither practical nor necessary. ... These
LeRoy Day, interview with the author, June 29, 1995.
Donald Slayton, memorandum to Shuttle Manger, August 25, 1970 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
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feelings have not been looked upon with much
favor, sympathy, or credibility.112
By the end of 1970, some 72 lifting body flights with
significantly less subsonic lift to drag than the shuttle
candidates had demonstrated unpowered and precisely
controlled runway landings. Unpowered landings of a Boeing
B-52, a Convair 990, a General Dynamics F-lll and a
Lockheed F-104 were also offered as demonstrations of how
a shuttle orbiter could safely land without the use of jet
engines. A chief aspect of the unpowered landing technique
that did cause some minor alarm, was the use of relatively
steep, high-energy approaches, despite its appraisal as
more accurate, safer, and actually less critical than most
low-energy approaches.113 Speed brakes, or a similar
device, was thus deemed essential when using such a
technique (see figure 4:11). The weight of a speed brake
systems would be minimal and they required no fuel, but can
be used much like engines to vary the landing pattern
parameters .114
Negotiations between penalties on payload and enhanced
reliability grew more intense as budget realities forced a
minimization of programme development costs. As shuttle
Jerauld Gentry, quoted in William Hieronymus, 'High-Speed Unpowered Landing Urged as Feasible
for Shuttle,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (October 5, 1970), p 16.
Pilots had basically the same problem in positioning planes during a dive bombing approach.
They would have to use a steep approach of about 10-25 degrees to intercept an aim point on
the ground. The steeper the dive angle the greater the accuracy.
Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice pp 172-173; William Hieronymus, 'High-
Speed Unpowered Landing Urged as Feasible for Shuttle,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
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designers looked for ways to maintain the shuttle's 65 000
pound lifting capability while reducing development costs
and risks, the arguments in favour of deleting the jet
engines grew in strength. NASA's shuttle managers
eventually approved the deletion of jet engines on the
baseline orbiter. Instead instructions were given to design
"jet engine kits" for flight tests and ferry tasks.
Although higher priority items had placed the jet engine
issue on the back burner they remained a shuttle
requirement up to 197 4 when the Office of Manned Space
Flight ultimately deleted them altogether.115 The penalty
of carrying jet engines and their fuel to orbit and back
ultimately influenced the decision not to include them in
a shuttle design. Considerable research on unpowered
landings had offered an alternative and substantially
cheaper option, but little consideration at this time had
been given to logistics issues. The "jet engine kits" or a
glider-type towing system were considered as possible
solutions to ferry tasks and flight testing, but 'a space
shuttle optimized for the orbital tasks does not readily
adapt to horizontal takeoffs and cross-country atmospheric
flight.'116 A different solution, thus had to be derived.
Space Shuttle Requirements Document Level 1: Revision No.7, October 7, 1974 (NASA History
Office Archive, Washington DC), p 3.
Robert Thompson, Von Karman Lecture p 12.
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The Selection of a Carrier Aircraft.
The prime motivations behind the removal of the orbiter's
jet engines were the reduction in overall system complexity
and increase payload lifting capacity by reducing system
weight. NASA's engineering community had persuaded the
agency's upper echelons as to the feasibility of the idea
and had instilled confidence in a glider concept.
Nevertheless, the result of this decision left NASA with a
major quandary. Without a means of transporting the orbiter
from the manufacturing site at Palmdale, California to
Kennedy in Florida, NASA would be faced with the real
problem of having built the proverbial "boat in the
basement" .117
A different, but related problem had also arisen
because of the loss of the orbiter's jet engines; that of
being able to flight test the orbiter. A series of subsonic
flight tests was considered necessary by a number of NASA
officials to evaluate the orbiter's atmospheric flight
characteristics, especially during the planned steep
unpowered approach to landing. To have the first landing of
the orbiter conducted from reentry on its first orbital
test flight was considered an extreme option.118
Ivy Hooks, David Homan, Paul Romere, 'Aerodynamic Challenges of ALT,' Norman Chaffee, (ed)
Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 2 p 295.
Ibid, p 296; 'Giant Aircraft Would Lift Shuttle Orbiter, ' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(February 4, 1974), pp 38-41.
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As a possible solution to both these problems, a few
engineers from Johnson suggested to the Orbiter Project
Manager, Aaron Cohen, that the orbiter could be ferried by
another aircraft, in a mode similar to that used to launch
the X-15. Cohen, however, was far from impressed by the
idea, as he recalled:
Well one day some of our engineers came to me and
said Aaron, we think we can fly [the orbiter] on
top of [another aircraft] and ferry it. I said
that's the dumbest idea I have ever heard of, I
don't even want to hear about this. I said, you
guys get out of my office ... I am too busy to
talk about those dumb ideas.119
Nonetheless, the engineers were very persistent and set out
to convince upper management that the idea was indeed
workable.120
By early 1974, negotiations had reached a point where
NASA's top management gave approval for a number of
feasibility studies into the carrier aircraft idea.
Numerous concepts were examined, but as the year progressed
three configurations emerged as the most likely candidates:
(i) development of a new carrier aircraft named the Virtus;
(ii) use a modified Air Force Lockheed C-5A; or (iii) use
of a modified Boeing 747.
Virtus was a new aircraft design proposed by John
Conroy, designer of the Guppy aircraft that were used by
NASA to transport major elements of the Saturn/Apollo
Aaron Cohen, interview with the author, September 8, 1995.




system. NASA officials, therefore, took the proposal
seriously and contracted a feasibility study through the
Langley Research Center. With an overall length of 280
feet, a wing span of 450 feet and a height of 100 feet,
Virtus, a latin word used by the Hungarians to denote
striving for success in the face of overwhelming odds, was
an apt name for this giant aircraft. Preliminary estimates
put the cost of building two Virtus aircraft at around $25
million. Despite its innovative structure, the Virtus
design utilized many existing aircraft subsystems to keep
costs low. A cockpit and forward fuselage section from a C-
97 was envisaged for the crew module. The landing gear and
other high development cost items would have been taken
from surplus Boeing B-52 bombers. The Virtus was to be
constructed from conventional aluminum and the design
reduced curved surfaces to an absolute minimum, thus
simplifying both fabrication and construction.121
The two alternative concepts were modifications to
aircraft already in existence. Lockheed and Boeing were
both receiving funding, equal to $100 000 per month, to
study the feasibility of using either a Lockheed C-5A,
provided by the Air Force or a Boeing 747. Lockheed claimed
that its configuration would not require any major
structural modifications nor any significant subsystem
changes. Boeing's proposal, on the other hand, called for
121
'Giant Aircraft Would Lift Shuttle Orbiter,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (February 4,
1974), pp 38-41.
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substantial modifications, which would add over 9 000
pounds of structure to the 747 aircraft. The two aircraft
were both equally capable of airlifting the orbiter, but in
early 1974 NASA favoured the C-5A concept because the plan
involved the Air Force providing the carrier on a demand
basis as part of its participation in the shuttle
programme. The Air Force however, were unable to make such
a guarantee. The House of Representatives had cut the $58.5
million request for the stretched Lockheed C-141 and the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet modification programmes, from the
Air Force's FY 197 4 budget. The move gave rise to some
concern at NASA, because it could place a heavier
operational demand on the C-5A fleet and thus reduce the
availability of the aircraft for shuttle purposes.122
Vitrus had a number of perceived advantages. The
configuration allowed the orbiter to be suspended between
the two fuselages, which simplified the problem of
separating the orbiter from the aircraft during the planned
approach and landing tests. Dropping the orbiter from the
Virtus would be no different from the types of tests NASA's
Flight Research Center had been conducting at Edwards for
years.123 Virtus was nonetheless short lived. The idea of
developing a new aircraft for the sole purpose of
Donald Fink, 'Carrier Designs for Space Shuttle Orbiter Being Refined,' Aviation Week and
Space Technology (April 29, 1974), pp 54-62.
'Giant Aircraft Would Lift Shuttle Orbiter,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (February 4,
1974), pp 38-41 .
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transporting the orbiter was considered unreasonably costly
and was thus quickly abandoned.124 NASA also doubted
whether the Vitrus could be developed on time for the
approach and landing tests, scheduled for 1977.125
Although NASA's top management were still concerned
about the safety of separation of the shuttle from either
the C-5A or the 747,125 the 747 was eventually chosen,
because of concern about dedication of C-5A's for NASA's
use.127 NASA's selection of the 747 caused some minor
concern within Congress. Senator Barry Goldwater expressed
'grave doubts' over its success and made it known that he
thought that the Vitrus concept was the better choice.128
Aerodynamic Design and the Orbiter's Wings.
When NASA embarked on its shuttle development programme,
behind them lay a fairly mature discipline on the
construction and flight characteristics of aircraft design.
Aerodynamics had come a long way from its empirical roots
at the start of the twentieth century. Experimental data,
Ivy Hooks, David Homan, Paul Romere, 'Aerodynamic Challenges of ALT,' Norman Chaffee, (ed)
Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 2 p 296.
Letter from James Fletcher to Senator Barry Goldwater, October 4, 1974 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
Letter from William Schneider, Acting Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, to
George Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, April 12, 1974 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
Letter from George Low to John McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force, July 3, 1974 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC).
Letter from Senator Barry Goldwater to James Fletcher, October 12, 1974 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
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mathematical models and flight experience all supported a
firm foundation of empirical and theoretical knowledge in
aerodynamic design.129 Nevertheless, inherent within the
shuttle's design lay numerous contradictions; and nowhere
did these contradictions reveal themselves more forcibly
than in the aerodynamics of the shuttle's return flight.
NASA and its contractors were faced with constructing
a vehicle that had to realize many conflicting
requirements. The orbiter had to perform the task of
reentry like a spacecraft and yet land on a runway like an
aircraft. This meant designing an aerodynamic configuration
that would function through the entire atmospheric flight
regime; from hypersonic through to subsonic and down to a
landing velocity. Each speed regime demands quantifiable
differences in aerodynamic design and those above
hypersonic were largely unknown. Indeed, the orbiter was
going to be the first winged vehicle ever to fly through
the hypersonic speed regime. The programme thus, presented
the first real technological test of theoretical high speed
flight, as Johnson's Director, Christopher Kraft recalled:
The ability to perform a reentry from Mach 26 to
touch down speeds . . . through the entire Mach
number regime, particularly from Mach numbers of
10 to 1, that was ... a technical feat, ... which
nobody had ever done before; and one which there
was no capability to run [a] test [on] in the
world, ... in wind tunnels or anything else. We
Walter Vincent i, What Engineers Know and How They Know It: Analytical Studies from
Aeronautical History (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1993), especially Chapter
1.
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had to do that by rope and by mathematics and by
guessing.130
So despite the maturity of aerodynamics, precedents did not
exist to facilitate many of the design requirements.131 In
the domain of aerodynamics, the return flight was going to
be fraught with difficulties.
At the time, the magnitude of the task seemed
overwhelming considering the size of the flight
envelope the variety of control devices, control
modes and control tasks.132
In contrast with other modes of transportation, such
as ships, cars and trains etc, the problems associated with
the stability and controllability of an aircraft take a
position of preeminence in its design, because it has to
move within three dimensional space as opposed to two.133
Determining design issues were: wing design, wing-body
integration and integration of aerodynamic and flight
control requirements. For the orbiter (as with all
aircraft), wing design was key, because of its influence on
vehicle weight, thermal environment, aerodynamic stability,
130
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buffet characteristics and gliding and landing
performance.134 Wing shape was also important because it
determined the vehicle's aerodynamic performance. Decisions
on shape were, therefore, made with the desired performance
in view. To define the shape of a wing, aerodynamicist need
to make a decision about the planform (the outline of the
wing when viewed from above) and the profile of the fore
and aft sections, referred to as the airfoil. Two kinds of
forces exert on the surface of a wing; pressure at right
angles to the surface, known as lift and, skin friction
tangential to the surface, known as drag. Lift depends
almost entirely on the distribution of pressure. Drag, by
contrast, depends primarily on the skin friction, which
exists by virtue of the viscous flow in a thin boundary
layer next to the surface of the wing.135 The problem
confronting the aeroplane designer is how to shape a wing
that will obtain the optimum lift and drag characteristics
needed for the vehicle's performance requirements. Wing
design for the orbiter was further complicated however,
because it had to satisfy the conflicting aerodynamic
characteristics of the entire flight regime. Stuart Treon,
chief of the Experimental Investigations Branch at the
James Young, Jimmy Underwood, Ernest Hillje, Arthur Whitnah, Paul Romere, Joe Gamble, Barney
Roberts, George Ware, William Scallion, Bernard Spencer, James Arrington, Deloy Olsen, 'The
Aerodynamic Challenges of the Design and Development of the Space Shuttle,' Norman Chaffee,
(ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference, Part 1 (Houston, Texas, NASA, JSC, Conference
Publication 2342, 1985), pp 209-263.
Walter Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It pp 18, 34; A.C. Kermode, An
Introduction to Aeronautical Engineering: Vol 1, The Mechanics of Flight (London, Sir Issac
Pitman & Sons, Ltd, 1940).
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Aimes Center, told Aviation Week and Space Technology at
the time, that the aerodynamic problems posed by the
shuttle were 'extremely unusual'.136
As highlighted above, the debate over wing design took
on a political edge as well as technical matters. Orbiter
configurations emanating from Johnson had adopted a
straight wing design, essentially for simplicity. During
the reentry phase of flight the orbiter would be positioned
at a very high angle of attack, almost 60 degrees, which
produced very high drag values to slow velocity. The
vehicle would remain at this attitude until about 40 000
feet, at which point velocity would have been reduced to
less than 3 00 feet per second. The nose would then be
pushed down and the vehicle would go into a dive until it
reached adequate velocity for level flight. Max Faget, the
champion of the straight wing design, maintained that the
important advantage of this configuration was that it
minimized heating rates and reduced overall system weight.
At such a high angle of attack, only the lower surfaces
would be directly exposed to the on-coming air flow, which
reduced the amount of protective insulation.137
Nevertheless, the low crossrange produced by Faget's
straight wing design combined with a high angle of attack
at reentry was unacceptable to the Air Force. Demand for a
Richard O'Lone, 'Shuttle Test Pace Intensifies at Aimes,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(June 24, 1974), p 71.
137
Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice pp 137-139.
158
return to runway after a single orbit dictated a relatively
shallow angle of attack and the high lift of a delta wing
to produce the desired 1500 nautical mile crossrange.
Crossrange was not the only point of contention between the
straight and delta wing designs. Slight centre of gravity
shifts and balance consideration tended to move the
straight wings aft, closing the gap between the tail and
the wing. Many of the early orbiter designs carried
internal fuel tanks, resulting in the centre of gravity
being near the middle of the vehicle's length. It thus made
sense to have the wings in roughly the same position for
stability. But when the external tank was introduced and
the weight of the orbiter's main engines grew, arguments
were raised that Faget's design, with its long leading and
trailing edges, would incur more heating problems than a
shorter vehicle with lower aspect ratio delta wings. Wind
tunnel and drop tests of models also indicated that the
straight wing design might be dynamically unstable. The
tests suggested the possibility of a divergent oscillation
in a falling-leaf mode and a tendency for the orbiter to
flat spin. Further analysis did show that the motions could
be easily dampened by reaction control thrusters, but
performing complex control commands during reentry was not
favoured by many at NASA or the Air Force.138
Ibid, pp 141-143.
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Although both configurations were technically
feasible, Air Force pressure eventually swayed NASA away
from the straight wing design. Despite the weight penalty
and increased complexity of thermal protection, in the
political arena Air Force support for the programme was
deemed far more important. As various shuttle concepts were
winnowed out, an orbiter configuration incorporating a
blended delta wing was eventually adopted in August
1972 .139
A series of wind-tunnel tests conducted during 1972,
indicated that the original configuration did not meet
NASA's landing performance requirements. Initially NASA had
not stipulated a landing velocity on which to design the
orbiter's wings, but midway through Phase-B the Office of
Manned Space Flight defined a subsonic design velocity of
165 knots. This would produce a touch down velocity of
between 180 to 190 knots, which was well within the state
of the art in landing gear systems. The need to meet these
requirements, then led to a re-configuration of the wing in
late 1972. In-house studies by NASA and activity at Grumman
indicated that a double-delta planform produced a more
efficient lifting surface than the blended delta and had
exceptional landing performance. In late 1972 NASA
instructed Rockwell to incorporate a double delta wing
139
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design (see figure 4:12). In addition, the double-delta
wing allowed for aerodynamic stability and trim to be
adjusted by modifying the lightly loaded forward delta
(glove). This simple control of aerodynamic features meant
that the design of the main delta wing box could be frozen
and any centre of gravity shifts or aerodynamic stability
problems could be corrected by glove modification, thereby
minimizing the impact on the shuttle programme as a
whole.140
Simplification was a fundamental principle of
aerodynamic design because of the inherent complexity and
contradictory nature, of the orbiter's return flight
trajectory. As such, the sophisticated geometric techniques
of past aerodynamicists were not deemed appropriate
solutions for the orbiter's design; as Space Shuttle
Manager, Robert Thompson recalled:
Aerodynamic oriented people . . . had done a lot of
work on trying to shape [the] vehicle very
cleverly so that it had good aerodynamic
characteristics through the entire speed range;
and its a very broad speed range because you go
from hypersonic speeds down to supersonic speeds
to subsonic speeds and the aerodynamic
characteristics change in those regimes, such
that something shaped to fly good in one regime
isn't necessarily good to fly in another. So we
avoided getting into a lot of fancy shaping of
the vehicle, or a lot of variable geometry kind
Richard Kline, interview with the author, May 31, 1995; James Young, Jimmy Underwood, Ernest
Hillje, Arthur Whitnah, Paul Romere, Joe Gamble, Barney Roberts, George Ware, William
Scallion, Bernard Spencer, James Arrington, Deloy Olsen, 'The Aerodynamic Challenges of the
Design and Development of the Space Shuttle,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical


















of solutions by just brute forcing our way
through.141
Very early on in the programme, therefore, NASA had decided
to incorporate a computer-controlled flight control system,
which permitted the required vehicle stability and handling
qualities to be artificially produced.
We actually used the control system on the
vehicle to stabilize it in many cases. We didn't
worry about giving it a basic airframe
stability.142
The integration of aerodynamic control requirements through
an automated system was thus of major importance in meeting
flying quality goals in all the flight regimes.
Augmentation of the aerodynamic stability through the
automated flight control system also allowed for a
minimization of vehicle weight as affected by control
surface arrangement, size and actuator requirements.
Traditionally, a relatively large empennage is required to
provide the requisite vehicle directional stability.
However, a smaller empennage, which contributed
significantly to reducing overall system mass could be
utilized because of the computer control system.143
Aerodynamic design was also influenced by a number of
programmatic decisions made during the Phase-B studies. The
most significant of these was the inclination towards and
Robert Thompson, interview with the author, September 7, 1995.
Robert Thompson, interview with the author, September 7, 1995.





consequential selection of, a silica tile thermal
protection system rather than a metallic hot structures
system.144 This design decision dictated that the initial
entry angle of attack should be as high as possible (around
30 to 50 degrees) to minimize reentry heating. A metallic
hot structures system would have allowed for a more shallow
trajectory.145 Nevertheless, the Air Force's fiercely
fought crossrange specification impose an angle of attack
of 30 degrees or lower to achieve the required hypersonic
lift to drag ratio. To reduce reentry heating and thus
increase the lifespan of the thermal protection system, a
compromise position was arrived at and an angle of attack
profile of 40 degrees was chosen for all missions not
requiring the high crossrange. The design of the thermal
protection system also dictated that the orbiter's surface
was composed mainly of large flat areas, limiting curvature
to smaller areas between the flat ones. This maximized the
use of uniform dimension tiles, which would minimize both
production and insulation costs. Wing and body integration
was important to obtain a balanced aerodynamic
configuration capable of trim and control over the entire
speed range and in minimizing thermal environment due to
interference flow effects. The orbiter's fuselage
144
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dimensions had been largely fixed by the size of the
payload bay, while aerodynamic and aerothermodynamics
considerations established fore-body shape and local
contours .146
In March 1974 a new baseline configuration for the
orbiter emerged. Further wind tunnel tests, however,
demonstrated that this configuration was also not workable.
The tests showed difficulty in providing trim capability at
the forward centre of gravity in the supersonic flight
regime. In addition, the tests indicated that the blunt
fuselage nose resulted in early transitional flow and high
temperatures along the lower body surface. The wing camber
and thickness distributions, designed for maximum subsonic
performance, also led to local fairings on the lower wing
and fuselage surfaces, which caused high local heating.
These findings led to a further modifications to the
orbiter's aerodynamic configuration and a refined shape
based on the first phase of wind tunnel tests was
eventually selected in February 1975.147
Negotiations about form and function shaped matters of
detail as well as matters of the whole. Political,
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technical, material and organizational factors all fused to
shape each of the sub-systems reviewed and, thus, the
shuttle itself. Once each of the parts was defined,
however, they had to be reconnected into the whole. And an
important part of the reconnection involved the bringing
together of humans and things in a specific organizational
form. The fabrication of large technological systems




Organizations are constructed to satisfy
particular needs arising out of their
environments. They have structures and these
determine their shape, their precise hierarchical
and authority character, their occupational
distribution with its rewards and status
attributes, their procedures and regulations and
their methods of control over the distribution of
resources in general.1
Ascension of the Lead Center.
Although many elements of shuttle technology had begun to
take shape by early 1970, the Office of Manned Space flight
had not reached a decision on managerial arrangements or
organizational structures for the programme. Many within
NASA assumed that research and development of the original
two-stage configuration would be evenly split between
Marshall and Johnson; with Marshall controlling the booster
and Johnson the orbiter. The only part of the debate
believed to be left open was whether to give both the
booster and the orbiter to one company, or have them
divided into separate research and development programmes
using two contractors. Major elements of the aerospace
industry had thus combined to form cooperative amalgams,
which forged themselves around the two portions of the
V.L. Allen, Social Analysis: A Marxist Criticpie and Alternative (Shipley, The Moor Press,
1975), p 273,
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shuttle system.2 Nevertheless, pressure to establish an
alternative programme management structure was exerted long
before NASA was forced to change the shuttle configuration.
Discussions between the Office of Manned Space Flight
and the Phase-B contractors about the philosophy of
industry participation, programme management, and
organizational structures were conducted at the end of
1970. Differing view points were put forward from both
McDonnell Douglas and North American Rockwell on management
structure and style, but it was clear that both contractors
did not favour NASA's current arrangements.3
The Douglas personnel seem to feel that separate
orbiter and booster contracts administered
independently by separate NASA Centers would be
an undesirable arrangement for the government and
industry and would lead to administrative chaos
as well as excessive funding requirements. ...
[North American Rockwell] also expressed concern
about having independent orbiter and booster
contracts separately administered by two NASA
Centers. ... [I] t is apparent that North American
would like to see a strong central program office
some-where within NASA.4
The Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight,
Charles Donlan, agreed with the Phase-B contractors and
urged a restructuring of programme management structure to
provide greater coordination among the Centers. He put
'Shuttle Group Readies Proposal Requests,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (January 19,
1970), pp 17-18; David Baker, 'Evolution of the Space Shuttle: Part 1,' Spaceflight (June,
1973), p 203. Boeing joined with Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas teamed with Martin Marietta,
Pan-American and TRW; and North American Rockwell, who initially bid alone later joined
forces with General Dynamics.
Charles Donlan, memorandum for the record, trip report, visit to Phase-B contractors with




forward a plan to decentralize management by incorporating
a lead Center concept. Such a management style, he argued
would preclude some of the conflicts between the field
Centers that had plagued the Apollo programme.5
Confrontation between the field Centers had its roots
in the establishment of NASA. A number of already existing
organizations, each with their own histories, traditions
and customs, were united during the post-Sputnik paranoia
to form the single space agency. NASA, more closely
resembled a confederation of organizations, with the field
Centers behaving like small fiefdoms, rather than
duplicating an absolutist dominion. This decentralized
structure, in which engineers and scientists carried out
their work in well-insulated Centers, was not conducive to
the grand project of Apollo and resulted in a mismatch
between the mission and the institutional interests of the
various field Centers. Two major reorganizations thus took
place early in Apollo, which centralized the programme
within the Office of Manned Space Flight and led to the
creation of the Johnson Space Center at Houston, Texas.6
Nonetheless, inter-center rivalries continued.
Henry Dethloff, Suddenly, Tomorrow Came... A History of the Johnson Space Center (Lyndon B.
Johnson Space Center, The NASA History Series, NASA SP-4307, 1993), p 227.
Howard McCurdy, Inside NASA chapter 1, pp 96-97; Walter McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth
pp 373-377; Dale Carter, The Final Frontier pp 203-207; Erasmus Kloman, 'NASA Organization
and Management from 1961 to 1985: the Vision and the Reality' Francis Hoban, (ed) Issues in
NASA Program and Project Management (Washington DC, Office of Management, Scientific and
Technical Information Division, NASA SP-6101(02), 1989) pp 35-43; Henry Lambright, Powering
Apollo pp 106-107, 109-111, After the 1967 Apollo fire NASA Administrator, James Webb
centralized the programme further taking control of the programme himself, see pp 157-162.
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One of the most striking divisions was between the
'nose-cone' people and the 'launch vehicle' people.7
There was always that rivalry between the launch
vehicle and spacecraft people. Some snobbery
developed, the attitude was that the spacecraft
people were more responsible for the results of
the mission than the launch vehicle guys were,
you know your the truck, and we are the real
reason for you being here.8
To resolve this conflict Marshall was given control over
propulsion and launch vehicles, Kennedy managed vehicle
assembly and launch activities and Johnson governed over
spacecraft. Spacecraft was, however, presumed by Johnson to
cover all human space activities and it wanted control over
operational activities as well. The first mission control
for human space flight was located at Kennedy, so when
Johnson was established and mission control moved there,
many at Kennedy saw it as a political manoeuvre, which
removed control from Kennedy. Jealousy and suspicion thus
grew between Johnson and Kennedy; and the close
relationship between Kennedy and Marshall, fashioned
through their common heritage, resulted in the rift between
launch vehicle and spacecraft growing much wider. As Apollo
progressed each Center sought to build its own capability
and expand its areas of competence to compete for future
projects. Attempts by the Centers to expand their remits
often led to complaints that each were usurping the others'
English, interview with the author, July 26, 1995.




responsibilities.9 As equal partners in the Apollo
programme, friction between the Centers continually
revolved around jurisdiction, as Robert Freitag, Deputy
Director of the Advanced Programs Office, recollected.
If there was ever an interface or a parallel
activity then competition always turned up. I
spent half of my life in NASA listening to
Johnson people telling me what's wrong at
Marshall and vice versa.10
In an endeavour to avoid any future discord between
the Centers over control of the shuttle programme, the
Office of Manned Space Flight wanted to establish early on
the programmes lines of responsibility and priorities.
Well there had been for a long time in NASA . . .
a conflict between the various organizations.
Whose running the show? And even in NASA, the
Johnson Space Center, its missions were known as
Apollo/Saturn ... and at Marshall, they were
Saturn/Apollo and so to avoid that kind of
conflict and we had a goodly amount of that right
early in the program, it was concluded the best
thing to do was establish a lead Center and put
the program office there and give them the
overall responsibility for running the program
... on that basis.11
The logical choice for the Office of Manned Space
Flight was to place Johnson in the role of lead Center.
The idea was the biggest department was the
orbiter. You have to get that thing up there to
be useful, everything else is subordinate to it,
... the reason [why Johnson was chosen] was they
had the orbiter, keep your eye on the orbiter all
the time because nothing else matters, as a
George English, interview with the author, July 26, 1995; Robert Freitag, interview with the
author, June 5, 1995; Erasmus Kloman, 'NASA Organization and Management from 1961 to 1985'
p 37; Henry Dethloff, Suddenly, Tomorrow Came p 108.
Robert Freitag, interview with the author, June 5, 1995.
James Jackson, interview with the author, July 12, 1995.
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result the management structure reflected those
changes.12
Johnson were, of course, in full accord with the plan as it
saw itself as the best organization to manage the
programme.
I think it was natural that the lead Center kind
of requirement and the lead Center selection
would be the Johnson Space Center because it was
where all the experience was.13
Outside of Johnson, though, the lead Center approach did
not find much favour.
There were others who wanted what they felt was
an Apollo type management where the command
module was separate from the Saturn V itself.
Well that was a different era and they were equal
partners in reporting to Headquarters. I had felt
from the very beginning that the shuttle was not
an equal partner, if there were compromises to be
made they ought to be made in favour of the
orbiter. Well the people responsible for the
[other systems] didn't feel like that, they
wanted an equal say.14
This pattern of conflict plagued NASA's internal workings
across a whole range of programmes and, as future
Administrator, James Beggs (1981-1986) recalled, continued
on throughout the shuttle programme:
Each Center at NASA has its own culture, its own
personality and each thinks it can do the job
better than the others. ... There's always been
a bit of an overlap and they will fight to hold
on to whatever piece of their pie they think is
important to them.15
Ibid.
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
Charles Donlan. interview with the author, June 7, 1995.






Charles Donlan eventually convinced the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight, Dale Myers, on the virtue
of the lead Center plan15 and in June 1971, the Office of
Manned Space Flight confirmed that Johnson would have
management responsibility for programme control, overall
systems engineering and systems integration, and overall
responsibility and authority for the definition of those
elements of the total system which interact with other
elements. The Center also had primary development
responsibility for the orbiter. Marshall would be
responsible for the development of the booster stage and
the main engines and Kennedy would design and direct launch
and recovery facilities. NASA Headquarters was to manage
the overall programme and have primary responsibility for
the assignment of duties, basic performance requirements,
allocation of funds and control of the major milestones
(See Figure 5:1) .17 Robert Thompson, who had been appointed
Space Shuttle Program Manager in April 1970, was given
responsibility as overall programme manager once the lead
Center system had been put in place, as Robert Thompson
recalled:18
Charles Donlan . . . and Dale Myers, they . . .
endorsed the concept of having the Program
Manager as lead Center, and that's when they
Charles Donlan, interview with the author, June 7, 1995.
Dale Myers, management instruction, space shuttle program management, July 12, 1971 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC); Henry Dethloff, Suddenly Tomorrow Came p 227.
18
Robert F. Thompson, interview with the author, September 7, 1995.
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Figure 5:1.
Space Shuttle Management Relationships 1971.
Institutional Relationships.
Programmatic Relationships.
Staffed by JSC, MSFC and KSC.
Table Space Shuttle Management Relationships:1974.
Programmatic Realtionships.
Institutional Relationships.
Staffed by JSC, MSFC and KSC.
actually tab me to be the Program Manager. ... I
essentially had two lines of responsibility, one
an institutional line of responsibility to the
director of the JSC and a program line
responsibility, either to a program director in
Washington or the Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight in Washington. ... I had
three major project offices that reported to me
. . . one here at the JSC, a second group at
Huntsville [Marshall] and a third group at
Kennedy.19
Some within the Office of Manned Space Flight had
qualms about the new management system. Paradoxically, the
lead Center approach had potential to increase conflict
between the various Centers because once it had been
established it changed the roles between Johnson, Marshall
and Kennedy significantly.20 The lead Center approached
assured Johnson a future in the shuttle programme, but both
Marshall and Kennedy remained uncertain about their
respective roles. It seemed evident to Marshall that White
House and Congressional manoeuvres would force major
organizational changes to NASA and Marshall had been
declining in the agency pecking order since its director,
Dr Wernher von Braun had been transferred to Washington.21
The subsidence of the two-stage, fully-reusable shuttle in
1971 also troubled Marshall. Elimination of the human-





Arthur Hill, 'MSC Seeks Major Role In Control of the Space Shuttle,' Houston Chronical (May
9, 1971), p 6.
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the programme focused fully on the orbiter.22
Justifications for the continued existence of the Center,
thus appeared weak and Marshall put up a great deal of
resistance to the lead Center approach.
It took a lot of cajoling, so to speak, to get
the Marshall Space Flight Center to abide by this
lead Center, ... but nevertheless, it was agreed
to reluctantly by Marshall.23
An equally important, but more subtle undercurrent,
dictating a movement towards the lead Center design was its
appeal as a device to most effectively utilize NASA's
dwindling resources. Although NASA's early accomplishments
had become synonymous with outstanding performance and it
was 'fashionable to judge other government programs by
space agency standards'24, NASA was not immune from the
effects of a steady slow down in productivity growth
afflicting the US economy. Stimulated by the massive
absorption of scientists and engineers into the vast public
works of space and defence, the escalation of the Vietnam
War, increased competition with the new economies of
Germany and Japan and a balance of payments deficit,
government procurement fell across the board. As a result,
employment in the fields of space and defence dropped
dramatically. Between 1968 and 1972 the aerospace industry
witnessed a fall from 1 108 300 employees to 591 400 and
22
LeRoy Day, letter to the author, May 5, 1996.
23
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
24
McCurdy Howard. Inside NASA, p 2.
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the number of active industry subcontractors decreased from
6 000 to under 4 000.25 NASA also suffered a total decline
in its employment. Peaking at 400 000 in 1966 it had
plummeted to 137 000 by 1971 (see Table 5:1).
The decline in NASA's employment was not only
restricted to the rationalization of its contractor
support, although this had been reduced by over '2 600 man-
years' during 197 0 .26 Civil service and direct paid
employment at NASA was also undergoing a steady decline
(see Table 5:2). A reduction of 425 civil service positions
at Marshall, Johnson and Kennedy was made during 1971 and
Dale Myers testified to Congress that civil service
employment for the three Centers would be further reduced
by 600 positions by June 30, 1972.27
I oversaw the down-sizing of the [Kennedy Space
Center] ... my primary involvement during those
years was trying to retain the skills that we
needed to do the rudimentary development of the
space shuttle program. . . . The philosophy had
always been ... that the ... NASA workforce would
be the continuing thread and the fabric of the
space program, and we used the contractor
workforce as the surge tank.28
Kennedy, though, had a more immediate problem. Nineteen
seventy witnessed the emergence of a debate, which
Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal (London, Abacus, 1983), pp 144, 160-4.
1972 NASA Authorization. p 141.
Statement by Dale Myers. Ibid.
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Kennedy Space Center. 1968 25 700 15 000 41. 6
Johnson Space Center. 1968 12 800 10 000 15 . 6
Marshall Space Center. 1964 23 000 10 100 56 . 6
Total Space Related
Employment.
1966 400 000 137 000 65 .7
Source: Adapted from Table 11-2 in Mary Holman, The
Political Economy of The Space Program p 355.
Table 5:2
Paid Employment3 by NASA Installation:
Number on Board at End of FY.
Installation. 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968b 1970 1971
Headquarters. 274 662 1 693 2 026 2 274 2 310 2 259 1 939
JSC. 2 392 4 721 4 688 4 956 4 539 4 298
MSFC. 5 367 6 844 7 639 7 432 6 935 6 325 6 060
KSC 604 1 880 2 618 3 044 2 895 2 704
Total Paid
Employees at NASA.C
8 420 16 042 25 667 33 108 34 366 34 641 32 548 30 506
a Permanent employees and temporary employees combined, excluding military personnel detailed to NASA,
b Employment figures represent number during middle of year,
c Includes total paid employment of all NASA field centers and offices.
Source: Adapted from Table 3-8, Jane Van Nimmen, Leonard
Bruno, Robert Rosholt, NASA Historical Data Book Volume 1:
NASA Resources 1958-1968 (Washington DC, NASA Scientific
and Technical Information Division, 1988), pp 84-85; and
Table 3-8, Ihor Gawdiak, Helen Fedor, NASA Historical Data
Book Volume 4: NASA Resources 1969-1978 (Washington DC,
NASA History Office, 1994), p 76.
threatened the position of the Center during the
operational era of the shuttle.
Uncertainty Over a Launch Site.
Kennedy had served as NASA's launch site since the
beginning of the human space flight programme. Located
along the Florida coast at Cape Canaveral, Kennedy had
grown out of a missile testing range established in 1947.
As the Cold War intensified the site rapidly expanded its
complex of launch pads (affectionately known as " ICBM
Row"), which eventually came to dominate the Cape skyline
by the late 1950s. When the Cold War moved into space, NASA
became the major player at the Cape. Merritt Island was
annexed by the organization in 1961 and the construction of
facilities to support the giant Saturn moon rockets soon
dwarfed anything that had stood there before.29 But despite
its established history, Kennedy was not automatically
viewed as the best location for shuttle operations. During
the shuttle's preliminary design and planning phases there
was a growing opinion, both within and outside of NASA,
that the shuttle's launch and turnaround operations should
be conducted from another site.30 Support technology for
For a detailed history of the Kennedy Space Center see, Charles Benson, William Barnaby
Faherty, Moonport: A History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations, (Washington DC,
NASA, Scientific and Technical Information Office, SP-4204, 1978).
George English, interview with the author, July 26, 1995.
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the shuttle was expected to be distinctly different from
what was required for expendable rockets.
Originally, it was hoped that Apollo equipment
could be modified at reasonable cost for use on
the Shuttle Program. The current studies show
that modifications may be so extensive that the
effect will be new equipment.31
A growing consensus thus formed around the idea of building
a new launch site rather than converting Kennedy. By the
end of 1970 several studies were under way to identify
alternative locations. The two Phase-B contractors,
McDonnell Douglas and North American Rockwell, were
instructed to 'conduct an evaluation to determine the
relative merits of various operations sites.'32 NASA also
established a Space Shuttle Facilities Group consisting of
representatives from several program offices, the 'manned
space flight Centers', and the Air Force, to be responsible
for the development of a 'master facilities plan.'33 In
addition a contract was let out to the Ralph Parsons
Company to support the Shuttle Facilities Group in their
studies and provide an independent evaluation.34
The Office of Manned Space Flight had directed Kennedy
to work on a definition of its role in the shuttle
Notes from an operation splinter meeting at the Johnson Space Center, April 27, 1971 (Kennedy
Space Center Archives, Florida).
Letter from George Low to Senator Clinton Anderson, October 23, 1970 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
Letter from George Low to Representative Olin Teague, December 22, 1970 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
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programme during a Management Council Meeting in October
1970.35 Kennedy's appeal to the Office of Manned Space
Flight was that NASA should 'take full advantage' of its
experience on prior programmes and make effective use of
existing resources.36 It was a strong lobby for the shuttle
to be located at Kennedy and a formed the basis of the
Center's rationale for holding onto the shuttle's launch,
landing and turnaround operations.37
Despite Kennedy's defences, over 150 potential
locations were examined by NASA. As the launch site studies
progressed members of Congress solicited NASA to locate the
shuttle's launch and landing site in their state. Senator
Clinton Anderson 'insisted that the Shuttle would be in
trouble unless it were launched from White Sands Missile
Range in New Mexico.'38 Representative George Miller
mobilized the Californians to press for Vandenberg or
Edwards Air Force Base as possible locations.39 NASA also
received petitions from Senators Roman Hruska and Carl
Curtis for the midwest state Nebraska,40 and Representative




George English, interview with the author, July 26, 1995.
Ken Hechler, Towards the Endless Frontier p 287.
39
Ibid.
Letter from George Low to Senator Roman Hruska, February 19, 1971 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
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George Mahon for Lubbock, Texas.41 Senator Edward Gurney
and Representatives Lewis Frey, Don Fuqua and Paul Rogers
urged that NASA should not move from their home state,
Florida, and keep shuttle operations at Kennedy.42
Representative Olin Teague, although a delegate for Texas,
also pushed for Kennedy, telling George Low:
Unless I am convinced that NASA is making maximum
use of existing facilities, I intend to oppose
any money for the Shuttle in every way, form or
fashion ... it is not "pork barrel" as far as I
am concerned.43
An eventual change in the shuttle's configuration to
gain vital political approval, imposed a very tangible
constraint on launch site options. The perceived advantage
of NASA's original two-stage shuttle design was that it
could be launched from any location. Coastal launch sites,
essential for expendable vehicles because of the need for
a vast ocean area to safely drop the various rocket stages,
would not be a requisite for a system that was fully-
reusable. Inland sites had, for the first time, become a
real possibility. With the introduction of unguided
recoverable solid rocket boosters and the possible
emergency jettisoning of the very large liquid
hydrogen/oxygen external tank, a vast uninhabited area once
Letter from George Low to Representative George Mahon, May 11, 1971 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
Letter from George Low to Senator Edward Gurney, March 15, 1971 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC); Letter from George Low to Representative Paul Rogers, April 1, 1971
(NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
Olin Teauge, quoted in Ken Hechler, Towards the Endless Frontier p 288.
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again became an integral part of the launch site decision.
Members at Kennedy seized this opportunity and pressed the
Office of Manned Space Flight for a decision.
I urge that we make every effort toward an early
decision on launch site selections. Because of
the inter-reaction between the shuttle design and
the geography of the launch site.44
With the new configuration launch site locations were
narrowed down to three possibilities: Kennedy, Vandenberg
Air Force Base (Vandenberg), which had been built to launch
the ill-fated Dyna-Soar, and an area in Matagorda County,
Texas. As the change to shuttle's configuration also
reflected funding restrictions, the investment of over $300
million to construct and equip a new launch site (more than
the cost of achieving the same capability at the two
existing sites, Kennedy and Vandenburg), also figured high
on NASA's agenda. In addition, locating a shuttle launch
and landing operation of the dimensions needed for the
shuttle at an undeveloped geographical area such as
Matagorda County, would require further federal funding to
provide community services such as water, sewage, schools,
highways and hospitals etc. Kennedy and Vandenberg, it was
shown, could jointly serve the national launch requirements




Major General R.C. Henry, Major General B. Sloan, 'The Space Shuttle and Vandenberg Air Force
Base,' Air Force Review (September/October, 1976), pp 20-26.
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In April 1972, NASA decided that both Kennedy and
Vandenburg would be the most prudent choices for shuttle
operations. Kennedy, situated on the south east coast,
would be utilized for all research and development launches
and for all easterly operational launches. Vandenberg,
situated on the north west coast, was planned to be
functional by the early 1980s and would be used for all
missions requiring high inclination launches not feasible
from Kennedy, including polar orbits.46 Kennedy was
assigned the prime responsibility for the design,
development, fabrication, and installation of all ground
support equipment to be used at both launch site. The
development Centers (Johnson and Marshall) would have the
prime responsibility for the variations and additions to
this ground support equipment or unique equipment that may
be required for shuttle testing at other locations.47
Selection of the Principal Contractors.
Once NASA had received Congressional sanction, plans for
the procurement of the shuttle's major contracts were put
into action very quickly. The approach was to phase the
awards to 'allow some certainty to be placed into the
Letter from John Foster to James Fletcher, April 13, 1972 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC)
Memorandum of agreement, space shuttle program ground support equipment responsibilities, May
9, 1972 (Kennedy Space Center Archive, Florida).
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weight estimates, operational characteristics'48 and
configurational dimensions of the technological systems.
Two awards had thus been secured by mid-1972: the prime
contract and the contract for shuttle's main rocket
engines. The contract for the shuttle's main engines had
originally been procured in July 1971, six months before
the presidential announcement to proceed with the shuttle
programme.
During the various phases of the shuttle's design
competition the overall configuration contractors were not
involved in designing the main engines. Instead three
contractors, (Aerojet Liquid Rocket Company, a division of
Aerojet General Corporation; Rocketdyne, a division of
North American Rockwell; and Pratt and Whitney Aircraft, a
division of United Aircraft Corporation) had been selected
in late 1969 to participate in the Phase-A main engine
studies.49 By June 1971 all three contractors had their
engine proposals ready for evaluation. NASA's tight
specifications had resulted in three very similar engine
designs being put forward. Nonetheless, each of the
contractors had subtle differences in their approaches. All
of the contractors had tailored their designs to have a sea
level thrust range of between 400 000 and 600 000 pounds,
Charles Donlan. interview with the author, June 7, 1995.
The original contract was for the development and delivery of 36 main engines for NASA's then
two stage fully reusable shuttle. NASA, 'Official Contractor Selection Statement,' reprinted
in Congressional Record - Extensions of Remarks (October 12, 1971), p E10689; 'Reusable Space
Shuttle Effort Gains Momentum' Aviation Week and Space Technology (October 27, 1969), pp 22-
24 .
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reflecting the upward movement in NASA's thrust
specification as the shuttle grew in size.50 The three
contractors had also employed the use of a common power-
head that could be fitted with a nozzle optimized for
either a booster expansion ratio or an orbiter expansion
ratio.51 Where the designs diverged was in the areas of
cooling systems and pre-burner structures. Pratt & Whitney
chose to incorporate only a single pre-burner in their
design because of its potential advantage in reducing the
number of failure modes. In addition they selected a path
of transpiration cooling instead of the conventional
regenerative cooling of the thrust chamber,52 which, they
claimed, would offered better specific impulse figures.53
In contrast Rocketdyne and Aerojet opted for a traditional
regenerative cooling system and utilized two separate pre-
burners to drive the fuel and the oxidizer turbo-pumps. The
development risk of manufacturing valves for directing the
hot gases from one common pre-burner to the two turbo-pumps
By June 1971 the sea level thrust specification had grown from its original 400 000 pounds
to 550 000 pounds.
Michael Yaffee, ' P&W Shuttle Engine Based on XLR129' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June
14, 1971), p 52.
Regenerative cooling systems date back to James Wyld, who demonstrated such an engine in 1933
for Reaction Motors Inc. The German V2 rocket also utilized the concept and Wernher von Braun
incorporated it on the Saturn engines during NASA's Apollo programme. The system comprises
of a jacket around the combustion chamber and nozzle through which one of the propellants (on
the Saturn engine it was liquid oxygen) is pumped through passages in the jacket to keep the
combustion chamber walls cool. The heat absorbed by the coolant is ultimately injected back
into the chamber. Transpirational cooling is accomplished by layering a film of coolant along
the surface of the combustion chamber and nozzle. Disruptions in the film are renewed by
injecting more coolant to reform the film. The process can be abetted by the use of porous
materials for the combustion chamber and nozzle walls, so that the coolant injection remains
continuous. Adelbert Tischler, letters to the author, March 18, 1997 and June 16, 1997; Mike
Gray, Angle of Attack: Harrison Storm and the Race to the Moon (New York, London, W.W. Norton
& Company, 1992), p 84.
Michael Yaffee, ' P&W Shuttle Engine Based on XLR129' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June
14, 1971), p 52.
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was a major factor in Rocketdyne's choice of dual units.
Separate pre-burners, it argued, allowed them to tailor the
pressures differently, which gave better control over the
power input into each turbo-pump and meant that each turbo-
pump could be trimmed for maximum efficiency.54
NASA's eventual selection of a contractor would thus,
in part, shape the ultimate design. NASA's initial plan was
to select two contractors for the early part of the
development phase, but as funding restrictions became more
apparent it was decided that just one contract would be
awarded. Political pressure was also being placed on NASA
as the effects of rising unemployment in the aerospace
industry began to bite hard on some states.55
Pratt & Whitney's engineers believed that they had the
edge over Rocketdyne and Aerojet because of extensive work
on their reusable XLR-129 staged combustion rocket engine,
which provided much of the technology base NASA used to
establish its design requirements.56 After a short period
of deliberation however, and 'to the surprise of many'57
Rocketdyne received the cost-plus-award-fee contract, worth
William Hieronymus, '$1 billion Shuttle Engine Program Seen' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (June 21, 1971), pp 60-63.
Representative Barry Goldwater Jr lobbied James Fletcher during the proposal period
supporting Rocketdyne's bid. His motivation arose from a desire to reduce the high
unemployment figures in the aerospace community in southern California. Letter from James
Fletcher to Representative Barry Goldwater Jr, May 20, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
Michael Yaffee, 'Reusable Rocket Motor Unveiled' Aviation Week and Space Technology (August
31, 1970) pp 38-44; Michael Yaffee, 'P&W Shuttle Engine Based on XLR129' Aviation Week and
Space Technology (June 14, 1971) pp 51-57.
Jerry Grey. Enterprise p 107.
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over $500 million, in July 1971.58 Pratt & Whitney
immediately filed a petition of protest with the General
Accounting Office claiming the award to be unduly biased
against them. Rocketdyne, Pratt & Whitney contended, had
disregarded the objectives stated in NASA's request for
proposals and NASA had failed to conduct proper written or
oral discussions. The substantive basis for Pratt Sc
Whitney's protest was that they had already built and
tested a staged combustion engine, which met most of NASA's
specifications. Rocketdyne, on the other hand, had never
run a complete staged combustion engine. Consequently,
Pratt & Whitney believed their proposal to be technically
superior and thus did not understand the basis for NASA
choosing Rocketdyne over themselves.59
While Pratt & Whitney's engine proposal had won on
management and work approach criteria, NASA's Shuttle
Engine Evaluation Board considered that Rocketdyne's engine
proposal surpassed Pratt & Whitney's in a number of areas,
namely: a better vehicle and engine integration design; an
interface design that was more compatible with NASA
requirements; the use of an established regenerative
cooling design, which was thought to be superior over Pratt
& Whitney's transpiration cooling approach; and finally
NASA. 'Official Contractor Selection Statement', reprinted in Congressional Record -
Extensions of Remarks (October 12, 1971) p E10689; 'Shuttle Engine Awarded to Rocketdyne'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (July 19, 1971) p 12.
Jerry Grey, Enterprise p 110; 'Pratt and Whitney Protest Shuttle Engine Award' Aviation week
and Space Technology (August 9, 1971), p 23.
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Rocketdyne presented their proposal at a lower cost. Pratt
& Whitney's design was also considered to be weak in
defining ground support equipment and although they had
demonstrated the XLR-129 in test, unlike Rocketdyne, Pratt
and Whitney did not have a proven flight record with the
size of engine demanded by the shuttle.60
One engine on the old Apollo stack was not
Rocketdyne's. All the rest were Rocketdyne
engines. A company with all that background and
certainly the leading rocket engine company, was
competing against Pratt and Whitney. Their engine
was . . . nowhere near the size engine that was
being called for ... and Rocketdyne's F-l engine
at the bottom of the of the Saturn V stack was a
big mamma. ... Rocketdyne had an immense design
and experience over Pratt and Whitney.61
NASA's underlying rationale for choosing Rocketdyne
however, can also been seen as the result of an interplay
between technological matters and entrenched social
relations. Marshall, who had management responsibility for
the shuttle's main engines, had a long and well established
relationship with Rocketdyne, as Rockwell's (Rocketdyne's
parent company) Space Shuttle Manager, Bastian Hello
disclosed:
For Rocketdyne to win was almost a given. [Pratt
and Whitney's] experience was with the Air Force
it wasn't with Marshall. Marshall had Rocketdyne
people in their compound, in there every day
doing business with them and their going to go
and pick an Air Force contractor, not likely.62
NASA, 'Official Contractor Selection Statement', reprinted in Congressional Record -
Extensions of Remarks (October 12, 1971).
Bastian Hello, interview with the author, April 27, 1995.





Agreement with Marshall's decision to stay with the company
they knew did not find universal consensus within NASA.
The contractor that had done the work on the
Saturn engines was accepted by the MSFC as
confident to do this work on the shuttle but, ...
frankly they weren't up to it.63
Given the protest, NASA agreed not to 'award the
definitive contract' for the development of the shuttle's
main engines until the General Accounting Office had
acted.64 Nonetheless, NASA continued to use Rocketdyne in
the design and planning of the engine under an interim
contractual arrangement until March 1972 when the protest
was finally settled in Rocketdyne's favour.65
NASA's selection of Rocketdyne in 1971 had a big
effect on the rest of North American Rockwell, who were
still putting their bid together for the orbiter, as
Rockwell's Space Shuttle Manager, Bastian Hello recalled:
When a division of our company was awarded the
rocket program [our] first reaction was, well
that's it we have no chance of winning the
orbiter. That's our piece of the action and one
of the biggest fights I had was keeping the
pressure on.66
Four companies (Grumman Aerospace, Lockheed, McDonnell
Douglas Corporation and North American Rockwell) submitted
bids for the shuttle's prime contract. Two months were
Adelbert Tischler. interview with the author, May 3, 1995.
Letter from George Low to Senator Allen Ellender (August 11, 1971).
Dennis Jenkins. Space Shuttle p 122.






allocated for the preparation of proposals, with a further
two months designated for NASA to analyze them.
Negotiations between NASA's Source Evaluation Board and the
contractors hence began on July 1 1972. The shuttle's
request for proposal were described as the 'loosest
procurement document ever issued by the NASA for a major
program.'67 Emphasis was being placed on innovation around
a basic concept, revealing NASA's intention to keep the
design details relatively fluid, allowing for the
possibility of using elements from each of the contractors
in the final configuration.58
Politically each of the contractors had both internal
supporters and adversaries within NASA, but all had
allegiances with certain areas.
All the areas of Johnson had their favourites.
There was those who had worked with Grumman on
the Lunar lander and there were those who had
worked on the command service module and they
were all for [Rockwell] . And there were those
that couldn't stand either one of the two, wanted
someone else, wanted a change and . . . thought
that it was time to take a major piece of the
business away from [Rockwell] ... and give it to
another contractor.69
During the evaluation North American Rockwell and Grumman
scored very high and were extremely close in the final
proposal ranking; followed by McDonnell Douglas and then
Zack Strickland, 'Space Shuttle RFP Stresses Innovation' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(March 27, 1972), p 18.
Charles Donlan. interview with the author, June 7, 1995.
Bastian Hello interview with the author, 27 April 1995.
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Lockheed. McDonnell Douglas scored badly because the Source
Evaluation Board considered that McDonnell Douglas's
organization of the eastern and western segments of the
company were relatively complex. The recent merger between
the two companies resulted in a proposal where engineering
functions were divided between both locations. NASA
ultimately thought that this would complicate the
assignment of overall engineering responsibility.70 John
Yardley, then working for McDonnell Douglas recalled:
We were struggling with this merger and there was
a lot of bad feeling with the Douglas people ...
because they thought they were much better at
everything, . . . but anyhow we finally wrote a
proposal that split up the work between Douglas
and McDonnell and there was a 2 000 mile gap, so
it wasn't a good organizational proposal. .. I
went to Washington to talk to Bob Thompson and
some of those guys and they said you guys have
the best Phase-B proposal but then you give us
all this mish mash of an organization that we
can't understand.71
Although close in the ranking, an unfortunate event at
Grumman had left them with a hole in their organizational
structure as Grumman engineer Richard Kline remember:
We started going through our bid then . . . Lou
Evans died of a heart attack ... [so] Joe Gavin
was made president of the company and that then
created a management void ... and the up shot of
it ... was that in the final evaluation . . . we
were judged to be sizeably less competitive. ...
The Grumman proposal was technically the
strongest of the three, but it lost hands down in
the management activities, it was also the
highest cost. ... We proposed a cost which we
NASA's official contractor statement for the space shuttle program, September 1972 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC).
John Yardley. interview with the author, August 9, 1995.
189
thought was low but nevertheless realistic, but
it was more than other bidders had proposed who
were also technically adequate.72
It was North American Rockwell who had submitted the lowest
bid at $2.8 billion. This, along with their success with
the main engine contract, gave it some cause for concern.
I can remember the consternation on our
chairman's part when he heard that we were the
lowest bidder. He thought ... we'd got a big
loser on our hands and I hasten to tell him that
you've got one of the world's biggest winners on
your hands.73
In the end though, North American Rockwell's apprehension
was unfounded. On July 26, 1972 the Space Transportation
Systems Division of North American Rockwell won the $2.6
billion contract to design and build the space shuttle
orbiter and manage the systems integration function.
I recall the word coming in sometime in the month
of July that we had won it. Of course there was
a huge hip hip hurrah and a lot of gnashing of
teeth in the other companies. ... Grumman was
particularly upset because . . . coming out of
Johnson they thought that they had won the
technical proposal and it turned out in
retrospect that indeed they had. We had won the
management and cost proposals and we were close
enough in the technical proposal that the odds
went over to us.74
However, NASA imposed restrictions on North American
Rockwell, especially over its choice of sub-contractors.
Richard Kline, interview with the author, May 31, 1995.
Bastian Hello interview with the author, 27 April 1995.





NASA told us that you are going to include the
other contractors, you are not going to leave
them out in the cold. [However,] while NASA said
you will include them they were very reluctant to
say give them this and give them that, they
pulled back from that. One of the first things
that happened past the win and the ... Rockwell
euphoria, was the [Rockwell] president and I flew
around to see the other contractors. I can recall
clearly walking into Joe Gavin's office and ...
talking about what piece of the action would they
get. . . . Grumman had been telling their people
... and their shareholders, not to worry we are
going to get a billion dollars of this program.
Well that wasn't to be and they were quite let
down when they found out .. that their piece of
the action was building wing sets.75
Integrating the Gargantuan.
Combined with the orbiter contract was a second task, named
an integration and support.
We had already put together an organization that
had a nucleus of government people leading all
kinds of activities, but we wanted a prime
contractor to plug into that integration support
activity to help us prepare interface control
documents, to help us prepare weight programs, to
help us prepare all the interface engineering.76
Systems integration had grown more complex with the advent
of each new programme. The Mercury and Gemini programmes
both had comparatively simple physical and functional
interfaces between space craft and launch vehicle. During
Apollo, the interfaces, although more complex, were again
intentionally kept simple.
Up until the time that we started with the
shuttle, what we did was minimize the interfaces
Bastian Hello, interview with the author, April 27, 1995.
Robert Thompson, interview with the author, September 7, 1995.
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between the manned part of the vehicle and the
power part of the vehicle so that there were only
several wires. There was very little transfer of
information back across the interface between the
spacecraft and the rocket and so the coordination
and integration problems were insignificant,
relatively speaking.77
The arrival of the space shuttle, however, marked a
significant change in the management of systems engineering
and integration. The tenet of shuttle development was to
have an integrated vehicle where the most expensive part,
the orbiter, was to be recovered and reused. This led to a
design concept that placed a great majority of the
technological sub-systems, including major proponents of
the propulsion systems, inside the orbiter. Accordingly,
the interface complexity between the programme's
technological elements and the NASA Centers would increase
dramatically. It was decided, therefore, to employ the
orbiter contractor (the main hardware development
programme), in a dual role, by also allowing them to
provide integration support.78 The responsibility of the
shuttle's prime contractor was thus reinforced.
All the different contractors that were involved
in building the shuttle had different
geographical locations ... posed a considerable
challenge. We started off having interfaces at
each one of the prime contractor plants ... so
the major part of the integration contract was to
serve as an interface with all the various
contractors to make sure that what they were
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
Owen Morris. 'SE&I and Management for Manned Space Programs' Francis Hoban. William Lawbaugh.
Ed. Readings in Systems Engineering (Washington DC, NASA, Scientific and Technical
Information Program, 1993) pp 87-104.
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doing, and the lessons they were learning during
the design ... all teamed together.79
However, as time went on it became clear that Rockwell
was unable to organize all the complexity on its own: as
Johnson Engineer, Norman Chaffee recalled:
Initially, [systems integration] was kind of
haphazard. ... We had Rockwell as the integrator
of systems within the orbiter. They didn't do a
particularly [good] job of doing that, but going
beyond that, the integration of how does the
orbiter fits onto the external tank and how does
the solids fit on that, and what are all the
integrated loads and how to the main engines fit
into the orbiter, how does the fluid system feed
everything, . . . none of that was very well
organized.80
Rivalry between the Centers was also causing problems with
management surveillance, evaluation of Center activities,
systems integration and technical control; as NASA's
Associate Administrator, John Yardley, reported in 1974:
The sister Centers are always suspicious of the
objectivity of the lead Center. ... R.L. Thompson
... feels that once the technical direction has
been given, it's clearly the other Center's
responsibility if problems arise. Chris Kraft . . .
concluded that [Johnson] could not direct
[Marshall] as a practical manner. This problem is
further complicated by the fact that the two
Centers have entirely different management
styles, so that even if the other negative
factors could be resolved, this would remain ...
a continual source of controversy.81
Raymond Dupree, interview with the author, August 8, 1995.
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
Memorandum from John Yardley, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight to the Deputy
Administrator and the Associate Administrator, December 26, 1974 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
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Thus, a systems integration organization was
established within the Space Program Managers Office at
Johnson, which was defined specifically to report to the
overall Program Manager. Under the control of Owen Morris,
the organization was responsible solely for integration of
various components. An important aspect of its successful
governance was a recognition of the existence of separate
projects and the diversity under which these projects were
being produced. Morris decide, therefore, to ignore issues
that arose within the confines of these distinct projects
and concentrate only on bringing all the pieces together
and making sure that the machine worked as a whole. This
was done by each division identifying people within their
projects to take on the duties of systems integration, who
then reported directly to Owen Morris.82
Of course, with a project as large and as complex as
the shuttle, politics was an inherent part of the
interface. As Johnson Engineer, Norman Chaffee recalled:
Because of the fact that we were doing the main
propulsion feed system in the orbiter we were
responsible for all of the components that took
the [propellants] from the external tank and feed
it to the main engines. Marshall Space Flight
Center built the external tank and the main
engines, and we were responsible for all the
stuff in between ... so there was a very strong
interface we had with the MSFC. ... [So] there
was always a big flap between Marshall and
Johnson having to do with the proper interface
values and our ability to either take propellant
from them at the right conditions and give it
Robert Thompson, interview with the author, September 7, 1995; James Jackson, interview with
the author, July 12, 1995; Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
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back to them at the engine at the right
conditions; and in order to accommodate a
development problem we had, if we needed some
relaxation from them they were always very
reluctant to give it. They wanted us to solve our
problem, didn't want us to create a problem for
them; and the same way if they needed some
relaxation or some tighting of a specification to
solve an engine problem or tank problem then we
would be equally reluctant to give any ground
(see figure 5:2 for interface) .83
Solutions to both technical and political problems were
often reached through a series of working groups and
systems integration groups. These would be jointly chaired
by senior managers of the Centers involved and would meet
at alternate locations to placate some of the political
rivalry. Along with staff from the Centers would attend
their contractors. Staff from Rockwell, who still had
responsibility for overall integration, and Owen Morris's
team would also attend to support these meetings.84
These meetings ... were huge, sometimes [they]
would last three or four days and get very
contentious and very detailed. Most issues ended
up, because at the core engineers are reasonable
people and can be rational, most things could be
worked out. We could find some rationality, and
where it couldn't, is primarily where schedule
and money was involved.85
If a solution could not be found, or a Project Manager
would not sign up for a particular change, then the issue
would move up to the Configuration and Control Board, or
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
James Jackson, interview with the author, July 12, 1995; Norman Chaffee, interview with the
author, September 9, 1995.
















change board, which was chaired by Space Shuttle Manager,
Bob Thompson. The integration working groups were held on
a weekly basis every Wednesday and the change boards were
held every Friday. The motivation behind this timetable was
that it was hoped that problems could be worked out in the
days in between, so that they did not have to appear before
the change board. Nevertheless, there was always plenty of
activity within the change boards and one was held every
Friday, throughout the programme.86
In the change board, Thompson would sit at the head of
a table and around this table would be ten or twelve key
advisors. Various systems experts would then come into the
meeting a give a presentation on what tests had been done,
what recommendations were being made and what changes they
wanted to introduce. If the Project Manager was not located
at Johnson, then Thompson would also be in teleconference
with the Project Manager and usually with other engineers
at different locations, to get their input.
Typically in a bureaucracy like NASA you have
lots of different people going off in lots of
different directions, studying and analyzing what
if we do this, what if we do that. Then you have
to have some way to bring all those things into
a central form under a Program Manager, and that
Program Manager also has to sit there and listen
to the various debates . . . then decide what to
do.87
And as Johnson's Director Christopher Kraft recalled:
8 6
Robert Thompson, interview with the author, September 7, 1995; James Jackson, interview with
the author, July 12, 1995; Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
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Robert Thompson, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
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Bob Thompson forced a consensus on every
technical issue.88
Progress toward the construction of the gargantuan
sociotechnical ensemble had now moved on a stage. Points of
closure had been reached on design and the mobilization of
people and artifacts gained momentum. NASA was poised to
activate the ensemble and set it in motion toward its
ultimate goal: the construction of the machine. The fusing
of both technological and social organization had
commenced, driven by a singular purpose: the translation of
a concept into an object. The shape and direction of the
ensemble however, fed upon reflections from the past as
well as a vision of the future. Its burgeoning nature, form
and function was thus witnessed with some trepidation in
certain quarters of NASA.
When the shuttle program was approved . . . NASA
officials and many other people in NASA, plus a
great number of the contractors, said this is the
Apollo substitute. The Centers rushed to get
their people piled onto this program, a drastic
mistake because everyone wasn't competent to do
that kind of thing. The contractors that were
accepted by the Centers were identically the same
contractors used in the Apollo program. In many
respects . . . right there the program was starting
to go wrong.89
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.





The machine is not neutral, ... technology is
always a historical-social project: in it is
projected what a society and its ruling interests
intend to do with men and things.1
Electorial Divisions.
Despite the increased pace in constructing the gargantuan
sociotechnical assemblage, external resistance was still
being experienced. The shuttle programme had not moved
beyond the point where it could be easily curtailed and
there were still powerful opponents in the political arena
who were prepared to take up that cause.
1972 was an election year and the award of a multi-
billion dollar project during such a volatile period did
not go unchallenged. NASA's selection of North American
Rockwell sent out minor shock waves, which caused some
factional eruptions in Congress. Jean Westwood, Chair of
the Democratic National Committee, considered that NASA's
preference for North American Rockwell had come from more
than just practical considerations. Five directors of North
American Rockwell had contributed to Nixon's 1968 election
campaign, so Westwood claimed that the Rockwell award
Herbert Marcuse, 'Industrialization and Capitalism in the Works of Max Weber' Negations
(Boston MA: Beacon Press, 1969), pp 225, 224.
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represented the 'latest, and perhaps most blatant example
of President Nixon's calculated use of the American tax
payers dollars for his own re-election purposes.'2 As such,
Westwood pushed for an investigation into the relationship
between contributions from directors of North American
Rockwell to the presidential election campaign and NASA's
award of the shuttle contract to be conducted.3 North
American Rockwell declined to make any comment on the
allegations, but NASA was eager to deny that politics
played any part in the selection process and stated that
North American Rockwell was 'chosen on technical and
management merits alone.'4 Within Congress Westwood
received severe criticisms from her fellow Democrats.
Representative Olin Teague (Democrat, Texas), claimed the
shuttle contract was 'one of the most thoroughly and
objective studied contract awards in any recent major
government program.'5 The call for an investigation was
seen by others as a political manoeuvre to force ground
between Nixon and one of the Democratic candidates, George
McGovern, as the presidential election campaign heated up.
Jean Westwood, quoted in 'The Democratic National Committee' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (August 7, 1972), p 15.
The five identified by Jean Westwood were: J.L Atwood, contributed $2000; George Karch,
$1000; Frederick Larkin Jr, $1000; Henry Mudd, $3000; and Willard Rockwell, $1000 (1972
dollars), Ibid.
Zack Strickland, 'Shuttle costs Remain $5 billion' Aviation Week and Space Technology (July
31, 1972), pp 12-13 .
Olin Teauge, quoted in 'The Democratic National Committee,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (August 7, 1972), p 15.
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Representative Thomas Downing (Democrat, Virginia) warned
against such tactics when he told the House floor:
I don't know how large a bloc they are, but the
ticket might as well write off all the voters who
are affected either directly or indirectly by the
aerospace industry.6
Westwood failed in her attempt to get an investigation, but
the shuttle remained a target in the electorial affray.
As in 1968, the continued involvement of the US in
Vietnam dominated the 1972 election. Nixon's 'secret plan'
to end the war in six months and ensure 'peace with honour'
had proven disastrous. The Administration appeared no
closer to a solution at the end of their four year term, in
spite of their detente and Vietnamization policies.7 A
resolution to Vietnam, therefore, clouded many other issues
during the election campaign, including Watergate.
An overwhelming majority in all the Republican
primaries ensured Nixon his nomination to stand again.8 The
Democratic primaries had furnished a sufficient majority
for Senator George McGovern to stand as Nixon's adversary;
a nomination which had surprised many because of McGovern's
radical platform. The mainstay of McGovern's manifesto was
his proposals for a 'peace economy', which involved: the
immediate pull out of US troops from Vietnam; the 'phasing
Thomas Downing, quoted in Ken Hechler, Towards the Endless Frontier p 290.
Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: /American Foreign Policy, 1938-1980 (Middlesex, England,
Penguin Books Ltd, Second Revised Edition, 1981), pp 308-334.
Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon p 544.
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down' of military spending and a corresponding increase in
government spending on welfare, education, health, housing
and other civilian projects; and the tightening up of the
tax structure which was perceived as 'only benefiting big
business.' For the aerospace industry in particular,
McGovern's plan was for conversion. Military production was
to be replaced by civilian production.9 Although NASA was
established as a civilian agency and prided itself on its
civilian status, McGovern believed the shuttle to be
primarily a military programme. Two weeks after Nixon's
announcement to develop the shuttle, McGovern told a
Florida campaign audience that if elected he 'wouldn't
manufacture a foolish project like the Space Shuttle to
provide jobs' and that furthermore he considered the
programme to be 'an enormous waste of money.'10 The shuttle
had thus become part of the divide between the McGovern and
Nixon tickets.
An early campaign speech from Vice President Spiro
Agnew also focused on the shuttle as an election issue.
Agnew launched a vicious attack on the shuttle's critics
labelling them as 'reactionaries, Utopians and unrealistic'
in arguing that spending on space technology should be
redirected to social problems. Such policies he argued,
would 'bring to a virtual halt this country's technological
9
George McGovern, An American Journey: The Presidential Campaign Speeches of George McGovern
(New York, Random House, 1974) .
George McGovern, quoted in Ken Hechler, Towards the Endless Frontier p 289.
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progress.'11 The advancement of science and technology, the
accumulation of new knowledge, spin-off technology and
investment in high skilled employment were all well
rehearsed compositions of promotional rhetoric for the
space programme and Agnew cited them all as examples of the
'benefits from the space program that will improve the
quality of life for all mankind.'12
On the side of the Nixon campaign was a large portion
of the aerospace industry. The shuttle's relationship to
jobs in that sector and its embodiment of scientific and
technical progress meant that McGovern's intentions
received a hostile reaction from many in the business. One
of its public voices, Aviation Week and Space Technology
took a strong stance against McGovern in its editorial at
the time:
His campaign speeches make it clear, that if
elected, he intends not only to wipe out the
future defense posture of this nation, but also
strip its new technology to bare bones.13
The diatribe went on to claim that McGovern stood against
'every major aerospace technical development program
including the shuttle,' and that his policies would 'wreak
havoc upon the US.' In their view, 'for an aerospace worker
to vote for Sen. McGovern would be to vote for self-
Spiro Agnew, address by the Vice President of the United States at the Florida Jaycees State
Convention, Daytona Beach, Florida, January 29, 1972 (Kennedy Space Center Archive, Florida),
PP 1,2.
Ibid, pp 5,6.
R. Hotz, 'Editorial,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (July 31, 1972), p 7.
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destruction'.14 Much the same conclusion had also been
drawn within the higher echelons of the aerospace unions.
The American Federation of Labour and the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) were so vexed by
McGovern's nomination that for the first time in its
history the executive council adjourned without voting for
any presidential endorsement.15
The AFL-CIO's declaration of neutrality however, did
not prevent considerable labour support for McGovern, even
among central labour bodies constitutionally subject to
official policy.15 Delegates to the 1972 International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM)
convention voted to endorse McGovern despite a resolution
urging the IAM to remain neutral because of McGovern's
opposition to the Super-Sonic Transport programme, the
Lockheed loan and the B-l bomber.17 Nixon though, found no
support among the IAM delegates. IAM President, Floyd
Smith, emphasized Nixon's poor record, especially in the
aerospace industry, in his keynote speech:
By ordering deep cutbacks in defense spending,
government employment and space expenditures and
Ibid.
Conservative politics prevailed within the AFL-CIO executive long after Vietnam had shattered
the-cold war consensus. Although its middle class allies had deserted Johnson and campaigned
for an end to the war the AFL-CIO continued to support the conflict. To the AFL-CIO,
McGovern's nomination was a manifestation of what they perceived as an extremist take over
of the Democratic Party. David Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth
Century Struggle (New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980), pp 238-244.
Ibid, p 242.
'Convention Backs McGovern, No Support at all for Nixon' The Machinist (September 14, 1972),
PP 1,7.
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offering no proposals for conversion to meet the
peacetime needs of the nation, the Nixon
Administration increased the number of depressed
areas from six in early 1969 to 62 by early 1972.
The nation's aerospace Centers were especially
hard hit. Hundreds of thousands of workers in all
job classifications were stranded in communities
which had no use for their skills. . . . When
Congress tried to provide such an alternative by
appropriating funds to create needed jobs ...
Nixon either vetoed these efforts or refused to
release funds that had already been authorized.18
Nevertheless, Nixon had the support of his "silent
majority". A Gallup poll at the end of August put Nixon in
the lead with a 64 percent share of the vote and had
McGovern trailing behind with only 3 0 per cent.19
Kissinger's secret talks in Vietnam with Le Due Tho had
almost reached a point of agreement, inspiring Kissinger to
announce on October 26, just in time for the election, that
'peace is at hand.' Despite McGovern's plea to the
electorate, to not 'let this man fool you again', 60 per
cent of the voters chose Nixon in the largest victory in
modern American electorial history.20
Although Nixon's Administration could not be described
as ardent champions of the human space programme, a
Republican triumph assured relatively strong support for
NASA's shuttle programme. Presumably, given McGovern's
rhetoric, the shuttle would have been a symbolic peace
economy victim. Even assuming that McGovern could not have
Floyd Smith, quoted in Ibid, p 7.
Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon p 680.





forced through all of his radical policies, it is
conceivable that a Democrat win would have resulted in the
programme's immediate cancellation.
Shoots of Financial Crisis.
Throughout the election year the Office of Management and
Budget indicated to NASA that it was in full accord with
the settlement over the shuttle.21 But the shuttle did not
represent the totality of NASA. The agency's resources were
spread over a myriad of different programmes, both
operational and in the making. Hence, for NASA, an
important part of the 1972 settlement entailed a commitment
to retain the agency's total annual funding; as NASA
Administrator, James Fletcher, advised Nixon in July 1973.
In January 1972 when you approved the space
shuttle development, I stated that I could
conduct the right kind of space program ... at a
"constant budget" [sic] of $3.4 billion. ... I
would have not recommended starting the shuttle
at a lower budget projection.22
NASA's interpretation of a constant budget, was a
guaranteed annual funding level $3.4 billion, in FY 1971
dollars, during the shuttle's development. Such a rigid
interpretation was not, however, shared by the Office of
Management and Budget. Fletcher's request for a $1 billion
Memorandum from Willis Shapely to George Low, July 26, 1972 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC); Letter from James Fletcher to Roy Ash, Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, July 13, 1973 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC); Letter from James
Fletcher to Richard Nixon, July 13, 1973 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
Letter from James Fletcher to Richard Nixon, July 13, 1973 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
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shuttle reserve was immediately cut and NASA's FY 1973
budget was submitted in 1973 dollars so NASA lost any
inflationary increments.23
In the months following Nixon's reelection the Office
of Management and Budget formulated plans to curb the
growth in federal spending. Having permitted heavy spending
in 1972, in part to assure a Nixon victory, the Office of
Management and Budget intended to reverse policy and work
towards what they regarded as desirable economic goals: a
reduction of the budget deficit to $12.7 billion in FY 1974
and a programme of more austere economies for the following
years to reduce it further.24 In December 1972, NASA was
told by the Office of Management and Budget that it had to
take a major cut in its FY 1974 funding as part of the
overall budgetary squeeze.25 The result was a presidential
budget request for NASA in FY 1974 of just over $3
billion.26 As projections for FY 1975 did not appear to
offer any alleviation, Fletcher advised Nixon of a pending
crisis.
It will not be possible to continue to run a
balanced program ... unless adequate funding is
provided in FY 1975 and in future years. ... We
Robert Thompson, interview with the author, September 7, 1995; NASA's total appropriation for
FY 1973 was $3 407 636 000. Ihor Gawdiak, Helen Fedor, NASA Historical Data Book Volume IV
Table: 4-12, p 133.
James Reichley, Conservatives in an Acre of Change p 227.
Letter from James Fletcher to Roy Ash, Director of OMB, July 13, 1973 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC); Letter from James Fletcher to Richard Nixon, July 13, 1973 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC) ; Joseph Trento, Prescription for Disaster pp 129-130.
Ihor Gawdiak, Helen Fedor, NASA Historical Data Book Volume IV Table: 4-13, p 134. NASA's
total appropriation for FY 1974 stood at $3 039 700 000.
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... assumed (with Office of Management and Budget
knowledge) that the reductions were only
temporary, and that future years' budgets would
again reach the required level. The programs we
now have under way cannot be sustained at the FY
1973/74 levels, nor can they be sustained at the
Office of Management and Budget projected level
of $3.2 billion for FY 1975. ... Either the
shuttle will have to be cancelled and with it the
only future plans for US men in space, or we will
have to forgo one or more of the major areas of
output.27
Despite NASA's supplications, the agency's total FY 1975
budget only just exceeded $3.2 billion.28
The combination of sustained funding cuts and emergent
cost-overrun from some of the shuttle contractors were, by
themselves, major contributors to the onset of financial
difficulties at NASA. With the fusion of a larger, more
pervasive, ingredient, inflationary crisis, NASA's
financial difficulties only got worse.
The seeds of inflationary crisis had been sown long
before NASA embarked upon the shuttle programme. Sustained
economic growth in the US had been based primarily on an
increasing reliance on the cheap flow of oil and raw
materials from the Third World. Oil had become an important
raw material for all the advance capitalist countries. The
proportion of oil in the world energy supply had increased
from 21.5 per cent in 1940 to 67.2 per cent in 1974. The
price of raw materials including oil had not risen much in
Letter from James Fletcher to Richard Nixon, July 13, 1973 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
Ihor Gawdiak, Helen Fedor, NASA Historical Data Book Volume IV Table: 4-14, p 135. NASA's
total appropriation for FY 1975 stood at $3 231 093 000.
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more than twenty years and the US had benefited from
favourable terms of trade with the Third World that had
remained low during the 1950s and 1960s. Tired of
capitalist exploitation, a general movement in the Third
World sought to redress the balance and force through more
equitable terms of trade. The prices of corn and timber
rose first, followed by textiles and finally, in the autumn
of 1973, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries,
described as powerless in the ten years after its
foundation in 1960, quadrupled the price of crude oil.
Terms of trade had already risen by 13 per cent in 1970-73,
with the oil shock they rose a further 69 per cent in 1970-
74. The prices of raw materials almost doubled over about
a year from the summer of 1972 until the autumn of 1973,
prior to the oil shock. The rising prices of primary
products, together with rising wages, squeezed US profit
rates substantially; and although real wages became
sluggish in 1973 and actually fell in 1974, the profit rate
plummeted with an outbreak of inflationary crisis.29
Prodded by rising prices, falling wages and massive
lay-offs, organized labour in the major aerospace
industries went into negotiations, demanding both
substantial flat wage increases and changes in the formulas
for calculating cost-of-living clauses. The initial
Itoh Makoto, The World Crisis and Japanese Capitalism (London, MacMillan Press, 1990), pp 32-
34, 50-57; Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremess The Short Twentieth Century 1914-91 (London,
Michael Joseph Ltd, 1994), chapter 9.
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response by management at the large aerospace companies,
Boeing, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas and Rockwell, was to
consistently reject proposals put forward by unions and
refuse to negotiate. By the end of 1974, however, Boeing
and Lockheed had entered into an agreement with both the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers (IAM) and the United Automobile Workers (UAW) .30 In
the past when one major company reached agreement the
others generally fell into line. Notwithstanding, the
offers emanating from McDonnell Douglas were described by
the IAM as 'an insult' and a 90 day strike, by over 20 000
workers, thus, ensued. The strike's impact went beyond all
four plants of the company also affecting launch facilities
at Kennedy.31
With rising costs of materials and labour, many of the
shuttle's contractors argued that it was difficult to
continue development projects with dollars that bought
substantially less than projected in 1972. NASA's FY 1975
funding was based on a 5 per cent inflation factor, but by
late 1974 overall levels of inflation on materials stood at
around 9 per cent and in some areas approached 10 per cent.
The prime contractor, Rockwell, went back to NASA to seek
'Stop Work Meeting at Boeing Aerospace Bargaining Heats Up,' The Machinist (September 19,
1974), p 1; 'Aerospace Bargaining Focuses on Boeing,' The Machinist (September 26, 1974), p
1; 'Full COLA Escalator Negotiated at Boeing,' The Machinist (October 10, 1974), p 2;
'Uncapped COLA, Pensions Win Lockheed Ratification,' The Machinist (October 31, 1974), p 1.
31
'Nationwide Stike at McDonnell Douglas,' The Machinist (February 13, 1975), p 2; Nationwide
Strike at McDonnell Douglas Halts Aircraft, Missile Production,' The Machinist (February 20,
1975), p 1; ' IAM Aerospace Strikers, 20 000 solid, Keep McDonnell Douglas Closed,' The
Machinist (February 27, 1975), p 1; 'Strikers Turn Thumbs Down on McDonnell Douglas's
Substandard Offer,' The Machinist (April 3, 1975), pi; 'St Louis Ratification Ends McDonnell
Douglas Strike,' The Machinist (May 22, 1975), p 1.
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more money, but NASA compelled Rockwell to absorb a $5 to
$10 million loss under FY 1975 shuttle spending. NASA also
informed Rockwell that it could only expect about $700
million per year in shuttle funding during FY's 1975-78: a
figure that Rockwell claimed, was about $100 million per
year below the amount the shuttle's development schedule
required.32
In a push for retention of the constant budget, NASA
continually advised the presidency and the executive branch
of the political consequences of sustained funding cuts.
A great deal of support for the space program in
general, and for the shuttle in particular,
hinges on program balance. Without this balance
we would lose support for the remaining program
in the Congress, by the public, and by the
scientific and users communities.33
A fiscally imposed slippage of the Shuttle
development schedule by the Executive Branch for
the third consecutive year may well result in
termination of the program. Congress could take
it as evidence of an internal Administration
intent to create an untenable development
environment that would lead inevitably to
cancellation. Or Congress could take it as a lack
of Administration determination and real
commitment to preeminence that would provide an
incentive to terminate the program by legislative
fiat.34
Debates about the necessity of spending taxpayers
money on the shuttle, and its place within a host of
K. Johnsen, 'Inflation Boosts Labor Demands,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (July 23
1974), pp 12-13; Craig Covault, 'Inflation Forcing Shuttle Changes,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (September 23 1974), pp 20-22; Barry Casebolt, 'Overrun on Costs Of Shuttle
Studied,' The Huntsville Times (April 14, 1974), pp 5-6.
Letter from James Fletcher to Roy Ash, Director OMB, July 13, 1973 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
NASA position paper, 18 October, 1974 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC), p 2.
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national priorities, again reached the Congressional
political agenda during 1973 and 1974. Much of the space
science community expressed concern that if NASA maintained
its commitment to the shuttle within a reduced budget many
space science programmes would be cancelled or delayed. The
space science field, it was argued, would be 'irretrievably
damaged' or 'severely disabled, ' if it had to take the
shortfall for an underfunded launcher development
programme.35 NASA's upper echelons, although in agreement
with the need for increased funding, contested the
arguments made against the shuttle. By re-recruiting
Mathematica, evidence on the economic returns from the
shuttle was again utilized to suggest that, in the long-
run, the savings provided by an operational shuttle would
result in more money being available for space science, not
less.36 The logic of this argumentation was put forward
with such authority that, by the end of 1973 large sections
of the space science community were professing that the
shuttle would be a valuable asset to scientific research in
the 1980s and beyond.37
The General Accounting Office, however, were more
sceptical. Given the tight budget ceilings, it claimed that
Constance Holden, 'Space Shuttle: Despite Doubters, Project Will Probably Fly' Science (April
27, 1973) pp 395-397; 'Proxmire "Frustrated" by Capable Defense of Shuttle' Space Business
Daily (April 12, 1973).
Ibid.
'Space Science Board Finds Shuttle of Great Value to Science' Space Business Daily (October
11, 1973) pp 203-204 .
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neither the shuttle nor existing or alternative expendable
launch vehicles could be developed and operated.38 On
advising Congress, the General Accounting Office did
recommend that:
if limit budget resources required an austere
future space program, then current expendable
[launch vehicles] may offer more flexibility for
the most economic choice among fewer missions.39
By 1975 the General Accounting Office expressed grave
doubts about NASA's ability to construct the shuttle on
time and within budget. Its main concern was that NASA's
budget estimates and schedule goals appeared to be overly
optimistic and as a result, the agency's project estimates
might be understated and its reserves overstated.40
In the Senate, William Proxmire, restated in 1973 that
'he intuitively felt that the shuttle should not be built, '
because he believed it was, 'usurping money that is
desperately needed for ghetto and other societal
problems.'41 His rationale was questioned, however, by the
Californian Senator, Alan Cranston. Cranston argued that,
rather than cutting funds from the space shuttle, Proxmire
should restore cuts already made by the Office of
GAO, Analysis Of Cost Estimates For The Space Shuttle And Two Alternate Programs, report to
the Congress, June 1, 1973 (General Accounting Office Distribution Center, Washington DC),
pp 32-34 .
Ibid, p 40.
GAO, Staff Study: Space Transportation System February 1975 (General Accounting Office
Distribution Center, Washington DC), pp 3, 21, 24.
'Proxmire "Frustrated" by Capable Defense of Shuttle,' Space Business Daily (April 12, 1973)
p 236.
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Management and Budget. He claimed that the expenditure
could be justified because it would create up to 50 000
jobs directly and call on the services of some 10 000 sub¬
contractors and suppliers.42 Taking an isolationist
position, Cranston argued that monies for social programmes
should come from the:
$30 billion the Administration plans to spend to
maintain 3 400 US installations and 600 000
service men in 30 foreign countries. . .. The
shuttle is clearly more important than spending
$10 billion on foreign military aid to 64
countries - 27 of whom have military or quasi-
military dictatorships.43
Pressure was also being felt from both the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers (IAM) and the United Automobile Workers (UAW) as
they lobbied the Senate for approval of shuttle funds. In
statements to the committee, IAM President, Floyd Smith,
and UAW President, Leonard Woodcock, both emphasized that
the shuttle could provide up to 70 000 jobs across 48
states; and added that the programme would help ease the
aerospace depression, which had taken more than 250 000
jobs since 1969.44
The justifications for and the arguments against,
spending billions of dollars on a new launch vehicle drew
much attention within Congress between 1972 and 1974. But
42
Alan Cranston, press release from the Office of US Senator Alan Cranston, April 10, 1973




'UAW + IAM = Shuttle,' The Machinist (April 12, 1973) p 1.
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this issue had been well aired during the 1970 and 1971
Congressional debates and yet the opponents of the shuttle
had failed to terminate the programme. Another part of the
Congressional debates, therefore, centred on the building
blocks of NASA's claims to economic and routine access to
space: demand and function.
Paragons of Demand.
In the first half of 1970 the Office of Manned Space Flight
envisaged an operational shuttle fleet conducting 75
flights per year, at a cost of between $2.7 to $3 million
per flight.45 As NASA's development plans were delayed
during 1970 and 1971 and fresh justifications were sought,
predictions of future shuttle traffic models fluctuated
from a low of 492 to a high of 736, over a 12 year
period.46 After President Nixon's approval of the programme
in 1972, NASA's predicted a maximum of 60 flights per
year.47 The politics surrounding NASA's claims of
inexpensive access to space and it consequential link to
increases in market demand, however, grew in intensity as
the shuttle slowly progressed from its conceptual phase
into development. Disagreement about the economy of an
NASA, Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document Level 1
Heiss K.P, Morgenstern 0, Economic Analysis of the Space Shuttle System: Volume 1 (Study for
the NASA, Contract No. NASW-2081, January 31 1972); Dale Myers, Memorandum to Deputy
Associate Administrator, Planning, June 17, 1971 (NASA History Office Archives, Washington
DC) .
NASA, Space Shuttle Requirements Document Level 1: Revision No.4
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operational shuttle tended to converge on NASA's
proclamations, made in 1971, that the cost of sending
payloads into space would be reduced to $100 per pound.48
An eminent physicist, senate committee consultant and
senior member of the Quadri-Science Incorporation, Ralph
Lapp, told the Aeronautical and Space Science Committee in
1972, that the 'true price' of shuttle operations would be
$5 100 per pound.49 Mathematica, the firm contracted by
NASA to conduct the an economic evaluation of the shuttle,
accepted that launch costs of $100 per pound were not
accurate, but it continued to reiterated that the shuttle
would eventually produce savings in the region of $4 to $5
billion over a fleet of expendable launch vehicles in the
1980s.50 NASA, of course, corroborated Mathematica's
findings, echoing their claim that:
Together with NASA's in-house work,
[Mathematica's results] conclusively show that
the space shuttle is a clear [sic] economic
choice.51
But to some, it was a claim that remained untenable.
In 1973 NASA found that the battle over flight costs
was far from over. The Office of Management and Budget's
See for example testimony by Dale Myers, NASA Authorization 1972, Hearings Before the
Committee on Science and Astronautics, United States House of Representatives, p 136.
A crucial aspect of the $5 100 figure came from a statement buried within the Mathematica
report which reduced the 40 000 pound theoretical payload weight average to 5000 pounds.
Ralph Lapp, Testimony to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Science, NASA Authorization
For Fiscal Year 1973 (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972), p 1071.
'Proxmire "Frustrated" by Capable Defense of Shuttle' Space Business Dally (April 12, 1973),
p 237.
Emphasis in original. NASA Authorization For Fiscal Year 1973 p 1111.
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Evaluations Division, refused to accept NASA's traffic
model projections and accused the agency of starting with
a 'number that strains credibility' and going up from
there;52 and a 1973 General Accounting Office report to
Congress also concluded that the shuttle's operational
costs would be far in excess of what was being predicted by
NASA.53 In its report, the General Accounting Office
arrived at a very different conclusion from NASA and
Mathematica. This disparity arose principally because of a
difference in methodologies. NASA had not included
development and procurement costs in its calculations and
produced an efficiency index which assumed the shuttle
would carry maximum capacity on each flight. As many of the
planned missions did not require full shuttle capacity and
because NASA left out important cost factors such as
development and production, the General Accounting Office
believed that NASA's comparison between the shuttle and
expendable launch vehicles 'was not a meaningful one.'54 By
including both development and procurement costs and
computing in an average payload weight over NASA's 1973
traffic model (see table 6:1) the General Accounting Office
concluded that costs per pound would be closer to $3 500;
Niskanen William, head of the Office of Management and Budget's Evaluations Division, quoted
in Claude Barfield, 'Intense Debate, Cost Cutting Precedes White House Decision to Back
Shuttle'.
GAO, Analysis Of Cost Estimates For The Space Shuttle And Two Alternate Programs, Report to





Shuttle Flight Traffic Baseline: 1973.
Year 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 Total
KSC Flights 12 18 23 22 26 26 40 30 41 40 37 39 354
VAFB Flights 0 18 20 18 24 18 26 19 22 17 26 19 227
Total 12 36 43 40 50 44 66 49 63 57 63 58 581
Source: NASA/DOD Space Shuttle Orbiter Fleet Size Analysis,
Prepared by the Office of Manned Space Flight and US Air
Force Systems Command, May 15, 1973 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
more than either existing expendable launch vehicles or a
family of new expendable launch vehicles (see table:
6:2) .55
Ultimately, though, the General Accounting Office
concluded that the formulation any cost saving projections
were:
unrealistic, since the systems will be in
development until 1979 and any performance
savings must accrue over a long period of
years .56
Nevertheless, the General Accounting Office did clearly
state its reservations about the programme.
NASA's estimates do not remove our reservations
that the Space Shuttle will produce cost savings
... while there is uncertainty in cost estimates
for both the Shuttle and expendable systems, we
believe the degree of uncertainty for the Space
Shuttle estimates is greater than for the
expendable systems. With these differences in the
degree of uncertainty in launch system costs, we
do not consider it prudent to place too much
confidence in the projected cost savings.57
NASA rebutted much of what was being reported by the
General Accounting Office. NASA Administrator, James
Fletcher thought that it had overestimated shuttle costs
and accordingly found no real basis to the report.
We believe that NASA's economic models have
erred, if at all, on the side of conservatism;
Ibid, pp 29-31.
Ibid, p 12.
Ibid, pp 23-24, 41.
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Table 6:2.
GAO's Comparison Of Costs Of Placing
Payloads In Orbit.
Total launch system cost
for aggregate payload










4.3 4 . 5 4 . 6
Total launch system cost
through 1990 (billions
of 1971 dollars)
$13 .3 $11. 6 $16 .1
Total launch system cost
per pound of payload in
orbit (1979-90)
* Rounded to nearest $100.
Source: Adapted from Tabl
*$3 100





Estimates For The Space Shuttle And Two Alternate Programs,
Report to the Congress, June 1, 1973 (General Accounting
Office Distribution Center, Washington DC), p 30.
and that this is more true today than when the
shuttle was approved in early 1972.58
The General Accounting Office however, commented that:
Although NASA believes its estimates are
conservative, our experience with estimates for
large systems involving significant uncertainties
has taught us to view such estimates with a
healthy scepticism.59
However, NASA, at this time, had managed to shift the
debate away from cost-per-pound as a measurement of
efficiency and instead, had introduced 'per mission costs'
as the basis upon which to gauge the shuttle's economic
advantage.60
[Cost per pound was] an elusive criteria, a
siren, it attracted people, but when you analyzed
it cost per pound [was not] all that great. It
was the cost-per-flight that was important.61
Within the Congress, the General Accounting Office report
did not gain many allies. A House of Representatives
Appropriations Committee, sent instructions to the Library
of Congress to prepare an alternative report soon after its
release. Entitled, The June 1, 1973 General Accounting
Office Analysis of the Shuttle Program: A Critical
Assessment, it gave quite a scathing appraisal of the
General Accounting Office's analysis. Accusing the General
Letter from James Fletcher to Elmer Staats, Comptroller General GAO, May 21, 1973 (NASA
History Office, Washington DC).
GAO, Analysis of Cost Estimates for the Space Shuttle and Two Alternate Programs (General
Accounting Office Distribution Center, Washington DC), p 35.
NASA Comments on the Statement of Dr Ralph Lapp on the Space Shuttle, reprinted in NASA
Authorization For Fiscal Year 1973 pp 1108-1112.
Charles Donlan, interview with the author, June 7, 1995.
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Accounting Office of presenting irrelevant arguments about
the cost comparisons between the shuttle and an expendable
launch system, the report cited the organization's lack of
knowledge about space technology as the foundation of their
misconceptions about the programme.62 An underlying
suggestion within the assessment was that those who opposed
the shuttle had misconstrued the primary "logic" behind the
programme.53 The General Accounting Office, defended its
research conclusions and stressed that its main judgment
was the uncertainty involved in any cost projections.64
The contested issue of launch costs was closely linked
with two other related and equally contestable factors;
first, how often the shuttle was going to be launched? And
second, how sizable was the demand for a shuttle service
going to be? The higher the demand the larger the traffic
model. The larger the traffic model the lower the cost.
George Rathjens, a professor of political science at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, advised Congress in
1973 that NASA's traffic models were 'overstated' and that
the agency were proposing 'at least twice as many flights
as can be justified.'65 The General Accounting Office, also
'The June 1, 1973 GAO Analysis of the Shuttle Program: A Critical Assessment' reprinted in
Congressional Record - Senate (June 30, 1973) pp S12701-S12702.
GAO Report on Analysis of Cost of Space Shuttle Program, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Manned Space Flight US House of Representatives (Washington DC, Government Printing Office,
1973) .
Ibid.
'Mondale Hoping New GAO Report will Help Kill Shuttle' Space Business Daily (April 11, 1973),
p 230.
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very sceptical of NASA's traffic model predictions,
described them as 'more uncertain than the costs of the
transportation systems themselves'.66 More worrying for
NASA's higher echelons, however, was a growing doubt over
the traffic models within the agency itself. Space Shuttle
Manager, Robert Thompson recalled:
There was somethings that came out early . .. that
may have misled some people. We talked about ...
55 flights a year, something like that. I never
felt we would ever get up to anything like that.
I mean 55 shuttle flight a year would put more
stuff in orbit than you could even think about
doing. No one has got that kind of funding or
that kind of need, so we never configured any of
the logistics or the infrastructure behind the
shuttle for much more than about twenty something
flights per year.67
George English, a chief bureaucrat at Kennedy recollected:
Nobody here [Kennedy] really believed that we
would do 40 or 50 flights per year, that was
totally unrealistic. That was guys trying to sell
the program, that's exactly what that was. . . .
[Traffic models of that size were known to be
unrealistic at a very early stage in the
programme because of] the nature of the
environment which you were dealing with. Space is
a very hostile environment and it's not like
flying an aeroplane. . . . The work involved in
preparing a vehicle for launch, particularly a
reusable vehicle, is pretty horrendous. So there
was never any of our knowledgeable people . . . who
ever thought we would be able to launch 40, 50
shuttle's a year. We use to talk about that and
without a serious purpose, a serious goal, there
was no need for it. People were talking about
communication satellites, but how many do you
think we would put up?68
GAO, Analysis Of Cost Estimates For The Space Shuttle And Two Alternate Programs (General
Accounting Office Distribution Center, Washington DC), p 12.
Robert Thompson, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
George English, interview with the author, July 26, 1995.
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Hans Mark, then Director at NASA's Ames Center, reflected:
The whole cost-effectiveness argument, I believe,
was fraudulent from the start ... and I said so
in the private councils at the time, but I didn't
want to get thrown out so I never went public
with it.59
I remember that we had a lively discussion with
Heiss during his visit because the flight rate
that both he and NASA headquarters were
projecting . . . were substantially higher than the
launch rates in the early 1970s. Many of us were
unhappy with the conclusions because we could not
honestly reconcile ourselves to the shuttle
launch rates being forecast.70
NASA's own launch rate had peaked at 31 in 1966; by 1973,
it was down to 13.71
Another focus for the misgivings surrounding NASA's
traffic models centred around the relationship between NASA
and the contractors who provided the data. A Vermont based
"citizens group", the Universe Astronautics Foundation
Inc., opened this question in an attempt to inject some
distrust over the validity of Mathematica's results.
Central to their argument was the claim that both Lockheed
and Aerospace had vested interests in the shuttle and,
therefore, could not be seen as independent from NASA.72
The involvement of Lockheed and Aerospace in the shuttle's
cost-effective analysis and the effect of that involvement
Hans Mark, interview with the author, September 8, 1995.
Hans Mark, Space Station p 49.
Including DOD launches peak year activity stood at 73 in 1966 and the slowly dropped to 23
by 1973. NASA, Pocket Statistics (Washington DC, NASA History Office, 1995), p B4.
'Space Shuttle Antagonists' Space Business Daily (June 5, 1973), p 197.
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on Mathematica' s results was a concern that also found
echoes within NASA's own rank and file. Adelbert Tischler,
Director of the Chemical Division of the Office of Advanced
Research and Technology wrote:
On presenting its conclusions to Congress Oskar
Morgenstern . . . opened his statement with a
declaration that the Mathematica results could be
no more accurate than the contractor's data from
which they were drawn. To me (and I was there)
that was an open hint that Oskar saw shortcomings
in those data.73
Nevertheless, by the end of 1973 the confidence of the
cost-effectiveness arguments was 'frustrating' opponents in
the Congress.74 Once the Mathematica study had filtered
through, many of the shuttle's adversaries began to swing
over to the NASA camp.75 The cost-effectiveness arguments
had penetrated to such a level that many in Congress were
willing to accept them.
Senator Proxmire ... was a vocal opponent of the
shuttle and then one talk I gave after he had
seen this [Mathematica study] he said he gave up
fighting the economics, there was too much in
there for him to combat, he accepted it
finally.76
The uncertainty of what a future space programme would look
like, tended to favour the NASA position. The debate on
economic questions had become extraneous because the issues
Adelbert Tischler, letter to the author, November 13, 1996.
'Proxmire "Frustrated" by Capable Defense of Shuttle' Space Business Daily (April 12, 1973),
pp 236-238.
Bill Sneed, interview with the author, August 21, 1995.






were based on predictions that stretched as far as 30 to 40
years into the future so neither side could really prove
its case.77 NASA and its supporters had thus, successfully
shifted the debate temporarily away from economics.
Unpredictability meant flexibility. The shuttle, touted as
a flexible technology promised an adaptable new space
transportation system that could meet the needs of an
uncertain future in space. George Low's premise, that the
importance of the shuttle lay in its new capabilities, had
permeated enough for one Senator to comment that he saw:
merit in the argument that the Space Shuttle
represents the next logical step in space.78
Function, however, was another issue in dispute.
The Politics of Function.
In 1972, Ralph Lapp also questioned NASA's most celebrated
attributes of the shuttle; the promise of versatile space
operations through the retrieval, refurbishment and repair
of satellites.
The increasing complexity of orbital devices
calls for a much greater payload of checkout
devices ... It is not a matter of a man with a
screwdriver fixing mechanical things. I know in
some cases, even the men who are putting up these
scientific satellites prefer their own laboratory
only to check them out. Professor Van Allen told
me that quite recently. ... Furthermore, if you
look at the Comsat satellites, they prefer to use
The National Space Programme, Congressional Record, the Senate (May 30, 1973), pp S9863-
S9864; Ranking GOP Commmittee Member Opposes Proxmire on Shuttle' Space Business Daily (June
4, 1973) p 188.
Charles MacMathias. Ibid, p S9863, my emphasis.
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lighter satellites and more of them. ... I am
sure Comsat Corp would be very reluctant to send
a Space Shuttle up, bring the satellite down,
repair it, and send it up again. I believe they
would be more prone to replace it with a more
efficient satellite.79
The DOD's top brass however, had formed a convincing
rationale based upon the shuttle's new capabilities to
support the programme. Its reaffirmation of support in 1972
served to assure patronage for the shuttle within Congress
during that critical year. Secretary of the Air Force,
Robert Seamans, concluded his testimony to the Senate
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences by saying;
I believe the next logical step is to move toward
development of the Space Shuttle. If we proceed
step by step, we should be able to develop a
Shuttle that will offer significant advantages in
the way we operate and perform our missions in
space. Also, if we are successful in our
developmental efforts, we could open new avenues
for a greater range of applications of space
which would benefit all of mankind.80
John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering
at the DOD, told the Senate Committee that:
The Department of Defense can benefit from the
new operating capabilities of the Shuttle for
future military space operations, [because of its
ability to] recover, adjust, modify, repair, and
return selected payloads and thus make more
effective use of our space hardware.81
What Ralph Lapp had deemed an unimportant function for both
scientific and commercial users, the US military saw as
Ralph Lapp, Testimony to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Science, NASA Authorization
For Fiscal Year 1973 (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972), pp 1077-1078.
Robert Seamans, Ibid, pp 1041-1042, my emphasis.
John Foster, Ibid, p 1000
224
potentially a valuable asset. The technology's promise of
routine access to space combined with short turnaround
times were viewed by the DOD as superior advantages worth
pursuing. An ability to resupply or deploy new or
refurbished payloads quickly in times of crisis held a
great appeal for the DOD.82 Underlying the military agenda
however, was the opportunity for it to become actively
involved in human space flight; something the DOD had
coveted since the beginning of the space programme.
As manned operations become more routine and as
scientists and technicians are equally able to
accompany their payloads in space, our use of man
in military space operations will become
practical.83
Paradoxically it was a NASA failure in 1973 that
served as a further justification for an investment in the
shuttle. A rehearsal for continuous operations in orbit was
provided by Skylab, the centre piece of NASA's Apollo
Applications Program. Constructed for both scientific and
industrial applications, Skylab was a two storey orbiting
laboratory converted from the upper stage of the giant
Saturn V Moon rocket. It was an ill-fated programme
however, plagued with problems from the very start.
Unforseen aerodynamic loads broke off part of the station's
external heat and meteoroid shield and caused the loss of





May 14, 1973. The second solar array also did not open,
leaving Skylab with no power and without protection from
the searing heat of the sun.84 A rescue crew was sent up to
repair Skylab on May 25 and after 28 days of work,
involving a number of spacewalks, Skylab was deemed fully
operational.85 Two further visits were made to Skylab each
involving space walks and medical, scientific and
industrial experiments. The final mission came on November
16, 1973. During this mission NASA unwittingly learnt some
crucial lessons on the psychological problems associated
with long term stays in space. Relations between Houston
and Skylab 4's crew, Gerry Carr, Bill Pogue and Edward
Gibson, soon broke down after it was discovered that the
crew were attempting to hide Pogue's affliction with space
sickness. The result was an escalation of conflict between
mission control and the crew. Among a catalogue of
complaints, the crew found that: the levels of noise inside
the station impaired their sleep, the internal tannoys were
unreliable, the drinking water was filled with bubbles,
which led to chronic flatulence, and they had become bored
with their diet and their replacement clothes, which were
all the same colour. Combined with continual changes to,
and increases in, their workload the crew eventually went
84
NASA Investigation Board, 'The Initial Flight Anomalies of Skylab 1' Francis Hoban, William
Lawbaugh, (ed) Readings in Systems Engineering (Washington DC, NASA, Scientific and Technical
Information Program, 1993), pp 181-199.
8 5
The crew members were Charles Conrad, Paul Weitz and Joe Kerwin. Frank Anderson, Orders of
Magnitude pp 82-84; Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book Volume III pp 93-108;
Nicholas Booth, The Encyclopedia of Space (London, Brian Trodd Publishing House Limited,
1990), p 113-115.
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on strike. Hasty compromises by mission control soon eased
the situation and after a short period they resumed work.
The crew eventually returned to Earth after spending a
record 84 days in space.86
Skylab was short lived, but it provided a welter of
medical and scientific data on long stays in space. The
programme also served NASA well as a public relations
vehicle, accentuating the potentials of human operations in
near Earth orbit. It demonstrated that humans could
withstand long stays in space and still perform "useful"
work. Emphasis had also been placed on industrial
applications in a zero-gravity environment; a necessary
slice of propaganda to justify NASA's shuttle programme and
endorse the vision of a commercialized and industrialized
space environment of the future.
The space walk repairs carried out on Skylab had
coincided with the Congressional debates, providing a
demonstration of the shuttle's future possibilities.
Political rhetoric had adroitly turned misfortune into
powerful vindication. After Skylab, one Senator commented:
Moreover, substantial savings may arise from
eliminating such costly losses as the $100
million orbiting astronomical observatory and the
$70 million Mariner Mars failure. These costly
failures would very likely have been avoided had
a Space Shuttle been available. In this
connection, the repair of Skylab is a very good




can carry out on a future malfunctioning
satellite.87
Another Senator expressed much the same view:
In the era of Space Shuttle, ... hardware which
was damaged or failed would no longer have to be
abandoned. The successful and timely repair of a
Skylab would thus become normal operations of
space flight by this Nation. This appears to me
to be a very logical way to do business, and an
example of just one of the many valuable roles
which the Space Shuttle can play.88
"Normal operations" in space would, nonetheless,
involve a lot more than the activities of astronauts in
orbit.
Despite criticisms, in 1975 NASA's financial problem, its
consequences, and the continued justifications for
developing the shuttle within a restricted budget, had
minimal political impact, coming as they did in the
aftermath of the Watergate scandal. Between 1973 and 1974
the Nixon Adminstration fell from one political crisis into
another. Vice President Spiro Agnew was forced to resign in
October 1973 on State corruption charges; and accusations
of a cover up, which involved pay-offs, pressuring the FBI
and the erasure of key conversation tapes, resulted in many
of Nixon's aides being ordered to resign in the same year.
Nixon himself managed to hold on to power through 1973 and
8 7
Cutting from the Congressional Record, the Senate, June 30, 1973 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
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into 1974, but with impeachment by the Congress pending, he
was finally forced to become the first president to resign
from office on the 8 August 1974. The affair marked the end
of the imperial presidency and a resurgence in the power of
Congress. President Gerald Ford attempted to restore
confidence in the office of the presidency and provide a
'period of healing,' but he was to experience unprecedented
opposition from the Congress and a growing cynicism from
the American public with public institutions.89 James
Fletcher's appeal to the new president to restore NASA's
funding and support both the space shuttle and the US space
programme, contained within it a reflection of the crisis
that besieged US government at the time:
As a matter of conscience and duty, I must inform
you of the steady erosion of the United States
space capabilities and of the dangers this poses.
... If the civil program continues to be held
below its critical threshold, we run a real risk
of foregoing rich benefits in international
prestige, military spinoffs, economic and
industrial stimulation, and constructive
noninflationary employment. ... In my view we
have reached a breaking point. . . . Even the
usually conservative financial community is
recognizing that signs of a national
technological crisis - and the shrinkage of the
NASA program has been a major contributor to that
90
crisis .
David McKay, American Politics and Society (New York, Basil Blackwell, 1987); M.J.C. Vile,
Politics in the USA (London, Hutchinson, 1976); Jonathan Schell, The Time of Illusions (New
York, Vantage, 1975) .




Despite the financial and political problems which NASA
faced, Enterprise the first test article orbiter was
produced on time. For NASA it was an important milestone in
the shuttle's development. For many members of the American
public it was an opportunity to escape political cynicism
and marvel at the technological sublime.
Following aerospace tradition, the shuttle was
unveiled to the public at a roll-out extravaganza at the
Palmdale assembly plant in California on September 17,
1976. Over 2000 guests, three major television networks,
two senators, two congressmen and six cast members from the
television series Star Trek attended the ceremony. As
Enterprise emerged from its hanger the Golden West Air
Force band rolled drums and played the Star Trek theme
tune. The reason Star Trek played such a prominent role was
the result of a concerted write-in campaign to the White
House by fans demanding that NASA change the name of the
first orbiter from its original Constitution to the name of
the fictitious star ship Enterprise. During a 45 minute
meeting on September 8, 1976, President Gerald Ford
notified NASA Administrator, James Fletcher of the campaign
and made it known that Enterprise was also his preferred
choice. It is not clear why Ford intervened in such a
trivial part of the shuttle programme, since for most of
his presidency he left the project to its own devices.
Coming at the end of an election year, Ford may have
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considered that this populist manoeuvre would win him some
critical votes; at least from the Star Trek fan club.
Fletcher's agreement with Ford over the naming of the first
orbiter did cause some concern among a number of NASA
officials, because of the commercial and marketing
activities associated with the series. Other agency
officials however, saw the name as giving the shuttle ready
recognition. The mythology of an American-led multinational
corps of missionaries spreading peace by enterprise suited
the post-lunar propaganda and served to justify the
continuing exploitation of space.91
An estimated 35 000 to 40 000 people jammed into
Rockwell's Palmdale plant to catch a glimpse of Enterprise
on September 18, 1976 during an open house day. Open house
had originally been designed for Rockwell employees, but
media publicity indicated that it would be open to the
public, which resulted in a much larger turnout than
expected.92 Ordinary members of the public also lined the
roads to catch a glimpse of Enterprise when it was moved by
trailer the 3 5 miles from Palmdale to the Hugh L. Dryden
Flight Research Center on 31 January 1977 (see Print 6:1).
Thomas O'Toole, 'Space Shuttle Orbiter Shown for First Time in California,' Washington Post
(September 18, 1976); 'Shuttle Orbiter Named,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (September
13, 1976), p 26; Dale Carter, The Final Frontier pp 200-201.







Science and technology lie at the heart of social
asymmetry. Thus technology both creates systems
which close off other options and generates
novel, unpredictable and indeed previously
unthinkable options. The game of technology is
never finished, and its ramifications are
endless.1
Conditions of Development Practice.
Budget cuts, costs overruns and inflation were all
significant shapers of technological development practice
at NASA, as Johnson's Director, Christopher Kraft
recollected:
At the time of developing [the space shuttle] we
also had to change the character of NASA, at
least the manned space flight parts of NASA.2
Up until the shuttle, cost, although not a non-factor, was
not the factor which determined NASA's practices. During
Apollo, development practice was primarily shaped by its
schedule. The criteria for success involved not just a
working technology, but completion of the mission within an
established deadline. Cost was thus a variable that could
be tailored to the needs of the technology and the
Michel Callon, 'Techno-Economic Networks and Irreversibility,' John Law, (ed) A Sociology of
Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination (London, New York, Routledge, 1991), p
132 .
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
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schedule.3 As Johnson engineer, Norman Chaffee recollected,
many of the Apollo/Saturn Moon rocket's requirements had at
least two, if not three, alternate technological solutions
running in parallel:4
In the good old days of Apollo, if you had an
idea, [or] you recognized an area of risk in the
program, it was very easy to go and get money to
work on a technology or an alternate concept that
would provide you [with] a viable backstop; in
case you did run into a problem.5
Nevertheless, the shuttle had to be built within a fixed
price contract. For NASA, this was 'unheard of:'6
Cost became one of the major factors and we had
to turn the whole organization, the whole
management scheme, ... in fact the aerospace
industry had to be modified, to design [and
build] something of that complexity and that
amount of new technology.7
NASA had to convince its engineers, scientists and
administrators that cost was as a big a factor as the
aerodynamics or the schedule. Cost thus drove both the
schedule and the technological potentialities.
By in large everything we did, from the choice of
what the concept was, to the breadth of the test
program, to the number of what if situations, .. .
there was almost no backup program. We were
committed to our first approach and only in very
rare cases would the program manager provide any
money because I am so concerned about the risk of
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995; LeRoy Day, interview with
the author, June 26, 1995; Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995, my emphasis.
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this particular element that I want to fund a
backup activity.8
In the shuttle money was part of the design
criteria. When you design a flying machine you
always have a weight bogey that you have to
design too. Well, in the shuttle, not only did we
have a weight bogey, but we had a dollar bogey
that everything had to be designed to also.9
Budget constraints had impacted on the shuttle's
development schedule each year since its inception. A nine-
month slip was required in 1972 to accommodate an $85
million reduction in the FY 1974 budget and another 6-
months' slip was incurred in 1973 to meet an $89 million
reduction in the FY 197 5 budget.10
As the press of the budget, the limitations of
the budget, became more and more apparent ... we
began to push things off; we began to lose
schedule. We used schedule as the rubber band and
the schedule began to slip.11
Schedule slippage, though, was not the only victim of
restricted funding. In 1974 NASA formed a Space Shuttle
Programme Costs and Requirements Committee to initiate some
shuttle programme changes to reduce costs. The cost and
requirements committee was made up of persons outside of
the shuttle programme to give NASA a fresh look at the
development effort, but it was not permitted to alter basic
shuttle requirements. NASA's upper management eventually
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
Samuel Beddingfield, interview with the author, July 31, 1995.
NASA, position paper, 18 October, 1974 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
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approved 2 6 changes in the shuttle programme to save an
estimated $360 million over a three year period, which
included: deferral of ground support equipment, deletion of
a number of test programmes and deferral of some hardware
construction.12
What we were doing was basically saying that we
will take a schedule slip, or we will take a
performance decrement, but we are committed to
this thing we chose and if we have to leave off
some tests and analytically estimate the
performance in certain realms and do a smaller
number of test, we [will] do that.13
As a design requirement for the shuttle, we did
not ... build any development hardware. We just
went right straight to the final configuration
and built the hardware and said that is what we
will test; that's what we will fly if it tests
ok, rather than going through a whole development
phase where you built various types of hardware
... and then selected from that experience what
you were going to fly with.14
NASA's development strategy for the shuttle was thus
described as "success-orientated". It was a strategy that
gambled on each piece of development hardware and its
subsequent verification test succeeding on the first
attempt. Simply stated, it was the inverse of Murphy's law;
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History had equipped NASA with the confidence to
employ a "success-orientated" approach to the development
of the shuttle.16 A significant difference between the
shuttle and NASA's previous space programmes was the
breadth and depth of the knowledge and experience base of
the US space flight community.
We were a little bit more comfortable with . . .
the physics of flying in space. ... By the time
we had got to the shuttle program we had flown
Apollo, ... we had done a lot of things that we
were going to do again.17
Shuttle benefitted from the standpoint that many
of the people who had worked on shuttle had cut
their teeth on the Saturn program, both at
Johnson and Kennedy and also here [Marshall] .
People we had in management slots had a lot of
experience, a lot of knowledge, they had been
through problems before.18
At the outset of the shuttle's design there existed a
concrete foundation from which the technology could be
built. Scientists, engineers and administrators faced fewer
unknowns than they did at the commencement of human space
flight. A welter of different methodologies, practices,
knowledge and technologies devoted to solving the problems
of human space flight had already been generated. Numerous
solutions could thus be applied again and unique
requirements could be addressed by drawing on previous
experience. Space technology was considered by many to be
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
Herb Yarbrough. interview with the author, September 5, 1995.





relatively mature. The shuttle was represented as a "next
step" technology; a programme that would bring known
techniques together in a new form.
The old, thus, shaped the new. NASA thought that the
innovation process would be a lot less complicated for the
shuttle:
The innovation process was kind of something that
was just hoisted upon us. We said ok, were going
to use the same technology that got us to the
Moon and back. We learnt an awful lot in
developing Apollo . . . we are not going to make
the same set of mistakes again.19
Problem solving, itself, would be a lot different:
As often as we could we just avoided problems
rather than solve them. ... If you could just
avoid it, ignore it, or override it, you just did
that, you didn't try to get too sophisticated.20
But, many of the requirements for the shuttle were very
different from Mercury, Gemini, or Apollo.21 That was a
different era and the technology was designed and
fabricated under notably different conditions. With the
shuttle, the management of cost and political uncertainty
had become important considerations. Each would have to be
monitored and manoeuvred through very carefully.
Nevertheless, NASA was primarily a technical organization
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
Robert Thompson, interview with the author,
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
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and 'making the shuttle fly, very clearly, was still the
most pressing need'.22
History was also entrusted with the authority to
introduce another radical shift in NASA's development and
testing practice: flight of the shuttle's first orbital
test with a crew on board. The beginnings of human space
flight was a perilous adventure. Space is a hostile
environment and the expanse of the unknowns at the debut of
human exploration were infinite. As the risks were many and
the stakes were high, trust was centred on the machine.
Astronauts were supplementary to the technology rather than
an integral part of it. Like the monkeys that preceded
them, the first explorers into space had little to do but
sit there and enjoy the ride.23 Consequently, during
Mercury, Gemini and Apollo, the first orbital test flights
were automated. Humans were not "plugged into" the system
until there was enough confidence in the technology. The
space shuttle, however, symbolized a new era in space
travel; one in which humans played a much larger role.
Nevertheless, cultural expectations resulted in a
propensity towards automation. Many of the systems
designers were working on the basis that first orbital
flight would not be piloted, but stirrings within NASA were
considering a different avenue altogether.
Bill Sneed, interview with the author, August 21, 1995.
Tom Wolf, The Right Stuff (London, Jonathan Cape, 1979).
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In August 1973, engineers at Johnson requested
assistance from the Langley Research Center to investigate
its proposal that a crew should be on board the shuttle's
first orbital test flight. After a short period, Langley
concurred with Johnson, arguing that a crew on the first
orbital test flight would increase the success of the
mission, because they would be able to intervene in certain
emergency situations. In addition, Langley thought that the
presence of humans would also add an incentive for
increased reliability at all levels of development.24
Johnson thus pushed its idea forward, but it was up against
a strong tide of tradition, as Johnson's Director,
Christopher Kraft recalled:
Well, we had a large argument about that, as you
would expect. It took a lot of convincing of our
management and of ourselves that we didn't have
to fly the machine unmanned first, that we could
take advantage of the redundancy of the human
being in the system to correct any of the
unknowns ... that we'd come up against. ... there
were a lot of people who thought we were crazy
. . . thought that the vehicle would burn up [on
reentry]. Some didn't think we could control it;
some didn't think that man could fly it properly
during reentry, that he'd have vertigo. A lot of
people thought the configuration we had was going
to blow up on the pad.25
By the end of 1973, though, other sections of NASA's upper
management were also affirming the benefits of having
W.H. Phillips, Chief of Flight Dynamics and Control Division, Langley Research Center,
memorandum for distribution, December 6, 1973 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
Chris Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
239
humans on the first orbital test flight. Kennedy Director,
Kurt Debus told NASA Associate Administrator, Dale Myers:
I believe that there are programmatic advantages
in going "manned" for the first launch. Certainly
there is a cost saving to be realized by avoiding
an additional unmanned configuration. These costs
are incurred through additional automation,
additional redundancy not required with a man in
the loop, and additional processing time required
by configuration changes. ... I believe our
knowledge and experience have progressed to the
point that we can adequately assure crew safety.
... I believe that a "man in the loop" greatly
enhances a first mission success. ... loss of an
orbiter on the first mission would be critical to
the Shuttle program. Due to this, I believe the
Shuttle program is somewhat different from past
programs in that we should exceed past precedents
and efforts ... to assure success of the first
mission. ... Basically, such a flight is to test
the unknown. If analysis and test programs
indicate these unknowns are of a lethal nature,
then such a flight should not be made. If on the
contrary, the unknowns are of a nature that can
be overcome by man, then the mission should be
manned.26
By mid-1974 the debate surrounding crewed versus non-
crewed first orbital flight had reached the highest
echelons of NASA. The agency's initial approach, to design
for a crew on the first orbital flight, but retain the
automated option, was proving 'undesirable' because design
decisions at the detailed level were slow; and it was felt
that the emerging design was being heading towards greater
automation. A crewed first orbital flight, it was argued,
Letter from Kurt Debus to Dale Myers, November 1, 1973 (Kennedy Space Center Archive,
Florida).
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provided the greatest probability of success at lowest cost
and at the earliest schedule.27
We took a look at flying it unmanned and it was
an economic trade-off versus a schedule trade-off
versus risk. We figured out how we could fly it
unmanned, but we felt confident enough in the
vehicle that we did not need to spend that kind
of money . . . and we knew that if we flew it
manned one time that we would be alright, but it
was a risk.28
NASA's new Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight, John Yardley, confirmed his support for a crewed
first flight in mid-1974.
I have recently reviewed all the facts pertinent
to a decision regarding manning the first Shuttle
orbital flight. Based upon this review, I have
determined that we should proceed with design,
development, and testing of the shuttle
considering only a manned first flight ... This
is based on my judgement that the manned benefits
of greater probability of success ... far
outweigh the crew and program risks involved.29
Shortly after, the decision to have a crew on the first
flight was endorsed by Associate Administrator, Rocco
Petrone, Deputy Administrator, George Low and
Administrator, James Fletcher on July 19, 19 7 4 . 30 Although,
not everyone at NASA agreed with this decision, as
Notes from meeting at NASA Headquarters on the manning of the first orbital flight, July 9,
1974 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
Samuel Beddingfield, interview with the author,
Memorandum from John Yardley, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, to Rocco
Petrone, Associate Administrator, July 18, 1974 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC) .
The recommended course of action was to proceed with the design and development of crewed
version of the shuttle with a review of the risks 18 months before scheduled first flight.
If this review considered the risks too great then a retro-kit could be implemented to
automate the first orbital flight. Ibid.
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Marshall's Director of the Science and Engineering
Directorate, James Kingsbury recalled:
It would not have taken an awful lot to have
flown unmanned, but the determination was made
early on that it would have cost a lot of money
to develop the software to permit that. In fact,
I seriously doubt that that is the case, because
on the way up the crew is a passenger, on the way
back the crew can be a passenger until they get
on the runway and then they have to step on the
brake and steer. But it was seen as a big money
saver and, therefore, enthusiastically supported
by the politicians, [but] those of us who were
very conservative engineers didn't like it. ...
It ... said that the probabilities of something
happening to the crew were greater than they
normally had been in the past, because this would
be a system that had not been tested in flight.
And you cannot do all of the testing to represent
the complete flight system on the ground. So
there [were] many many unknowns.31
Indeed, far from being a conglomeration of established
technologies, simply utilized in a new form, the shuttle
represented a major innovation in many areas.32 One of
those areas was the shuttle's main rocket engines. Getting
the engine to work and work consistently over 100 flights
represented one of the toughest challenges, because it
housed a myriad unknown quantities.
Fabrication and Test of the Main Engines.
In mid-1975 the first test of a shuttle engine was
conducted at NASA's National Space Technology Laboratory in
Mississippi. The test itself lasted less than a second, but
James Kingsbury, interview with the author, August 16, 1995.




it marked a critical turning point in the engine
development programme.33 Component testing, conducted at
Rocketdyne's Santa Susana Field Laboratory in California,
had not proceeded smoothly. The traditional practice of
testing each component individually on a component test
stand had been hindered by the very integrated nature of
the staged combustion engine design (see figure 7:1) .
Simulating the rest of the engine to test a single part had
turned into a major development programme in itself.
Rocketdyne found that it was constructing component test
stands that were essentially complete engines. To NASA's
upper management this appeared an expensive and time
consuming method. Consequently, at the end of 1974 shuttle
programme management terminated the component test
programme and changed the approach to building a complete
test engine:34
We changed the program around and moved as
quickly as we could to build an engine so we
could get it down to [the National Space
Technology Laboratories at] Mississippi and do
the testing.35
Programme activity thus shifted to building what was
called an integrated subsystem test bed engine. This was
essentially an engine, but it was not built to flight
The Mississippi test site had originally been constructed for static tests on Saturn V
engines. During 1973 the facilities were modified to accommodate the shuttle's main engines.
Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Engine Passes Critical Milestone,' Aviation week and Space Technology
(June 30, 1975), pp 37-42; Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle pp 153-154.
James Kingsbury, interview with the author, August 16, 1995; Robert Lindstrom, interview with
the author, August 17, 1995.





















Source: John McCarty, Byron Wood, 'Space Shuttle Main
Engines: Interactive Design Challenges,' Chaffee Norman.
Ed. Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 1. (Houston,
Texas, NASA, JSC, Conference Publication 2342, 1985).
hardware specifications. It was larger and heavier than a
flight engine and did not include a computer controller or
a full size nozzle. The main functions of this engine was
to "prove" that the concept would work and to test
components such as the turbopumps.36 In the original
specifications, sub-system hardware was expected to perform
100 flights before major refurbishment. For the main
engines, this specification was translated into a duration
target to confirm the reliability of the design.
We had set ourselves a target, since it hadn't
been done before we had to make it up, that we
had to have 60 000 seconds on an engine before we
fly people on it.37
The 60 000 seconds requirement was largely based on
historical data. The Apollo J-2 engine design had run for
60 000 seconds during testing before it was certified. The
same requirement, therefore, followed through into the
shuttle engines. Of course, the requirement did not refer
to a single engine, but to the engine design. The 60 000
seconds represented a mark of confidence in the design; the
cumulative test time of a number of engines and engine
components.38 An important aspect of the engine's design
was the use of line replaceable units. Each engine
component was designed to be interchangeable, thus allowing
Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Engine Passes Critical Milestone,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(June 30, 1975), pp 37-42.
James Kingsbury, interview with the author, August 16, 1995.
James Kingsbury, interview with the author, August 16, 1995.
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engine maintainability over the 100 flights.
Notwithstanding, each line replaceable unit had to adhere
to a cost-effective criterion so a reusable target of
27 000 seconds was established for each replaceable
component.39
Marshall and Rocketdyne's initially approached engine
fabrication and testing using classical techniques:
internal engine environments were predicted; loads and
stresses were calculated; models were developed; and design
tolerances were created. Many of the original design values
were drawn from NASA's previous engine programmes, but it
soon became apparent that the classical approach was not,
in general, accurate enough to predict internal
environments; and the engine could not be accessed in all
areas to measure these environments.40 The goal of high
performance and high efficiency at very low weight pushed
both technology and technique to their limits. The engine
design had looked good on paper, but getting the system to
work took much longer than expected, because the engine did
not operate the way it was initially intended.41 By the end
of 1975, the engine test programme had fallen behind
schedule, because of various hardware and software
39
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problems.42 Marshall and Rocketdyne, therefore, had to
incorporate a different approach to their fabrication and
testing techniques, which utilized data from hardware
failures to build up empirical knowledge of how the engine
worked.43
One of the first hardware failures occurred during a
test on September 11, 1975, when a fuel pre-burner oxidizer
valve leak resulted in an oxygen rich mixture that damaged
the turbine in the high-pressure fuel pump. Marshall and
Rocketdyne initially traced the problem to an unbalanced
pressure load on the valve, which led to a failure of its
static seal. As the engine tests progressed, however, the
fuel pre-burner oxidizer valve continued to let propellant
flow into the pre-burner combustors after the valve was
closed. Further analysis showed that the failures were the
result of a design fault. A number of traps existed within
the valve that permitted fuel to collect and enter the
combustors after the valve had closed. The valve thus had
to be redesigned so that traps downstream of the shut-off
mechanism no longer existed.44
An altogether more elusive problem, which eventually
became known as sub-synchronous whirl, troubled Marshall as
42
Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Engine Delays Overcome,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (July 5,
1976), pp 43-49 .
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the engine programme moved into 1976. Many of the tests
during 1975 had been of short duration at low power levels.
The test programme was intentionally phased in terms of
power and time, so that Marshall and Rocketdyne could gain
more knowledge as they worked towards a full duration test
at full power. As the longer duration tests at higher power
levels progressed, it was discovered that higher vibration
levels than desirable occurred in the high-pressure fuel
turbopump. Within the turbopumps is a large shaft that
spins at speeds of over 40 000 revolutions per minute at
full power. As the shaft built up speed another oscillation
within that oscillation occurred, causing rotor
instability, which eventually destroyed the pump and
damaged major sections of the engine.45 The problem
perplexed both Rocketdyne's and Marshall's engineers for
many months, as Rocketdyne engineer, Lee Solid recalled:
Nobody anywhere in any industry had any knowledge
or any experience in this new phenomena called
sub-synchronous whirl. ... I'm still not sure
that we totally understand it.46
The sub-synchronous whirl problem forced Marshall to
continue engine tests at 75 per cent power level, delaying
the first test at full power until a solution could be
45
46
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found.47 Finally, Marshall/Rocketdyne were able to build
dampers and bearings that counteracted the frequencies, but
this solution was only suppose to be temporary, so that the
engine could be tested at full power;48 it ended up being
the final solution.49
Although Marshall and Rocketdyne were behind schedule
and had yet to test an engine at full power, by early 1977
many of the engine test milestones had been completed.50
Nevertheless, the engine programme was to suffer another
severe blow, when a test engine caught fire on March 24,
1977 . Early analysis pointed towards a failure in the
oxidizer turbopump. Programme officials believed that the
fire had started in a section where dynamic seals separate
the liquid oxygen in the pump from the hot gases in the
turbine. A leak in the seals, argued Marshall, could have
allowed the liquid oxygen and hot gases to mix, starting a
fire. Minor changes to the seals were thus initiated.51 A
series of successful engine tests with the modified
components after the fire appeared to substantiate the
analysis and boosted the confidence of Marshall and
Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Engine Delays Overcome, ' Aviation Week and Space Technology (July 5,
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p 47.
'Shuttle Main Engine Being Modified,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 30, 1977), p
39 .
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Rocketdyne engineers.52 But on September 8, 1977, an
oxidizer turbopump exploded, dashing Marshall's hopes of
achieving its goal of 10 000 seconds of test time by end of
the year.53
Further research found that the flow of liquid oxygen
coolant to the oxidizer turbopump bearings tended to unload
built in stresses on one bearing in each pump, while adding
extra loads to the second bearing in each pump.54 Bearing
problems in both the liquid hydrogen pump and the liquid
oxygen pump plagued Marshall and Rocketdyne for several
years.55 Marshall sought assistance outside of the agency,
but as James Kingsbury, Director of the Science and
Engineering Directorate at Marshall, recollected, this was
not forthcoming:
We had bearing problems, we went all over the
world asking people in the engine business what
do you know about your bearings; and they said,
well if we had yours we wouldn't do it that way,
we'd quit.56
Marshall even went back to Pratt and Whitney, one of the
engine design competitors, and asked it to review
Rocketdyne's pump design. But what Pratt and Whitney
'Engine Tests Raise Confidence,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (August 8, 1977), p 23.
Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Main Engine Problem Diagnosed,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(October 24, 1977), pp 17-20.
Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Main Engine Problem Diagnosed,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(October 24, 1977), pp 17-20.
Robert Lindstrom, interview with the author, August 17, 1995.







proposed was a much heavier pump, which NASA would not take
at that time because of its influence on overall system
mass and, thus, payload lifting capability.57
Analysis indicated that bearing stress was caused by
two major factors: the colossal speeds of the turbines and
sharp increases in temperatures. Many areas of the pumps
began super-cooled and then seconds later were subjected to
temperatures of over 2 000 degrees fahrenheit. Marshall and
Rocketdyne engineers, thus had to find a solution to a
thermal gradient that appeared in their analysis graphs as
just a spike.58 Modifications involved a combination of
changing the velocity of the coolant flow to the oxidizer
turbopump bearings and applying different pre-load stresses
to counteract propellant flow influences. The bearings in
the main oxygen turbopump and its pre-burners were
strengthened to carry loads 30 to 40 per cent higher than
they were previously designed to withstand; and
modifications were also made to the hydrogen turbopump
bearings to ensure that they shared the loads more equally.
In addition, the balance of the engine was also improved to
reduce vibration and, therefore, the stresses that the
bearings had to withstand during operation.59
Robert Lindstrom, interview with the author, August 17, 1995.
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995; James Kingsbury, interview with the
author, August 16, 1995.
Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Main Engine Problem Diagnosed,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(October 24, 1977), pp 17-20; Craig Covault, 'Modified Shuttle Engines Enter Testing,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 22, 1978), pp 55-61.
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Many of the problems that afflicted the turbopump
bearings also plagued the turbine blades within the
hydrogen turbopump. The turbine is powered by hot gas
(hydrogen rich steam) generated by the fuel pre-burner. The
turbine blades thus went from the temperature of liquid
hydrogen (minus 423 degrees fahrenheit) to the temperature
of combustion (roughly 2 000 degrees fahrenheit) in about
two and one half seconds; and because of the speed of the
pumps (over 40 000 RPM) , the turbine blades were very
severely loaded. Testing towards full power revealed
erosion of the turbine blades, which accelerated as the
test continued.60 In addition, a number of blades exhibited
fatigue cracks (see figure 7:2), which gave rise to a major
concern about blade failure, as Rocketdyne engineer, Lee
Solid recalled:
It was difficult for us to develop turbines. ...
We had a period where we went through turbine
blade cracks; and you really don't want a turbine
blade coming off, [because] then [the turbine is]
unbalanced and a pump can just go to
destruction.61
Resolution of blade erosion and blade fatigue was
approached in two ways. First, Marshall and Rocketdyne
assumed that blade stress was a linear function of blade
height, thus an attempt was made to modify the distribution
60
61
James Kingsbury, interview with the author, August 16, 1995; Lee Solid, interview with the
author, July 26, 1995; Robert Ryan, Larry Salter, George Young, Paul Manafo, 'SSME Lifetime
Prediction and Verification, Integrating Environments, Structures, Materials: The Challenge,'
Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 1 pp 386-402; John McCarty,
Byron Wood, 'Space Shuttle Main Engines: Interactive Design Challenges,' Norman Chaffee, (ed)
Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 1 pp 600-617.
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251
Figure 7:2.
Source: John McCarty, Byron Wood, 'Space Shuttle Main
Engines: Interactive Design Challenges,' Norman Chaffee,
(ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 1.
of gases in the pre-burner. This, it was calculated, would
reduce the inner-core temperature by raising the outer
diameter temperature in a region where higher blade
temperatures could be tolerated. Second, it was assumed
that the temperature of the blades at ignition directly
correlated with the amount of liquid oxygen accumulated up
to the point of ignition. Marshall and Rocketdyne thus
addressed the thermal gradient spike encountered at
ignition by regulating the liquid oxygen flow to the pre-
burner through an adjustment of the inlet valve. Further
tests after these two modifications demonstrated a marked
improvement in blade erosion and cracking, but the life of
the blades were severely reduced; and NASA had to change
its specifications, reducing blade life expectancy from the
design goal of 27 000 seconds to 5 000 seconds.62
In a second report to the Congress, the National
Research Council Assembly of Engineering's adhoc Committee
for the Review of the Space Shuttle Main Engine Development
Program, expressed concern over the performance and life
expectancy of the hydrogen turbopump turbine blades. A
major point of controversy between the Committee and
Marshall/Rocketdyne focused on the location of fatigue
cracks. Marshall and Rocketdyne had come to the conclusion
that replacement of the turbine blades was only necessary
James Kingsbury, interview with the author, August 16, 1995; Lee Solid, interview with the
author, July 26, 1995; Robert Ryan, Larry Salter, George Young, Paul Manafo, 'SSME Lifetime
Prediction and Verification, Integrating Environments, Structures, Materials: The Challenge, '
Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 1 pp 386-402; John McCarty,
Byron Wood, 'Space Shuttle Main Engines: Interactive Design Challenges,' Norman Chaffee, (ed)
Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 1 pp 600-617.
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when cracks were found in the leading edge of the blades.
Cracks that appeared on the blade's platform were
considered to be tolerable unless they propagated into the
blade's leading edge. The difficulty in knowing how far a
crack had progressed formed a point of contention between
NASA and the Committee. The committee considered that a
procedure, which allowed the use of blades with small
cracks in the platform for flight engines, was contrary to
conventional practice; and it demanded that NASA detailed
procedures for determining crack growth rates and developed
statistical data to justify its confidence in blades with
cracks in the platforms.63
On May 10, 1978, Marshall and Rocketdyne started a new
series of tests with the modified engine. NASA hoped that
the new series of tests would provide the engine programme
with the momentum it needed to support a 1979 launch date.
Nonetheless, apart from the significant hardware
modifications required to get the engine to perform as
"specified," Marshall and Rocketdyne were also faced with
a lack of components to test. The limited components,
originally procured with constrained funding to support
engine development, were not able to keep pace with the
changes in the programme. In addition, Marshall considered
that the engine modifications could not be verified until
Craig Covault, 'Further Shuttle Launch Slip Forecast,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(February 26, 1979), pp 17-19.
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the new components had accumulated 3 400 seconds of
testing.64
May 1978 also witnessed the first cluster tests: the
simultaneous firing of three engines together. The Main
Propulsion Test Article, as it was known, consisted of a
flight weight external tank attached to a test stand and a
simulated orbiter. The upper two thirds of the simulated
orbiter was a triangular beam that duplicated the orbiter's
mass, but the aft of the simulator was nearly identical to
a flight vehicle. Here the three main engines were mounted
in the same arrangement as they would be on a flight
orbiter (see Print 7:1). A key element of this test series
was to test the manifold system and line arrangements of
the propellant. Earlier human-rated boosters, like the
Saturn IB and the Saturn V, used multiple direct propellant
lines instead of the overall manifold system designed for
the shuttle. More than 300 Rocketdyne and NASA employees
were directly involved in the tests series, which programme
officials called the most complex large propulsion system
evaluation ever undertaken in the US space programme. The
test budget amounted to just over $52 million.65
NASA's upper management anticipated that with the
start of these new tests its planned 1979 launch date could
Craig Covault, 'Modified Shuttle Engines Enter Testing,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(May 22, 1978), pp 55-61
Craig Covault, 'Propulsion Tests Provide Shuttle Data,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(May 29, 1978), pp 49-53.
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Print 7:1
Source: Craig Covault, 'Propulsion Tests Provide Shuttle
Data^ Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 29, 1978)
still be met. A series of successful firings through to
September 1978, raised the confidence of NASA and
Rocketdyne engineers enough for NASA's upper management to
inform the Congress that all the design problems had been
solved and that the engine would be able to support a first
flight on September 28, 19 7 9 . 66 This view was overly
optimistic. In December 1978, NASA faced a further setback
as, once again, valve problems arose to plague engine
development.
A failure in the engine's main oxidizer valve caused
the destruction of yet another engine. The main oxidizer
valve is a ball-type unit, in which the 2.5 inch diameter
propellant passageway inside the metal sphere rotates about
90 degrees from the fully opened to the fully closed
position. The valve is partially opened through a hydraulic
servoactuator when the engine starts, to allow propellant
to flow at a low power level. It is then gradually moved to
the fully open position by the engine electronic controller
as thrust increases. The main oxidizer valve regulates the
flow of liquid oxygen from the oxidizer pump to the
hydrogen and oxygen pre-burners and to the engine's main
injector (see Print 7:2). It is an inherent part of the
engine's staged combustion power cycle, where combustor
gases are used to operate high-pressure turbopumps. The
John Yardley, statement for the record to the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space,
February 22, 1978 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC); 'Shuttle Launch Delay,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (July 3, 1978), p 25; Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Engine Tests
Successful,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (September 25, 1978), pp 12-13.
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Print 7:2
Source: Edward Kolcum, 'Shuttle Engine Firing Successful,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (March 2, 1981), p 16.
first combustion stage occurs in the oxygen and hydrogen
pre-burners. Exhaust from the pre-burners is then used to
run turbines that power the high-pressure turbopumps that
force hot, partially burned propellants into the main
injector, where the propellants are enriched with oxygen.
The second combustion stage then begins in the main chamber
at higher temperatures and pressure levels.67
Turbulence, resulting from 5 000 pounds per square
inch flow of liquid oxygen through the engine's main
oxidizer valve, was thought to have caused vibration and
rubbing among several valve components during the December
test. A similar oxidizer valve was used on the Apollo J-2
engine, but the environment of the J-2 engine was less of
a problem because the pressure flow through the valves was
only about 2 000 pounds per square inch. Engine destruction
was believed to be triggered when a sleeve, bolted to a
spring housing in the inlet passage of the valve began
moving and ignited a thin steel shim, which separates the
sleeve from the housing.
Dom Sanchini, manager of the shuttle main engine
programme for Rocketdyne, told Aviation Week and Space
Technology that the fire in December 1978 was the result of
a design problem rather than a problem in production or
quality control:
Craig Covault, 'Engine Failure Threatens Shuttle's Schedule,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (January 8, 1979), p 13; Bruce Smith, 'Shuttle Main Engine Tests Accelerated,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (February 12, 1979), p 44; 'Space Shuttle Engine Problems
Believed Solved,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (April 16, 1979), p 19; 'Shuttle Valve
Modifications To Be Made,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (August 20, 1979), p 21.
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We had a built-in tolerance in certain parts,
which is quite common. What we will do now is
design it so that the two parts are always press-
fit together, no matter what the temperature or
vibration environment.68
Modifications were thus made to the main oxidizer valve and
two pre-burner oxidizer valves. The sleeve and spring
housing was redesigned so the two parts fitted together
tightly instead of having a small space between them. This
involved increasing the thickness of the shim from 0.002
inches to 0.004 inches so it would be less likely to
ignite. The sleeve mounting flange was also strengthened,
so that more torque could be applied to the bolts that held
it in place on the spring housing; and an application of
dry lubricant on parts that may rub together and cause
friction was added to engine fabrication procedures.69
The programme's biggest problem, as a result of the
failure, was the time involved in the reconstructing the
engine from a limited amount of parts and the time involved
in retesting the valve. The valve failure had caused more
than a month's delay to the engine programme; and when
testing resumed the effort was stepped-up to evaluate a set
of three redesigned oxidizer valves. The perceived
verification time for the valves was two months. To speed
up the process, Marshall and Rocketdyne tested the valves
Dom Sanchini, quoted in Bruce Smith, 'Shuttle Main Engine Tests Accelerated,' Aviation Week
and Space Technology (February 12, 1979), p 44.
Craig Covault, 'Engine Failure Threatens Shuttle's Schedule,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (January 8, 1979), p 13; Bruce Smith, 'Shuttle Main Engine Tests Accelerated,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (February 12, 1979), p 44; 'Space Shuttle Engine Problems
Believed Solved,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (April 16, 1979), p 19; 'Shuttle Valve
Modifications To Be Made,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (August 20, 1979), p 21.
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on a rotated four day cycle. By early 1979, and after 5 000
seconds of test time, engine programme officials believed
they had solved the main oxidizer valve vibration problem,
because the tests showed no signs of a similar
occurrence.70
By early 1979 the engine design had accumulated 34 810
seconds of testing time over 394 firings. NASA still
believed that a first launch by the end of 1979 was
possible. Nonetheless, the National Research Council's
Assembly of Engineering follow-up report to Congress,
disagreed with this assessment. The report, which was
drafted before the main oxidizer valve failure, expressed
the view that the engine's problems were likely to push the
first shuttle launch well into 1980. The real concern for
both Marshall and Rocketdyne was not however, problems of
the past, but the difficulty in knowing what additional
problems lay ahead.71 In May 1979, one of them surfaced.
During a planned launch-duration (520 seconds) test on
a flight certified engine, several of the more than 1 000
tubes that carry liquid hydrogen through the engine's
exhaust nozzle to cool the engine bell, ruptured and
separated from the nozzle (see figure 7:3) .72 Marshall and
'Space Shuttle Engine Problems Believed Solved,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (April
16, 1979), p 19.
Craig Covault, 'Engine Failure Threatens Shuttle's Schedule,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (January 8, 1979), pp 12-14.
'Shuttle Three-Engine Test Article Firing Postponed,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (May
28, 1979), p 23.
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Figure 7:3.
Source: Robert Ryan, Larry Salter, George Young, Munafo
Paul. 'SSME Lifetime Prediction and Verification,
Integrating Environments, Structures, Materials: The
Challange,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical
Conference: Part 1.
Rocketdyne engineers believed that flexing of the large
flight nozzle over a series of 48 previous engine tests,
which in turn applied pressure to the attached hydrogen
fuel line, was the cause of nozzle failure.73
One of the problems involved in testing a high
expansion ratio nozzle at sea level is atmospheric
pressure. When pressure along the interior wall of the
nozzle is less than the ambient air pressure, the nozzle
flexes. This is because the exhaust plume does not fill the
nozzle until internal pressure is greater than atmospheric
pressure. As engine thrust builds up, two distinct
phenomena occur. First, the plume is basically cylindrical
in nature and is directionally unstable, moving around
erratically within the nozzle. As the velocity of the plume
flow increases, it passes through a region where a Mach
disc or cone materializes within the nozzle and a void
develops within the exhaust, known as a separation point.
Then, as internal nozzle pressure increases, the Mach cone
leaves the nozzle creating very high and localized shock
waves (see Print 7:3 for engine during test). As a result
of both these phenomena, sections of the shuttle engine's
nozzle wall moved more than an inch and caused the normally
circular outlet to become slightly elliptical in shape.74
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Print 7:3
PURE POWER - The transparently clean combustion product of the Space Shuttle Main Engine's liquid
oxygen and liquid hydrogen propellants is very evident during this static test conducted at the Santa Susana
Field Laboratory of Rockwell International's Rocketdyne Division near Canoga Park, California. Rocketdyne is
under contract to NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama for the development and production of the
Space Shuttle Main Engine.
RD-12/071188. Contact: Paul Sewell or Diana Croon White
Courtesy of Rocketdyne.
We first found this out by accident, tearing up
nozzles because of those loads and this
separation point. ... So we designed ... one you
could test at sea level and ran it almost full.
I mean we pushed it right to the edge so you
didn't have to go and build a highly
sophisticated vacuum system to test rocket
engines in.75
Two approaches were considered by programme officials
to the nozzle flexing problem: first, redesign of the
nozzle hydrogen duct system, to strengthen it against
nozzle flexing; or second, redesign of the duct system to
make it more flexible, so that the nozzle could adapt to
shape changes. Marshall and Rocketdyne's attempts at the
first solution found that a thickening of the tubes that
carry liquid hydrogen through the engine's exhaust nozzle,
only abetted the problem. The increased mass offset the
increased stiffness thus the frequency of the shock loads
stayed the same; increases in mass only increased the loads
proportionally. A different solution thus had to be found.
After further analysis it was determined that the
horizontal run of the steerhorn had to be fixed to the
rings that stiffen the nozzle, to reduce the shock waves.
A device called a steam loop was also incorporated to
reduce nozzle expansion induced by the high temperatures of
the engines exhaust. Further tests corroborated the
Another Shuttle Launch Delay,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (November 12, 1979), p 20.
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995.
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effectiveness of this design change and it was incorporated
into the flight engine design.76
Notwithstanding, nozzle performance remained below
hardware specifications. The nozzle had accumulated about
12 000 seconds of operation before failure, and although
its design life was suppose to be 27 000 seconds, programme
officials had to redetermine how many engine start-stop
cycles would be acceptable for the large-nozzle design for
future operations. The design goal of 55 firings could not
be obtained, even with the redesign. A limit of 24 firings
on each engine was eventually imposed on the nozzle design
and the steerhorn feedline.77
A ruptured hydrogen fuel line returned to haunt NASA
during a cluster test on November 4, 1979. The incident was
similar to the failure that had occurred six months
previously, but NASA officials claimed that the cause was
very different. Investigation of the failure found that
improper weld wire had been used in the fabrication of the
engines. Marshall and Rocketdyne discovered over 1 900
welds in each engine where the wrong weld wire had been
used, 400 of which were considered critical. Amplifying the
problem, suspect welds were also found on the flight
Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995; Robert Ryan, Larry Salter, George Young,
Paul Manafo, 'SSME Lifetime Prediction and Verification, Integrating Environments,
Structures, Materials: The Challenge,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical
Conference: Part 1 pp 386-402; Bruce Smith, 'Main Engine Incident Laid to Nozzle Flex,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 28, 1979), pp 77-79; 'Main Engine Malfunctions Cause
Another Shuttle Launch Delay,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (November 12, 1979), p 20.
Bruce Smith, 'Main Engine Incident Laid to Nozzle Flex,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
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engines fitted to Columbia, which had to be pulled off the
vehicle for repair. Repair consisted of the application of
nickel plating to the weld. But, first, an acid etch test
had to be used to determine if the suspect welds were
indeed below specifications. During the tests and repair
process, Marshall and Rocketdyne found that over 20 per
cent of the welds in each engine consisted of Inconel 600,
a weaker wire than the specified Inconel 718. Over 110
hours of plating was thus deemed necessary for each engine.
The problem was further complicated by the location of many
of the welds; deep inside the turbopump machinery.78
In mid-1980 another serious fabrication problem was
unearthed. By chance a contractor who inspected the
engine's heat exchangers picked one up in an improper
manner and accidently bent it. When attempts were made to
straighten the bend, the exchanger cracked; a reaction that
should not have occurred.79
The heat exchanger is an engine component that
converts liquid oxygen into gaseous oxygen. The component
had failed before, back in December 1978, causing a fire on
the test stand. The National Research Council Assembly of
Engineering's adhoc Committee for the Review of the Space
Shuttle Main Engine Development Program, thought the heat
'Main Engine Malfunctions Cause Another Shuttle Launch Delay,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (November 12, 1979), p 20; Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Project Faces New Problems,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (December 10, 1979), pp 20-21.
Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Concerns Force Action,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June 2,
1980), pp 14-16 .
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exchanger posed a potential threat to the total shuttle
system and were concerned about the incident. A destructive
failure of the heat exchanger during flight could
potentially result in the loss of the entire shuttle.80
Nonetheless, Rocketdyne and Marshall were having a
great deal of difficulty in determining the cause of the
failure; as Dom Sanchini, manager of the shuttle main
engine programme for Rocketdyne, told Aviation Week and
Space Technology:
We haven't been able to find anything wrong from
a design standpoint. We have to suspect and
generally believe that somehow the problem
existed in the fabrication process or in some
retrofits we did to that area of the engine that
somehow damaged the heat exchanger. Work was done
in the area of the heat exchanger, but not on the
heat exchanger itself, so there was no
requirement to specifically proof test the heat
exchanger after the work.81
Engineers at Rocketdyne had been trying to simulate damage
to a heat exchanger to see if a leak, that the company
believed caused the December 1978 fire, could be
duplicated. None of these damage tests, however, resulted
in any leaks. Nevertheless, the incident in 1980
highlighted a possible cause. During the inquiry into why
the heat exchanger cracked after restraightening,
Rocketdyne found that improper material had been used in
the manufacture of some of the heat exchangers. The device
Craig Covault, 'Engine Failure Threatens Shuttle's Schedule,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (January 8, 1979), pp 12-14.
Dom Sanchini, quoted in Craig Covault, 'Engine Failure Threatens Shuttle's Schedule,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (January 8, 1979), p 14.
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was suppose to be made entirely of 316 stainless steel, but
Rocketdyne found that a 718 nickel alloy had been used on
the heat exchanger under investigation. As the inquiry
expanded, Rocketdyne detected two more engines which also
contained the improper metal.82
Nevertheless, the engine tests continued, under the
weight of NASA's upper management pressure to keep the
March 1981 launch date. But on July 30, 1980 yet another
engine caught fire on the test stand. A post-test analysis
of the fire indicated that it was caused by a failure of a
sensor system, which fed information to the engine's
computer controller. For the engine's computer controller
to make accurate "decisions", it monitors the pressure
inside the engine's main combustion chamber. But, since the
gas in the chamber was hotter than any pressure sensor
could tolerate, the sensor had to be placed in a tube off
to one side of the main combustion chamber and then
continually cooled by a flow of liquid hydrogen.
Marshall/Rocketdyne's early analysis found that an inlet
mechanism, which regulated the flow of hydrogen to the
sensor failed, thus, permitting a higher than required flow
of hydrogen over the sensor. This resulted in the senor
receiving incorrect information about what was going on
inside the combustion chamber, so in turn it fed
Craig Covault, 'Engine Failure Threatens Shuttle's Schedule,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (January 8, 1979), pp 12-14; Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Concerns Force Action,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (June 2, 1980), pp 14-16.
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disinformation to the computer controller, which then drove
the engine beyond specifications.83
By the end of 1980 Marshall and Rocketdyne had
completed several engine tests with no problems. The
programmes initial goal of 60 000 seconds of pre-flight
test-stand firing had been well overtaken because of the
additional tests required to qualify all the modifications:
NASA had accumulated just over 80 000 seconds. However,
NASA original goal of running an engine for 27 000 seconds
before major refurbishment had been reduced to around
15 000 seconds. And in many areas, such as the turbopumps
this was even less. Nonetheless, the engine worked and the
technology was ready for the "real test", the first
flight.84
Fabrication and Modification: the External Tank.
As the design of the shuttle's external tank was based on
the Saturn tanks, development was judged by many at NASA as
not to pose any major technological challenges.85
Notwithstanding, the external tank did present NASA with a
number of problems. Interactions with other elements of the
Craig Covault, 'NASA Tightens Shuttle Schedule Again,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(August 11, 1980), pp 27-28.
'Shuttle Engine, Tile Work Proceeding on Schedule,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(September 15, 1980), p 26; 'Final Shuttle Engine Tests Set,' Aviation Week and Space
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shuttle system, its operational environment and political
matters all coalesced to remodel and refine the shape of
the external tank as its development proceeded. By mid-1974
it became increasingly clear that not all the design
details had been sufficiently scrutinized.
Since both the propellants are cryogenic (liquid
oxygen, at minus 297 degrees fahrenheit and liquid
hydrogen, at minus 423 degrees fahrenheit), ice would form
on the outside of the external tank during propellant
loading and prior to lift-off. This phenomena was, of
course, well know to NASA. Previous experience with
cryogenic technologies on the Saturn launch vehicle and the
Apollo spacecraft had furnished the agency with a broad
knowledge base about the properties of cryogenic fuels. The
major problem at that time was the construction of a
suitable environment that would limit propellant boiloff so
as to maintain the fuel's quality. Minor ice build up on
the rocket's external structure was not, in itself,
considered to be a real problem. Yet, on the shuttle, such
occurrence could potentially be very dangerous.
The orbiter's thermal protection system, a ceramic
tile being developed by the Ames Research Center and
Lockheed, was proving very fragile. It was notified that if
ice was allowed to form on the external tank then debris
caused by the vibration of lift-off could damage this
266
system. So, by April 1974, a 'no ice/debris' requirement
was imposed.86
We were well into the design of the tank when we
realized just how fragile the insulation on the
bottom of the orbiter was going to be. So then we
had to come up then with insulation on the tank
that would withstand less than minus 400 degrees
[fahrenheit] on one side and still be above 32
degrees [fahrenheit] on the outside so as not to
create ice.87
No ice meant that both Marshall and Martin Marietta had to
design a thermal system that would cover the entire acreage
of the tank, including all its feed lines, brackets and
anything else that was on the outside.88
During April 1974, several working sessions took place
to evaluate various solutions to the icing problem. A
number of proposals were put forward, ranging from de-icing
sprays to thermal paints and heating blankets, or
shrouds.89 As these differing approaches dwindled the
concept of a spray-on-foam, which could cover the entire
tank, including all the brackets and feed lines,
dominated.90 Spray-on-foams had been used on the
Apollo/Saturn vehicles as cryogenic tank insulators to
86
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prevent propellant boiloff. A rigid closed cell
polyurethane foam, specified as BX-250, had been employed
on the second stage of the Saturn rocket and had also had
some commercial success. BX-250, a low density material,
proved to have excellent insulation qualities at low
temperatures and was available on the commercial market.91
Accordingly, in June 1974, NASA selected the BX-250 spray-
on-foam as the external tank's thermal insulation design.92
Notwithstanding its advantages, by the end of 1974 the
acceptability of BX-250 was in serious doubt. During
ascent, the leading edge of the tank would have to
withstand aerodynamic heating. In the area between the
orbiter and the tank very high and contained velocities of
air could also cause aerodynamic heating.
The insulation had to both insulate from a ice
standpoint, but it had to withstand very high
temperatures also. So those two are two
absolutely opposing requirements, we ...
literally [had to] develop very light foam
insulations that could withstand both aerodynamic
heating as well as being a good [cryogenic]
insulator.93
To solve these problems, Martin Marietta had initially
proposed the direct application of an ablator material,
SLA-561, to the cryogenic substrate at points where high
temperatures were expected; the tank's leading edge, the
91
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intertank and the aft dome. Wind tunnel tests conducted
throughout 1974, however, were showing large increases in
predicted ascent heating, which exceeded the capabilities
of BX-250. The system was thus unable to accommodate the
new environment without major increases in the use of the
SLA-561 ablator, which resulted in a significant and
unacceptable increase in mass.94 Space Shuttle Manager,
Robert Thompson ordered the NASA Centers to find an
alternative solution.95
In November 1974 a new urethane modified isocyanurate
foam material produced by the Upjohn Company, CPR-421, was
selected to replace the BX-250.96 This material possessed
the required ablation characteristics, was compatible with
the original design concept and was also commercially
available. There was, nonetheless, concern over its
suitability. The material was going to be used in an
environment which was unlike any previous commercial one so
it would require considerably greater quality controls for
flight qualification. A comprehensive developmental and
verification programme was, therefore, initiated to
James Odem, interview with the author, August 21, 1995; Frederick Bachtel, Jerold Vaniman,
James Stucey, Carroll Cray, Bernard Widofsky, 'Thermal Design of the Space Shuttle External
Tank,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Vol 2 pp 1041-1050.
Letter from Robert Thompson to Shuttle Projects Office Manager, Kennedy, November 4, 1974
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Committee on Science and Technology US House of Representatives, Space Shuttle: 1975 Status
Report (Washington, US Government Printing Office, February 1975), p 94.
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characterize this "off the shelf" product, which lasted
into 1975.97
Towards the end of 1975, Martin Marietta was forced to
stop work on all CPR-421 activity because of two toxicity
problems, which by that point had become critical. The
first concerned its application; because of the isocyanates
used, the urethane foam was potentially hazardous to
personnel working with the material. It was found that
exposure to CPR-421 during application could cause
respiratory problems and was potentially lethal. The second
problem revolved around a ominous chemical reaction that
could occur when the external tank reentered the
atmosphere. Tests at the Southern Research Institute,
conducted during January 1976, confirmed an earlier
discovery that the CPR-421 foam contained chemical
components which could, on pyrolysis, produce a toxic
substance referred to as trimethylol propanephosphate.98
There were some within NASA who argued that pyrolysis
on reentry did not present a problem, as it could be
assumed that the Earth's atmosphere would 'dilute the
products of combustion tremendously.'99 Nevertheless, a
programme to reformulate a new composition, which did not
97
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contain the phosphate component was initiated; resulting in
the manufacture and testing of a new material, designated
CPR-488.
Solutions to the first problem involved the
establishment of strict production and application
techniques. Facilities had to be designed to ensure there
was no release of any toxic products outside of the spray
enclosure. An automatic, computer controlled system was
therefore employed to control and monitor spray
application, which had to be conducted inside large
environmentally-controlled application cells.100
Health and safety were not the only concerns with foam
application. Insulation efficiency and ablator rates had to
be consistent and repeatable. The most critical defect,
which had to be controlled and was also difficult to
detect, was a weak bond-line. It was discovered that under
cryogenic conditions there was an increased risk that the
insulation may de-bond because the materials became brittle
at approximately minus 180 degrees fahrenheit. Material
temperature at application, thus had to be heated to near
135 degrees fahrenheit and tank substrate temperature had
to be heated to 140 degrees fahrenheit to ensure adhesion.
This critical process did not however, alleviate the risk
of de-bonding during fuelling. Two primary strains could
Ibid; Frederick Bachtel, Jerold Vaniman, James Stucey, Carroll Cray, Bernard Widofsky,
'Thermal Design of the Space Shuttle External Tank,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle
Technical Conference: Vol 2 pp 1041-1050.
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adversely effect the insulation materials during tank
loading; cryogenic chill-down of the tank (thermal strain)
and internal tank pressure (substrate strain). Traditional
practice was to load cryogenic fuel tanks with little or no
ullage pressure. The tanks were subsequently pressurized
for launch and ascent to meet both structural and
propellant delivery requirements. Tests and analysis showed
that if the strain due to tank pressurization is applied
prior to loading, when the materials were near to room
temperature, rather than cryogenic, then their structural
margin was increased.101
Problems with the insulation materials was not the
only difficulty facing NASA. As Herb Yarbrough, member of
the Space Shuttle Program Office at JSC, recalled, the
structural integrity of the liquid oxygen tank was also
causing problems:
We found out that the ... oxygen tank couldn't be
fuelled without pressure. We used water to
simulate the liquid oxygen and when they pumped
water into the tank without a head of pressure on
the tank the dome of the tank kind of collapsed
and left a inward dent in the tank which was
about 18 inches wide and about 18 inches deep and
about 12 feet long. So they found out that they
had to keep the tank pressurized as they were
filling it with liquid oxygen.102
A re-ordering of the launch procedures was, therefore,
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hydrogen tanks were to be pressurized prior to fuel
loading.
In March 1976 engineers at Johnson unearthed a
"bombshell". Detailed investigations determined that using
the orbiter as the backbone of the entire shuttle structure
would not be workable because it would be unable tolerate
the high wind loads of ascent.103 Consequently, a
fundamental problem arose; either Johnson would have to
redesign the orbiter, or Marshall would have to redesign
the external tank. Johnson, as the controlling Center, was
responsible for making the decision and when it designated
the tank, a political altercation transpired between
Marshall and Johnson. In terms of systems integration, the
problem represented a serious violation of interface
protocols. Some at Marshall regarded the problem as
Johnson's and thus up to Johnson to correct. Passing it
onto Marshall was perceived as a misuse of Johnson's power.
As James Kingsbury, Director of the Science and Engineering
Directorate at Marshall, recollected however, the decision
was really driven by cost. At such a late stage in the
shuttle's development it was far simpler and cheaper, to
James Kingsbury, interview with the author, August 16, 1995; GAO, Space Transportation
Systems: Past, Present, Future Report to the Congress, May 27, 1977 (General Accounting
Office Distribution Center, Washington DC), pp 9-10.
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redesign the external tank than it was to redesign the
orbiter.104
So the decision was made to redesign the attach
points to the tank to take the loads out through
the tank. The tank was not designed to take the
loads out, so the tank had to be redesigned.105
Understanding the wind conditions and what wind
conditions the shuttle could withstand, placed an atypical
demand on NASA's dynamic load analysts. Whereas all NASA's
previous launch vehicle configurations were axisymmetric,
the shuttle had four bodies connected in parallel.
Definition of the forces and pressure distributions on all
the bodies was thus extremely complex. The most crucial
event during ascent would be when the shuttle flew through
the Max-Q, the time of maximum dynamic pressure (forces
greater than 400 pounds per square foot) .106
The tank at that point in time is still the back
bone, holding it all together. So you've got the
solid rocket's thrust, that's going in at the
middle of the inner tank and you got the orbiter
thrust, that's going in at the back end of the
liquid hydrogen tank. So you're pushing about a
million and half pounds of [liquid oxygen] up
there and yet you've got a long liquid hydrogen
tank that's real light ... yet its got to take
all of the loads from the [main engines]. So its
a very tricky design in dynamics analysis that we
had to prove on the ground before we flew it for
the first time.107
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Early load studies consisted of full dynamic simulations
and cases were run using typical techniques to survey
loads. It soon became apparent, however, that the shuttle's
configuration was far more sensitive to wind conditions and
system dispersions than was previously realized. A
continuation with the traditional method would have been
both expensive and time consuming. New analytical tools,
therefore, had to be developed to provide a more rapid and
cost-effective method of surveying all of the combinations
of flight time, wind conditions and systems dispersions.108
A redesign of the external tank to strengthen its
structure, so that it could act as the backbone of the
shuttle system, was initiated, primarily because of the
increases in the predicted aerodynamic loads. Nonetheless,
a new problem surfaced in early 1977, which gave further
cause to reinforce the external tank. An update to the
lift-off analysis database, conducted to support the 1977
shuttle critical design review, indicated a marked increase
in dynamic loads at the region of the orbiter/external tank
forward attachment structure. It was discovered that during
the fire up start sequence, as the orbiter's main engines
built up to 100 percent power level, the force of the
The focus of the load survey was the q-alpha versus q-beta flight envelopes called
"squatcheloids." The squatcheloid provided a means of defining the pertinent flight dynamics
parameters such as dynamic pressure (q), angle of attack (alpha), angle of sideslip (beta)
and the rotational accelerations. Alden Mackey, Ralph Gatto, 'Structural Load Challenges
During Space Shuttle Development,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference,
Part 1 p 340.
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combined engine/booster thrust would bend the top of the
external tank.109
The top of [the tank would] move about four feet.
[When] you fire up the solids and when they come
up [to] thrust, you want the tank to be back
straight so that when you lift off all of the
vehicles are in the right attitude and that's a
pretty sensitive sequence. What that meant was we
had to understand extremely well the structural
dynamics, the structural capabilities of that
tank.110
An extensive structural test programme was thus initiated
on the external tank. A complicating factor was that NASA
had selected construction materials that got stronger at
the cryogenic temperatures. In order to verify the
capabilities of the external tank, therefore, Marshall had
to run the qualification tests at those cryogenic
temperatures.111 As External Tank Manager, James Odem
recalled, testing a tank filled with a quarter of a million
pounds of hydrogen was a harrowing experience.
I lost a lot of nights sleep running that test
program because any leak or any slight failure
and you lose the whole facility.112
Reinforcement of the external tank alone did not
represent a total solution to the problem. Hence, several
additional options were also examined including: reducing
109
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the main engine thrust on lift-off; lift-off with only two
of the three main engines; tilting the shuttle on the
launch pad; and introducing a time delay for the solid
rocket boosters ignition and vehicle release. NASA
concluded that most of these options were either
ineffective, unfeasible, or introduced an undesirable risk
to safety. Only the last, introducing a time delay on
booster ignition, appeared to be both effective, easy to
implement and fall within acceptable risk criteria. A team
was thus established to calculate the dynamics of shock and
vibration on the shuttle during engine ignition and plot a
time history of the base-bending moment. Mathematical
models indicated that a delay of 2.7 seconds should be
specified before booster ignition. Herb Yarbrough, member
of the Space Shuttle Program Office at JSC, witnessed the
first real test of these calculations during a flight
readiness test of the main engines in 1980:
I recall being amazed with results ... from ...
the activity that calculated when to light the
solid rocket boosters ... It turned out we did a
flight readiness firing before we actually flew
the vehicle. [We] lit up the main engines and
burned them for 20 seconds ... and in that time
we found out that [the] calculations were right
on the money. ... The vehicle would bend and ...
sway in each direction and [they] calculated the
frequency of that sway and when we should light
the solid rocket motors.113
Yet despite all its problems the first external tank
rolled off the production line in early 1978, ready for a
Herb Yarbrough, interview with the author, September 5, 1995
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197 9 launch. On its arrival at Kennedy the giant tank drew
quite a crowd (see print 7:4).
Testing and Model Development: Thermal Protection.
The Thermal Protection Branch at NASA's Ames Research
Center had been researching and testing reusable thermal
protection materials since the mid-1960s. By 1970 this
programme had been stepped up, as Ames conducted tests on
candidate insulation materials for the shuttle. During
these tests, two problems had become evident. First,
facilities were found to be inadequate for accurate
testing. The arc-jets at Ames, while able to produce the
necessary high-temperatures, were incapable of sustained
tests on large samples of heat shield materials; and
second, because facilities at Ames were deemed inadequate,
the Thermal Protection Branch considered that the results
of the tests could not be analyzed satisfactorily.
Sufficient knowledge about the properties of the materials,
it was argued, could not be gleaned from the tests being
conducted. Underlying the arguments coming from the Thermal
Protection Branch in 1970 were proposals for expansion.
Larger facilities and more researches would serve to both
understand the heating phenomenon Ames was dealing with,
and demarcate the work of Ames from its main internal
competitor, the Langley Research Center.114
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In April 1975 Ames's new 60 megawatt arc-jet facility
was put into operation. Three times as powerful as any
previous facility, its primary task over the next few years
would be to test the heat resistance of the orbiter's
thermal protection system. Although the verification test
programme had yet to be fully defined, it was considered
that materials characterization would involve classic
multiple tests to answer questions pertaining to life
expectancy. The Office of Manned Space Flight's
requirements had dictated that thermal protection material
samples should be subjected to 100 tests of 1 000 seconds
each. In addition, tests would focus on heating the
materials up to 2 500 degrees fahrenheit and then raising
the temperature in increments of 100 degrees fahrenheit
until destruction.115 Although important, these tests
provided only a limited interpretation of the environment
within which the thermal protection system would operate.
NASA and Lockheed engineers had to go much further. If the
shuttle was to come back unscathed, all reentry conditions
had to be duplicated and known as accurately as possible.
Reentry heating phenomena had been under investigation
since the mid-1920s,116 but the first steps towards a
quantitative understanding of reentry dynamics was not
Benjamin Elson, 'New Unit to Test Shuttle Thermal Guard, ' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(March 31, 1975), p 52.
Walter Hohmann had published work in 1925 on the theoretical mechanics of a reentry vehicle.
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established until the late-1950s. Advancements in
supersonic flight and reentry ballistic missile technology,
during the 1950s, rested upon a major shift in aerodynamic
theory. Within these new environments, the characteristics
of fluid dynamics changed. Fluid flow had to be viewed as
compressible as opposed to incompressible, which was the
case for subsonic aerodynamics. Aerodynamic engineers, thus
had to delve deeper into the physics and the chemistry of
gases to deal with the new problems posed by reentry and
supersonic flight. Kinetic theory of gases, flow problems
and radiation transfer all moved to centre stage. Classical
aerodynamic boundary-layer theory had long dictated that
streamline needle-nose shapes were required to reduce
aerodynamic drag and, thus, minimize heat transfer to the
vehicle's structure. Aerodynamicists at the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, however, presented the
radical idea in 1951, that reentry shapes needed to be
blunt. Blunt shapes, it was discovered, deflected more heat
into the air; and because the vehicle's resistance to the
tenuous upper atmosphere would be at its maximum, the
vehicle would start to slow down sooner within the thinner
atmosphere so less heat would be transferred to the
vehicle's surface.117
Walter Vincenti, workshop presentation at the University of Edinburgh, May 20, 1998; Robert
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During the 1960s the reentry dynamics of blunt-nose
vehicle configurations had been well practised by
aerodynamicists working on the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo
capsules. Nevertheless, requirements for the orbiter's
thermal protection system dictated a more accurate and
intricate definition of reentry heating than for any of
NASA's previous vehicles. The three dimensional geometric
complexity and the large scale of the orbiter posed a
greater challenge to the definition of the reentry flow-
field and subsequent heating, than had any previous
system.118 Simulating flows, especially turbulent flow, in
the laboratory presented NASA and Lockheed with their most
difficult problem. Although the science of fluid mechanics
was still largely unknown territory,119 its understanding
was of great importance, because maximum heating rates and
material ablation would occur when turbulent flow became
fully established.120
The phenomena of turbulent flow and boundary-
layer transition have been under intense
investigation for more than a century with
somewhat limited success. This limitation is
possibly measured by the anxiety which develops
when engineers are required to predict boundary-
Robert Ried, 'Orbiter Entry Aerothermodynamics,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical
Conference: Part 2 pp 1051-1061.
Stanley Berger, Laminar Wakes (New York, American Elsevier Publishing Co Inc, 1971), preface.
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layer transition outside the range of
experimental data.121
In general there are two types of boundary layers,
laminar and turbulent; and both are fundamentally different
in character. Laminar flow takes place smoothly in parallel
laminae, free of irregular eddying motion. Turbulent flow,
by contrast, contains a large number of small eddies that
move in a chaotic manner. As a result of the transverse
mixing of gases, turbulent flow tends to be thicker than
laminar flow and has higher velocities close to the
surface. This effect causes the turbulent flow (all things
being equal) to exert higher skin friction than the laminar
flow and, therefore, cause extreme surface heating.122
The problem of simulating turbulent flows and
boundary-layer transition was tackled through the
development of both simplified theoretical models and
empirical evidence based on the previous experience and
knowledge gleaned from the blunt reentry capsules of
Mercury, Gemini and Apollo.123 This could be done because
geometrically similar bodies develop identical flow and
shock patterns within the subsonic and supersonic speed
regimes. Within the hypersonic speed regime, however, there
is considerable interaction between the boundary-layer and
Robert Ried, 'Orbiter Entry Aerothermodynami.es,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical
Conference: Part 2 p 1055.
Walter Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It pp 37-39.
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the shock pattern. When this occurs, the similitude
requirements are more difficult to satisfy. To circumvent
this problem the standard technique was to introduce
simplified models using data from accurate predictions
under incompressible flow conditions to provide predictions
under compressible flow conditions using distortions of
geometry to balance distortions of velocity.124
Representative locations were thus selected on the orbiter
and then data collected from tests on models in a wind
tunnel were scaled-up to flight conditions by correlating
boundary-layer transition and turbulent heating as a
function of the Reynolds number behind a normal shock (see
figure 7:4).125 From these simplified models a reentry
trajectory was mapped that would be consistent with the
thermal protection system's capabilities.126 The orbiter's
reentry configuration, however, was not a true blunt
reentry vehicle nor was it a slender flight vehicle. The
flow dynamics would vary along the orbiter from the high
entropy of a blunt-body nose flow asymptotically toward a
low entropy slender-body flow.127 More complex models and
analytical techniques were, therefore, required.
Stanley Berger, Laminar Wakes preface, pp 3-6.
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Figure 7:4.
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Source: Robert Ried, 'Orbiter Entry Aerothermodynamics,'
Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference:
Part 2.
Along with the development of theoretical models an
array of instrumentation was required to recreate boundary-
layer transition from laminar to turbulent flows in the
laboratory. The foundation for the definition of the
reentry aerothermodynamics environments were the wind
tunnel test data taken from scaled models of the
orbiter.128 Wind tunnels, although a valuable tool, had
their limits. The most pressing problem was the scaling-up
of data without the introduction of some error or
distortion. Although a range of techniques were available,
such as pressurizing or cooling the air in the tunnel,
chilling the models to cryogenic temperatures, or using
helium instead of air, complex mathematical equations were
also a necessary part of the prediction process.129
Complementing wind tunnel activity, therefore, was an
increase in the use of computer technology in computational
fluid dynamics. Many of the engineers and managers at Ames
were eager to enter what was then a new research field as
Dean Chapman, Chief of Ames's Thermo- and Gas-Dynamics
Division recalled:
I'd been out of fluid mechanics for eight or nine
years when I took over the division in 1969. When
I reviewed the field and saw what computers were
doing even then, it became clear to me that they
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experimentalist never dreamed about, so I decided
to press into that area.130
In 1970 the Theoretical Branch and the Hypersonic
Free-Flight Branch were combined to form the new
Computational Fluid Dynamics Branch. Ames, however, had the
poorest computer facilities within NASA and both Ames
Director, Hans Mark and Chapman sought to remedy this
situation quickly. The collapse of the Air Force's Manned
Orbital Laboratory Program left available an IBM 360-67,
which was immediately aquisitioned by Ames in a most
unusual manner. Hans Mark had Ames people in Sunnyvale on
the very day that the Manned Orbital Laboratory closed
down, pulling the computer out before it was declared
surplus and installing it at Ames. The acquisition of the
IBM 360-67 opened the door for an aggressive research
programme by the Computational Fluid Dynamics Branch. Soon
after, Ames acquired the Illiac IV (a supercomputer capable
of performing 300 million calculations per second and
storing one trillion bits of information at a time) through
more usual channels. Mark and Chapman both saw the
acquisition of Illiac as the deciding factor in
establishing Ames as the NASA Center for computational
fluid dynamics.131 Its performance was so revolutionary
Dean Chapman, quoted in Elizabeth Muenger, Searching the Horizon: A History of Ames Research
Center (Washington DC, NASA, Scientific and Technical Information Branch, 1985), p 173.
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1989), chapter 7.
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that Mark, Chapman and Melvin Pirtle, head of the Illiac
programme, argued that the relationship between wind tunnel
testing and computational fluid dynamics was shifting in
favour of the latter.132
Nonetheless, wind tunnel experiments and computational
fluid dynamics worked in parallel to evaluate the reentry
environment and aid the design and fabrication of the
thermal protection system. For example, computational fluid
dynamics showed unusually high temperature regions along
the fuselage and vertical tail, caused by vortex flows
created by air flow strakes; and wind tunnel experiments
revealed that the nose wheel doors and the external tank
attachment fittings created premature boundary-layer
transition to turbulent flow with a consequential increase
in temperature. Such identifications of the environment and
effects of design features, contributed to the thermal
protection system design and distribution. Combined with
the arc-jet tests, which indicated that the ceramic tiles
could withstand temperatures of 3 100 degrees fahrenheit,
confidence in the system grew.133
The amount of data being generated by both
computational analysis and wind tunnel experiments was
colossal. Indeed, there was so much information that by
Dean Chapman, Hans Mark, Melvin Pirtle, 'Computers vs Wind Tunnels for Aerodynamic Flow
Simulations,' Astronautics and Aeronautics (April 1975), pp 22-35.
Memorandum from Charles Donlan to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, March 25,
1976 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
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early 1976 rumours had begun to circulate around NASA that
sufficient caution and care was not being exercised in the
review of the data. Concern soon arose within the Office of
Manned Space Flight over what steps were being taken by
both Ames and Rockwell International, to critically examine
the data for errors.134 A visit to Rockwell International
at Downey, California and to Ames, was thus made by members
of the Office of Manned Space Flight to discuss the issue.
After three days of discussion and review, confidence was
raised that the aerodynamic and aerothermal data was being
'carefully and thoroughly assessed.'135
Fabrication, Application and Modification: Thermal
Protection.
While the process of prediction and wind tunnel testing in
the area of reentry aerothermodynamics proceeded,
production of the orbiter's thermal protection system got
under-way. The transition from laboratory production of the
silica thermal protection system to full production had
many scale-up problems.
Control of the purity and consistency of the silica
fibres presented NASA and Lockheed with their'first major
production problem. The silica fibre, a key ingredient in
the production of the tile, came in an amorphorous form.
Memorandum from Charles Donlan to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, February 19,
1976 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
Memorandum from Charles Donlan to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, March 25,
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Crystalline forms of the fibre, however, were found to have
a thermal expansion coefficient 30 times greater than the
amorphorous form. A crucial element of the production
process, therefore, was the transformation of the silica
fibre from its amorphorous form to a crystalline structure,
but this was not an easy procedure. Shrinkage and
distortion of the sintered silica composites impeded the
formation of crystalline structures that would be
acceptable to NASA. To achieve the dimensional stability
dictated by shuttle requirements, a silica fibre greater
than 99.6 per cent pure was necessary.136
Locating fibres with sufficient purity, thus, became
a major concern of tile production. Lockheed's supplier,
Johns-Manville, were unable to meet all the purity
requirements and an alternate source was sought. However,
silica fibres provided by other suppliers were much larger
in diameter than those provided by Johns-Mansville, which
was unacceptable to NASA. The exact diameter of the fibre
was considered to be of crucial importance to the tile's
thermal performance. NASA, therefore, decided to intervene
in Johns-Mansville's production process and introduced
extensive post-treatment and rigid process controls, from
the selection of the sand used in making the fibre through
to the fiberizing and cleaning process, to minimize
Robert Dotts, Donald Curry, Donald Tillian, 'Orbiter Thermal Protection System, ' Norman
Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference pp 1062-1081.
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contamination of the "sub-standard" fibres and bring the
Johns-Manvilie fibres up to an acceptable standard.137
Another materials problem was encountered during the
production phase of the thermal protection tile early in
1975. In the original design concept, the thermal tile was
applied with multiple layers of borosilicate glass coatings
to prevent moisture absorption, provide protection against
handling damage and provide optical property control (solar
absorption). During manufacture and during thermal testing,
it was discovered that the multi-layer glass coatings had
a tendency to crack or foam. Arc-jet tests at Aimes
revealed coating failures on approximately 40 per cent of
the tiles when they were exposed to a succession of
simulated reentry environments. Possible causes of the
coating failures included: problems with glass coating
composition, processing cycle errors, glazing cycle errors
or problems with coating distribution, but budget
restrictions in 1975 deferred any detailed investigation
until well into 1976. Finding a solution to the coating
problem thus had to wait a further year. Eventually Ames's
proposal, to use only a single-layer glass coating,
received funding for qualification testing in mid-1976.
After a lengthy verification programme, NASA found that the
single-layer coating did not foam during production and
Ibid.; Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc., Space Systems Division, 'Summary of High
Temperature Reusable Surface Insulation Program,' Space Shuttle 1976 Statue Report for the
Committee on Science and Technology US House of Representatives (Washington DC, US Government
Printing Office, October 1975), pp 325-329.
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actually provided a better match with the thermal
coefficient of the silica insulation material. The superior
performance of the single-layer coating over the multi¬
layer coating, in many of the tests, ultimately persuaded
NASA officials to change the design.138
Once these two key materials problems had been
solved, full-scale production could begin. Technical
matters, however, were not the only obstruction to tile
production. Funding limitations in 1975 resulted in a
substantial modification to the shuttle programme's
schedule. In the development of the thermal protection
system, the primary impact of the budget restrictions was
to defer the procurement of special tooling equipment. This
delayed the completion of the production facility in
Sunnyvale, California;139 as Johnson's Director,
Christopher Kraft recalled:
We made a decision to put off building the tile
factory, because we didn't have the money. We had
to put the money into the schedule and we had to
develop the schedule ... and we just decided we
could wait a couple of years.140
The Sunnyvale plant contained some of the most modern
manufacturing equipment then available, including:
W.H. Morita (ed) Space Shuttle System Summary p 110; Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc.,
Space Systems Division, 'Summary of High Temperature Reusable Surface Insulation Program,'
Space Shuttle 1976 Status Report for the Committee on Science and Technology US House of
Representatives (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, October 1975), pp 325-329;
Robert Dotts, Donald Curry, Donald Tillian, 'Orbiter Thermal Protection System,' Norman
Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference pp 1062-1081.
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc., Space Systems Division, 'Summary of High Temperature
Reusable Surface Insulation Program,' Space Shuttle 1976 Status Report for the Committee on
Science and Technology US House of Representatives (Washington DC, US Government Printing
Office, October 1975), pp 325-329.
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
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precision controlled kilns and furnaces, numerically
controlled milling machines and the most up-to-date
blending and slurry casting equipment. As with flow
dynamics analysis, computers played an important role in
the fabrication of the thermal protection system. Orbiter
configuration coordinates were plotted from a Rockwell
engineering data base, and then converted into computer
programmes. These programmes then drove the numerically
controlled mills that machined the tiles into precise
dimensions.141
By the end of 1978, application of the complex array
of thermal protection tiles to the shuttle orbiter,
Columbia, was nearing completion. It was a complex process.
Many of the 33 000 tiles had been formed into individually
specific shapes, determined by the aerodynamic and
aerothermodynamics data that governed the computer-
controlled milling machines. Thus, every tile was stamped
with a number, which correspond to a precise position on
the orbiter. Each tile then had to be applied individually,
checked for any differences in height that might induce
turbulent flows, and carefully indexed before being "glued"
to the structure. In addition, a gap of no less 0.010 inch
had to be ensured between each tile to allow for thermal
expansion and contraction: and for the flexing of the
orbiter's wing surface during flight. The application rate
141
Robert Dotts, Donald Curry, Donald Tillian, 'Orbiter Thermal Protection System,' Norman
Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference pp 1062-1081.
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was slow and was further hindered by fragility of the tile
material. On average, one technician applied one tile per
week.142
As the planned September 1979 launch date approached,
Rockwell found themselves behind schedule with the tile
application. To avoid adverse publicity, NASA decided that
the remainder of the tiles could be attached at Kennedy. So
on March 24, 1979, Columbia was airlifted atop NASA's
Boeing 747 to the launch Center with around 6 000 tiles
left to install.143 The plan did not, however, go as
intended. A sizeable amount of the tiles were lost during
the flight from California to Kennedy. As a public
relations exercise it was a disaster. It appeared to the
media that if the most advanced spaceship in the world
could not even fly from California to Florida without tiles
falling off, then how was it suppose make the journey into
space?144 Most of the tiles that were lost were "dummies",
put in place as substitutes due to some concern about the
effects of turbulence on the "actual" tiles, but the event
severely damaged NASA's reputation.
Towards the end of 1979, however, NASA found that it
had a much larger problem. Due to budget and schedule
142
'Thermal Tiles Applied to Orbiter 102,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (November 27,
1978), p 64; 'F-15 Used in Shuttle Tile Test,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (February
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pressures, NASA had decided to move ahead with the tile
fabrication and installation before the final aerodynamic
loads and stress analysis had been completed. The design of
the tiles was, therefore, based on the initial predictions
that had emerged from these studies. As the predictions had
become more refined they highlighted a serious weakness in
the strength of the tiles.145 As Space Shuttle Manager,
Robert Thompson, recalled:
One of the things that we got into a little bit
of difficulty with, we didn't characterize the
tile materials as thoroughly as we should
have.146
And Johnson's Director Christopher Kraft remembered:
When we finally got the factory built and started
producing the tiles, we got enough tiles to run
a sufficient statistical sample, and low and
behold the strength was only half what we thought
it was.147
Late in 1979, NASA suspected that between 10 000 to 12 000
tiles were below the "new" specifications. But, as the
programme turned in 1980, aerodynamic and
aerothermodynamics data were predicting that up to 31 000
tiles would need to retested.148
145
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146
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The first problem NASA had, was how to test the tiles
while they were still on the orbiter. What NASA came up
with was a "proof-test device" that combined a vacuum
chuck, which attached to a single tile, a pneumatic
cylinder, which applied the specified load, and six pads,
which would be attached to the surrounding tiles to react
to the load (see figure 7:5). The device would then stick
to the orbiter, rather like a plunger, and attempt to pull
a single tile off, within a specified load. If the tile
stayed fixed, then it passed the test. If it came off, then
clearly it didn't. Although a simple and effective
solution, a second problem emerged: what if the test itself
weakened the tile? To solve this problem Kennedy's
engineers attached an acoustic sensor to the proof-test
device to monitor the acoustic emissions from fibre
breakage. This involved the establishment of a large scale
laboratory programme to arrive at a failure criteria. The
programme simulated the flight loads over 100 missions and
monitored the changing acoustic signatures as the tiles
failed.149
The next problem for NASA was what to do with the
tiles that came off. Initially, the "repair" concept was to
install a graphite sheet under the tiles to increase their
adhesion to the orbiter. However, this was abandoned quite
William Schneider, Glenn Miller, 'The Challenging "Scales of the Bird": Shuttle Tile





Source: William Schneider, Glenn Miller, 'The Challenging
"Scales of the Bird": Shuttle Tile Integrity,' Norman
Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 2.
early for a simpler process known as "tile densification",
which involved coating the surface facing the orbiter with
a colloidal silica coat. This provided the tiles with a new
surface that spread the loads more evenly. However, having
been forced into a major modification of its tile
application programme, NASA adopted the change with
caution.150 Many at NASA believed that the tile problems
should never have occurred and laid the blame on Rockwell.
George Jeffs, President of Rockwell International Aerospace
Operations, told Aviation Week and Space Technology:
I think its a fair criticism that we didn't
define the problems more clearly. ... We worked
too hard on the quality of the material alone and
waited too long for the thermal analysis while
awaiting a detailed structural definition.
Perhaps it was a bit too long to understand what
the [orbiter structural deflections] might be and
their effects in the tiles. I am troubled that we
are suffering a lot of shots at our engineering
reputation because of the bloody tiles, and we
are doing everything we can to clean them up.151
Kennedy's engineers hoped that the data obtained from
the "pull-tests" would enable a relaxation of requirements
thus reducing the reapplication number. But, by the end of
1979, Kennedy had pulled off and reapplied over 12 000
tiles. Originally the densification process was restricted
to the black tiles along the bottom of the orbiter,
however, early in 1980 there was growing concern about
Ibid; Craig Covault, 'Kennedy Center Starts Shuttle Stacking,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (November 5, 1979), pp 18-19.
George Jeffs, quoted in, 'Orbiter Protective Tiles Assume Structural Role,' Aviation Week and
Space Technology (February 25, 1980), p 22.
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As the programme moved through 1980, it became
apparent that the tile problem was a lot more serious than
had been anticipated; and concern soon focused on the
"special tiles" around the wing leading edge, the
windshield, the undercarriage doors, the tail, and tiles in
other areas that did not have square or rectangular shapes.
These special tiles were often located in areas that would
endure very complex air flows that could not be easily
analyzed and they were not amenable to the pull-test
technique. Thus, NASA had to go back to wind tunnel testing
on the tiles. However, this was both expensive and time
consuming, so NASA decided to select only certain locations
from several of the most complex air flow fields to build
up a data set (see figure 7:6). To reinforce the analysis,
the scale model tests in the wind tunnel were correlated
with similar air flows on fighter aircraft. NASA attached
some of the tiles to wing sections on an F-15 and an F-104
and then flew the aircraft through flight conditions up to
1.4 times the severity of those expected on the shuttle.154
The test programme was not completed until January
1981. NASA's revised first launch date had been set for
March 1981, however, the tests showed up serious flaws in
the special tiles. It was speculated from the data, that
the high pressures of ascent could lift the windshield
'F-15 Used in Shuttle Tile Test,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (February 25, 1980), p
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tiles from their moorings. As with all the tiles, the
windshield tiles had been machined from a block of ceramic
in such away as to ensure that all the fibres run in
parallel to the shuttle's surface. This was done, because
analysis had demonstrated that a parallel grain orientation
would minimize the heat transfer to the orbiter's aluminum
skin. However, this grain orientation caused a reduction in
the tiles strength because of the relatively low number of
vertical fibres. The first solution, therefore, was to
machine new tiles with the fibres running perpendicular to
the orbiter's surface. This would provide the strength, but
it would also reduce thermal efficiency. Thus, a second
solution, combined with the first was also necessary. On
further analysis it was found that the window itself would
act as a heat sink, so NASA decided that by bonding the
part of the tile that overhung the window directly to the
glass this would increase the thermal capacity of the tile
(see figure 7:7) .155
The testing also determined that the corner tiles on
the wing trailing edge and flaps would fail within seconds
of engine and booster ignition. To solve this problem NASA
went back to an older idea that had long been abandoned: a
mechanical attachment called the auguer (see figure 7:8) .
The auger system was twisted into the tile and then
William Schneider, Glenn Miller, 'The Challenging "Scales of the Bird": Shuttle Tile
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attached to the substructure via bolts. The key component
was a Belville washer, which acted as a soft spring to
prevent the loads from the bolts breaking the fragile
tile.155
After two years of testing and redesign, NASA's
confidence in the thermal protection tiles was reinforced
and by March 1981, many of the problems were deemed solved.
However, this confidence was not shared outside of NASA
and, as Columbia prepared for its first flight in April








A Crisis of Confidence
It is clear that the true problems of our nation
are much deeper - deeper than gasoline lines or
energy shortages, deeper even than inflation or
recession ... The threat is nearly invisible ...
it is a crisis of confidence. ... Confidence has
defined our course and has served as a link
between generations. We have always believed in
something called progress. ... We ourselves are
the same Americans who just ten years ago put a
man on the Moon. And we are the generation that
will win the war with the energy problem, and in
the process rebuild the unity and confidence of
America.1
In the spring of 1979 a second oil shock struck at the
heart of the US economy. Petrol lines, which had not been
seen since 1973, reappeared, but this time they were
accompanied by panic, hoarding and even violence. After a
ten day summit at Camp David, where President Jimmy Carter
took advice from leading politicians and experts, the
President returned to Washington DC to deliver a long
awaited speech on the energy crisis. In part, the speech
was a declaration in the faith of the technical
capabilities of the nation to solve any problem, or any
obstacle that lay in its path. The Lunar landing was upheld
as a symbol of progress, a sign of confidence and world
President Jimmy Carter, 'Crisis of Confidence Address, July 15, 1979,' reprinted in Richard
Hofstadter, Beatrice Hofstadter, (ed) Great Issues in American History: From Reconstruction
to the Present Day, 1864-1981 (New York, Vintage Books, 1982), pp 522-524.
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leadership. Yet, those same people that had placed an
American on the Moon were experiencing their very own
crisis of confidence.
Electorial Passage.
Carter's victory in the 1976 Presidential election came at
a time when the US was still suffering from the
"humiliation" of Watergate and Vietnam. Carter's apparent
youth, confidence and integrity, attracted wide popular
support. President Ford, by contrast, appeared uninspiring
and uncertain, offering only a second-rate leadership over
a country that was threatening to turn into a second-rate
power. Unlike Ford, Carter promised optimism and a vision
for the future. He had also developed a political style,
which exhibited a great concern for the people and an
antipathy toward the power exerted by pressure groups and
big business. During his acceptance speech as the
Democratic candidate, on July 14, 1976, Carter spoke of the
need for a national health system, cuts in defense spending
and policies designed to help the poor and boost
employment.2
President Ford, meanwhile, had submitted a defense
budget to Congress, which called for a significant increase
in military hardware procurement. In part, the policy
stemmed from a perceived decline in the US defense posture
2
Ian Derbyshire, Politics in the United States: From Carter to Bush (Edinburgh, W & R Chambers
Ltd, 1988), pp 24-29.
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brought about by detente with the Soviet Union and the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements of 1972.3
During his presidential campaign Carter criticized this
policy. Carter's views on national security stemmed from an
approach to foreign policy and defense that questioned the
vast resources committed to defending US interests. His
response was blunt: the US public would no longer tolerate
the siphoning off of more tax dollars into Pentagon
coffers. Such a policy stance, he argued, would halt
economic recovery and only further weaken an already
faltering economy. Towards the end of 1976, it appeared to
the US public that Carter was right, as the economic
indicators pointed to a slow down in the economy. However,
the slow down was only temporary and recovered before
Carter had a chance to implement his expansionist policies.
Nevertheless, the Carter Administration was fortunate in
the sense that the economy appeared bad enough for the
majority to believe that it was his policies and not
Ford's, that were required.4
To NASA, Carter was an enigma, at least as far as the
shuttle programme was concerned. He was an engineer by
training, but many at NASA did not think of him as a space
Robert Hotz, 'Ford's Cadillac Budget,' Editorial, Aviation Week and Space Technology (January
26, 1976), p 11.
David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War (New York, Harper
Collins, 1990), pp 398-399; Stephen Woolcock, 'The Economic Policies of the Carter
Administration,' M. Glenn Abernathy, Dilys M. Hill, Phil Williams, (ed) The Carter Years: The
President and Policy Making (London, Frances Pinter, 1984), pp 35-36.
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programme supporter.5 Despite pre-election statements
supporting both the agency and the shuttle, NASA officials
had remained cautious about how they expected the agency to
fare under the Carter Administration.5
The key issue for NASA under the new Administration
was orbiter procurement. Funding for Orbiters four and
five, argued NASA officials, would have to begin in the FY
1978 budget cycle if the agency was to maintain the wide
range of shuttle launches planned for the 1980s.7 However,
attempts by NASA to secure a five orbiter fleet and the
debate surrounding the undertaking, had actually begun long
before Carter stood for election. In 1976, the debate
intensified because NASA was uncertain about the political
terrain. Many at the agency were concerned that if approval
on fleet size was not forthcoming before the election, then
NASA would have to go through a completely new
justification procedure for the shuttle; and there was a
real sense of trepidation about the outcome.8
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995; John Yardley, interview with
the author, August 9, 1995; Bill Sneed, interview with the author, August 21, 1995; Hans
Mark, interview with the author, September 8, 1995.
E. Kozicharow, 'Shuttle Support Seems Assured,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (November
8, 1976), pp 14-15; 'Space Agency Readies Carter's Briefing,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (November 15, 1976), p 22.
'Space Agency Readies Carter's Briefing,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (November 15,
1976), p 22.
Memorandum from James Fletcher to John Yardley, March 28, 1977 (NASA History Office Archive,
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Questions Over the Size of the Space Fleet.
In 1971, when NASA was still pushing its plan for a fully-
reusable two-stage shuttle, the Office of Manned Space
Flight pictured a fleet complement of five orbiters and
four boosters, which would operate out of two launch
sites.9 In 1973, when the issue was reexamined in the light
of major modifications to the shuttle's configuration, NASA
and the Air Force preserved both the size of fleet
complement and the launch site strategy.10 Five orbiters,
argued NASA, would be 'sufficient to support the 1971
traffic model of 581 shuttle flights.'11 Indeed, five
orbiters were judged able to support 581 flights with a
substantial margin for growth.12 And with three orbiters
allocated to Kennedy and two at Vandenburg, future civilian
and military space hardware would be transported and
serviced by the same technological system.13
The grandiose plans formulated at Office of Manned
Space Flight envisaged a space shuttle service that would
administer all future space activity. The image conveyed a
Merrit Preston, Memorandum, June 4, 1971 (Kennedy Space Center Archive, Florida).
NASA/DOD Space Shuttle Orbiter Fleet Size Analysis, prepared by the Office of Manned Space
Flight and US Air Force Systems Command, May 15, 1973 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
Ibid, pp 8-9.
Estimates of it potential in 1973 went as high as 834 flights over the same twelve year
period. M. Malkin, Memorandum to Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, May 30,
1973 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
NASA/DOD Space Shuttle Orbiter Fleet Size Analysis, prepared by the Office of Manned Space
Flight and US Air Force Systems Command, May 15, 1973 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
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future of clean, reusable and routine space travel, where
all other launch vehicles had been displaced in favour of
the shuttle.14 A shuttle monopoly was central to the vision
of economic space travel. Monopolization was a necessary
objective and the benefits associated with economies of
scale served as its rhetorical confirmation. Paralleling
the economic discourse, therefore, was a debate over the
size of a shuttle fleet; the larger the fleet, the greater
the rewards. Behind the rhetoric though, lay a simple
strategy. If NASA could persuade those in the political
arena on the benefits of economies of scale, then its
production budget would be vastly increased. As the
programme advanced however, events conspired to frustrate
the aspirations of NASA's planners.
NASA had an authorized development budget which
provided funding for the first two orbiters and a
production budget that included funding for a third. Beyond
that, there was no budget planning for a fourth or fifth
orbiter.15 The additional orbiters were excluded from
NASA's budget projections because during the campaign to
gain political approval, both the White House and the
Congress had perceived orbiters four and five as an Air
For an example see, James Fletcher, 'NASA's Aerospace Programs: Options for the Future'
Strategic Review Vol 2, No.2 (Spring, 1974) .
George Low, Malcolm Currie, Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and the NASA
Administrator, 8 May, 1976 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
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Force procurement responsibility.16 During the early
planning phases the idea of a NASA/DOD partnership had been
embraced by both agencies. A perception that each partner
would share the funding of building the orbiter fleet, thus
persisted into the mid-1970s. By 1975 however, it had
become clear to NASA that the DOD had shifted its
position.17
There was some talk about the Air Force buying
some orbiters, where they would become what we
called blue shuttle's; Air Force blue shuttles.
That just became too expensive at the time, so
our . . . plans in the Air Force was to use the
NASA fleet.18
The Congress had also become aware of a change in the
DOD/NASA relationship in early 1975 when a General
Accounting Office report indicated that the Air Force had
not been directed by the DOD to included any funding for
shuttle purchases in their budget submissions.19 The DOD's
view of its role had thus evolved from partner to major
user. As Lieutenant General, Forrest McCartney reflected,
many sections of Air Force were showing increased
scepticism in NASA's proclamations about the shuttle; and
were especially concerned about NASA's drive towards a
policy of monopolization:
Memorandum from NASA Comptroller to Associate Administrator for Space Flight, April 21, 1976
(NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
17
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We in the Air Force felt that NASA had overstated
the capability and need for the shuttle. ... So
I think, in those days the Air Force could see in
the early seventies [that the shuttle] would
become the only launch vehicle that the country
[would have]. The Air Force always had
reservations about that, always opposed that and
always felt that they did not want to be confined
or dedicated to one vehicle.20
As the programme turned into 1976, confrontation arose
between NASA and the DOD over which agency was to ask
Congress for funding to purchase the two additional
orbiters.21 In testimony before the Senate Space Committee
the Pentagon stated that paying for the additional orbiters
would exceed the figure that it calculated would be cost
effective for taking part in the shuttle programme.22
Confirmation of the DOD's intentions came during an
informal meeting between NASA Associate Administrator,
George Low, Associate Administrator for Space Flight, John
Yardley, the Pentagon's director of research and
engineering, Malcolm Currie and other members of the DOD in
May 1976. Currie indicated at that meeting that he
personally would support a five orbiter fleet, but he
warned NASA that if the DOD was directed to absorb the
funding for the additional orbiters, then 'its support for
Forrest McCartney, interview with the author, July 28, 1995.
Victor McElheny, 'Aerospace Contracts, Put at $1 Billion, Hinge on Debate Over Space
Shuttles' The New York Times (August 24, 1976), p 37.
307
the shuttle would vanish.'23 Indeed, Malcome Currie had
supported a five orbiter fleet when he told the Congress
earlier that year that the three orbiters planned by NASA
would not be adequate for DOD needs.24 Nevertheless, it was
clear to NASA that orbiters four and five would not be
manufactured in the near future without a significant
increase in the agency's budget.
I do not currently see the agency with the
capability to undertake the funding of these
orbiters based on budget priorities and within
the likely budget allowances during the
applicable period.25
George Low, forced by the DOD's new position, thus set
in motion a campaign to convince Congress during 1976 that
NASA should fund orbiters four and five.
I believe that . . . providing over-allowance funds
to DOD for Orbiters 4 and 5 should ... be ...
discarded. The reason for doing this is that
there are people in the Senate who feel strongly
that DOD should carry its share of Shuttle
development and procurement, and, therefore,
should buy those two orbiters. What you have to
demonstrate ... is that it is all the same
taxpayer's money and that it therefore really
dosen't matter whose budget it is in ... and that
putting it in the NASA budget greatly simplifies
other matters.26
George Low, memorandum for the record, meeting with Malcolm Currie on orbiter procurement and
reimbersment policy, May 19, 1976 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
'Pentagon Says Three Shuttle Orbiters Inadequate' Defense/Space Business Daily (March 4,
1976), pp 25-26.
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(NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
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Argumentation in favour of a five orbiter fleet complement
was, nonetheless, constructed on weak foundations. Indeed,
George Low had to condemn an internal NASA position paper,
which indicated that a three orbiter fleet combined with a
fleet of expendable launch vehicles would prove just as
economical.27
If this is the best we can do, we might as well
give up now. There is no way that we will get
funding over and above the NASA budget for
Orbiters 4 and 5 unless we can prepare a much
more logical and factual document. The argument
[presented] ... leads me to the conclusion that
we should buy only 3 orbiters and maintain a
Titan III capability. By your own figures, we
could maintain this capability for five to ten
years at a cost considerably less than the cost
of the additional two orbiters.28
George Low and Malcolm Currie thus recommended that NASA
and the DOD assumed a political position, which claimed the
need for six orbiters; all to be built by NASA.29 To
camouflage fractures in the argumentation the five orbiter
fleet, described as sufficient in 1973, was presented in
1976 as the minimum fleet size. NASA Administrator, James
Fletcher, told the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, James Lynn toward the end of 1976:
a fleet of five orbiters is the minimum fleet
size which should be acquired to support the
national requirements projected during the 1980-
NASA draft issue paper on orbiter procurement, April 7, 1976 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
George Low, Memorandum to Associate Administrator for Space Flight, April 19, 1976 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC).
A Proposed Memorandum written by George Low and Malcolm Currie to be signed by NASA
Administrator, James Fletcher and Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsford, and sent to the
President or the director of the OMB, May 8, 1976 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington
DC) .
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1991 period. ... A decision now not to procure
the additional orbiters would impose a tight
operational ceiling on our future space
capability which could adversely impact this
nation's leadership in space technology and the
attainment of the significant benefits to mankind
we are certain will evolve through new an
innovative uses of the Space Shuttle fleet. ...
Since the initiation of the ... program in 1972,
NASA and DOD have funded or developed budget
plans for over $11 billion in FY 1978 budget
dollars toward development and support of a
viable . . . Space Transportation System. We
believe that it is prudent to add the approximate
additional ten percent to this significant
investment to practically double our space flight
capability and to provide a fleet size we believe
is the minimum essential to move forward in the
exploitation of space.30
Nevertheless, NASA failed in its attempt to secure orbiter
production funding before the presidential election.
Instead the debate on fleet size continued on into the
Carter Administration.
Early in 1977 the General Accounting Office presented
a report to the Congress on the progress of shuttle
development and NASA planning. The report was exceptionally
critical on the question of orbiter procurement. Five
orbiters, claimed the General Accounting Office, was far in
excess of what would be required. Using historical data
rather than NASA's space traffic models, the General
Accounting Office came to the conclusion that two orbiters
would be sufficient to serve space activity in the 1980s.
It thus recommended that Congress should defer the
Letter from James Fletcher to James Lynn, Director Office of Management and Budget, October
22, 1976 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC), my emphasis.
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construction of two or three of the planned five
orbiters.31 NASA, concerned that the report would influence
Congress to hold back on orbiter production appropriations,
defended its position. John Yardley told Aviation Week and
Space Technology:
They [the General Accounting Office] haven't
grasped the reason for five orbiters. ... [E]ven
if we went down to 200 flights in the 12 year
period, we still made out cheaper with a five-
orbiter fleet compared to a mix of orbiters and
expendable launch vehicles.32
And James Fletcher, prior to leaving NASA in May 1977,
commented:
It is my considered judgement that the national
interest will be best served by committing now to
a five orbiter fleet, and that the eventual size
of the national space program and the individual
budgets of the several user agencies will in no
way be predetermined by this decision. A five
orbiter fleet provides a cost-effective launch
posture even at the levels of space activity of
last year.33
However, the General Accounting Office pointed out that:
The extent to which space flight activity will
increase is largely dependent on the willingness
of the Congress to fund new space projects and
applications because approximately 80 percent of
the projected payloads will be Government
financed.34
GAO, Space Transportation Systems: Past, Present, Future, Report to the Congress, May 27,
1977 (General Accounting Office Distribution Center, Washington DC).
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James Fletcher's resignation as NASA Administrator became
effective on May 1, 1977. Frank Press, Carter's science
advisor, pushed to have Robert Frosch as the fifth NASA
Administrator. Frosch, a weapons scientist with a
background in physics, was a friend of Press, so thought
loyal to the Carter Administration. During his first
meeting with the President, Carter asked Frosch to closely
examine the shuttle programme to determine if it should be
shut down. Thus, Frosch found out very quickly that he was
working with an Administration that was trying to free
itself from the past. Every programme had to be examined,
with the view that if it was not cost-effective it should
be eliminated. Frosch eventually decided that the shuttle
programme was a valuable asset, because it was the only
project that maintained a human space programme.35
Meanwhile, the new Office of Management and Budget,
under the guidance of Vice President, Walter Mondale, were
examining methods of reducing the shuttle fleet to three
orbiters.36 On November 29, 1977 the Office of Management
and Budget called a high-level meeting to discuss the
shuttle's future. In attendance was the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, James Mclntyre, Secretary
of Defense, Harold Brown, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Charles Duncan, Secretary of the Air Force, Hans Mark,
Joseph Trento, Prescription for Disaster pp 147-149.
Space Shuttle: Office of Management and Budget Production Options February 2, 1977 (NASA
History Office Archives, Washington DC).
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Director of Central Intelligence, Stanford Turner, and the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, William
Perry. The Office of Management and Budget presented three
options to the meeting. First, to continue with the current
plan, a five orbiter fleet operating out of two launch
sites; second, to the cut the shuttle programme back to
three orbiters operating from Kennedy only, which involved
retaining an expendable launch vehicle capability; or
third, a compromise position of constructing four orbiters
and leaving the question of a second launch site open for
future review. The Office of Management and Budget made a
strong argument for the second option on the grounds that
it would aid the Administration's near-term budget
problems. Hans Mark, a former NASA employee, and Harold
Brown refused to accept the Office of Management and
Budget's proposal so no decision was made.37
Nevertheless, the Office of Management and Budget
pushed for some sort of a decision in that year and yet
another meeting was held on December 16, 1977 to reach a
final settlement. At this meeting Harold Brown took a very
strong position against the Office of Management and
Budget's proposal. He argued that a three orbiter fleet was
unacceptable from the standpoint of national security. His
argument was based on the fact that NASA's first two
orbiters (Columbia and Challenger) would be heavier than
Hans Mark, The Space Station pp 71-73.
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the following vehicles (Discovery and Atlantis), so they
would be unable to lift the DOD's heaviest payloads. At
least two of the lighter orbiter's would be required,
argued Brown, because the DOD would need a backup in case
one of them was lost.38 Brown's arguments eventually swung
Carter's decision over to the compromise position and he
reduced the shuttle fleet to four orbiters.39
NASA Administrator, Robert Frosch told Congress that
Carter's decision was an indication that his Administration
had misgivings over whether the shuttle would be capable of
conducting all the missions forecast; and that he
interpreted the deferment of the fifth orbiter as a policy
of caution, by allowing additional time to judge whether it
would actually be needed. There was a strong cross-party
move in the Congress, however, to reverse Carter's
decision. Many in of the space committees believed that a
four orbiter fleet would limit civilian space programmes
and could place the US in a vulnerable position for the
strategic use of space in defense, if one orbiter were lost
or damaged. Senator Harrison Schmitt (Republican, New
Mexico), a former Apollo astronaut, said that he believed
the Carter Administration had a 'great misunderstanding'
about the importance of technology to the future of the US.
Thus, Congress ignored the proposals of both the Office and
Ibid.
39
Dick Baumbach, 'KSC Is Pleased With 4 Shuttles' Today (January 24, 1978), p 8A.
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Management and Budget and the General Accounting Office and
four Congressional committees added $4 million in FY 1979
funds to preserve the option for a fifth orbiter.40
The Flowering of Financial and Management Crisis.
The shoots of financial crisis, as was shown at the end of
chapter 5, surfaced soon after Nixon's reelection in 1972.
NASA had faced budget constraints through FY's 1973, 1974
and 1975; and inflationary pressures had also caused NASA's
purchasing power to erode. In August 1974, the shuttle's
Program Manager, Robert Thompson had expressed concern over
the programme's financial future.
Overall, we feel that the funding available for
Shuttle Projects for fiscal years 1975 through
1977 is very marginal since there are no funds
available for growth or change allowances.41
This remained an explicit concern at NASA, as the agency
continued to experienced (what it perceived as) a declining
budget posture. President Ford's FY 1977 budget submission
to Congress of $3.7 billion enacted a $182.6 million cut in
NASA budget request, but more significantly to NASA, the
Craig Covault, 'Fifth Orbiter Support Rises in Congress,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(February 27, 1978), pp 20-21; 'Fifth Orbiter, Stereostat Voted Funding by House Committee,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (March 6, 1978), pp 13-14; 'Senate Unit, House Vote Fifth
Orbiter,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 1, 1978), pp 22-23; 'Senate Unit to
Consider Funds for Fifth Orbiter,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (July 31, 1978), p 21;
'GAO Sticks To Its Guns On Shuttle Fleet Sites,' Aerospace Daily (August 8, 1978), pp 161-
162 .
Robert Thompson, quoted in, GAO, Staff Study: Space Transportation System, February 1975
(General Accounting Office Distribution Center, Washington DC), p 4.
315
total figure represented 'a level approximately 25 percent
less than that of a $3.4 billion constant budget'.42
Given the condition of the US economy and the rhetoric
of the presidential election, it appeared that NASA would
not suffice any better under a Carter Administration.
Although unemployment had fallen from its peak of 9 per
cent in 1975, it remained close to 8 per cent in 1976; and
inflation hovered around 7 per cent for most of that year.
The government's budget deficit stood at $66.4 billion in
1976, which was equivalent to 4.1 per cent of GNP (a record
at that time for the US) and federal expenditures accounted
for 22.6 per cent of GNP. Once in office, the general
objectives of the Carter Administration were: to reduced
unemployment to 4.5 per cent by 1981; bring inflation down
to 5 per cent; balance the federal budget, reduce
government expenditures to 21 per cent of GNP and inject
$60 billion into the economy in increased spending on
social programmes over the four year term.43 It was not a
programme that favoured large technological projects.
By the end of 1977 a myriad of technical problems were
having a cumulative effect on the shuttle programme's
financial condition.44 The shuttle had consumed over $1.2
42
William Lilly, Memorandum to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, April 21, 1976
(NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC), my emphasis; NASA's total appropriation for
FY 1977 was $3 819 090 000. Ihor Gawdiak, Helen Fedor, NASA Historical Data Book Volume IV
Table 4-16, p 138.
43
Stephen Woolcock, 'The Economic Policies of the Carter Administration,' M. Glenn Abernathy,
Dilys M. Hill, Phil Williams, (ed) The Carter Years: The President and Policy Making (London,
Frances Pinter, 1984), pp 36-37.
44
See chapter 7 for details on some of the technical problems.
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billion during FY 1977, but additional testing, major
redesigns of both hardware and software, and the need for
the employment of additional labour in the fabrication of
Columbia, had drained the programme's reserves and placed
pressure on the agency's overall resources.45 To save the
programme and remain on target for a first launch in March
1979, NASA Administrator Robert Frosch proposed a plan to
Congress to shift $100 million from the orbiter production
budget (monies allocated to begin building the shuttle
fleet) to the design, development and test budget.46
Although, this plan did not go without some criticism in
Congress. William Proxmire announced that his
Appropriations Subcommittee would hold a hearing in
December to examine, what he saw, as a shuttle cost overrun
of $100 million.47
For the first time NASA has admitted that there
will be an overrun of between four percent and
seven percent in the cost of the space shuttle.
Even more disturbing are indications that there
may be significant delays in implementing the
shuttle system and performance degradations that
could impair or destroy the shuttle's cost
advantages over the use of conventional
expendable launch vehicles. ... These proposed
changes may be the tip of the iceberg. Further
increased costs along with program delays and
Statement of Robert Frosch before the Senate Appropriations Committee, HUD - Independent
Agencies Committee, draft version, November 29, 1977 (NASA History Office Archives,
Washington DC).
Ibid; Robert Frosch, Letter to Representative Edward Boland (Democrat, Massachusetts),
November 9, 1977 (NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC); Thomas O'Toole, 'NASA Asks
$100 Million Shuttle Fund Shift,' The Washington Post (December 2, 1977), p A2.
'Proxmire Sets Hearing On Space Shuttle Cost,' Washington Star (November 28, 1977), p 3.
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reduced shuttle performance may just be over the
horizon.48
In this prediction, Proxmire turned out to be correct. In
January and February 1979, NASA officials went before
Congress to request an additional supplement of $185
million to keep the shuttle programme on schedule for a
1979 launch date, which was approved on the basis of
Frosch's testimony that the FY 1980 budget fully supported
the development programme.49 Nevertheless, in this
prediction, Frosch was unequivocally wrong.
NASA's first space flight shuttle, Columbia, arrived at
Kennedy in late March 1979. With the first launch due some
months later, President Carter announced:
The first great era of space is over. The second
is about to begin.50
The statement, largely based on the assurances coming from
NASA, was, nonetheless, premature. The shipment of Columbia
to Kennedy was, as one Johnson Official, Herb Yarbrough,
recalled, primarily done for political reasons.
[When Columbia] went down [to Kennedy] ... it was
not ready for delivery, but the program had a
William Proxmire, Press Release from the Office of Senator William Proxmire, November 28,
1977 (National Air and Space Museum Archives, Washington DC).
'NASA Budget Provides No Real Growth, ' Aviation Week and Space Technology (January 22, 1979) ,
p 16; 'Frosch Defines FY 1980 Budget,' Roundup (Houston, Texas, NASA, Johnston Space Center,
January 26, 1979) , pi; 'House Unit Okays $185 million FY '79 Supplement For Shuttle, '
Defense/Space Daily (March 7, 1979), p 34.
Jimmy Carter, quoted in NASA Activities, May, 1979 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington
DC) .
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milestone and we had budget problems and not
delivering on time wouldn't have helped that.51
March 1979 had been the predicted launch date for a
number of years. Thus, getting the shuttle to Kennedy by
that date had become a key objective. Yet, it soon became
apparent to those at Kennedy that the vehicle was nowhere
near ready to fly, as Rockwell engineer (Kennedy Div.),
John Tribe, remembered:
When the vehicle got here it wasn't finished. ...
so we had a lot of work to do down here, it was
almost like we had to finish building it.52
And as Deputy Director of Space Shuttle Projects Management
at Kennedy, Samuel Beddingfield, also recollected:
Well when the shuttle got here, and this has been
kind of a tradition, an unfortunate tradition,
that when the Rockwell people deliver a
spacecraft down here to be launched its never
finished. It has a lot of work to be done on it,
even though they claim that its finished. Now
when that one came in the tiles were a huge
problem, the thermal protection system tiles. We
lost a lot of them in transit, just flying it
across the country. ... It ended up that we had
to replace almost all the tiles on the whole
vehicle and the work was not very well done, they
had a lot of sloppy workers and there was a lot
of other things that had to be tweaked. The
landing gear was not working right, the brakes
were not working right. So we practically rebuilt
the thing down here; so it was a long time after
it was delivered before the first flight and part
of it is just being absolutely concerned with
checking it out, making sure everything works.
But a large part of it was that it just wasn't
finished being built. They did the same thing on
the Apollo space vehicle.53
Herb Yarbrough, interview with the author, September 5, 1995.
John Tribe, interview, with the author, July 28, 1995.
Samuel Beddingfield, interview with the author, July 31, 1995.
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In a tremendous effort to complete the work on
Columbia in time for a November 197 9 launch, NASA moved
over 2 000 workers from Palmdale, California to Kennedy at
a cost of over $1.8 million. A huge complex of temporary
accommodation and facilities was established at Kennedy to
house all the workers, who were working seven days a week,
three shifts a day, to finish building Columbia. In
addition, NASA also hired every man and women in Bravade
County that wanted to work on the space shuttle, to work
with the application of the thermal protection tiles,
because it was a such a labour intensive operation.
Included in that workforce was over 320 high school
graduates and college students on their summer vacation.54
John Halsema recalled his experiences as a temporary
technician, hired to install the thermal protection tiles.
When I started working ... we were in a big push
to get the shuttle finished. . . . We started
working a tremendous amount of hours ... after my
initial training, we started working 12 hours a
day for five days a week and 8 hours a day on
Saturday and Sunday. . . . We had to be at work at
five in the morning and we got off at 5:45. ...
I think everybody at that period of time had a
real personal feeling about working on the space
shuttle. Most of the people that were hired
temporarily here, grew up here and so they were
in the same situation I was, they had [grown up]
watching rockets take-off. . . . All of us were
young, in our late teens to early twenties . . .
there were a few of the old hands that had been
technicians during the Apollo program and they
were kind of the corporate memory and we got to
John Tribe, interview, with the author, July 28, 1995; R. Jeffrey Smith, 'Shuttle Problems
Compromise Space Program,' Science 206, (November 23, 1979) , pp 910-914; Arlen Large,
'America's Space Shuttle Lemon,' Wall Street Journal (January 31, 1980) , p 14; Deborah Kyle,
'The Space Shuttle: Ahead of Its Time - Or Biding It?,' Armed Forces Journal International
(July, 1980), pp 44, 56; S. Diamond, 'NASA Wasted Billions, Federal Audit Discloses,' New
York Times (April 23, 1986).
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hear what it was like during the big pushes
during the Apollo era.55
For the temporary technicians, working on the shuttle was
both an 'interesting and enjoyable' experience. Although
the hours were long, for many it fulfilled their dreams of
getting up close to a space vehicle. For the full-timers at
Kennedy, however, getting the shuttle ready to fly was
turning into a nightmare, as John Tribe recalled:
Those were some black days, ... I wondered if
we'd ever fly. It just seem like that every time
we started to put things back together there
would be another [modification], or another
crisis would occur, so that we had to go and
start taking it apart again.56
As detailed in chapter 6, technical problems continued
to plague the programme through 1979 and 1980. By the end
of March, 1979 it had become clear to NASA's higher
echelons that the FY 1980 and FY 1981 budgets could not
sustain the development programme. In April 1979,
therefore, NASA officials went back to the Congress and the
White House to inform them that the programme required an
additional $270 million in FY 1980 and $200-250 million
more in FY 1981. The date for the first launch was again




John Halsema, interview with the author, July 26, 1995.
John Tribe, interview, with the author, July 28, 1995.
John Fialka, 'U.S. Space Shuttle Program Has New Money Problems,' The Washington Star (May
2, 1979); 'NASA Will Tailor Shuttle Slip to DOD Needs, Seek Budget Hike if Required,'
Aerospace Daily (May 3, 1979), p 15; Thomas O'Toole, 'Space Shuttle Money Pinch May Force
Science to Back Seat,' The Washington Post (May 6, 1979) ; John Noble Wilford, 'Delay in
Space Shuttle Facing Carter Review; Funds May be Raised,' New York Times (May 11, 1979).
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NASA finally confessed up to the problems they
had. They had been sort of keeping them
undercover and accepting the fact that they had
to live with the smaller budgets that [the
Carter] administration was placing on the
shuttle. That got us in trouble with the Congress
because two weeks before ... we had been up in
the Congress testifying that we really didn't
need any more money. ... When they found that we
needed more money then that's when ... the shit
hit the fan and the Congress became very very
upset with NASA.58
Senator Adlai Stevenson (Democrat, Illinois), chair of the
Senate subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space,
expressed a major concern that NASA appeared to have
discovered its $270 million shortfall rather suddenly, when
only a month previously the agency had told the Senate that
the programmes budget was sufficient. Representative Edward
Boland (Democrat-Massachusetts), chair of the House
Appropriations subcommittee on HUD-independent agencies,
also remarked that 'NASA's credibility has been stretched
a little thin' by the revelation of funding problems little
more than a month after the regular budget hearings.59 And
Representative Larry Winn (Republican, Kansas) commented:
After spending all these years travelling from
one briefing on Shuttle status to the next, I
feel like I have totally wasted my time. The
visits gave me the confidence to go before my
colleagues in the House of Representatives and
fight for the necessary support to move this
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
John Fialka, 'U.S. Space Shuttle Program Has New Money Problems,' The Washington Star (May
2, 1979); 'NASA Will Tailor Shuttle Slip to DOD Needs, Seek Budget Hike if Required,'
Aerospace Daily (May 3, 1979), p 15.
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program along. I can now see that it was a false
sense of confidence.60
Indeed, the disclosure of funding problems led to a general
crisis of confidence over NASA's ability to manage the
shuttle programme. And despite NASA Administrator, Robert
Frosch's claim that NASA's top management did not know
about the enormity of the increases sooner because of
'institutional pride,'61 both the Congress and the White
House insisted on investigations into NASA shuttle
management.62
Redemption.
NASA's profile on Capitol Hill plummeted after its request
for additional funding and there was a growing concern
within the agency about the rise in opposition to the
shuttle. As Johnson's Director, Christopher Kraft recalled,
it was a dangerous time for the programme.
It was about the period [when] ... we began to
recognise that we had a large financial problem
on our hands [that] NASA was almost in the
position where they had to turn the program into
an R&D program, as opposed to an operating
vehicle. And go to just producing one vehicle and
finding out what we could do with it: as opposed
to producing a number of vehicles and making it
Larry Winn, quoted in Ken Hechler, Toward the Endless Frontier p 304.
'Frosch Sees 'Error in Judgement' in Timing of Shuttle Disclosures,' Aerospace Daily (July
5, 1979), pp 20-21 .
Letter to Senator Howard Cannon from Robert Frosch, reprinted in Aerospace Daily (May 14,
1979), p 68; Memorandum to Robert Frosch from Alan Lovelace, reprinted in Aerospace Daily
(May 14, 1979), p 69; 'Carter Asks for Space Shuttle Briefing,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (August 6, 1979), p 21.
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the work horse of the space program, which was
what it was originally designed to be.63
NASA considered that the agency alone would not be able to
get the increases through Congress. What it needed was the
support of the Office of Management and Budget and the
President.64
Paradoxically, given Carter's election rhetoric, it
was the military potentials of the shuttle and space in
general, that had become significant to the White House. In
mid-1977, Carter had established an Inter-agency Space
Program Coordinating Committee to draw up various space
policy options. The committee, headed by Carter's Defense
Secretary, was made up of members from: NASA, the DOD, the
State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Office of the President's National Security Advisor, the
Office of Science and Technology, the Department of
Agriculture, and the Department of Commerce. By early 1978,
the committee had reached its conclusion and a draft policy
document had been sent to the White House for Carter's
approval. The policy document sparked controversy among
some civilian agencies and within Congress, because of its
emphasis on the military and intelligence utilization of
space. Many argued that if the policy directive were
approved then the DOD would have greater control over
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
Memorandum to Curt Hessler, Associate Director OMB, from Alan Lovelace, Duputy Administrator,
n.d (NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC).
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civilian space activity. Nevertheless, in October 1978,
Carter authorized the space policy directive and a number
of inter-agency committees were established to ensure both
civilian and military exploitation of the shuttle.65
Combined with issues stemming from the fleet size
debate, as shown above, the shuttle became further
embroiled with a military agenda. As the issue of funding
reached the highest echelons of power, the density of this
entanglement increased. NASA Administrator, Robert Frosch
had originally proposed that the $270 million required to
complete the shuttle's development could be transferred
from NASA's production budget, as was done in 1977.65 The
Pentagon, however, were not in agreement. Shifting funds
from production to development would delay the delivery of
orbiters 3 and 4 (Discovery and Atlantis) which had serious
implications for the launching of DOD reconnaissance
satellites. Discovery and Atlantis were designed to be much
lighter orbiters than Columbia and Challenger. Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, William
Perry, told Congress that if they approved the funding
increases, then NASA's schedule for development of the
Press release from the Office of the White House Press Secretary, on the Presidents Space
Policy, October 18, 1978 (Marshall Space Flight Center Archive, Huntsville, Alabama); Craig
Covault, 'Unified Policy on Space Readied,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (January 2,
1978), pp 14-16; Craig Covault, 'Space Policy Mandates US Leadership, 'Aviation Week and Space
Technology (October 16, 1978), pp 24-26; Craig Covault, 'Debate on Space Policy Heats,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (February 5, 1979), pp 12-13; Craig Covault, 'Space Policy
Discussion Stresses Solid Goal Need,' Aviation Week and Space Technologry (February 19, 1979),
pp 52-54.
Thomas O'Toole, 'Space Shuttle Money Pinch May Force Science to Back Seat,' The Washington
Post (May 6, 1979); John Noble Wilford, 'Delay in Space Shuttle Facing Carter Review; Funds
May be Raised, ' New York Times (May 11, 1979) .
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first four orbiters would meet DOD launch requirements, but
with very little margin. The DOD needed the lighter
orbiters to launch their heavy spy satellites into a polar
orbit, and they needed Atlantis by December 1983:
Atlantis's delivery date was September 1983.67
Late in 1979, Carter declared his support for NASA's
request for extra funding in FY 1980 and FY 1981.68 NASA
claimed that it was surprised by the Carter
Administration's decision to place a higher priority on
adherence to the planned launch schedules for certain DOD
shuttle missions than on the objective of holding the NASA
budget within previously approved levels. Key sources
within the Pentagon professed that the key question, which
convinced Carter to push Congress for the extra funding was
the availability of the shuttle to launch intelligence
missions needed to verify Soviet compliance with the second
round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II),
which was being debated in the Senate at the time.69
It was at the time of the SALT talks and
agreements and the Carter Administration began to
use the shuttle as a political tool, an
international political tool, to threaten the
Russians with the capabilities the shuttle would
have to intervene in a hot war and as a spy tool.
... It was after one of those very detailed
'Shuttle Must Have All Funds Required to Meet DOD Needs,' Defense/Space Dally (June 6, 1979),
p 177; 'Frosch Sees Shuttle Supplement of Several Hundered Million Dollars,' Aerospace Daily
(October 19, 1979), pp 237-238.
Craig Covault, 'Administration Backs Shuttle Fund Rise,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(September 17, 1979), pp 22-23.
'Administration Vetoed NASA Plan to Slip Shuttle Further,' Aerospace Daily (September 20,
1979), p 36; Alton Marsh, 'SALT Support Tied to Defense Gains,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (August 6, 1979), p 20.
meetings in Switzerland ... that he came back to
this country and became aware that the shuttle
was well behind schedule and well under budgeted.
And so he said what do you need to fix it? We
told him.70
We were under a lot of cost pressure ... and I
think that was about some of the time when some
of the weapons control programs with the Russians
were being initiated. ... It appeared that the
plans were for the shuttle to orbit satellites
that could monitor what the Russians were doing
in connection with these treaties. So some of our
cost problems went away during the Carter
administration because of that.71
NASA had maintained that they were unaware of the
implications of SALT II on the delay of orbiter
production.72 But by end of 1979 the agency had no problem
with using SALT II to reinforce its position. In September
it had become clear to NASA that the first launch would
slip further from April 1980 to September 1980. In a letter
to Carter, Frosch was eager to make it clear that:
... the schedule adjustment will not [sic] affect
the important initial SALT related launch
schedule for the shuttle in early 1983, and all
subsequent national security related missions.73
Estimates of funding over and above the planned spending
limits ranged from $200 to $300 million for FY 1980 and
$400 to $450 million for FY 1981. Frosch told Carter:
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, September 1, 1995.
Robert Lindstrom, interview with the author, August 17, 1995.
'Administration Vetoed NASA Plan to Slip Shuttle Further,' Aerospace Daily (September 20,
1979), p 36.
Memorandum to President Carter from Robert Frosch, September 11, 1979 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
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We believe that a general commitment now should
be sufficient to assure the Congress that the
Administration is still fully committed to use
the shuttle for the important SALT-related launch
in early 1983 .74
On November 14, 1979 Frosch and Carter had a private
meeting to discuss the status of the shuttle. At this
meeting Carter again reiterated his support for the
programme and its continuation towards fully operational
status.75 After that meeting, Frosch told Congress that the
driving force behind keeping the shuttle on schedule was
the SALT II agreement.75 Prior to the meeting, the White
House had conducted a shuttle review, which involved the
Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, and the National Security Council. They
all reaffirmed the need for the shuttle programme to
continue as originally planned because of SALT II. One high
level observer noted that the most significant ramification
of the review was the substantial change in position of the
Office of Management and Budget.77
Letter from President Jimmy Carter to Bob Frosch, November 26, 1979 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC) ; Press briefing on Robert Frosch's conversation with President Carter
regarding the space shuttle, November 14, 1979 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
Thomas O'Toole, 'NASA Head Says Carter Will Fully Back Shuttle,' The Washington Post
(November 15, 1979) ; John Noble Wilford, 'Carter To Seek Aid For Space Shuttle,' New York
Times (November 15, 1979).
Craig Covault, 'Carter Backs Shuttle Fund Rise,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (November
19, 1979), pp 16-18.
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In 1972, NASA claimed that the first orbital flight would
take place in 1977. By 1973, this had moved forward to
1978. As the programme progressed the launch date slipped
further and further into the future. March 1979 came and
went. Then it was September 197 9, December 197 9 and then
the spring of 1980. In mid-1980 it became clear to NASA
Administrator, Robert Frosch, that the shuttle would not be
launched before the next presidential election and he
announced a new launch date of March 1981.78 Thus, it was
President Ronald Reagan, not President Carter, that would
gain the "political capital" from a "space spectacular".
78








When the system attained to a certain degree of
development, it had to root up this ready-made
foundation, which in the meantime had been
elaborated on the old lines, and to build up for
itself a basis that should correspond to its
methods of production.1
Print 9:1 captures a moment in time during a readiness test
for the inaugural flight of Columbia. The test was part of
a series that took place some months before Columbia's
first flight, which eventually took place in April 1981.
Together, the tests marked the end of the long process of
design, development and fabrication. The technology had
taken on physical form. It existed as an object and was
ready to make the transition from conditions of
construction to conditions of use. The boundary between
creation and operation was, nonetheless, more opaque than
this. Conditions of use were as significant during
construction, as conditions of construction were during
use. However, whereas the previous chapters principally
addressed the former, the central focus of this penultimate
chapter is on the latter.
Karl Marx, Capital, A Critique of Political Economy: Vol 1, The Process of Capitalist
Production Samuel More, Edward Aveling, (trans), Frederick Engles, (ed) (Chigaco, Charles
H.Kerr and Co, 1919), p 417.
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Source: Edward Kolcum, 'Shuttle Engine Firing Successful,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (March 2, 1981), p 16.
Idioms From the Airliner Lexicon.
Based on the premise of a "mass space market", the essence
of the shuttle revolution was economies of scale. What this
meant in operational terms, was a radical shift in the way
NASA was organized and the way in which that organization
had worked. Conceived as a routine operational vehicle, the
shuttle was to compel parts of NASA to face a new
environment; an environment geared to providing a regular
service.
Yet, regular, routine, or mundane work, was not part
of the perceived practice of NASA's space divisions.
[Routine operations] were not very well known. We
had people who had been involved with aircraft,
... but the NASA culture was not into operations
period. NASA was excellent at planning and
operating on a mission basis. They didn't have
experience in operating on a continual basis with
turning vehicles around, processing them, getting
that vehicle ready to fly again [and] having
another vehicle behind that.2
Before 1970, NASA had built a reputation for being an
innovative organization, working largely in realms of the
unknown and pushing forward the boundaries of both
knowledge and machinery. Assimilated into this image after
197 0, was a "NASA speak" that voiced idioms from the
airliner lexicon. Customer service, customer demand, the
marketplace, load factors, and frequent turnaround, all
became part of a discourse exhorting the shuttle
revolution. In the "new politics" of space, analogies with
Herb Yarbrough, interview with the author, September 5, 1995.
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the airlines were often used to accentuate the shape of
things to come.3
George Low [NASA Associate Administrator] . . .
left us a terrible heritage. ... He said we have
to take a Frontier Airlines approach to shuttle
operations. Now, Frontier Airlines was a little
airline out west that had cheap rates. ... Well
it gave the public the impression that flying the
shuttle was like flying an airline.4
Unlike NASA's previous human space programmes, where
the agency designed the requirements, developed the vehicle
and served as the customer, with the shuttle, NASA would
have to provide a flexible, on-going service, for people
other than itself.5 Although ideas of turning the shuttle
over to private hands had been examined, NASA was aware
that, at least in the short term, it would be responsible
for shuttle operations.6 Thus, in the early to mid-1970s,
members from both NASA and Rockwell contacted some of the
major US airline companies in an effort to accumulate
expertise in operational procedures.7
John Yardley, 'To the First Launch,' Astronautics & Aeronautics (February, 1979), pp 28-34,
72; William Gregory, 'Shuttle Open's Door to New Space Era,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (November 8, 1976), pp 39-43; 'Kennedy Center Stresses Customer Service,' Aviation
Week and Space Technology (November 8, 1976), p 122.
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I can remember that we brought in all the
airlines, ... Delta, American, United, to tell us
how they operated; . . . and we conceived the
shuttle as being like an aircraft, you bring it
back, you maybe change-out one or two things, you
check-it-out and you go back. . . . Much like an
airline, you land and you take-off. ... We were
very definitely, at that time, modelling after
the airlines.8
Realistically or not, the concept was ... flying
60 missions a year. In other words every two
weeks, turning them around and flying again and
that concept drove us for quite some time in how
we would do the operations. ... So my job was to
start thinking about how we might do the
operations on a on-going basis and in an
economical fashion, which meant if you were
flying every two weeks you had several orbiters
... in orbit at the same time and you had have
crews handling that. . . . We made a number of
visits to airline control Centers ... and talked
to airlines ... and had a number of study
contracts, of how they operated compared to what
we were doing. How they controlled the scheduling
and the overflights ... the repairs, the
turnaround time. ... So we looked at control
Centers where the Administrator, the Program
Director and all that, had all the data coming
in, you made contact with all your managers, like
the airlines do with all their airline planes;
like how many were down, how many did you bring
up last night. We talked to the airlines about it
... because they were as close to what we were
after than anybody.9
But, in the end, NASA was unable to gain much experience,
or knowledge from the airlines that it found applicable.10
There's some things that you could learn from
airline maintenance, but the airline maintenance
people that came in to look at the operations, I
think, really learnt more to help their
operations from what we were operating than we
Bill Siieed, interview with the author, August 21, 1995.
Chester Lee, interview with the author, May 2, 1995.
LeRoy Day, interview with the author, June 26, 1995; Ted Carey, interview with the author,
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learnt from them. [The shuttle was] just a
different beast.11
The one I remember was American Airlines ... when
we were trying to figure how to run the shuttle
. . . [but] it's not an aeroplane and you can't
operate it like and aeroplane ... I don't think
we learned anything out of that.12
Nevertheless, the idea that the shuttle could be run
along similar lines as a commercial airline had become
ingrained. Johnson's Director, Christopher Kraft, commented
in 1978:
If we're going to make this thing a routine
operation, it's got to go in a more matter-of-
fact manner, more like an airline operation, than
we've seen in the past.13
James Abrahamson, NASA's Associate Administrator for the
Office of Space Transportation System Operations,
commenting in 1981:
[W]e have to make a major effort ... to simplify
and improve our procedures so that we can have a
reliable and repeatable airline-type operation.14
The impression was of a future with clean, reusable and
routine space travel.
If you look back at the pictures, at the artist's
styling of what it was going to be like, [they]
showed an orbiter sitting in this sterile
[orbiter processing facility], glistening floors,
one little access stand and about two technicians
George English, interview with the author, July 26, 1995.
Francis Hoban, interview with the author, May 15, 1995.
Christopher Kraft, quoted in 'Kraft Sees Growing Role of Private Industry in Space' Roundup
(Houston, Texas, NASA, Johnson Space Center, September 29, 1978), p 4.
James Abrahamson, quoted in, Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Management Shifting to Operations,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (December 21, 1981), p 16.
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wandering around. It was totally unreal, but
unfortunately we believed the propaganda.15
Planning for the Spaceliner.
Early in 1974, NASA began to prepare its organization for
the change over from expendable launch vehicle to shuttle
operations. The Office of Manned Space Flight was
reorganized in a new Office of Space Flight that took
control over both the shuttle and expendable launch
vehicles. NASA saw this reorganization as indicative of the
seriousness that it placed on shuttle operations, because
it removed the traditional split between human and non-
human space flight; an organizational structure that was no
longer thought pertinent to shuttle operations. Other key
elements of NASA's reorganization were the establishment of
a Deputy Associate Administrator for Operations and a Space
Transportation Systems Operations Directorate, both housed
in the new Office of Space Flight.16 This structure
remained in place until the budget fiasco in 1979, which
influenced further management changes. The Office of Space
Transportation Systems was renamed the Office of Space
Transportation System Acquisition and was given total
control over shuttle operations, scheduling, pricing,
15
16
John Tribe, interview with the author, July 28, 1995.
James Fletcher, special announcement distributed to all NASA centers, March 5, 1974 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC) ; 'NASA Reorganizes Manned Space Flight Office, '
Aviation Week and Space Technology (September 29, 1975), p 19; John Yardley, Operating the
National Spaceline, Draft paper for AIAA presentation, January 28, 1976 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
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launch service agreements, and the Spacelab program. NASA
considered that this reorganization would streamline
shuttle management by first, allowing the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight, John Yardley, to focus
attention on getting the shuttle built and flying; and
second, by centralizing all shuttle services in a single
user-orientated organization.17
Nevertheless, the critical issue was labour. NASA knew
that it could not continue to conduct operations the way it
had on the Apollo programme, where there was an enormous
ground support team.18 An issue Kennedy's Acting Director,
Miles Ross, commented on in connection with the Space
Flight Operation Ad Hoc Committee.
This group must be very aware that the Space
Transportation System [STS] will not command the
space transportation market place by NASA decree
but must be cost effective, flexible, and
responsive. The proposed Center responsibility
charts in the report and the Marshall Space
Flight Center comments on the report indicate
overlaps of Center responsibilities that could
result in a very complex, expensive, and
inflexible inter-Center interfaces. It is the
emerging feeling among shuttle critics that "with
3 NASA Centers and Headquarters elements
involving 30,000 people preparing for an STS
operation, an operation involving fewer than
30,000 people is not likely to result." This new
office must be very aware that good operational
'New Shuttle Admin Office User-oriented' Roundup (Houston, Texas, NASA, Johnson Space Center,
October 19, 1979), p 1; 'Lunney Acting STS Chief of Operations' Roundup (Houston, Texas,
NASA, Johnson Space Center, November 30, 1979), p 1.
Chester Lee, interview with the author, May 2, 1995.
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practice, the Congress, and the users will demand
a less expensive, more flexible operation.19
Regardless of shuttle operational requirements, NASA was
shedding civil service employment on the direction of the
Office of Management and Budget as part of the agency's
overall budget cuts. NASA in-house employment had steadily
declined from 33 929 in 1969 to 23 779 in 1978, a decrease
of almost 30 per cent.20 However, the estimates of NASA and
contractor labour for shuttle operations, uniformly rose
with the machine's complexity.
Well it's the thing that we call the marching
army. ... For reasons that aren't quite clear to
me, more is better in NASA. And a friend of mine,
... he has done some work on processing parts of
the shuttle down at the Cape [Kennedy] . For
instance, the fuel cells, the fuel cell's trail
through that organization is like a spider's web.
... It's bizarre in some cases. ... One of the
fellows on the shuttle took us down to Michoud
and we were looking at tanks being manufactured
and he said to me, 'on this tank there are
100 000 visual inspections . . . 100 000 visual
inspections is an enormous waste.' He was
absolutely correct.21
All three of NASA human space flight Centers were
gearing up for shuttle operations during the mid-1970s.
Concern about how shuttle flights would effect activities
at Mission Control was a big issue for Johnson.22 But for
Letter from Miles Ross, Acting Director KSC, to John Yardley, Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight, January 9, 1975 (Kennedy Space Center Archive, Florida).
Ihor Gawdiak, Helen Fedor, NASA Historical Data Book: Volume IV p 59.
Francis Hoban, interview with the author, May 15, 1995.
'JSC to Ask Think Tank to Study Center Roles,' Roundup (Houston, Texas, JSC, August 18,
1978), p 1.
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Kennedy, planning and working on concepts for shuttle
operations was the central issue, because the level of
activity on the ground, required to prepare the shuttle to
fly, would be an order of magnitude of what would be
demanded once it lif ted-off .23
In the early days of human space flight most of the
activities during launch preparation were merely an
extension of the factory. All of the procedures for both
the factory and the launch site were written at the
factory. So the design, test, fabrication and launch was
almost totally under the control of the factory. The
continuous and routine nature of the shuttle, however, made
launch and turnaround procedures Kennedy's responsibility;
even when hardware and software interfaces with shuttle
components and ground support equipment were designed
elsewhere.24 Thus, Kennedy had to establish a whole new set
processes, procedures and management control systems.
In the early 1970s we spent our time planning out
how we were going to get this thing ready to fly,
because it was a major new thing. ... So we tried
to mount everything we knew about boosters,
spacecraft, aircraft and overall maintenance to
figure out how we were going to process this
thing.25
NASA and contractor employees at the Kennedy
recognized early that the shuttle was a technological
2 3
Robert Sieck, interview with the author, August 1, 1995.
24
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regime unique to its own operations. NASA's attention to
considerations of continual operations may have long been
a traditional part of aircraft design and development, but
in the design and development of space vehicles, this had
not been the case. Thus, Kennedy consistently pushed for a
new dimension to research and development so that
operational logistics would be an early emphasis of a
shuttle design.26 As Robert Sieck, Kennedy Director for
Shuttle Operations, recollected:
Our challenge ... was to make sure [the shuttle]
was compatible with being checked out, inspected
from one mission to the other, because this was
a new concept. . . . Before we built everything
brand new and flew it and threw it away. ... So
we wanted to develop a system that would not only
carry the payload, but also would be maintainable
during the turnaround activity.27
And as Rockwell (Kennedy Div) engineer, John Tribe also
recalled:
When we were still trying to decide what
configuration [the shuttle] should take ... my
primary purpose . . . was to get the operational
influence into the design. ... I had been down on
the op's end for ten years and knew what we ought
to have on a vehicle that would permit easy
maintenance, fast turnaround; make it a useable
vehicle and not just some analysist's design of
what they think it ought to be. ... My first five
years on the orbiter was really working those
interfaces. Going back, fighting to get specific
Letter to Deputy Associate Administrator, Aeronautics from G. Merritt Preston, May 1970
(Kennedy Space Center Archives, Florida); Letter to NASA Headquarters, Acting Administrator
for Advanced Research and Technology from G. Merritt Preston, May 7, 1970 (Kennedy Space
Center Archives, Florida); Letter to Dale Myers from Kurt Debus, July 16, 1970 (Kennedy Space
Center Archives, Florida); Letter to Acting Director, Space Shuttle Program from G. Merritt
Preston, August 20, 1970 (Kennedy Space Center Archives, Florida); Letter to Director of
Launch Operations from G. Merritt Preston, September 4, 1970 (Kennedy Space Center Archives,
Florida); Letter from Merritt Preston to the Director, Space Shuttle Technology Program, 1971
(Kennedy Space Center Archives, Florida); John Tribe, interview with the author, July 28,
1995 .
Robert Sieck, interview with the author, August 1, 1995.
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design criteria that would make it easier for us
down here in the field.28
Routine operations necessitated ease of access to all
the various sub-systems that would require maintenance,
repair, replacement, checkout and pre-flight testing. The
position of each sub-system within and on the shuttle, were
thus important considerations. The technicians that would
swarm the shuttle during its preparation for launch and
again after its return flight, had to be able to work on
their specialised sub-system with the least hinderance;
either from other technicians or from other sub-systems.
Access routes along the vertical and the horizontal, and
the position of each sub-system in relation to other sub¬
systems within the same locality, were critical design
issue. If a particular sub-system needed to be replaced,
then the last thing Kennedy wanted was another sub-system
right in the way.29
The most critical changes for Kennedy, however, was in
making the transition from preparation and planning with
expendable vehicles to preparation and planning with a
reusable vehicle. With the shuttle, Kennedy was introduced
to a whole new problem; that of "technological life". Up
until the shuttle, all of NASA's operational experience in
human space flight had been with launch vehicles and
John Tribe, interview with the author, July 28, 1995.
John Tribe, interview with the author, July 28, 1995; Robert Sieck, interview with the
author, August 1, 1995; Lee Solid, interview with the author, July 26, 1995; Ted Oglesby,
'Selected Apollo/Saturn Operational Problems,' 1972 (Kennedy Space Center Archive, Florida).
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spacecraft that were brand new and flown only once.30
Typical missions during the early years lasted, at most,
for only a few days; and each individual flight, was
regarded as a unique event, subject to its own set of
risks, problems and enigmas.31 Concerns about technological
life were, therefore, limited to the life of the mission.
Nevertheless, as Rockwell Engineer (Kennedy Div), Ted
Carey, explained:
That all changed with shuttle, because
theoretically we were going to fly parts of the
thing for 20, 3 0 or 40 years and that had not
been designed for; ... there wasn't anything set
up to monitor how many cycles, or how much
operating time, or how many launch environments
or anything like that. So that was totally driven
by this new, strange, reusable machine.32
Technological life, reliability, safety, and age were
all inextricably linked. Engineers at Kennedy were sure
that the 'rate of failure' would increase as the hardware
got older.
The equipment we deal with is older ... and older
systems don't mature with age, they just get
older.33
The pressing problem was knowing when a particular piece of
hardware was going to 'run out of life:' at what point
would it fail. Cooperation with the other NASA Centers and
development contractors was a necessary part of this
Robert Sieck, interview with the author, August 1, 1995.
Howard McCurdy, Inside NASA pp 72-73, 142-143.
Ted Carey, interview with the author, July 22, 1995.






process. A mass of data on technological life was being
generated by the shuttle's development engineers via a
range of testing methods. Certain parts were tested to
destruction; in others deliberate flaws were introduced to
discover if the testing procedures picked them out; and
system tests within simulated operational environments,
over specified "life spans" also added to the data set.34
However, the problem of technological life was further
compounded by the enigma of "technological history". The
notion that once a particular system was installed and
started to fly, it would develop a unique history shaped by
a myriad of different events. In this case, each serial
number, on every piece of technology, would actually
represent the different experiences of that particular
system. Technological life, therefore, would not only be
determined by system design, but by the manufacturing
process and particular flight experiences. Finding a method
to track the history of each sub-system was, therefore, of
the utmost importance. The nature of technology demanded a
very fine set of test requirements for pre-launch checkout,
but all of those tests would not necessarily be applicable
for every turnaround; it would depend upon the history of
34
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each part. As an operational procedure, this whole area was
brand new to NASA.35
Building for the Spaceliner.
The goal of achieving rapid turnarounds with reusable
technology and less labour, thus, drove a total revision of
launch operations philosophy, with change centred on
widespread automation and computerization.36 The concept
was to have the shuttle in direct computer connection to
the Launch Control Center, so that engineers could monitor
what was going on in the spacecraft at all times. The
original concept called for a central monolithic mainframe
approach, similar to that used on Apollo. But members at
Kennedy considered that such an approach would mean that
the checkout programmes would have to be run serially,
which could frustrate the goal of a 160 hours turnaround
time. Instead, Kennedy proposed a system that consisted of
a collection of minicomputers that could run in parallel.
This, it was argued, would speed up the turnaround process
and avoid conflict between component engineers and some
central memory allocations committee, over working space in
the central computer.37
Ibid; Mike Kinnan, research and technology objectives and plans, Form 1417A, December 1977
(Kennedy Space Center Archive, Florida).
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The concept that emerged was the launch processing
system; a computer network that linked hundreds of
components and test circuits to a central data sub-system,
which consisted of two dual Honeywell 66/80 central
processing units sharing a megaword of memory, and 172 disk
drives with 30 billion bytes capacity; and a checkout,
control and monitor sub-system, which consisted of 41
Modular Computer Inc., minicomputers (MODCOMP 11/45),
sharing a common 64K-word, high-speed pipeline memory to
communicate with each other. The data would then be
displayed on consoles in the Launch Control Center and the
Firing Rooms. The job of the central data sub-system was to
store data on test procedures, vehicle processing, a master
programme library, historical data, pre and post test data
analysis and other vital information. Whereas the control
monitor sub-system, would conduct the actual turnaround and
launch processing.38
I think that we made a great deal of progress
when we did the launch processing system. We
realized that we did not have enough, a good
enough way to transmit what was going on at the
pad back to the firing room and when we developed
the common data buffer for the launch processing
system that was a big process to do that. We
could know a great deal more about what was going
on a great deal quicker. We developed the
computer to computer network rather than having
to go through different relay logic waiting for
a relay to click in an another relay to click in.
... We had computers, of course, in Apollo, but
William Bailey, 'Launch Processing System: Concept to Reality,' Norman Chaffee, (ed) Space
Shuttle Technical Conference: Part 1 pp 532-538; National Space Transportation System
Reference: Volume 2, Operations, September, 1988 (Kennedy Space Center Archive, Florida);
'Usable Launch Data Elements Delivered,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (November 8,
1976), p 83.
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they were very old . . . and we realized very
quickly there was no way we could make the
shuttle work using that kind of computer.39
In contrast to previous practice, where the hardware was
selected first and then the software was built to fit a
"committed-to" system architecture, with the shuttle
Kennedy began work on the software first. The Ground
Oriented Aerospace Language (GOAL) programme had been under
development since 1969, using data and experience
accumulated from the launch tests and firings conducted on
the Apollo/Saturn launch vehicles and spacecraft. Due to
its near-English terminology, Kennedy considered that the
language would be suitable for shuttle operations, because
it would be easily learned by tests engineers.40 Though, a
lack of software specialists at Kennedy meant that IBM had
to be enlisted in May, 1974 to provide systems engineering
and software development support.41
We had a whole bunch of test procedures written
in English. . . . Most of them written by
experienced ground processing engineers, ... but
then we were going to execute those procedures
with software. The first decision we had was were
we going to let those guys write them in English
and then get some software specialists to come in
and convert them into software language ... or
were we going to teach the systems engineers,
some of them fairly old, software application
language. We decided to do the latter and then
let software specialists in to help them with
Samuel Beddingfield, interview with the author, July 31, 1995.
Letter from G. Merritt Preston, Director of Center Planning, to Space Shuttle Program
Manager, JSC, December 23, 1971 (Kennedy Space Center Archive, Florida).
Craig Covault, 'Cape Shuttle Capabilities Broadened,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(October 8, 1975), pp 40-43.
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sticky issues ... That was a tough problem
because a lot of guys . . . didn't want to do
that.42
Automation of turnaround and launch processing was,
nonetheless, only one of many changes at Kennedy. Of
crucial importance was the runway. Kennedy did not have a
runway. On Mercury, Gemini and Apollo there was no need,
but the shuttle was coming back and it needed somewhere to
land. A runway did exist on the Air Force Base at Cape
Canaveral and Kennedy did seriously examine the possibility
of using it, but the Center found that it was more
expensive to figure out a way of transporting the shuttle
back to the Vehicle Assembly Building, than it was to build
a new runway. The shuttle also demanded that Kennedy built
some hanger-type facilities, which were eventually known as
the Orbiter Processing Facilities.43
Nevertheless, the construction of facilities for
shuttle operations at Kennedy was, as with all other
aspects of the shuttle programme, shaped by the tight
budget environment. This impelled the Center to base most
of its planning on modifications to the Apollo/Saturn
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What we tried to do was reuse many of the Apollo
facilities as we could. ... We modified the
launch pad, we modified the Vehicle Assembly
Building, a lot of buildings down in the
industrial area were modified, we modified the
Launch Control Center; all [of] those were
reused.45
The type of modifications to be done, however, often
provoked debate.
In the mid-1970s, modifications to the launch pad
kindled a big controversy between Kennedy and Rockwell.
Rockwell's approach was similar to that used on Apollo,
where the launch pad was clean and the launch umbilical
tower was attached to the mobile launch platform. A large
service structure would then be rolled into place once the
vehicle was in launch position. This was known as the
'tails north' approach because the shuttle would be taken
out to the pad orbiter first, so its tail would face north.
The Design Engineering Directorate at Kennedy, however, did
not want to take that approach. It did not want a moving
tower again, because it was perceived as too costly to
maintain. Instead, Kennedy wanted to have the umbilical
tower situated at the pad. With the shuttle the umbilical
tower was not as fundamental as it was on Apollo, because
most of the umbilicals were designed to come up through the
tail service mask on the orbiter. Thus, only a minor amount
of umbilicals were required on the tower itself. This
approach was known as 'tails south' because the shuttle
Samuel Beddingfield, interview with the author, July 31, 1995.
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would be taken out to the pad tank first, thus the
orbiter's tail would face south. Kennedy eventually won the
day and 240 foot of the nearly 400 foot Apollo launch tower
was removed from the mobile launch platform and placed at
the pad.46
As with most large construction project, though, small
aberrations would domino very quickly. The discovery of
requirements for significant ground facility modifications
challenged Kennedy's managers because many were unearthed
late in the programme.47
When you have to rotate the shuttle, pick it up
at the Vehicle Assembly Building, we wanted to be
able to pick it up at the front, but structurally
you can't do that. So you had to have these very
large, huge beams that come down the side and the
load can only be taken where the engine, the
thrust of the engine, reacts into an aft bulkhead
at the back, which means that we then had to have
very large pieces of ground support equipment,
which takes manpower to install, but it also
takes maintenance. All of this stuff it adds
geometrically.48
Once we put the tower up at the pad and developed
the mobile launcher, then [we started] getting
the Air Force requirements; and they said we want
to install our payloads at the pad rather than
install the payloads prior [to assembly] . So then
[we had] to start building . . . the rotating
service structure; and as you start building the
rotating service structure, then everybody says
gee that's a pretty good idea, that gives us good
access. So it starts getting more and more
requirements on the rotating service structure
John Tribe, interview with the author, July 28, 1995; James Jackson, interview with the
author, July 12, 1995; Sammual Beddingfield, interview with the author, July 31, 1995; Mike
Leinbac, interview with the author, July 27, 1995.
Craig Covault, 'Shuttle Shifting to Launch Processing,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(November 10, 1980), pp 17-20.
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and the next thing you know its too heavy, so you
have to change the machinery that you got to move
the thing.49
We found out that we needed to use [a] water
system to suppress the sound energy ... because
there is about 35 mega watts of sound energy that
comes out of the thing and it reflects off of
these flat decks and back up into the vehicle,
which could destroy the payload. So we found the
most practical way to stop that was flood it with
a lot of water and let the water absorb the sound
energy. Well, you look around and say ok, what
kind of water do we need? So we said alright, we
need a flow rate of a million gallons a minute.
You look around and try and find a pump that will
pump a million gallons a minute and there are no
pumps. So we said ok, we have to build a water
tank that holds 300 000 gallons and we will dump
that in 18 seconds. And so the stand pipe ... has
to be fourteen feet in diameter ... so you end up
building big water tanks with big pipes coming in
just to use that water for 18 seconds. Those
requirements, sometimes they end up at the last
minute you don't know about them until you run
the rocket engines.50
The task of operational planning at Kennedy was also
hindered by: the fluidity of the shuttle's configuration,
the shuttle's mass, the budget restrictions imposed by the
Office of Management and Budget, and encroachments by
Congress .51
We were trying to lay out the design for all of
the access stands in the [orbiter processing
facility] and at the pad and [Rockwell] was
continually moving access areas around . . . doors,
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stabilize where's the right position for those
panels .52
We had a fleet size that we weren't real sure
about. So how many hangers did you need to put
these orbiters in and you took a look, well if
you fly 60 a year you've always one or two in
orbit so you don't have to have a hanger for each
vehicle because there is always one flying. When
you fly seven a year you don't always have one in
orbit so you got to have some place to park it.
So it changes things like that. How many
buildings to you have to build and how many
cranes do you have to have in the assembly
building. Are there enough cranes to handle two
at a time or do you need to handle two at a
time.53
I had to lay out the criteria for the runway
before the shuttle was designed because ...
somehow throughout the history of the United
States the Congressional people have really got
to where they control the construction of
facilities budget, almost down to a very fine
level. So the lead time on construction of
facilities budget is like five years ... So in
order to get a runway built in time for what we
thought we were going to need it on the
programme, we had to start laying out the
criteria for runway and convincing the people in
Congress that yes we need this runway, before the
shuttle was finalized at all.54
The most severe impact, however, was a reduction in
the amount of instrumentation and check-out systems Kennedy
wanted on the shuttle to ease maintenance and turnaround
procedures.
Providing the instrumentation cost . . . money and
weight; and neither one of those things could we
afford.55
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Everything we wanted to do down here [Kennedy] in
the way of maintenance that added weight, [went]
out; and we have lived to regret this for many
years .56
[0]ne of the things that we were forced to
restrict early on in the program, because of
financial constraints, was the ... attention that
was given to the turnaround and the design of the
systems for self-test and things of that sort
that would of improved the turnaround
capability.57
If they built the vehicle exactly the way we
wanted it, it would be easy to checkout during
turnaround, but it would be too heavy to fly any
payloads . So that was a compromise. We didn't get
everything we would have liked.58
As a consequence, the requirement of 160 hours turnaround
time between landing and launch was placed in jeopardy. The
turnaround time of two working weeks was specified from
very beginning of the shuttle programme, when NASA was
still pushing its two-stage, fully-reusable
configuration.59 And although many other aspects of the
shuttle changed in the politics of post-Apollo, the
turnaround time remained.
The original criteria was to be able to turn it
around in two working weeks. . . . We obviously
can't do that, but that was a big driver ... and
they changed a lot of the other criteria about
the shuttle ... but they never changed the goal
John Tribe, interview with the author, July 28, 1995.
James Jackson, interview with the author, July 12, 1995.
Robert Sieck, interview with the author, August 1, 1995.
NASA, Space Shuttle Requirements Document Level 1, Office of Manned Space Flight, July 1,






of being able to turn it around in 160 hours; so
it made planning for it very difficult.60
When Columbia arrived at Kennedy in March 1979, the
machine struck a sense of awe into many members of the
Center. Despite all the preparations and planning, Columbia
was a major revelation; as Robert Sieck remembered:
Compared to other flight hardware that we had
received down here during the Gemini and Apollo
program ... it wasn't anything like we had had
before. The complexity of it, the size of it, the
number of components and rules and the
requirements that went with it, were an order of
magnitude more than anybody down here had
experienced; and all of the things that we had
learned on the Gemini and Apollo program ... were
not applicable to shuttle. It was like starting
over again.61
And Ted Carey recalled:
Then when the first orbiter arrived, which was
1979, we . . . had to sit down to figure out how
you actually did this, which turned out quite a
bit different from what we thought. We had
originally thought you could turn an orbiter
round in two weeks but after we saw one and ...
saw all the complexity we realized that was not
possible. So we had to figure out how to get
ready for the first flight.62
Within a couple of months after Columbia's arrival,
Kennedy's top management started getting discrepancy
reports by the hundreds. It thus became obvious very
quickly, that NASA's expectations and forecasts for test
Samuel Beddingfield, interview with the author, July 31, 1995.
Robert Sieck, interview with the author, August 1, 1995.
Ted Carey, interview with the author, July 22, 1995.
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and checkout were an order of magnitude wrong.63 As
Rockwell Engineer (Kennedy Div.) John Tribe commented,
when:
you build a vehicle of that magnitude and that
complexity, then the checkout takes forever. You
got to check every redundant path, every piece of
wire, every component.64
Columbia's first flight eventually took place on April 12,
1981. The first launch was originally scheduled for April
10, but the back-up flight computer failed 20 minutes
before lift-off.65 Thus, the launch was rescheduled for two
days later. This time everything went according to plan and
Columbia climbed into the Sky on the Sunday morning with no
problems. However, once in orbit a potentially serious
problem emerged. Television monitor cameras, fitted to
observe the payload bay doors open, caught sight of missing
tiles on the orbital manoeuvring system, pods. This, in
itself, was alarming to NASA, but what concerned mission
control most was what if tiles on the bottom of the orbiter
were also missing. NASA spent all of April 13 endeavouring
to find a solution, but as Hans Mark recalled:
Ted Carey, interview with the author, July 22, 1995; Herb Yarbrough, interview with the
author, September 5, 1995; Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.
John Tribe, interview with the author, July 28, 1995.
John Garman, 'The "Bug" Heard 'Round the World,' Software Engineering Notes 6 (October 1981),
pp 3-10.
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There was, of course, not much that we could
really do. If there were indeed tiles missing
from the portion of Columbia that would
experience the highest heating rates, then we
would only find out by making the attempt to
bring her back to earth. So we made our best
calculations and estimates, but, in the final
analysis we had to ... hope for the best.66
On April 14, Columbia returned safely. The first
"actual" test had been completed.
Going Operational.
On July 4, 1982, (American Independence Day) President
Ronald Reagan welcomed Columbia home from its fourth
flight. From a flag-decked rostrum, Reagan announced that
the shuttle was ready for its transition from development
to operations. He was reading straight from a NASA policy
document.67 NASA had already decided that it was going to
fly four test flights and then declare the shuttle fully-
operational,68 but:
nobody knew what that meant, because every flight
after that time was anything but operational. So
that was quite arbitrary.69
. . . there was no way it was operational, after
the first four flights. However, we began to fly
scientific payloads anyway, because we knew the
press would be jumping on us.70
Hans Mark, Space Station pp 124-125.
James Abrahamson, interview with the author, July 5, 1995; Francis Hoban, interview with the
author, May 15, 1995.
Hans Mark, interview with the author, September 9, 1995.
James Abrahamson, interview with the author, July 5, 1995.







A big issue for NASA's upper management in the 1980s
was transforming the culture of the agency, from one that
treated every flight as unique to one that conformed to
"routine operations".71 Once the design, development test
and engineering was essentially "completed" and the shuttle
moved into "routine operations", the NASA penchant for
invention surfaced anew. NASA's engineers wanted to begin
work on the next project, which was the space station. But
since the political climate was not amenable to committing
funds for a space station at that time, NASA's engineers
tended to find things on the shuttle that they could go and
work on: as a Johnson engineer, Norman Chaffee recalled:
As a result we started focusing on every little
anomaly that would occur on a shuttle flight.
[Each] would be carefully logged and given a
number and it would be worked to the nth degree.
Now in many flights we had, because the shuttle
was still a developmental type of vehicle, there
was enough things that were routinely going
amiss, so there was plenty of things to work on,
but it would get almost humorous, because when
missions went well and there were no anomalies
the managers would invent anomalies, things that
they normally weren't interested in knowing about
or didn't care about. For instance, on the
Auxiliary Power Unit we had an exhaust duct
temperature [gauge] that failed every flight. ...
It was a bad design you didn't need the data.
We'd fix it or let it go, but the next time you
fly it, it would break again, nobody really cared
much. I remember one flight, everything was
working perfectly but this temperature
measurement, and the Program Manager decided he
wanted a crash investigation of why this thing
has failed because that was the only thing that
had gone wrong, so we must need to work on that.
I think NASA is a problem solving organization
James Beggs, interview with the author, June 6, 1995; James Abrahamson, interview with the
author, July 5, 1995.
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... and if NASA doesn't have a real problem to
work on NASA will make up a problem to work on,
and that just part of the culture.72
Rockwell engineer, Ted Carey, however, held a different
perspective on that period.
The change traffic was generated by the hardware
feeding back to the designers what was wrong with
it. We had a very large number of discrepancy
reports, we call them PR's (problem reports), ...
and there was a very conscience desire to not
only repair a problem, but to eliminate its
cause. ... So for the first five or six flights,
as a matter of fact on into the . . . thirtieth
flight, there was still a very high percentage of
work being done as a result of discrepancies
being recorded on the ground. We had extensive
test and checkout of the ground. We actually did
a basic re-check of everything every flight. ...
The hardware is talking to you, you have to
listen to it ... most of the problems that you
have in the space business try to tell you that
they are there ... so a lot of those resulted in
design changes. ... As a matter of fact, at one
point [NASA Administrator, James] Beggs decided
that he was going to cut back the cost of the
design engineering people at Downey, so that he
would stop the engineering changes from coming
in. Most of us thought that was very
unintelligent. Those engineering changes were not
cosmetic and they were not insignificant and to
hide your head in the sand and pretend that those
changes were not necessary might seem like seem
like a good management technique, but it's not.73
Nevertheless, for NASA Administrator, James Beggs, and
Johnson's Director, Christopher Kraft, the continuous
changes in design were seen as a major hinderance in the
transition to an operational mode.
Norman Chaffee, interview with the author, September 6, 1995.




There were several problems: one is that
unfortunately engineers, being engineers, like to
make thing better as time goes on. [And] because
engineers like to improve it, they keep adding
bells and whistles to the machine and you would
like them not to do that, but unfortunately both
engineers and astronauts like the latest
equipment. ... So the tendency is to want to put
the latest of everything in the machine and you
have to fight that a little bit, but you have to
give in as well.74
Engineers are notorious for the cliche that the
better is the evil of the good, and so they
continually try to make it better. ... [As such]
NASA has maintained an R&D mode as opposed to an
operating mode. ... You can't continue to play
with it if your going to drive the operating
costs down.75
The continuous modifications and changes to the design
raised a further problem in the transition to routine
operations: none of the orbiters were the same.
Standardization is an important part of operational
technologies, especially complex technologies. Without
commonality, the procedures and logistics of service and
repair become more complicated. NASA was faced with
orbiters rolling off the production line that were all
subtly different. As James Beggs recalled, this presented
a major problem in the drive towards efficient operations:
Everything NASA builds is a unique article ... so
there is a difficulty inherent within the
business in standardizing the equipment. We ...
have looked from time to time at making a common
bus which would be something you could produce in
quantity and then put the unique instruments and
flight equipment aboard the bus, but even that's
difficult. ... I think we're stuck with the fact
James Beggs, interview with the author, June 6, 1995.




that these programs will be non-standard.
Everything changes ... as we learn more about
them. ... Each of the orbiters was different to
the one before and that presents problems . As you
go along you try to improve the flight
characteristics and the structural capability of
the machine and so the heaviest and least
efficient machine is the first one; that's
Columbia. ... That means that getting spare
parts, and what have you, is difficult because
some parts don't fit and they had to be kept
specially.76
The problem of spare parts, however, was not only due to
non-standardization. NASA faced a spare part shortage in
the early 1980s, mainly because of a lack of logistics
planning and an inadequate inventory of replacement parts
due to the tight budget environment. For example in 1984,
NASA only one spare engine that had to be shared by all the
orbiters. Cannibalization of parts from one orbiter to the
next was thus a common occurrence during the early
operational years.
One of the decisions that had to be made, in
order to live within the budget, ... we couldn't
buy spare parts. So we ended up robbing out of
one orbiter and putting parts in another one and
when it would come back, taking them out of that
one and putting them in another one. That caused
a lot of frustration that operational
organizations normally don't have to live with.77
In 1983, Congress approved a higher budget for the
procurement of spares, but the long lead time involved in
James Beggs, interview with the author, June 6, 1995.
Herb Yarbrough, interview with the author, September 5, 1995.
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their fabrication meant that shortages continued through to
1986 .78
Shortly after Columbia was delivered to Kennedy, the
new Office of Space Transportation Systems had attempted to
lay down a concrete traffic model (see table 8:1 for 1979
traffic model). Before this time traffic model predictions
had become confused, since different sections of NASA and
the contractors had been using assorted traffic models
during budgetary planning presentations.79 However, in the
wake of Columbia, NASA's flight manifest just kept on
falling,80 as the Director of Space Transportation Systems
Operations, Chester Lee, recalled:
Over the years ... the flight numbers went from
60 to 50 per year, to 40 per year, to 30, 24 per
year . . . then we talked 12. Now we are down to
8.81
The falling flight rate, of course, had a severe impact on
the cost-per-flight; an issue that had been politically
sensitive since the shuttle's conception.
In 1976, Deputy Administrator, George Low had
established a pricing policy, which averaged the shuttle's
cost-per-flight at around $18 million in 1975 dollars (see
78
Letter from James Fletcher to Edwin Garn, Chairman on HUD Independent Agencis Committee on
Appropriations, July 8, 1983 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC); Letter from James
Fletcher to David Stockman, Director of OMB, April 12, 1982 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC) ; Letter from James Fletcher to Bill Nelson, Chairman on Space Science and
Applications Committee, June 20, 1985 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
79
Letter from Chester Lee to John Yardley, March 30, 1979 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
80
'NASA Schedules 34 Shuttle Flights Through '85' Defense Business Daily (June 3, 1981) p 184.




User Category. Phase I.a Phase II.b




$17.1 - 19.3 M $16.2 - 18.1 M
DOD. $12.3 - 14.0 M $11.7 - 13.2 M
a. Phase I represents the first three fiscal years of shuttle operations.
b. Phase II represents the nine fiscal years subsequent to Phase I.
Source: Memorandum from George Low to James Fletcher, May
28, 1976 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
table 8:2) .82 By 1984, The Associate Administrator for the
Office of Space Flight, Jesse Moore, indicated that the
total average cost of operating the shuttle has grown to an
average of $60 million per flight (in 1975 dollars).83 NASA
blamed the reduced flight activity, but there was a
recognition that the projected costs were overly optimistic
even for the high flight rates assumed. In 1981, NASA's
Acting Administrator, Alan Lovelace, had commented that the
shuttle's operations costs would not meet the projected
figures drawn up in the 1970s. Those estimates he remarked:
were partially designed to defend a program on
the basis of its cost effectiveness [and] I
happen to not agree with those figures.84
Nor did the General Accounting Office.
In 1982, just before the completion of Columbia's
forth test flight, the General Accounting Office released
a report claiming that the shuttle could cost $116 million
per flight (in 1975 dollars) .85 As such, argued the General
Accounting Office, NASA would effectively be subsidizing
non-government users.
It is ironic that at a time when NASA's programs
are suffering due to budget constraints, they are
Memorandum from George Low to James Fletcher, May 28, 1976 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
Review of Space Shuttle Requirements, Operations, and Future Plans, Report prepared by the
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, US House of Representatives (Washington DC,
US Government Printing Office, 1984).
Alan Lovelace, quoted in, 'Lovelace sees Fewer Flights, Increased Costs Likely For Shuttle'
Aerospace Daily (May 6, 1981), pp 25-26.
GAO, NASA Must Reconsider Operations Pricing Policy to Compensate for Cost Growth on the
Space Transportation System Report to the Congress, February 23, 1982 (General Accounting
Office Distribution Center, Washington DC), p 14.
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Table 9:1.
1979 Space Shuttle Traffic Model.
Year. 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Total
KSC. 7 16 18 25 30 36 34 40 38 41 38 30 353
VAFB. 0 0 2 6 12 15 18 18 15 16 17 15 134
Total. 7 16 20 31 42 51 52 58 53 57 55 45 487
Source: Letter from Chester Lee to John Yardley, March 30,
1979 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
locked into a pricing policy that encourages
[shuttle] use at NASA's expense and at the
expense of its space science, applications and
aeronautics programs.85
The idea that NASA would be subsidizing non-government
users caused a stir in Congress. Thus, a debate emerged
over whether NASA should charge users marginal costs or
total average costs. Many members of Congress were incensed
by the idea of government subsidizing commercial users and
pushed for a policy whereby non-government users would pay
a share of the fixed costs.87 NASA, however, argued that
commercial users would pay all costs, because government
has to pay for the fixed costs regardless, so marginal
costs, which would be all the expenses of a particular
flight, could not constitute a subsidy.
Capturing the commercial market was of utmost
importance to NASA. For the shuttle to be "effective" NASA
needed to monopolize the space market; government, military
and commercial. Winning the debate on marginal costs was
crucial if NASA's vision of rapid expansion in space was to
be fulfilled. NASA Administrator, James Beggs, made this
point in his testimony to Congress:
The [marginal] costs recovery policy ... would
allow for an internationally competitive price
and also permit the industrial entrepreneurs to
develop or improve technology products with some
Ibid, p 19.
Space Shuttle Operations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space,
US Senate (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982); Space Shuttle Requirements,
Operations, and Future Plans, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and
Applications, US House of Representative (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office,
1984); Review of Space Shuttle Requirements, Operations, and Future Plans, US House of
Representatives.
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extensive, but not excessive risk of capital. ...
Total cost recovery . . . may not be non¬
competitive for the current spacecraft and
satellite customers and might result to be too
expensive to encourage the developers of new
space products.88
And indeed, Beggs was right. The commercial community was
primarily interested in cost-per-flight. A NASA Advisory
Council study had found that many commercial users would be
willing to use the shuttle, but only if it was competitive
with expendable launch vehicles.89
However, this was not the only apprehension expressed
by potential commercial users. Their overall concern was
that NASA was too preoccupied with developing the shuttle,
rather than improving its customer service. Indeed, the
commercial world:
perceive too much fascination by NASA with the
role of the astronaut, with in-orbit checkout,
and with recovery, and not enough emphasis on
simply transporting payloads to orbit on schedule
at the lowest cost and maximum dependability.90
Delays and schedule problems had instilled a lack of
confidence in the shuttle on the part of the commercial
world. In addition, the interface requirements and the
amount of documentation required by NASA for the shuttle,
vastly exceeded what commercial users had become accustomed
89
James Beggs, quoted in. Review of Space Shuttle Requirements, Operations, and Future Plans,
p 33.
NASA Advisory Council study of effective shuttle utilization, conducted by a NAC Task Force,
1983 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC); Letter from Daniel Fink, Chairman NASA




to with expendable launch vehicles; as NASA's Associate
Administrator for Science and Applications, Burton Edelson,
recalled:
My first involvement, while I was still at COMSAT
corporation, was to try to determine if the
shuttle would be effective in launching
communication satellites and they were
advertising a low price. Despite that, INTELSTAT
never decided to use the shuttle ... in every
case they used either the Atlas-Centaur or the
Arian vehicles, which were the spacecraft flying
at that time. And the reason was that both the
Atlas launches and the Arian launches were
configured to the spacecraft, whereas the shuttle
demanded that you re-engineer and rebuild your
spacecraft to be satisfactory to launch on the
shuttle; and primarily to keep the shuttle safe
from any danger form the payload. Well that is
just not a viable way to develop a launch
vehicle. The US then required that all commercial
launches would go on the shuttle . . . but of
course INTELSTAT did not come under the authority
of the United States and they could choose any
vehicle they wanted and so they chose
[expendables] . So it was clear . . . that the space
shuttle would never be good for launching
commercial payloads; communication satellites.
Even if the price was competitive, the
reliability and dependability were so low that it
couldn't be used for commercial communication
satellites. ... It's true that the shuttle launch
environment was benign, it didn't subject the
payload to the G's [force of gravity], on
acceleration that a rocket launch would have. On
the other hand, you needed lots of protective
devises to protect the shuttle and the health and
safety of the shuttle crew, which you normally
don't worry about. Also, it provided much less
access to the payload, so it made it much harder
to design and build a satellite to launch on the
shuttle, because one thing is you had to [have it
configured] a year ahead of time and it had to go
through all kinds of checks . . . and you had no
control over it then. You couldn't make any
changes. ... Whereas with an expendable launch
vehicle, the launch vehicle accommodates the
payload. ... If the payload operator wants to
change something three days before the launch,
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well then he just changes it three days before
the launch.91
During 1983 and 1984 the shuttle's flight rate climb
slowly, reaching a peak of 9 in 1985. The agency was still
on a very steep learning curve, but as Herb Yarbrough
recalled, NASA was optimistic about increasing its flight
rate further.
When the folks over in the mission operations
directorate came to talk to the program office,
Glen Lunney [Shuttle Programme Manager] asked
them, hey we got 18 flights on the books for next
year can we do that? And they'd say sure, we had
18 this year. He said no we didn't we only flew
9 and they said yeah but you guys changed your
mind on every flight at least once so we had to
every damn one of them over again.92
But on January 28, 1986 Challenger exploded 73 seconds into
its flight. All the crew lost their lives. The event marked
a turning point for NASA and as Alex Roland has suggested
the end of the romantic era of spaceflight.93
Burton Edelson, interview with the author, June 22, 1995.
Herb Yarbrough, interview with the author, September 5, 1995.
Alex Roland, 'Barnstorming in Space: The Rise and Fall of the Romantic Era of Spaceflight,






The Shapers and Forces of
a Technology
Technological development has come to be viewed
as an autonomous thing, beyond politics and
society, with a destiny of its own which must
become our destiny too. From the perspective of
here and now, technological development has
become simply the blind weight of the past on the
one hand and the perpetual promise of the future
on the other.1
For a variety of contemplations about the future, the
technologies associated with space have personified human
progress. Through the mediums of science fiction, "popular
science", journalism and academic thought, the "belief" in
the beneficial nature of science and technology have been
assimilated with US axioms of the "frontier spirit" and the
"American Dream" to make humanity's quest to reach the
stars appear foreordained.2 As the protagonists vied to
construct their machine, they continually evoked and
reinforced this complicated nexus of ideas about space
travel and the fortunes of human history. The space
industry's leading prophets meticulously carved an image of
David Noble, Progress Without People: New Technology, Unemployment, and the Message of
Resistance (Toronto, Between the Lines, 1995), pp 5-6.
For a comprehensive analysis see, Dale Carter, The Final Frontier: The Rise and Fall of the
American Rocket State (London, New York, Verso, 1988).
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the shuttle as the precipitator of a revolution akin to
those thought to be engendered by the ship, train and
aeroplane that preceded it. The shuttle symbolized the
maturation of the "space age". Routine space travel meant
an "exploitable" environment. With space no longer the
restricted terrain of specialists, new industries and new
communities would be forged high above the Earth's surface
by the inventors and entrepreneurs of tomorrow.3 It was a
vision that was bright and technically led; a progeny of an
era of technological enthusiasm, when human progress was
firmly tethered to advancements in science and technology.4
... the dominant ideology of progress took it for
granted that the growing domination of nature by
man was the very measure of humanity's advance.5
Indeed, those that stood in opposition to the shuttle were
often caricatured as standing against progress itself and
denounced as heretics, Utopians or reactionaries.6
The economic surge of the 'golden years' of the 1950s
and 1960s seemed powered by technological revolutions.7
Hence, government policies towards technological change
See chapter 2, ft's 6, 10; chapter 3, ft's 32, 37, 38, 103, 105; chapter 6, ft's 12, 80, 87,
88, 91; chapter 8 ft's 14, 30, 50; chapter 9, ft's 3, 4, 6, 13-15.
Thomas Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm 1870-
1970 (New York, Viking Penguin, 1989); JanGolinski, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism
and The History of Science (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998) .
Eric Hobsbawn, The Age of Extremes p 261.
See chapter 2, ft, 37 chapter 3, ft, 114; chapter 6, ft, 11.
Eric Hobsbawn, The Age of Extremes chapter 9.
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sought to encourage invention and innovation on the
assumption that they would ultimately improve standards of
living. In the two decades following the Second World War,
the US government's contribution to research and
development grew significantly. The shuttle was a product
of this period; part of a theorem that suggested the role
of government and state was to correct the follies of the
market and promote economic growth through scientific
advancement and technological innovation. These
undertakings usually followed a Keynesian macro-economic
abstraction which dictated that government should avoid
direct competition with private capital. Keynes's pyramids
and cathedrals of the twentieth century came in the form of
"high-technology: " that is technological enterprises
thought to be too high risk for the market.8 Such
technological endeavours, so the theorem maintained, could
only be beneficial: they would promote employment, skills
and expand the industrial infrastructure. For the champions
of the shuttle, these "spin-offs" from the accumulation of
new knowledge and new technology, were well rehearsed
Phyllis Deane, The State and the Economic System: An Introduction to the History of Political
Economy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989); Christopher Freeman, Carlota Perez,
'Structural Crises of Adjustment, Business Cycles and Investment Behaviour,' Giovanni Dosi,
Christopher Freeman, Richard Nelson, Gerald Silverberg, Luc Soete, (ed) Technical Change and
Economic Theory (London, New York, Pinter Publishers, 1988), pp 38-66; Richard Nelson,
'Institutions Supporting Technical Change in the United States,' Giovanni Dosi, Christopher
Freeman, Richard Nelson, Gerald Silverberg, Luc Soete, (ed) Technical Change and Economic
Theory pp 312-329; Malcolm Goggin, (ed) Governing Science and Technology in a Democracy
(Knoxville, The University of Tennessee press, 1986); Richard Nelson, Richard Langlois,
'Industrial Innovation Policy: Lessons from American History,' Science 219 (February 18,
1983), pp 814-818; Roy Rothwell, Walter Zegveld, Innovation and the Small and Medium Sized
Firm: Their Role in Employment and in Economic Change (London, Frances Pinter Publishers,
1982); Colin Norman, The God that Limps: Science and Technology in the Eighties (New York,
W.W. Norton & Co, 1981).
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compositions of promotional rhetoric used to support large
public investments into NASA's human space programme.9
Within the dominant ideology of progress, building the
shuttle was seen as a "logical" undertaking that would
inevitably lead to the progressive "conquest" of space.10
Yet, although instrumental to the realization of NASA's
shuttle, the circumstances that underlaid the machine's
reason for being were far more complicated. To understand
the development of the shuttle as merely a manifestation of
the drive for progress, is to ignore a history rich in
complexity. Its materialization relied on the mobilization
and juxtaposition of numerous heterogeneous elements from
both the material and social worlds.
The starting point of this historiography was the
exposure of choice.11 Scattered throughout the tangled
fabric of the shuttle's history were alternatives;
different paths of development, various points of
intervention and the ever present possibility of
retrenchment. As the end result of over ten years of
research, design, development and fabrication, the
"inventing" of NASA's shuttle was a complicated process,
which involved a complex array of interactions and ranges
9
Chapter 6, ft 90.
See chapter 2, ft 6, table 2:1. Developments in space technology are still couched in the
rhetorical argumentation of progress today. See for example, Leonard David, 'To Boldly Go For
Profit,' Scotland on Sunday (March 30, 1997).
Marcel LaFollette, Jeffrey Stine, 'Contemplating Choice: Historical Perspectives on
Innovation and Application of Technology,' Marcel LaFollette, Jeffrey Stine, (ed) Technology
and Choice: Readings from Technology and Culture (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press,
1991), introduction.
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of choice. Once NASA set the process of technological
change in motion, it took on many directions and contained
a multitude of potentialities. The design that eventually
dominated (whether it was the shuttle's overall
configuration, a sub-system, or just part of a sub-system)
represented a particular solution rather than the only
one.12 Behind the form, function and purpose of each
technology was a set of decisions about which path to take.
For every avenue taken there were many others that were
ignored or rejected; for every problem that arose, several
solutions existed simultaneously; and for each solution
employed, came a whole new set of problems. Choosing
between a variety of alternative options was thus a
pervasive part of design and development practice. From the
shuttle's inception through to it operation, different
technological potentialities were available and in the
process of winnowing each one out, other alternatives came
to light.
The sheer number of choices were at their most
prevalent during the design phase. The shuttle designs
emanating from both the contractors and from areas of NASA
came in all shapes and sizes.13 Indeed, there were even
those, both within and outside of NASA, who thought it
John Law, Michel Callon, 'The Life and Death of an Aircraft: A Network Analysis of Technical
Change, ' Wiede Bijker, John Law, (ed) Shaping- Technology/Building Society: Studies in
Sociotechnical Change pp 21-52; Thomas Hughes, American Genesis.
See chapter 2, ft 13 and tables 2:2, 2:3, 2:4.
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unnecessary to develop a reusable vehicle at all and
advocated modifications to the existing expendable
systems.14 This range of potentialities was not just
confined to matters of scale. In matters of detail choices
between differing paths of development were also typical.15
It would be wrong to assume, however, that once a design
becomes established choice is ultimately surrendered.
Surface impressions of the shuttle design presented in 1973
and Columbia, completed in 1981, may not reveal much
deviation.16 Nevertheless, throughout the "development
years" a whole new set of choices arose as the various
problems of fabrication came to light. The shuttle
programme entered into a period of fragile stabilization
after the design phase, where though there was a powerful
tendency to shift away from heterogeneity towards
universality, stabilization, alignment and control,
deviation remained a significant part of the underlying
process .17
By emphasising the existence of choice in
technological change it then becomes possible to understand
its social dimension. The decision making process was not
governed solely by the constitution of technology. The
See chapter 2, ft 10
See chapter 4.







outcome of a shuttle design, the process of turning that
design into a technological system and the method of
operating that system, depended on more than just the
application of technique. As Thomas Hughes has noted,
technological change only appears as "natural" or "logical"
because large technological systems have embedded within
them the characteristics of the past. Such massive systems
have an inertia of motion analogous to that of the physical
world. Their mass of technical and organizational
components tend to maintain their steady growth and
direction.18 Donald MacKenzie and Steven Yearley have also
highlighted that patterns of technological change become
institutionalized, thus their internal dynamics are often
veiled from "public" view.19 Once the "black box" of
technology is opened, however, its intricate and
paradoxical nature is revealed.
The chief protagonist in the shuttle's history was, of
course, NASA. It was the organization that fostered the
mammoth activity to transform knowledge into materiality.
But NASA cannot, in the conventional sense, be seen as the
"inventor" of the shuttle. The shuttle, far from the
18
Thomas Hughes, American Genesis p 460.
Donald MacKenzie, Inventing1 Accuracy, pp 385-387; Donald MacKenzie, Micro Versus Macro
Sociologies Of Science and Technology (Edinburgh, PICT Working Paper No. 2, 1988); Donald
MacKenzie, Economic and Sociological Explanations of Technological Change (Edinburgh, PICT
Working Paper No. 27, 1990); Donald MacKenzie, Theories of Technology and the Abolition of
Nuclear Weapons (Edinburgh, Working Paper in Sociology, 1995); Steven Yearley, Science
Technology and Social Change (London, Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1988).
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product of a lone inventor, or pure application of
science,20 was brought into existence through the combined
labours of tens of thousands of people and the fusion of
millions of separate parts. Decisions were thus scattered
across a wide social spectrum. The shuttle's "successful"
translation into a working machine largely depended,
therefore, on what John Law has termed 'heterogeneous
engineering' .21 NASA had to establish a shape for the
shuttle that would allow it to survive. This meant that
along with the material, it had to "engineer" social,
political and economic matters. Rather than an autonomous
thing, the shuttle formed part of a "seamless web" between
science, technology and society: it could not exist without
the social interactions within and among social groups.22
Social matters were, therefore, as a significant influence
on the content of the shuttle as technological or
scientific matters.
As the invention of NASA's shuttle was a collective
process, no one individual had complete control over its
Indeed, this can be said of other technologies. See, Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy:
A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge Massachusetts, The MIT Press,
1993), especially chapter 2.
John Law, 'Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of the Portuguese Expansion,'
Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, (ed) The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New
Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology pp 111-134; John Law, 'The Anatomy of
a Socio-technical Struggle: The Design of the TSR2,' Brian Elliott, (ed) Technology and
Social Process pp 45-69; John Law, Michel Callon, 'The Life and Death of an Aircraft: A
Network Analysis of Technical Change,' Wiebe Bijker, John Law, (ed) Shaping
Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change pp 21-52.
Thomas Hughes, 'The Seamless Web: Technology, Science, et cetera, et cetera,' Brian Elliott,
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composition, function or purpose. Buried deep with the
technology can thus be found the various "interests" of
those involved in its realization.23 Interests and goals
are associated with all aspects of technological change.
Together they operate as contributory causes of action,
which create technologies. This is not to say that
interests and goals are sufficient causes of action in
themselves, only that an explanation of action would be
incomplete without some reference to them. They form part
of the social motives of technological production.24
Activity is, itself, modulated by interests, which lie
between actors and their goals.
In part, the origin of the shuttle can be located in
the expansionist interests of NASA. In a changing
environment, organizations tend to monopolize existing
capabilities and attempt to procure greater resources
through the adoption of new goals or extending old ones.
Extending the objectives of the organization serves the
interests of its members, because it enables them to carry
out more tasks, gain greater influence and, therefore,
become indispensable within their fields of operation.25
23
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The materialization of NASA's shuttle in 1968 coincided
with the realization of Apollo. The old sociotechnical
order, built up around Apollo, was slowly being dismantled.
The grand assemblage of scientists, engineers, bureaucrats
and industrial might, required a new goal if their
interests were to continue to be served; and those
interests were firmly centred on the development of
advanced technology. Incrementalism would not suffice and
was resisted.26
In the minds of the public, the White House and
Congress, there was little differentiation between the
Lunar mission and NASA. NASA had become Apollo. Ergo, the
agency's orientation towards leap-frog innovation rather
than incremental innovation stemmed, in part, from an
internal perception of where the agency was going. NASA had
entered the new world of post-Apollo with no concrete
identity. A new approach to space operations, one that
would substantially reduce the costs and risks of getting
to and from space would, in the eyes of NASA's elite,
bolster the organization's future. Thus, the idea of a
reusable launch vehicle took shape as the key to making
space a place of routine; and the goal of establishing a
technological trajectory towards total reusability became
the primary intention of the shuttle's designers.
See chapter 2, fts 2-10, 47-50.
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In the dawn light of the 1970s, however, NASA
witnessed a pivotal shift in the locus of control over its
activities. During the 1960s, control was essentially
internal. NASA's reputation as the most thoroughly
professional organization in the federal government had, to
a large extent, been built upon the idealization that
"political" decisions and "technical" judgements were
separate. This dichotomy flourished because the agency was
allowed a large amount of technical discretion against a
background of relatively minimal political interference.
The objective, getting to the Moon before the Soviet Union,
was so important politically, that the method was
essentially left in the hands of the experts. With the
space race won, however, political considerations began to
supersede engineering judgements. After 1969, NASA was no
longer the expert, dictating the direction of space
technology to a lay audience on Capitol Hill. Instead,
members of the agency had to be more aware of, and become
more responsive to, key actors in the political system.27
When individuals, groups and organizations work
together then agreement is required on the things that need
to be done. As agreements tend to rest on negotiation and
renegotiation, this process forms a strong undercurrent
27
Barbara Romzek, Melvin Dubnick, 'Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the
Challenger Tragedy,' Public Administration Review (May/June, 1987), pp 227-238; Howard
McCurdy, Inside NASA chapter 3.
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influencing the direction of technological change.28 In the
process of making the concepts real, the ideas and the
artifacts were not only transmitted from one actor to the
next, they were collectively composed by the actors.29 The
design and purpose of NASA's shuttle, as a whole and in its
parts, was modified as one group negotiated with another.
Each interest group involved in the shuttle's history play
determining roles in shaping the technology's final form.
Although shielded from the follies of the market, NASA
did not operate within a vacuum. The work of the shuttle's
protagonists was interwoven with the existing power
relations of US society. Those who wielded social, economic
and political power defined, to a considerable extent, what
was and what was not technically possible. Thus, there was
a limit to the transformative capabilities of NASA's
heterogeneous engineers. NASA was but one of many branches
in an immense state bureaucracy, all of which were involved
in struggles for finite funds on Capitol Hill. Government
budgets represent the outcome of political negotiations
over the setting of priorities for action. Those that are
successful in procuring resources are those that have
Anselm Strauss, Negotiations: Varieties, Contexts, Processes, and Social Order (San
Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978).
Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society
(Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1987), p 104.
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prevailed in the political struggle.30 Consequently,
political expediency formed an important social imperative,
required to secure and continually serve the shuttle's
avaricious demand for resources, as well as to ensure the
preservation of the sociotechnical order. NASA's relations
with both the White House and Congress were integral to the
shuttle's beginning and an important factor in its
survival. Governmental influence, however, only formed one
part of a much more complex power structure. Other branches
of the US state and powerful sections of private capital
also played determining roles in the shuttle's creation and
continuation.31 Thus, NASA had to form a wide political
consensus on the direction and purpose of the civilian
space programme.
In the formation of a consensus on space policy, NASA
made three distinct, but related shifts in its position.
First, the shuttle was decoupled from the space station;
second, NASA sought political coalitions with groups that
were previously hostile, or ignored; and third, NASA
abandoned its penchant for total reusability. As a myriad
of people and organizations were introduced into the
sociotechnical assemblage, both the technology and NASA's
goals underwent a process of redefinition.
David Noble, America By Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (New
York, Alfred Knopf, 1977); David Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial
Automation (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1984); Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New
York, Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1968); John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State;
Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations (Boston, Pitman Publishing, 1981).
See chapter 2, fts 19-31, 37-75; chapter 3, fts 84-116; chapter 6; chapter 8.
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Between 1968 and 1970, the shuttle was subordinate to
a space station, pictured only as a means to a greater
ends. By the end of 1971, the shuttle was extolled as a
pragmatic, universal and economical technology in its own
right; and by the end of 1972 exhorters for the shuttle had
described it as indispensable to the needs of national
security and economic advancement. Two processes can be
seen at work here: what Bruno Latour has called a
'translation of interests;'32 and what Langdon Winner has
termed, 'reverse adaptation.'33 Once the shuttle was
separated from the space station, its utility was tailored
to cater for the interests of others.34 The two claims that
emerged most forcibly during 1971, were the shuttle's
ability to provide routine and economic transportation to
space. These utilities were promoted in an endeavour to
gain allegiance with the military, the scientific community
and the commercial world. Thus, the new consensus was
founded on the exploitation, as opposed to the exploration,
of space. Without the space station, NASA had to "seek
missions" for the shuttle that would match its technical
capabilities. So the retrieval, repair and service of
satellites in orbit also became the mainstay of the
Bruno Latour, Science in Action chapter 3.
Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political
Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1978), pp 238-251.
See chapter 3, fts 29-42.
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shuttle's advancement; regardless of whether anyone really
wanted such a capability.
NASA's traditional support from its industrial allies
was, of course strong. A recession within the aerospace
industry at the end of the 1960s meant that firms like
Rockwell, McDonnell Douglas, General Electric and Grumman
Aerospace, were eager to secure new government contracts
for large scale technological programmes. These allegiance
were critical politically when Nixon was fighting his
second election in 1972.35 Nixon's political advisors
recommended approval of the shuttle on the grounds that it
would provide employment directly in the skilled areas of
science and technology and in other non-skilled sectors via
the sub-contracting out of production. Indirect employment
would also benefit through the maintenance of local
economies in those areas that development and production
took place. Thus, NASA also employed what Latour has termed
the 'invisible detour'.36 Through a reinterpretation of the
shuttle as necessary to economic growth and scientific
advancement, NASA gained the advantage of translating a
particular interest into a much larger one: the "interests
of the nation" . Any threat to the former became a threat to
the latter.37
See chapter 6, fts 2-20.
Bruno Latour, Science in Action.
For a good example of this see chapter 6, fts 21-44.
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The kernel of many of these transformations can,
however, be located long before the space station was
shelved, in the subtle differences between the frames of
references of the Office of Manned Space Flight and the
other shapers of space policy. The Office of Manned Space
Flight was predominately interested in creating
technological capabilities, whereas all the other groups
focused their attention on establishing mission
objectives.38 The shuttle had originated from the former,
rather than the latter. With no specific mission to tailor
the technology to, justifications for the shuttle could be
constructed around a variety of rationales that would
convince other groups that its development would be in
their advantage. The means were transformed into the ends.
Rather than a method to achieve a particular goal, new
capabilities and the possibility of economic and routine
access to space, were turned into objectives in themselves.
The purpose of the technology was, therefore, shaped
through the negotiations of different interest groups. Its
function, a manifestation of the convergence of those
interests. As the goals of the technology changed, so did
its requirements and, thus, its specifications and
configuration. The very content of the shuttle was shaped
by negotiation. This was effectively demonstrated in NASA's
"allegiance" with the US Air Force. Once the goals of the
See chapter 2, fts 48-49.
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shuttle changed, NASA needed Air Force support to bolster
it position. For its patronage, the Air Force demanded
certain key requirements: specific, crossrange capability,
lifting capability and payload bay capacity. All were
incorporated and each altered wing shape, engine thrust and
orbiter size.39 In tandem with the Air Force, certain parts
of the White House bureaucracy also had a significant
impact on the shuttle's form. The key impediment to NASA's
plans was development costs. Scepticism within the
political arena over NASA's requests for a multi-billion
dollar investment in new space technology was evident. The
Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and
Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee,
all demonstrated and acted upon their apprehensions over
the costs associated with the agency's proposals.
Misgivings were not just centred within the White House.
Vocal opponents within Congress also attempted to focus an
anti-shuttle campaign and mobilized enough opposition to
halt the programme. Activation of a project on the size and
scale that NASA envisaged was, therefore, interrupted by a
political will to stem public spending and to check NASA's
intangible justifications for a $20 billion investment in
new technology. The result was a radical change in the
configuration of NASA's shuttle from its original two stage
See chapter 3, fts 56-65.
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design to an orbiter incorporating an expendable fuel tank
and two solid fuelled rocket boosters.40
Negotiation was, therefore, a fundamental part of the
shaping process: necessary to maintain confidence in, and
secure funding for, the project. Opposition to the shuttle
programme existed at the highest levels of government.
Without the defence of other vital power allies, NASA could
not have put in place the foundations of the sociotechnical
order and from these foundations construct the gargantuan
assemblage that formed the shuttle. The convergence of
NASA's own organizational interests with the interests of
other parties thus helped shape both the shuttle's
composition and its utility.
It would be a mistake to presume, however, that
interests and negotiation were only involved in matters of
scale and that decisions on matters of detail were based on
technical criteria alone. NASA was not itself a homogeneous
entity and individuals and groups within the organization,
sought to locate themselves in positions that would render
them indispensable to the system. Large organizations, like
NASA, can be seen as a conglomeration of "political
communities" each with their own culture and distinct ways
of thinking about the way the organization's missions
should be conducted. Thus, each community will not only
have a notion of its own role, but will also form notions
See chapter 3, fts 69-82.
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about the roles of other communities within the
organization. The essence of an organization, and the
technology it produces, can then be defined and redefined
through the ideological and political struggles that occur
within the organization amongst its own members.41
At the start of the shuttle programme roles within
NASA were not well defined, so during the design process
each Center attempted to carve out its niche of the
business. The manifestation of struggles for proprietary
control over technique, knowledge, expertise and even the
artifact itself, was an intrinsic ingredient of
technological development and change. Confrontation between
the NASA Centers usually revolved around particular
technologies or areas of technical knowledge. This process
of negotiating jurisdiction boundaries around artifacts or
facts among professional groups has been observed as a
technique used to distinguish their work from others within
similar fields.42
Members at Johnson tried to gain ownership of the
programme by proposing a small interim shuttle that would
serve as a test project for the larger version. Their
strategy was simple; if successful, Johnson would have
built up the necessary expertise to gain control over the
James Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New
York, McGraw-Hill Book Co, 1967); Theo Farrell, Weapons Without a Cause.
Anne Kerr, Sarah Cunningham-Burley, Amanda Amos, 'The New Genetics: Professionals Discursive
Boundaries,' The Sociological Review 45, (May, 1997), pp 279-303.
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development of larger shuttle at a later date.43 Although
NASA headquarters dismissed the idea, within its own ranks
brewed another struggle between Dale Myers, Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight (and former director
of Rockwell) and Marshall's past director Wernher von
Braun, who had been moved to a headquarters position. Each
put forward ideas on phasing the shuttle programme, in the
event of a funding shortfall. Myers, who through Rockwell
had strong ties to Johnson, proposed an orbiter-first
approach, whereas Von Braun, because of his allegiance to
Marshall, favoured a booster-first approach.44 Technical
justifications were forwarded for both methods, but each
was shaped by the perspectives and interests of the
respective Centers. The coalition of interests was also
pivotal in the building of the shuttle's main engines.
Despite concerns voiced within NASA over the engine design
proposed by Rocketdyne, the company was able to secure the
resources to build it because of its close associations
with Marshall.45 Marshall, because of its expertise in the
field of rocketry, also managed to persuade the Office of








design was superior to the gas generator, in spite of
disagreement emanating from Johnson.46
Interests and goals thus crossed the social scale;
nevertheless, they were, in themselves, shaped by the
historical and structural conditions within which those
that create them reside. The quest for space arose from the
post-war economic boom, the escalation of the Cold War, and
the growth of the technocratic state.47 The shuttle was a
product of these conditions, but it emerged during a period
of transition. The history of the twenty years after 1973
is that of instability, crisis and the formation of a
different role of government and state. The twin plagues of
inflation and unemployment, brought forth the philosophy of
the "free-marketeers", which advocated the rolling back of
the state.48 In parallel, the activities of science and
technology were beginning to be viewed with suspicion and
even trepidation. Protest grew in intensity and through
environmentalism gained a platform to voice their concerns
about the catastrophic potentials of scientific and
technological progress.49 For NASA, these shifts resulted
in the shuttle becoming more closely aligned with the
See chapter 4, fts 25-34.
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military. Although privatization did make the political
agenda in the 1970s,50 the redefinition of the shuttle as
a national security asset best suited this change of
ideological position.51
The above analysis has thus argued that social contexts
were instrumental to the shaping of NASA's shuttle.
However, to feature social contexts alone is insufficient.
The shuttle was, above all, a physical artifact that had to
work in the material world: a world that functioned
independently from the human realm and frequently outside
of its command. So it is worth noting Walter Vincenti's
observation that:
We should not, in our enthusiasm for social
shaping (or construction) of technology, take . ..
technical shaping as incidental if we want to
understand technological change in all its
fascinating complexity.52
The shuttle builders could not decide which machines to
build without some idea of how they were going to work.
Hence, there must be some grounds for accepting that
certain representations of the material world approach
See chapter 9, ft 6.
See chapter 8.
Walter Vincenti, 'The Technical Shaping of Technology: Real world Constraints and Technical
Logic in Edison's Electrical Lighting System,' Social Studies of Science (August 1995), pp
553-574.
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"reality"; for, as Serigo Sismondo has suggested, if they
did not, then the world of representations would, in
themselves, be autonomous of the material world that they
aimed to explain.53 In the fabrication of the shuttle both
its form and performance had to conform to conditions
produced by the material worlds within which it had to
function. If conformity was not achieved then the
technologies did not work. Thus, the actualization of
technological potentialities had a propensity to stabilize
around the physical processes involved in their
functioning.54 The choices available in design decisions
were constrained by the material world: constraints that
inexorably hemmed the engineers in; limited their room for
manoeuvre; and reduced the possibilities. Ergo, material
representations were important shapers of engineering
solutions .55
A crucial part of engineering practice was the capture
of material agency: the task of determining the conditions
of "proper functioning." Design decisions concerning
propulsion had to contend with the force of the Earth's
gravitational pull. Together the boosters and the engines
had to accelerate the shuttle to a velocity of over 17 000
Serigo Sismondo, Science Without Myth: On Constructions of Reality and Social Knowledge (New
York, State University of New York Press, 1996), chapter 2.
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miles per hour to overcome the Earth's gravitational pull
and reach NASA's specified orbit.56 Similarly, both the
reaction control system and the orbital manoeuvring system
had to produce specific delta velocities so that the
shuttle could: be inserted into an orbital plane, maintain
orbit, change its pitch, roll and yaw while in orbit, and
be slowed down so that it would fall back to Earth.57 For
the designers, these criteria were unconditional. If they
were not achieved then the technologies would not perform
the required functions; they would not work. The material
world, as represented by Newtonian physics, compelled the
use of the rocket engine. This is not to say that the
rocket engine will, for all time, be the sole method of
propulsion able to reach and operate within space; just
that when decisions were being made for the shuttle's
propulsion systems, the rocket engine was the only solution
to the problem of generating such high energy outputs.
The physics of getting to space also directed NASA and
contractor engineers to reduce as far as possible, the
shuttle's mass. For the main engines this meant a major
change in structural design via a move away from bolts and
flanges to welded constructions. On the external tank it
drove the thickness of the aluminum walls. In the area of
thermal protection, it was an important factor in the
See chapter 4, ft 4.
See chapter 4, ft's 72, 82.
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selection of a ceramic system over a metallic one. It was
one of the primary reasons for the removal of the orbiter's
jet engines.58 Mass growth concerns also stripped the
shuttle of many of the instrumentations required by Kennedy
for ease of checkout and turnaround operations.59
Nonetheless the possibilities of reducing total system mass
were limited. State of the art in material technologies,
structural design and fabrication techniques in the 1970s
were not sufficiently advanced to offset all the problems
of mass ratio. To launch more than just a rocket engine
into space NASA had to adopt some form of staging
technique, which is why all the shuttle configurations
considered, had at least two separate stages. These, of
course, are only a few examples, used to illustrate a
general point. The relationships between, gravity, air
resistance, momentum and mass, were so vital that almost
every sub-system was shaped by them in some way.
Though the delta winged orbiter was essentially a
design based on NASA's "need" to accommodate Air Force
interests, it also became evident that the wing designers
had to capture two kinds of physical forces, lift and drag;
as well as profile the wing for optimum aerodynamic
stability, control and manoeuvrability.60 These criteria
See chapter 4.
See Chapter 9, fts 55-60.
See chapter 4, fts 129-140.
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were predominant shapers of the orbiter's wing and blended
with the political decision to produce the delta
configuration. Aerodynamic environments also played a
pivotal role in shaping many of the shuttle's other sub¬
systems. For example, the length and diameter of the
external tank, as well as the shape of its nose were all
influenced by predictions of the aerodynamic loads produced
during ascent. Furthermore, the configuration, surface and
structural integrity of the thermal protection system were
determined, to a large extent, by models in the
aerodynamics and aerothermodynamics of reentry, as well as
ascent.61
In each of these case, and in many others, both
function and form had to comply with conditions produced by
the material worlds within which the technology was to
operate. Thus, a crucial element of engineering practice
was the capture of material agency. It would be wrong to
assume that the interplay between material agency and human
agency followed a simple linear mechanism. The contours of
the material world were not always fully known in advance:
the shape of the machine, how it would perform, and the
environment within which it was to operate, were
continually being modified and explained through
engineering and scientific practice. Problems invariably
arose and their solutions had to be continually discovered.
See chapter 7, fts 145-157.
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Fabrication thus involved a 'dance of agency'; a
dialectical interaction between the material and human
worlds .62
The building of the shuttle's main engines provided a
good illustration of this exchange between material an
human agency.63 Constant intervention was an inherent facet
of engine construction. The original design failed to
capture material agency successfully; it did not perform as
intended. During fabrication and testing, the engine design
threw up a myriad of different problems as various failures
were exposed. Thus, the dance of agency was enacted. The
parts were assembled, the machine was switched on, the
engineers observed and monitored, and when the machine
malfunctioned the engineers had to modify their
understanding of how the engine worked, find solutions to
the failures and then redesign and retest the machinery.
Due to the complexity of the technology, however, the
solutions were not always apparent; the machine did not
give up its inner workings easily. Failures tended to
reappear and/or become redefined; and in the case of the
turbo-machinery, eventually become accepted as an innate
aspect of the design.
The shuttle's main engines were not, however, an
isolated example. In every case detailed, the technology
Andrew Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science (Chicago, The University
of Chicago Press, 1995).
See chapter 7, fts 33-84.
391
never functioned as expected, nor did the predictions or
models of the material world remain completely fixed. Far
from being an un-problematic progression of design,
development and operation, the formation of the shuttle was
a messy practice strewn with intricacy and uncertainty. The
actors involved in its fabrication often ventured into
unknown territory, and as they did so, their activities
embraced many possible scenarios. Social values then can
also surrounded the meaning of the shuttle. The "detailed
facts" about its workings, can in themselves be seen as
social constructs. Disparate interests, opposing knowledge
claims, dispute and controversy often resulted in a
seemingly unambiguous thing becoming several different
things at once, dependant upon a multiplicity of human
"viewpoints". What, on the surface, appeared as a solid or
fixed object was frequently open to "interpretative
flexibility", where a variety of interpretations formed
around the purpose of the technology or about its
functioning. For different social groups the shuttle as a
whole and in its parts, housed radically different
meanings.64 This fluidity of interpretation was especially
pronounced during technological testing.
64
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Testing performs a vital role in the development,
fabrication and operation of technology. It establishes
whether a concept is feasible by revealing faults within
the design; it forms a general confidence that the
technology will work within its functioning environment;
and it certifies that the technology will work consistently
over a specified amount of time. Testing is thus the formal
method of specification and identification of how the
technology will perform, is performing, or has performed.65
In technically complex projects, like the shuttle,
many different groups of engineers are involved in the
testing processes. All the components are, at first
separated and tested in isolation, before being integrated
into the system as a whole. As with other elements of the
programme, therefore, testing was a process of negotiation:
between groups of engineers, between engineers and
managers, and between the engineers and the technology. The
shuttle engineers pushed for the maximum technical
performance from the components for which they were
responsible. This frequently resulted technical problems
and failures. Thus, during testing, the technical
specifications were open to negotiation. Development of the
shuttle's main engines is a good example of this process in
action. Modification of the hardware was not the only
Trevor Pinch, 'Testing - One, two, Three ... Testing!: Towards a Sociology of Testing,'
Science, Technology, and Human Values (Winter, 1993), pp 25-41.
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action to result from the emergence of failures during the
testing process. The specifications of many of the
components were also changed. The design goal 27 000
seconds running time could not be obtained with either the
turbine blades or the engine nozzle and both were reduced
to 5 000 seconds and 12 000 seconds respectively. Indeed,
because of these problems and others, the engine design
life was reduced to 15 000 seconds running time: a major
change of systems design, which had an adverse impact on
the number of flights and, therefore, on the justifications
of the programme as a whole.65
Pickering see this "goal modification" as part of the
dance of agency. He argues that goals emerge from practice:
that machines serve as the surface of emergence for the
goals of practice and, therefore, human intentions. Thus,
a crucial part of building machines is the process of
"tuning" in which goals are transformed and "dictated" too
by the functioning of the machine. In the struggles with
material agency, plans and goals are always liable to
revision.67 Examples of this process of tuning are
scattered throughout the shuttle's history. As knowledge
about the "actual" functioning of the machines was
constructed, negotiation about the goals of the parts, and
the whole, followed.
See chapter 7, fts
Andrew Pickering, The Mangle of Practice
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The shuttle's main engines also provide a good example
of another dimension to testing: that of replication. In
chapter 7 it was shown that the engineers had to modify
their testing practices from constructing theoretical
models of how the engine worked to building up empirical
knowledge from hardware failures. However, because of the
integrated nature of the engine, the location of failure,
or the cause, was not always possible to find and, thus,
relied on engineering judgement about how the engine
worked. Continuous problems with the valves, bearings and
the pumps illustrate this well. Solutions to the initial
failures were implemented, the engines were tested again,
they appeared to work, but then failed again at a latter
date. Determining the cause of failure was thus a complex
matter: especially when the failure did not occur with
regularity. Problems with the engines heat exchanger also
highlighted the difficulty of replication. A fire in one
engine was believed to be caused by a leak in the heat
exchanger, but in isolated tests on the component the
engineers could not replicate the failure and, therefore,
not determine the cause. It was not until two years later
that they discovered Rocketdyne had been constructing the
part from "below specification" materials. The heat
exchangers that the engineers had been testing were not the
same as the one on the engine itself.
Confidence that the shuttle would work was reached
gradually, through a succession of "successful" tests taken
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together. However, the knowledge accrued through testing
was invariably open to dispute and the value of the
results, and the accuracy of the measurements, were often
open to question.58 The discussions on eliminating the
obiter's jet engines, detailed in chapter 4, was one such
controversy. Those within NASA that suggested the move,
were confident that the orbiter could land safely without
jet engines because of their past experiences with bringing
spacecraft back to Earth. Others, however, questioned these
judgements. Bringing a space capsule back down to land in
ocean, within a 200 mile radius target, was a lot different
from landing an orbiter on a mile long runway strip.
Similarity relationships and similitude requirements,
thus, lay at the heart of testing.69 Depending on the
operational environment, certain tests could only be
accomplished through the use of scale models in artificial
conditions created from theoretical assumptions, empirical
knowledge, engineering judgement and a reliance on
instrumentation. Some subsystems, therefore, did not
undergo an "actual test" until the shuttle flew as a whole
for the first time. Thermal protection and aerodynamic
design both fell into this category. The arc tests on the
Donald MacKenzie, 'From Kwajalein to Armageddon? Testing and the Social Construction of
Missile Accuracy,' David Gooding, Trevor Pinch, Simon Schaffer, (ed) The Use of Experiment:
Studies in the Natural Sciences (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Ibid; Donald MacKenzie, 'How do we Know the Properties of Artifacts? Applying the Sociology
of Knowledge to Technology,' Robert Fox, (ed) Technological Change; Trevor Pinch, 'Testing -
One, two, Three ... Testing!: Towards a Sociology of Testing,' Science, Technology, and
Human Values (Winter, 1993 ) , pp 25-41; Walter Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know
It especially chapter 5.
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thermal protection system, although an indicator of heat
resistance, did not represent the total operational
environment through which the system had to work. In
addition to the arc tests, NASA's engineers had to simulate
the complex air flows of reentry: the most difficult of
which was boundary-layer transitions from laminar to
turbulent flows. Recreating turbulent flows in the
laboratory was not an easy task, because of their chaotic
nature. Similitude requirements were, therefore, difficult
to meet and the "validity" of results depended upon the
acceptance of the engineering community about the claims of
the similarity relationship. This acceptance only came
after controversy. There was a concern within NASA that the
sheer amount of data coming from the wind tunnel tests and
computer models was hindering the analysis. Only after a
minor investigation by senior management was confidence
restored.70
Negotiation about the operational environment was,
therefore, a pervasive part of the testing process. Results
accrued through one set of tests did not always correspond
with results from another set of tests. This could be
clearly seen with the contention that arose about the
structural integrity of the thermal protection tiles.
Confidence in the tile systems was in serious doubt after
"refined" aerodynamic and aerothermodynamics data indicated
See chapter 7, fts 114-135.
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that the reentry and ascent environments were far more
severe that the tiles had been designed for. The "pull-
test", initiated by Kennedy, were an attempt to restore
this confidence, but the final result was a major redesign
of the tiles.71
Above I discussed the impact of material agency on the
shaping of the technology. However, the influence of
material agency reaches beyond the shaping of technical
matters. Synchronous with technological change is social
change. Large, complex technologies, like the shuttle, are
not just simple tools that can be introduced without wider
social consequences. In their modes of operation,
gargantuan sociotechnical assemblages require changes in
human practice, philosophy, culture and politics.72 The
operation of the shuttle stood in direct opposition to the
way NASA had originally been organized, and the way in
which that organization had worked.73 NASA's members had to
adapt to a new environment that stressed routine and
economic operations in space. In effect, the shuttle
71
73
See chapter 7, fts 140-156.
Mesthene Emmanuel, Technological Change: Its Impact on Man and Society (Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1970); Robert Heilbroner, 'Do Machines Make
History?' Technology and Culture (July, 1967); William Ogburn, On Culture and Social Change:
Selected Papers O. Duncan, (ed) (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1964).
See chapter 9
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reprogrammed its environment to suit the special conditions
of its own operation. Reusability, hardware life and
turnaround procedures, were all new to NASA. Together they
influenced a change in philosophy and practice, especially
at Kennedy. Whereas all of NASA's previous launches could
all be treated unique events, the shuttle necessitated
standardization and uniformity: a production line approach
that emphasized costs and schedule.
In the process of planning and preparation for the
shuttle's operational phase, NASA attempted to emulate the
commercial airliners mode of operations. Although
unsuccessful, what this led to was an impression that the
shuttle would operate like a commercial airline. Many
within NASA were unconvinced, and when Columbia finally
arrived at Kennedy, it confirmed for them that the shuttle
was going to be anything but routine. The "reality" and the
"myth" collided. This collision led to the growth of
antagonism between managers and engineers. NASA's higher
echelons, for political reasons, were pushing to get the
cost-per-flight down, which meant raising the amount of
flights per year and standardizing the turnaround process.
However, NASA and contractor engineers were primarily
concern with the physics of failure. Their engineering
culture dictated that they had to know why each failure
occurred, no matter how small, and eliminate its cause. In
addition, NASA's engineering culture embraced a penchant
for improvement. NASA's administrators, thus, had
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difficulty in stopping the engineers from "tinkering" with
the machine. The new technology, then, did not totally
dominate. NASA's existing culture and practices continued
in friction with the machine's operational requirements.
Technology's impact on the sociotechnical order,
however, also occurred prior to any use and long before the
machine was put into operation. It took place as a
consequence of fabrication. Once an individual,
organization or artifact was incorporated into the
sociotechnical assemblage, it was restructured to conform
to its modes of practice; it became an active part of the
entire system.74 Hence, social change occurred at the start
of technological creation, because the very activity of
design, development and fabrication entailed the
organization of people and things in a specific form.
Chapter 5 detailed some of the organizational and
management changes that occurred at the start of the
shuttle's development. As was shown, NASA's upper
management considered that the character of the shuttle was
very different from that of Apollo, so required a different
type of management structure. During Apollo the spacecraft
and the booster were treated with equal importance and the
organizational structure reflected that. With the arrival
of the shuttle, the orbiter (spacecraft) rose in status to
Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political
Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1978); Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man:
Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd,
1964).
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stand above the booster. The reason behind this was the
technical nature of the orbiter: a far more complex system
than NASA had ever built before, the orbiter's development
required an intricate means of control over sub-systems
integration. Systems integration, thus, went hand in hand
with orbiter development and fabrication. What this
effectively translated into was Johnson, the Center in
charge of the orbiter, and Rockwell, the contractor
selected to build the orbiter, taking overall control of
the programme.
With increased complexity, however, comes the
possibility of a 'crisis of control'.75 The problem of
"autonomous" technology lies in the understanding of
complexity. Complexity and the uncertainty that arises from
it has been described as the 'soul' of technology.76
Specialization and fragmentation entailed the concentration
of expertise at the level of the sub-system. Hence, because
of the millions of interlocking parts, no one person or
constituency had an absolute understanding of how the
technological system worked as a whole. The members of the
technological order only had a limited knowledge of their
artificial environment. The higher echelons of the
sociotechnical assemblage thus entrusted the particulars to
the lower echelons and the lower echelons credited the
7 5
Thomas Hughes, 'Managing Complexity: Interdisciplinary Advisory Committees,' Robert Fox, (ed)
Technological Change pp 229-245.
Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology.
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highest with an understanding of the universal. Each,
however, deceived the other. The goals of the assemblage's
elite could only be realized through the collective
cooperation of its lower levels, who were primarily
concerned with the preservation of their own objectives.77
What this reconstructed history has clearly shown then, is
that technological development and change does not follow
a predictable or "natural" path; nor is it the result of a
unilinear exchange between science and technology.
Technological change is diverse, unpredictable and
contradictory. In the creation this large technological
systems a variety of organizations, individuals and things
were enrolled into a range of associations, which were
continually being enacted and reenacted. The composition,
function and purpose of the sociotechnical assemblage was
not fixed, but dynamic. Intended and unintended
consequences, domino effects, and uncertainty were all part
of design, development, fabrication and operation process.
Indeed the technology and the social organization were so
complex that the most interesting thing about the shuttle's
history is not that the machine failed, as in the case of
Challenger, but that it actually worked at all.





The angle between a reference line fixed with respect
to an airframe and a line in the direction of movement
of the aircraft.
Attitude:
The position or orientation of an aircraft,
spacecraft, or other object, either in motion or at
rest, as determined by the relationship between its
axes and some reference line or plane.
Azimuth:
True launch heading measured clockwise from 0 degrees
north.
Boil-off:
Cryogenic fuels have very low boiling points and must
be kept extremely cold to avoid evaporation. It is the
loss of these fuels through evaporation that is know
as boil-off.
Centre of Gravity:
The point at which the entire weight of a body may be
considered as concentrated so that if supported at
this point the body would remain in equilibrium in any
position.
Sources: McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co,
Fifth Edition, 1982); Sykes J.B. (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary (London, Guild
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Control (New York, John Wiley & Sons Inc, Second Edition, 1982); Kermode A.C. An Introduction
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American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Inc, 1984); Vincenti Walter. What
Engineers Know and How They Know It: Analytical Studies from Aeronautical History (Baltimore,
The John Hopkins University Press, 1993); Dutton Lyn. de Garis David. Harding Richard.
Military Space (London, Brassey's UK, 1990); GAO. Space Transportation Systems: Past,
Present, Future May 27, 1975 (General Accounting Office Distribution Center, Washington DC);
Gray Mike. Angle of Attack: Harrison Storm and the Race to the Moon (New York, London, W.W.
Norton & Company, 1992).
403
Dynamic Instability:
A complicated phenomenon in which a body oscillates
about its equilibrium condition with ever-increasing
amplitude.
Elevon:
A control surface which acts like a combination of an
aircraft elevator and aileron, controlling pitch and
roll.
Empennage:
An arrangement of stabilizing surfaces on the tail of
an aircraft.
Flange:
A radially projecting or flat collar, or rim, used to
strengthen an object or attach it to another object.
Hypersonic:
Refers to speeds above Mach 5; five times the speed of
sound.
Lift/Drag Ratio:
Lift is what keeps an aeroplane in the air. To obtain
lift the wing must be propelled through the air at a
definite velocity and it must be set at a definite
angle of attack to the flow of air past it. Wing shape
and angle of attack, therefore, determine the lift
coefficient. Lift can only be obtained however, at the
expense of a certain amount of drag. This relationship
can be plotted and is known as a lift/drag ratio
curve.
Mach:
The term used to describe the speed of objects
relative to the speed of sound.
Mach Number:
In fluid mechanics the Mach number is defined as the
ratio v/c of the free stream velocity, v, to the
velocity of sound, c, in the fluid at the same
conditions, such as temperature and pressure. Mach
number is also the ratio of the inertia force of the
fluid to the force of compressibility. A body moving
through the fluid at subsonic speeds is preceded by a
region of gradually varying density and pressure that
controls the flow around the body. At Mach numbers
equal to or greater than unity the gradual transition
of pressure cannot exist and shock waves form at




A chamber or pipe that contains a number of inlets and
outlets to distribute fluid and gases to and from an
engine.
Mass Ratio:
A design parameter, which relates to the total mass of
a launch vehicle at ignition over its final mass at
burn-out.
POGO:
A situation of coupled oscillations between a vehicle
propellant feed system and the propulsion system.
Nautical Mile:
A unit of distance used principally in navigation.
Equal to 1.15 statute miles.
Near-Earth-Orbit:
Generally considered to be between 100 and 400
nautical miles, while far-earth-orbits reach out to
1000 nautical miles or higher.
Payload:
A specific complement of instruments, space equipment
and support hardware carried aloft to accomplish a
mission or discrete activity in space.
Prandtl-Meyer Expansion Angle:
Related to the Prandti-Meyer expansion fan, which is
a steady planar compressible fluid flow that occurs
only at supersonic speeds.
Regenerative cooling:
A rocket engine cooling system which comprises of a
jacket around the combustion chamber and nozzle
through which one of the propellants (liquid hydrogen
or liquid oxygen) is pumped through passages in the
jacket to keep the combustion chamber walls cool. The
heat absorbed by the coolant is ultimately injected
back into the chamber.
Reynolds number:
The Reynolds number is defined as Re= UL/v, where U is
the free-steam speed, L a characteristic length of the
body and v is the kinematic viscosity. The Reynolds
number is significant in the design of any system in
which the effect of viscosity is important in
controlling the velocities or the flow pattern.
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Specific Impulse:
Specific impulse is defined as the thrust produced per
unit of mass of propellant per second.
Subsonic:
Relating to speeds less than that of sound.
Supersonic:
Relating to speeds greater than that of sound.
Torque:
Any force that causes rotation.
Transpirational cooling:
A rocket engine cooling system in which cooling is
accomplished by layering a film of coolant (liquid
oxygen or liquid hydrogen) along the surface of the
combustion chamber and nozzle. Disruptions in the film
are renewed by injecting more coolant to reform the
film.
Trim:
The attitude of an aircraft in flight when a pilot
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